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Abstract
Why do militaries shift their loyalty from authoritarian regimes in some instances
of anti-regime protests and not others, and why do these shifts sometimes lead to
democratic change? These questions are crucial for understanding the role of the military
in democratization, given competing expectations in the literatures on civil-military
relations, pacted transitions, and civil resistance. They are also important for
understanding the outcomes of protests and other nonviolent campaigns for regime
change, a topic of increased attention in recent years. To answer them, I propose an
argument rooted in the bases of military authority. Militaries are delegated authority by
regimes and gain authority by virtue of their functional role in providing societal security
and stability. However, regimes often structure delegation to protect themselves at the
expense of military functional capacity. Their use of some coup-proofing strategies
introduces tensions between a military’s delegated and functional authority. When mass
anti-regime protests challenge regime legitimacy, I argue that the military is more likely
to choose to preserve its functional authority (rather than rely on the regime’s delegated
authority) by shifting loyalty. The likelihood of loyalty shifts is also affected by the
protest movement and whether it is committed to nonviolence and widely supported and
a better source of military authority. Using this argument, I explain military loyalty shifts
and their types, defined according to the extent and quality of the military organization’s
involvement. I then explain the relationship between types of shifts and democratization,
ii

arguing that democratic change is more likely when military loyalty shifts are
fragmented. In these cases, the military acts in favor of regime change, but is less able to
exercise influence over the transition compared to militaries that defect as unified
organizations. To test this argument, I use new data on military responses to all major
anti-regime protest movements from 1946 to 2015. I undertake a large-n, statistical
analysis, use methods of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and examine three
cases to assess support for my argument and its observable implications.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION
Militaries have important effects on political change. What effects they have,
though, is contested. The civil-military relations literature has generally held that military
involvement in politics has a deleterious impact on democracy. The literature on pacted
democracy, however, claims that military involvement can be key to democratization.
Recent findings in analyses of civil resistance also suggest that military loyalty shifts are
key to successful anti-authoritarian protests. Is military politicization a topic and hazard
that should be avoided at all costs? Or can it sometimes lead to successful
democratization? How can we best understand military defections and their impact on
post-protest political change?
The civil resistance literature has provided several examples where military
loyalty shifts accompanied successful anti-authoritarian regime protest movements. For
instance, military defections from President Suharto during protests in Indonesia in 1998 1
and President Khan in Pakistan in 1969 2 both achieved regime change followed by
democratic elections. Research on these and other civil resistance campaigns suggests
that unarmed civilians can overthrow autocrats in part because of regime security force

Mary P. Callahan, “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond,” Naval Postgraduate
School Occasional Paper 4 (1999): 15.
1

Arshad Javed Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan,” International Research
Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies 1 no. 8 (2015): 37.
2

1

loyalty shifts.3 Sometimes, though, protest movements do not gain military support and
that often leads to less successful results. The Chinese military was largely loyal during
the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, for instance, and the regime remained secure. 4
The long term impact of military support on democratization is also uncertain. In
Pakistan, the military declared martial law prior to elections and launched a coup less
than a decade after. 5
This empirical variation raises a number of questions that existing literatures on
the military in politics have a hard time answering. The civil-military relations literature
cannot explain why a military acting outside the authority delegated it by civilians
sometimes leads to democracy. The early pacted transitions scholarship and the recent
work on civil resistance show through their analyses of military involvement in
democratization that this understanding of militaries in politics is missing something.
However, while the importance of the military to civil resistance outcomes has been well
established, only recently have scholars begun to focus on explaining the military

Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence
State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004),” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39,
no. 3 (2006): 411-429; Zoltan Barany, “The Role of the Military,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011):
24-35; Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
3

B. Shelley, “Protest and Globalization: Media, Symbols, and Audience in the Drama of Democratization,”
Democratization 8, no. 4 (2001): 160.
4

Naghman Chaudhry, “Pakistan’s First Military Coup,” Naval Postgraduate School thesis (2012), 74;
Steven I. Wilkinson, “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan,”
Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000): 208.
5

2

responses.6 Further, there has been little effort to understand the implications of military
loyalty shifts for a country’s civil-military relations and democratization prospects.
In this dissertation, I provide a new framework for understanding military
involvement in political change that addresses these questions. I focus on two key sources
of military authority, that delegated by the regime and that produced by its functional
capacity. I argue that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty from authoritarian regimes
to anti-regime protesters when regimes have threatened them. Regime failure to maintain
popular support threatens delegated authority, and if the regime has used coup-proofing
that threatens functional authority, the military may defect. The likelihood of military
loyalty shifts is also affected by characteristics of the protest movement. If the movement
is nonviolent and widely supported, it is more likely to be seen as a better partner than the
regime for maintaining military authority. Finally, the type of military loyalty shift – in
particular, whether the military shifts loyalty as a united or fragmented organization –
impacts democratic outcomes. A fragmented military response is less likely to challenge
the new civilian regime.
The conflicting expectations of different literatures about the military’s role in
democratization motivated this study. I set out to understand the conditions under which a
military is more likely to use its leverage as guardian of the state to support protester-led

Holger Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
amid the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 1 (2015): 36-54; Terence Lee, Defect or Defend:
Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2014); Michael Makara, “Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring,” Defense and
Security Analysis 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-23; Julien Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: Military
Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo,” Democratization 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80; Philipp
M. Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection
during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” International Interactions 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-75; Sharon
Erickson Nepstad, “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3
(2013): 337-349.
6

3

regime change that results in democratization. I focus on two specific questions: 1) Why
do militaries shift their loyalty from non-democratic regimes in some instances of antiregime protests and not others? 2) Why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic
change?
My findings improve our understandings of the military in politics in two ways.
First, they spell out a novel logic for why the military (or parts of it) may shift loyalty
from a regime during some nonviolent regime challenges. Second, they demonstrate
reason to question the civil-military relations literature’s starting point that democracy
requires civilian control of the military regardless of the quality of civilians. Kohn, for
instance, argues that the normative goal is “…to make the military establishment
politically neutral, and to prevent or preclude any possibility of military intervention in
political life.”7 But I show that when a regime behaves in such a way as to lose popular
support and diminish functional capacities, political judgment by the military can, under
some circumstances, set the country on a more democratic path. I use the rest of this
chapter to establish this study’s place in existing work, briefly introduce my argument,
and preview the types of evidence I have collected in support of it.
The Military’s Political Impact and Democratization
Research on the role of the military in political change spans a number of fields,
including civil-military relations, democratization, and civil resistance. From above, this
scholarly work is in agreement that the military is an important political actor, but in
tension over whether the military can be supportive of democratic change. Civil-military
relations scholars view the civilian control of the military necessary for democratic
7

Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 141.

4

political systems as “…absolute and all-encompassing.”8 The pacted democracy literature
acknowledges a military may pose challenges to democratization, but points to cases
where the military and other elites supported democratic transitions to preserve their
interests. Research on civil resistance demonstrates the importance of nonelites in
political change, and that the response of militaries is often crucial for movements’
outcomes. Here, I further develop this theoretical puzzle. How might we understand
military support for peaceful political change given the harmful effects military
intervention in politics can have on democracy?
The civil-military relations literature’s principle concern with the military in
politics is whether or not the military is under civilian control, or the military acts within
the authority delegated it by civilians. Civilian control of the military is defined and
measured in a number of ways, from an absence of coups to military compliance with
civilian orders and civilian policymaking free from military influence.9 A key claim of
the literature is that democratic governance requires civilian control of the military, a
hierarchical and bureaucratic organization with coercive capabilities.10 As Croissant and
Kuehn state, “The very idea of democratic rule, understood as political participation and
control by the governed, presupposes that democratically-elected governments and
parliaments have the ability to decide policies without undue influence by nondemocratic

8

Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 142.

9

Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211-41.

Felipe Aguero, “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South
America,” International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (1998): 383-404.
10
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veto players such as the military.”11 Lack of civilian control threatens all aspects of
democracy, including elections, political rights, civil rights, and horizontal
accountability.12
Following this, democratization requires civilians control the military. Much
research centers on how transitioning democracies establish civilian control, especially
when militaries have exercised substantial political power in the authoritarian regimes.13
Militaries in these contexts are accustomed to acting politically and gaining or claiming
institutional and individual benefits.14 As powerful actors, militaries can exercise
significant influence over transitions from authoritarianism, making it difficult for
civilians in new democracies to establish control.15 In turn, new democracies that are
unable to establish civilian control suffer “...stagnation and regress in democratic
consolidation and sometimes even...democratic breakdown.”16
Overall, the literature concludes that military involvement in politics and
particularly the transition from authoritarianism threatens democratization. Even if the
military does not seize power, concerns remain regarding the role of the military in
Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New
Democracies,” Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (2009): 189.
11

Paul Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military
in Emerging Democracies,” Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 960.
12

Elizabeth P. Coughlan, “Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case,” Armed Forces and Society
24, no. 4 (1998): 519-33.
13

Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 141; Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coupism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” 935.
14

15

Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone (Princeton University Press, 1988).
Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in
Emerging Democracies,” 960.
16

6

democracy and its consolidation: “…will [the military] obey its civilian masters or will it
use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own
interests?”17 The field is skeptical that the military may help to bring about regime
change that is democratic, in contrast to the pacted transitions and civil resistance
literatures. It is thus a foil to my research because I seek to better understand the
conditions under which a military can support democratic change by supporting antiregime protesters.
The literature on pacted transitions to democracy also demonstrates the military
has impacts on political change. However, one of its major insights is that this impact is
potentially positive. Scholarly analyses of third wave transitions in Latin American and
Southern Europe conclude that splits between authoritarian regime hardliners and
softliners can lead to negotiations between regime and opposition elites, results in
strategic agreements, or pacts, for political change.18 In many cases, it is crucial that
among the softliners are military officers to support liberalization against potential coup
attempts by other regime elites.19 A military may believe its interest in a stable state with
a functioning government is best served by a new democratic regime; “[p]aradoxically
but predictably, democratic elections are thus often part of the extrication strategy of
military institutions that feel threatened by their prominent role in nondemocratic

17

Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 215.

Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
18

19

Ibid., 16-22.
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regimes.”20 Pacts can increase a military’s willingness to support democratization and
facilitate transitions by allowing the military to preserve its political, economic, or other
interests during the transition and under the new regime.21
As a powerful elite, the military can exercise great influence over pacts and the
transition from authoritarianism.22 Yet it can also facilitate the transition, in part because
it is an actor with a permanent institutional role, separate from any role in politics. In
some Latin American military regimes, for example, the military gave up power and
democratized so that it could return to the barracks.23 Militaries in those and other
transitions came to believe democratization was acceptable, especially when the
opposition was largely moderate and nonviolent and holding on to power would be costly
to the institution.24 On the basis of this research, the military may be supportive of
democratic transitions.
The civil resistance literature recognizes the role of the military in political
change through different means. Democratization in these analyses occurs not through
elite-led negotiations, but mobilized citizens pressuring authoritarian regimes and elites
20

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 67.
21

Bruce W. Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military (Praeger,
1996); Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23, no. 1
(1990): 1-21; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in
Brazil and Spain,” in Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future edited by Wayne
Seclher (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986): 175-215.
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” Issues in Democratic Consolidation:
The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (1992): 17-56.
22

Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991):
584.
23

24

John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead. Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transitions to
Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 445-72.

8

toward change. The military has long been recognized as an important elite in this regard.
According to Sharp, protesters should seek to remove the authoritarian regime’s pillars of
support, including the military, to increase their likelihood of success. 25 Analyses of
successful cases demonstrate that the military’s decision to shift support to the protesters
is often significant to these movements’ outcomes.26 Compared to violent campaigns,
civil resistance is more likely to achieve its aims in part because it is more likely to
generate military loyalty shifts.27 Nonviolent campaigns are 46 times more likely to
succeed when security force defections occur.28 This scholarship demonstrates the
military may support democratization when it chooses to support protest movements for
regime change.
In sum, these literatures address the military’s role in political change but reach
different conclusions about whether a role outside of civilian delegated authority can be
supportive of democracy. For the civil-military relations literature, the military must be
put under civilian control so it does not threaten the democratic transition or prevent
democratic consolidation. Yet civilian control may not be a necessary precursor to
democratic change, given the findings of the pact and civilian resistance literatures.
Recognizing militaries have sources of authority other than delegated challenges the
civil-military relations’ claim and is key to understanding why militaries sometimes
25

Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973).

Barany, “The Role of the Military”; Paul J. D’Anieri, “Explaining the Success and Failure of PostCommunist Revolutions,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 331-50; Rizal Sukma
“Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions,” in Military Engagement:
Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions edited by Dennis Blair
(Brookings Institution Press, 2013): 113-38.
26

27

Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.

28

Ibid., 22.
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support anti-regime protests, and when this support is more likely to lead to
democratization.
Existing Explanations of Military Loyalty Shifts
Though relatively nascent, a body of scholarship is developing in response to the
findings of Chenoweth and Stephan29 and others to explain military loyalty shifts during
popular challenges to authoritarian regimes. Here I briefly organize and summarize the
existing work, some of which I deal with in more detail in later chapters. The analyses all
focus to some extent on the impact of regime-military relations on military loyalty.
However, the cases they select for analysis lead to different accounts of how various
factors explain their outcomes of interest. I draw on some of this scholarship in making
my argument, but expand on its efforts in two ways: 1) I propose a more general
argument for the impact of regime control of the military, based in the sources of military
authority, and 2) I consider both the regime and the protest movement for their impacts
on these sources of authority. 30 My argument applies to and is explanatory of a wider
range of cases and outcomes as a consequence.
Some analyses focus on a regime’s provision of financial and political benefits
that become uncertain during challenges to its rule to explain military loyalty shifts at the
individual level. Regimes can incentivize loyalty, but individual soldiers will defect if
they believe the regime is at risk of falling. Nepstad makes this argument for military
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defections across the Arab Spring cases of Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. 31 The regimemilitary relationship here primarily affects individual soldiers’ motivations for disloyalty,
and defections occur as a series of individual loyalty shifts. However, it is unclear from
this explanation how such defections spread and to whom, and what might explain
variation across individual soldiers’ decisions.
Other explanations analyze defections as loyalty shifts by particular groups within
the military. These accounts are based largely on the Arab Spring or MENA cases, where
regimes structure the military in ways that incentivize loyalty on the basis of identity
group membership.32 In the face of mass protests, these militaries should exhibit in-group
loyalty and out-group defection, especially if the uprising is along ethnic lines. Even if ingroups are motivated to be disloyal, they will remain committed to regime strength
because they do not have a future apart from the regime.33 This is not always the case,
though, as demonstrated by the recent experience of Burundi. In the spring 2015 protests
against President Pierre Nkurunziza, it was his ally and fellow Hutu, Major General
Godefroid Niyombare, that spearheaded an attempt by dissident soldiers to prevent him
from attempting an unconstitutional third term.34
In some analyses, militaries (or parts of them) shift loyalty because the regimes
have used divide and rule tactics to create incentives for loyalty among the winners.
These regimes create loyalty ties rather than exploit existing identity links, and focus
31
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their efforts on the relatively small groups in the upper ranks that could most easily pose
a challenge to them – generating discontent in the rest of the military. Lee argues that use
of such strategies by President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and President Suharto
in Indonesia led the losing factions to defect in hopes of improving their professional
prospects and the military institution’s overall standing. 35 In these explanations, a
military shifts loyalty because of how the regime has structured the military organization
rather than individual concerns or group identities. Defections take the form of
significant, though often disunited, loyalty shifts.
Finally, some analyses explain loyalty shifts by the full military, such as observed
in Egypt 2011. Here, the focus tends to be on regime-military relations that provide for
military autonomy. The causal mechanism is not incentives to remain loyal, but
institutional capacity to defect. Albrecht points to segregation of the regime and military
in explaining Egyptian defections versus Syrian loyalty (though not acknowledging that
sections of the Syrian military did shift loyalty). 36 Lutscher makes a similar ability-based
argument, claiming that levels of force fragmentation make it easier for some militaries to
defect.37 These accounts give little attention to military motivations for disloyalty,
focusing instead on the ability of full militaries to defect. Such full defections, though
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highly consequential, are relatively uncommon; a military or parts of it may shift loyalty
in other ways.
Overall, existing explanations for military loyalty shifts in response to anti-regime
protests center on regime-military relations. Depending on the structure of these relations
and the incentives they generate, the military or parts of it will be motivated and/or able
to defect. The analyses’ specific arguments, though, depend in large part on case
selection. This limits their explanations to particular types, and perhaps instances, of
military loyalty shifts. Additionally, they mostly fail to address variation across protest
movements as a potential explanatory factor. This gap is in fact the motivation for
Morency-Laflamme’s recent study.38 In it, he argues that the decision of a military to
defect is determined by both the regime’s control policies (in particular, its use of
counterforces) and the opposition’s ability to provide credible promises regarding future
military interests. Empirically, it is a comparative case study limited to loyalty in Togo
1990-1993 and defections in Benin 1989-1990. Morency-Laflamme concludes that future
research should apply a framework of military and opposition characteristics to additional
cases.39
I propose an argument that brings together the existing explanations to understand
how the structure of regime-military relations and the characteristics of protest
movements impact the motivations and ability of the military to shift loyalty. I start by
recognizing that militaries respond to anti-regime protests in ways besides loyalty or
defection, with types of loyalty shifts that involve the military organization differently.
Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and
Togo.”
38
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As concerns strategies of regime control, I do not focus on one means of coup-proofing
over another (e.g. ethnic stacking versus counterbalancing), but consider them as a whole
for their effects on the military’s core interests and authority claims. Finally, I bring in
the protest movement by considering it as an alternative to the regime in the context of
challenges to the regime’s legitimacy and threats to the military’s sources of authority.
Military Authority and Defections
My argument follows the extant scholarship’s focus on regime-military relations,
but is rooted in the bases of military authority as affected by the regime and protesters.
Militaries gain authority in many ways, but two are especially consequential. First,
militaries are delegated authority by civilian leaders, and by extension, the population.
Second, militaries gain authority by virtue of their functional role in society, or their
involvement in the provision of order and stability. A military has maximum authority
when legitimate civilian leaders delegate it authority, and a secure state confirms its
functional capabilities.
However, civilian leaders, particularly autocrats, often structure delegation to
protect the regime at the expense of military functional capabilities. Personnel decisions
that reward loyalty over merit, counterbalancing using other security forces, and other
forms of coup-proofing compromise the military’s functional capacity and introduce
tensions between its delegated and functional authority. In other words, the military is
delegated authority by a regime that has hurt its capabilities and threatened its functional
authority. In these circumstances, the military’s delegated authority becomes especially
important, yet depends on the regime’s ability to maintain its power. When the regime
faces challenges culminating in mass protests against its rule, I argue that the military is
14

more likely to opt to preserve its functional authority by removing loyalty from the
regime or shifting loyalty to the protesters.
This logic follows existing work in arguing that regime-military relations impact
military responses to anti-regime protests. I go further by contending that particular forms
of regime control (such as coup-proofing) matter most because their impacts on
functional capacity affect the military’s authority. Militaries gain authority by virtue of
their capacity to create and maintain societal order, and thus both value and have
institutional interests in the conditions necessary for this.40 Mass protests against the
regime challenge its legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of the military’s delegated
authority. They also further call into question the regime’s support for military functional
capacity in providing for a secure society. The military has less delegated and functional
authority as a result of these regime-military relations in the context of mass protests, and
is more likely to shift loyalty.
My argument also gives special attention to the protesters, as the individuals and
groups to which the military may shift its loyalty. Because militaries are concerned with
both their delegated and functional sources of authority, it matters whether the protesters
are likely to be more legitimate (and thus a different source of delegated authority) and
better partners in providing for stability and security (and thus supportive of rather than a
threat to functional authority). The military is most likely to defect if the protesters are
committed to nonviolence and widely supported.
These factors may make overall loyalty shifts more likely. However, it is clear
from the cases noted at the beginning and of interest in the extant scholarship that
Martin C. Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power,” Latin American Research Review 10,
no. 3 (1975): 63-79.
40
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militaries often do not fully defect or fully remain loyal. Existing research tends to
broadly conceptualize both defections and loyalty, lumping together all significant shifts
and low level shifts with loyalty. The analyses of regime-military relations and defections
thus explain a limited amount of variation in military responses to anti-regime protests. In
this work, I leverage my argument’s various implications for military sources of authority
and the military as an organization to explain types of military loyalty shifts.
While military loyalty shifts are often crucial to the success of anti-regime protest
movements, their impacts on democratization are uncertain. Specifying the possible
military responses also helps me to explain when military shifts of support are more
likely to lead to democratic change. For this secondary outcome of interest, I argue that
democratization is more likely when military loyalty shifts are significant but fragmented.
In these cases, the military acts in favor of regime change, but is less able to exercise
influence over the transition compared to militaries that defect as unified organizations.
My argument generates the following general hypotheses:
Militaries will be more likely to shift loyalty from the regime when the regime has
threatened military functional and delegated authority.
Military loyalty shifts are more likely to lead to democratic outcomes when they
are significant but fragmented.
In later chapters, I further detail these hypotheses and their observable
implications and test them through regression analysis, qualitative comparative analysis,
and case studies.
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Empirical Strategy and Justification
My primary method of empirically evaluating this argument is a large-N crossnational statistical analysis. I collected quantitative data for my independent and
dependent variables for 154 cases of major anti-regime protests and use various
regression techniques to test my hypotheses while controlling for potential alternative
explanations or confounding factors. 41 The 154 cases that constitute my universe of
analysis are campaigns included in the Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) Data
Project.42 They are the dataset’s Category 4 episodes, defined as coordinated campaigns
with more than 1,000 observed participants and the goal of removing the incumbent
regime, from 1946-2015. Using MEC’s standards as a strategy for selecting my cases
ensures I test my argument on a wide range of anti-regime protest movements. It also
preempts the charge that I am only considering the sorts of protests where my argument
might be most likely to hold. I address possible problems with this strategy in Chapter
Three, but for now it is sufficient to note that the cases are comparable episodes of antiregime campaigns that vary across space and time. Further, their maximalist
categorization means they are the type of protests to which the military is likely to
respond, with important consequences.
I limit my study to nonviolent campaigns, for several reasons. First, nonviolent
and violent campaigns differ on many of the attributes I wish to hold more or less
constant in my analysis: the nature of the challenge they pose to the regime;43 their types
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and levels of participation;44 and their participants’ strategies.45 Including violent
campaigns would therefore complicate my analysis and conclusions. Second, my
argument applies to nonviolent campaigns, as the sorts of regime challenges likely to
offer the military an alternative in terms of authority. Violent campaigns by definition
threaten societal stability and security and thus military functional authority, and so I
would not expect loyalty shifts. In fact, Chenoweth and Stephan find that violent
campaigns are unlikely to generate security force defections. 46 While it would be
interesting to interrogate variation in military responses across such cases, I bracket that
research question for another study. Chenoweth and Stephan also find that defections
have less of an impact on the success of violent compared to nonviolent campaigns;47
consequently they are less inherently interesting in this context.
The results of the regression analyses suggest support for my argument and its
empirical expectations. Measures of coup-proofing increase the likelihood of defections,
as do measures related to the protest movement. The effects of these variables are greater
when I interact them, with each other (to assess conditional effects) and with other factors
that make the regime’s threats to military functional capacity more evident, such as recent
military defeat. The results also support my hypotheses related to types of military loyalty
shifts: greater threats to military functional authority are associated with higher level
loyalty shifts, mediated by the effects of coup-proofing on the military organization and
the role of the protest movement. Lastly, though military loyalty shifts have only small
44
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effects on democratization outcomes independent of campaign outcomes, fragmented
shifts consistently have a more positive impact than others.
I also use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to test my argument for military
loyalty shifts. Regression analyses of my full set of cases allows me to establish
relationships between my independent and dependent variables and compare their
strengths to standards of statistical significance. As I detail in Chapter Two, however, my
hypotheses imply that contingent combinations of variables produce loyalty shifts.
Basically, I argue that regime control strategies combine with protester characteristics to
produce threats to military authority, and these relationships are context-specific in their
effects on loyalty shifts. QCA uses Boolean algebra to assess such combinations and
determine conditions’ necessity and sufficiency for the outcomes. The results are in line
with my theoretical expectations, and make clear the strengths of a conjunctural approach
to analyzing causation. QCA is also appropriate for small- to medium- numbers of
observations. I use QCA after applying additional scope conditions to my universe of
cases, resulting in an especially comparable subset.
Lastly, I evaluate evidence for my arguments for loyalty shift and their impacts on
democratization through three case studies that I introduce below.
Introduction to the Case Studies
Chapters Six through Eight are case studies of major anti-regime protests in Mali
1990-1991, Bangladesh 1987-1990, and Peru 2000. They are tests of my theory because I
focus on the independent variables’ causal relationships with the dependent variables,
while identifying and examining mechanisms.48 I selected the three cases because they
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exhibit diverse values on the main explanatory variable of threats to military functional
authority. Through them, I test my argument across the range of variation in these
threats.49 The outcomes in the first stage of analysis – types of military loyalty shifts –
become diverse values on the explanatory variable for democratization outcomes. Case
studies involve in-depth research that leverages a variety of descriptive evidence for
causal inference.50 My observations for each case demonstrate the effects of regime
control and protester characteristics on military authority, and the military organization
on democracy, in ways I cannot measure or infer using probabilistic statistics or Boolean
analysis.
I summarize the main explanatory variable’s values, or the levels of threat, as well
as other relevant information across the cases in Table 1. In brief, threats to military
functional authority were greatest in Mali, where President Moussa Traore’s coupproofing compromised military capacities as evident in its loss to the Tuareg rebels. This
case therefore demonstrates how this level of threat can bring about united defections in
response to large protests. The Malian military leadership was then able to influence the
democratic transition through its role in the interim government.
The nature of threats to military functional authority were similar in Bangladesh
under President Hussain Muhammad Ershad and Peru under President Alberto Fujimori.
Both regimes exhibited personalist control, valuing regime security through personal
loyalty over military institutional concerns. This coup-proofing strategy weakened the
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military organizations and generated discontent among the non-favored factions. In
response to anti-Ershad protests, the Bangladesh military fragmented, with mostly junior
officers shifting loyalty against some senior generals. It remained disunited and out of
politics in the years after the regime’s fall. In Peru, Fujimori’s control did not extend into
the military’s efforts in the rural conflict against the Shining Path. Threats to military
functional authority were least in this case because the Peruvian military was functionally
effective. It had some authority on which to draw during the anti-Fujimori protests, and
only a small section of low-ranking officers and the rank and file shifted loyalty. The
military overall had little role in Fujimori’s overthrow and the subsequent political
transition.
The protest movements in the three cases do not have much independent effect on
the types of loyalty shifts. This in line with the findings of the other methods, protest size
in particular moderates the impact of levels of threat to military functional authority.
Large protests likely helped to bring about united defections in Mali, and might have
influenced the military responses in Bangladesh and Peru. However, the key factor for
the outcomes is functional threat level. In the course of research, I also uncovered
potential confounding variables. I note them here but ultimately conclude they do not
challenge the relationship between the explanatory factors and outcomes.

21

Table 1. Summary of case study arguments and findings
Mali

Bangladesh

Peru

Value on IV

Great threats to
military functional
authority (ICP, PCP,
recent loss)

Medium threats to
military functional
authority (PCP)

Low threats to
military functional
authority (PCP but
support in ongoing
conflict)

Role of
protest
movement

Large, diverse,
organized

Large, but major
divisions

Large, but less
sustained

Potential
confounds

Excessive repression
of protesters

Pre-existing military
factionalism; senior
military officials'
corruption

Long-term conflict;
Montesino's scandal
and senior military
officials' involvement

Outcome 1

United defections

Fragmented high level
shifts

Low level shifts

Outcome 2

Military-led
transition,
democratization

Military uninvolved
transition,
democratization

Military uninvolved
transition,
democratization

Other cases besides these three might also have qualified as diverse types,
according to Seawright and Gerring’s standards. I selected these three according to
criteria for influential cases as well. Within influential cases, they are crucial and least
likely because I use them to test whether “…the hypothesized relationship between X and
Y holds even though background factors (Z) predict otherwise.” 51 The cases involve
powerful militaries outside of civilian control that might not at first glance be expected to
support popular and nonviolent political change and democratization. They are also cases
for which there is sufficient information for research, but less has been written on
military responses and their importance for protest movements and political change. 52
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Theoretical and Methodological Contributions
This work brings together the literature on civil-military relations,
democratization, and civil resistance. It seeks to further our understanding of when a
military is more likely to support anti-authoritarian regime protesters and support
democratization. The military’s role in political change and democratic transitions has
long been considered by the democratization literature, but not in the context of antiregime protests, and in a mostly indirect way by the civil resistance literature. Further,
recent interest in military involvement in the Arab Spring and military intervention in a
number of Third Wave democracies has generated a new wave of civil-military relations
research.53 I look to contribute to this large and growing body of work.
I particularly look to challenge some of the civil-military relations field’s major
claims. Unlike the democratization and civil resistance literatures, which acknowledge
the military’s potential in supporting political change, the civil-military relations
literature holds that a politically active military undermines civilian control and the
prospects for democracy. The field is unable to explain why a military acting outside its
delegated authority can be supportive of democracy, given that the principle of civilian
control is “…civilians have a right to be wrong.” 54 My research demonstrates that in the
context of major protests against an illegitimate authoritarian regime, some forms of
military action can increase the likelihood of democratization. Further, the nature of
authoritarian regime control varies and impacts military responses to protests. Militaries
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that remove support from such regimes are acting politically, yet may also be supporting
democracy.
I argue that the authority delegated to a military from the regime is ultimately
rooted in the population, and that there is a distinction between this delegated authority
and a military’s functional authority. This distinction opens up the possibility that a
military acting outside its delegated authority and in favor of its functional authority can
lead to democratic political change. Through this argument, I develop and defend a more
nuanced view of the various impacts militaries have on politics – following evidence
from work on elite-and mass-led democratization that the military’s role can be crucial.
In doing so, I answer why a military might shift support from the regime to a protest
movement, and when these shifts might lead to democracy, against the expectations that a
military acting against regime control is consistently problematic for democratization.
I test my primary argument against three forms of evidence: large-N statistical
analysis; medium-N qualitative comparative analysis; and case studies. This combination
is valuable, given the relatively small number of observations in my universe of cases and
the need to both establish correlations and trace causality. They are also appropriate for
my argument. The statistical analysis allows me to assess the overall strength of my
explanatory variables’ relationship to the dependent variables. The qualitative
comparative analysis is fitting for the combinatorial nature of the causal conditions and
the outcomes. Finally, the case studies support the large-N and mid-range findings by
examining in more detail how variation in the regime’s threat to military functional
authority explains the extent of the military’s shift of support to the protest movement, as
well as how its response impacted post-campaign democracy.
24

As part my research, I developed a new dataset that collects and codes military
responses to all cases of mass anti-regime protests from 1946 to 2015. I describe the
categories of the response variable and my coding rules later in the dissertation. This
approach to understanding military loyalty shifts greatly expands the available data on
military defections, broadly conceptualized, and was necessary for the empirical
evaluation of my argument.
Policy Implications
Over the last decade, observers of democracy such as Freedom House have
expressed concern with a global decline in democratic rights and pace of democratic
expansion.55 At the same time, nonviolent campaigns for political change, though more
common, have been less likely to succeed.56 Given the finding that successful campaigns
are more likely than other forms of contention to lead to peaceful and stable
democratization, and the positive relationship between military loyalty shifts and
campaign success, this work has important implications for popular demands for
democracy. Understanding why some militaries may be more likely to shift their loyalty
from authoritarian regimes and how the form this shift takes impacts campaign success
and democratization is valuable knowledge for those engaged in civil resistance and those
who seek to support them.
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A related trend also of interest to policymakers is the decline in the number of
military coups.57 This development is viewed positively by observers of democracy and
civil-military relations. Coups are the clearest and most dramatic indicator of an absence
of civilian control of the military, and can be especially threatening to liberalizing or
newly democratic regimes. However, these observers may fail to recognize that a military
choosing to remain loyal to a civilian, authoritarian regime, in the context of major antiregime protests, is also a form of military political action. A military in this situation may
remain under civilian control, but in doing so support the regime’s efforts to repress and
frustrate the protesters’ demands for democratic change. My research’s theoretical
contributions challenge this narrow understanding.
National governments and regional and international organizations have been
deliberate in their efforts to reduce the likelihood of coups, by refusing to recognize
governments put in power by coups or halting aid or other benefits to militaries involved
in coups.58 Perhaps a better understanding of defections, as another form of military
political action, can provide an additional point of leverage for these actors over the
military with the goal of promoting democracy. My empirical findings show that military
action in this form – military support of protesters, through particular types of military
loyalty shifts – is important to democratization.
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Roadmap for the Dissertation
In Chapter Two, I develop my argument for military defections. I also describe
the main outcome of interest, types of military loyalty shifts, and explain how my
argument for general defections applies to shifts as they vary in terms of the military
organization’s involvement. I test the resulting hypotheses using statistical analyses of
quantitative data in Chapter Three. I test the argument as one of necessary and sufficient
conditions through qualitative comparative analysis in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five, I
present the argument for the impact of types of military loyalty shifts on democratization
outcomes, and then assess the empirical evidence for it with quantitative analyses.
Chapter Six through Eight are the case studies of Mali, Bangladesh, and Peru. I conclude
the dissertation with Chapter Nine.
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CHAPTER TWO: AUTHORITY THREATS AND MILITARY DEFECTIONS
In this chapter, I provide an argument for why some militaries shift their loyalty
from authoritarian regimes to anti-regime protest movements. The argument also
attempts to explain the type of military shifts of support. In other words, it provides
answers to two questions: overall, why does a military shift support from the regime; and
why do shifts vary in the extent and quality of the military organization’s involvement?
As introduced in the previous chapter, I will make the case that militaries are more likely
to respond to protests with loyalty shifts, or defections, when a regime has threatened the
sources of military authority (which link to societal stability and security) and anti-regime
protesters are a more promising partner in restoring this authority.
This argument applies to a range of military loyalty shifts. Scholarly attempts at
understanding military defections generally are important and relatively underdeveloped.
However, observers have described a variety of behaviors as defection-like in analyses of
military responses to anti-regime protests: military defections in the form of neutrality
during the anti-Milosevic campaign in Serbia,59 soldiers’ rebellion and then a coup by
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junior officers as part of the Carnation Revolution,60 and a military that was active in
persuading the king to give up power in Nepal in 2006.61 I contend that it is necessary to
re-conceptualize military defections on the basis of the extent and quality of the military
organization’s disloyalty. My argument’s focus on military sources of authority has a
number of implications that I leverage to explain different types of military loyalty shifts.
I develop the argument in the following sections. First, I explain my overall
argument for why a military will be more likely to shift its loyalty from the authoritarian
regime in response to anti-regime protests. Second, I define the main outcome of interest
in this study – types of military loyalty shifts – including the concept’s theoretical and
empirical underpinnings. I also compare this outcome to those in the existing defections
scholarship. Lastly, I draw on my general argument to explain the types of military
loyalty shifts.
General Argument
Militaries, as guardians of the state, have two primary sources of authority – the
authority delegated to them by civilian leaders (and by extension, the population) and the
authority tied to their functional role in providing for societal security. Military delegated
authority is the authority allowed them by civilians to carry out their missions as
specialists in violence. 62 Civilians delegate militaries both the coercive power and
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responsibility to provide security. Military functional authority is the authority that is
produced when militaries carry out their missions competently.63 Civil-military relations
involves the delegation of authority to a military organization that gains functional
authority when it uses its expertise efficiently. 64
Militaries have maximum authority when they are delegated authority by a
legitimate government and that authority provides them the capacity to protect society.
The military’s primary missions (for which civilians delegate it authority) are national
defense and internal order, but national security may come to involve defense of the
broader public interest, as well.65 The outcomes of a military’s two sources of authority
working in the same direction – a legitimate government and effective military – is
therefore a stable and secure society, which is the military’s ultimate interest.
Militaries’ interest in their capacity to create order holds regardless of level of
military “professionalism”, or whether or not the military is grounded in the Western
civil-military experience.66 Non-Western militaries have long been an area of attention
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for their involvement in the political and economic development of their respective
countries.67 Analyses of them generally start with the claim that militaries want societal
stability. Needler, for example, posits an “institutional interest” argument to explain
military behavior in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. 68 A military’s purpose is
to produce external and internal security, and fulfilling it can motivate support for, or
overthrow, of the civilian regime.69
The creation of order by militaries may involve them playing a functional role in
society that goes beyond professionalism in external defense. 70 From Stepan, militaries
sometimes also use their expertise to provide for “…internal security and national
development.” This “new professionalism” role and the authority it generates is common
in developing countries and present even in developed countries during periods of
instability. Militaries thus gain functional authority by playing a functional role that
involves a variety of missions to keep the state secure. Sometimes they fight wars against
external enemies; other times they engage in domestic development to reform society.
Because militaries are concerned with stability and security, as organizations they
seek the delegated authority necessary to perform their functional roles. Their corporate
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interests involve power, resources, and autonomy. Their specific interests tie to these
general ones and include the integrity of the military organization; control over military
rules, education, and personnel decisions; and sufficient military budgets and reasonable
defense policies.71 As Geddes claims, these interests allow militaries to maintain their
status, by providing for military effectiveness in their core duties. 72 They create the
conditions for security from internal and external threats and positively impact military
standing in society. 73 In other words, their fulfillment supports military capacity which
generate military functional authority.
Military organizational interests maintain their capacity to provide stability and
gain functional authority, and are shared by all members. Though some individual
soldiers may have different, additional interests – like material enrichment – these are
secondary because they depend on the military’s survival as an organization. Soldiers, as
part of the military profession, value the military’s organizational interests at least as
much as other, more narrow concerns.74 Military hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness,
professional autonomy, and sufficient resources matter not because they are fully realized
in every military but because they are closely tied to a military’s interests and authority.
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Yet, a military relies in large part on civilians for its interests. Civilian authorities
delegate authority to militaries to carry out their functions and guard against threats.
Some forms of authority delegation support military capacity and functional authority;
others hurt them. Authoritarian regimes are likely to employ forms that have mixed
effects because they face two major threats to their rule: control over non-elites and
power-sharing with other elites. Power-sharing, which involves delegating authority to
the military, is especially difficult, and historically, authoritarian leaders are most at risk
of being ousted by military coups.75 Regimes need militaries with enough authority to
guard against outside threats but not so much that they threaten their rule. This, often
termed the civil-military problematique,76 applies particularly to authoritarian regimes
because of the nature of the threats to their rule.
As a result of this trade off, some regimes seek to structure this delegation and
overall regime-military relations in ways that the military is less threatening to them.
These sorts of strategies are often termed “coup-proofing”. They take various forms, all
with the goal of protecting the regime from military coups. Regimes could provide the
military additional resources, in hopes of discouraging military disloyalty.77 However,
resources may increase military coercive capabilities and the likelihood of a successful
coup, if attempted.78 Regimes consequently tend to concentrate on decreasing military
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coup propensity by ensuring the loyalty of key personnel and/or obstructing their ability
to seize power.
Strategies that establish personal ties of loyalty between the leader and the
military aim to link the military’s fate to the leader’s security. They primarily involve the
regime making personnel decisions on the basis of loyalty rather than merit or other
institutional considerations. 79 Accordingly, the regime may stack with military with
coethnics80 or other loyalists; frequently rotate those in positions of command; purge
officers, especially those who are competent; 81 or divide the military into competing
factions.82
Some regimes form new security forces to counter the military, a strategy known
as institutional coup-proofing.83 Regimes seek to prevent coups using these “…numerous,
mutually suspicious rival forces that check and balance one another.” 84 The new forces,
or counterforces, are often primarily composed of loyalists, identity or otherwise. 85 In the
institutional coup-proofing research the particular mechanism through which
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counterforces prevent coups varies by case and analysis; they generally center on their
competing interests, which the military must overcome to seize power, 86 and the
coordination problems they create, making plotting and carrying out coups more
difficult.87 In sum, coup-proofing strategies aim to generate loyalty on the part of sections
of the military or other security forces and to reduce the threat of disloyalty by other
sections.
Regimes that coup-proof thus attempt to balance between delegating the military
enough authority to fulfill its duties, which may enhance military functional authority,
and not so much that the military threatens the regime. This is a tough balance to strike,
and further, research demonstrates that delegating authority through some forms of coupproofing has damaging effects on military capabilities and functional authority. Coupproofing that involves personal control aimed at guaranteeing loyalty weakens the
military organization, reducing military effectiveness.90 It puts loyal rather than capable
personnel in positions of authority, compromises the military hierarchy, and divides the
military institution. Regimes therefore reduce the risk of coups by reducing military
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autonomy, strength, and unity – corporate military interests that impact a military’s
ability to provide for stability and security or play its functional role in society.91
Institutional coup-proofing undermines military effectiveness, first by producing
coordination problems. Scholars have found that having a higher number of counterforces
both makes military coordination more difficult and hurts military performance in civil
and interstate conflicts.92 Institutional coup-proofing also redirects resources from the
military to the counterforces, jeopardizing force quality. This “infuriate[s] regular
military officers”93 and may actually lead to coup attempts.94 Even in the absence of
conflict, and in addition to causing coordination problems, institutional coup-proofing
challenges a key interest of the military: its monopoly on the use of force within the
state.95 In sum, by delegating authority in ways that hurt military institutional interests,
coup-proofing strategies hurt military capacity and functional authority.
When military corporate interests (and by extension, military capabilities and
claims to functional authority) are threatened, militaries often act to protect or enhance
them. This claim is supported by classic civil-military relations analyses, including
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Nordlinger97 and Finer.98 According to Needler, explanations of coups must look to the
“…collective and institutional interests of members of the armed forces themselves.”99
It is also borne out by recent research that argues coup-proofing is difficult because
militaries will recognize such regime efforts to diminish their power and move against
them.100 In terms of the above logic, coup-proofing strategies are regime power grabs of a
particular kind – through them, the regime attempts to control the military in ways that
serve the regime’s concerns yet have damaging effects on military functional authority.
These effects will be more visible following military defeat, and more serious when
societal stability and security is at risk – such as during challenges to the regime.
As the source of military delegated authority, regimes also rely on claims to
authority to justify their positions of power. Authoritarian regimes are not put in power
through free and fair elections but claim the right to rule based on lineage, religion, or a
particular political ideology.101 Often these claims take the form of “consequentialist
arguments”, where autocrats focus on the benefits their rule produces in terms of
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prosperity and wellbeing.102 The degree of regime authority impacts what a regime has
available to delegate to the military. The regime’s delegation of authority using coupproofing strategies introduces tensions between the military’s delegated and functional
authority. When the military’s functional authority has been diminished – as a result of
regime-military relations, and perhaps evident in the military’s failure to maintain
stability and security – its delegated authority becomes particularly important.
Yet, delegated authority depends on continued support for the regime from the
population. Mass protests against the regime challenge its legitimacy and reduce its
authority. Mass protests are societal unrest of a particular, popular kind that further call
into question the regime’s support for military functional authority in providing for a
secure society. The regime is at least partly at fault for the instability, and has already
threatened military functional capabilities. As the regime fails to maintain its claims to
authority, the military has less delegated and functional authority.
Research on military regimes in Latin America supports the claim that a military
will respond when regime illegitimacy threatens military authority. O’Donnell contends
that militaries intervened in politics in Cuba, Argentina, and other countries when popular
discontent with the regime threatened societal security. 103 The Argentinian military, for
example, took power in 1966 to restore social order after the civilian government failed
to address popular unrest resulting from economic crisis.104 In similar instances of
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popular discontent due to governance failures, militaries have felt justified in seizing
power.105 Other classic analyses of military coups make related points, arguing that
militaries are more likely to attempt coups when regimes are ineffective and
illegitimate,106 when military organizational interests are at risk,107 and during periods of
social instability.108
In response to protests, a regime may attempt to delegate some of its remaining
authority to the military in hopes of ending the popular challenge. If the regime first uses
other security forces, it will expect the military to remain loyal and be ready to support it
when needed.109 This support often comes in the form of repression of the protesters.
However, as DeMerrit points out, leaders and their agents of repression can have
different incentives.110 A similar logic follows from a military’s two sources of authority.
While protests challenge the regime and the military, military loyalty may further
compromise both its sources of authority. Support of the regime will not restore the
functional authority the military has lost due to coup-proofing. Support of the regime may
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be within its delegated authority, but will ultimately be costly as its source is the
population.
The military is more likely to opt to preserve its functional authority – rather than
rely on the regime’s delegated authority – in these circumstances. This decision can lead
to loyalty shifts, from the regime to the protesters. Challenges to the regime’s authority
that confront a military whose functional authority is already diminished and that are
popular and nonviolent put the military’s delegated authority further in tension with the
authority derived from its key functional role. This tension opens up the possibility that
the military may support the protesters as an alternative.
While military loyalty shifts may be more likely when regimes threaten military
functional authority, they also depend on whether protest movements are supportive of
military authority. Protest movements are a better source of delegated authority and less
threatening to functional authority if they are committed to nonviolence, moderate,
organized, and have broad membership. Regime challengers that use violence threaten
societal security and the military’s functional authority. Conversely, research has found
that nonviolent movements are more likely than other forms of regime contention to
encourage defection by regime supporters because they are less threatening.111
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Protest movements also vary in size, with important implications for military
authority. Larger protests indicate that the regime is highly illegitimate, the movement
has popular support, and the support comes from diverse social groups and interests.112
Large protests also signal that the movement is more likely to succeed and the regime is
at risk of falling. This helps to motivate and coordinate military shifts of support to
protesters. In research on coups, large protests increase the likelihood of coup attempts by
helping a military determine the level of societal support for regime change, a key
determinant of success.113 Further, ending the challenge when protests are large will
require greater military support of the regime, and put military sources of authority more
in tension. The above discussion and this logic brings me to my two general hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Defections will be more likely if the regime has used coup-proofing
strategies that threaten military functional authority.
Hypothesis 2: Defections will be more likely if the protest movement is committed to
nonviolence and large in size.
It follows from the first hypothesis that the more the regime has threatened
military functional authority, the more likely are military loyalty shifts. Authoritarian
regimes vary in how they structure their authority, including relations with the military,
and one way of understanding this variation is through regime type. The regime type
literature classifies regimes according to how regimes get support and exercise authority,
and on the basis of these differences, explains a number of political outcomes. As
112
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concerns military relations, the types of regimes vary in their control of political
appointments through which they can promote those they trust and security organs with
which they can punish dissent.114 Regimes whose leaders have higher levels of more
personal control use it to support their own security. According to the above logic, they
do so at the expense of military functional authority.
Personalist regime leaders are likely to employ a form of coup-proofing that
weakens the military by prioritizing loyalty when delegating authority. They rely on
smaller coalitions and exercise power as individuals, through personal bonds. Smaller
coalitions mean the leader is better able to monitor those close to him or her, and to
ensure their fate is linked to the leader’s survival.115 This sort of control of the military is
likely to involve non-meritocratic personnel decisions and divide and rule tactics. As a
result, the military organization is weak and factionalized, with parts of it tied to the
leader personally and others excluded from the regime coalition and its benefits.
Hypothesis 1a: Defections will be more likely in personalist regimes, because their forms
of control threaten military functional authority.
Single-party regimes are less likely to coup-proof through personal loyalty ties. In
these regimes, the leader shares authority with the party and exercises power through its
organization. Elites are promoted as they rise through the ranks of the party. The regime
tends to co-opt dissenting factions within the ruling party because the leader cannot rely
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on his or her own authority to rule.116 This structure of authority relations is paralleled in
the regime’s control of the military. The leader does not tie the military to himself
personally; instead using standardized, mostly meritocratic promotion systems.117
Leaders also do not create intra-military competition by relying on core factions of
loyalists. Consequently, militaries in single-party regimes are stronger organizationally
and have some autonomy from the regime and its leader.
Hypothesis 1b: Defections will be less likely in single-party regimes, because their forms
of control do not threaten military functional authority.
Military regimes are by definition headed by military officers, yet they too face
threats to their security from the rest of the military. Their ubiquity during the 1970s and
1980s resulted in a wealth of research on the relations between militaries as governments
and militaries as institutions. Like personalist regimes, military regimes and their leaders
exercise power through small coalitions.118 However, because these coalitions are made
up of military officers, coup-proofing is less likely. Leaders will not structure the military
in ways that damage it as an institution because officers in the coalition can hold them
accountable.119 Leaders are themselves part of the military, and so coup-proofing will
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ultimately hurt their interests, too. Military regimes are also less invested in holding on to
power,120 and will likely be in line with the military in response to a popular challenge.
Hypothesis 1c: Defections will be less likely in military regimes, because their forms of
control do not threaten military functional authority.
Given its focus on military capabilities, this argument generates additional
observable implications and hypotheses for testing. The impacts of regime-military
relations on military functional authority and military loyalty shifts are especially clear
when a military has recently been involved in conflict. If the conflict ended in military
defeat, or another outcome short of military victory, the military’s functional authority
will be in question. In these circumstances, militaries are more likely to link their poor
performance in conflict to coup-proofing, given the organizational problems those
strategies create. Defeat also increases coalition members’ incentives to reevaluate the
leader’s competence.121
Hypothesis 3: In regimes that coup-proof, defections will be more likely if the military
was recently defeated in conflict.
Ongoing violent conflict may also bring the damaging effects of coup-proofing on
the military organization into light. However, though conflict could strain regime-military
relations, the threat will focus the military and it will be less likely to consider or
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coordinate political change.122 Defeating an enemy requires concentration of state power
and support for the regime and status quo.123 A specifically domestic violent conflict
threatens the state and is unambiguously threatening to military functional authority
because of the instability it generates. The military will focus on deploying its capabilities
to defeat it, reducing the likelihood of loyalty shifts. Anti-regime campaigns that are
primarily violent will similarly lead militaries to unite with regimes to counter them.124
Hypothesis 4: Defections will be less likely if the military is involved in an ongoing
conflict or the regime is facing a violent challenge.
I graphically summarize the preceding discussion and logic of my hypotheses
regarding general military loyalty shifts below, in Figure 1. Next, I address competing
expectations for the effects of coup-proofing on militaries. Then I consider alternate
explanations of defections which helps to motivate my discussion of this study’s
outcomes of interest.
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Figure 1. General argument for military defections

Competing Expectations for the Effects of Coup-Proofing
Above, I argued that the regime’s use of coup-proofing strategies increases the
likelihood of military disloyalty during anti-regime protests by threatening military
functional authority. Protest movements that are supportive of military authority will
further increase the likelihood of loyalty shifts. According to the scholarship on military
coups, however, military loyalty shifts in the forms of coups involve both disposition and
ability, and coup-proofing is supposed to reduce both.125 This general claim raises a
question for my argument: if coup-proofing prevents coups, why does it not prevent
defections? Key to answering this question is accounting for the context of mass protests.
Before doing that, I more directly address the literature’s claims.
The coup scholarship contends some coup-proofing strategies reduce military
disposition for disloyalty. These involve control over military personnel decisions to
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structure the military in ways that loyalists with incentives to support the regime are in
key positions.126 Other strategies aim at reducing the military’s ability. Soldiers need to
coordinate to launch coups, so regimes establish barriers to communication and
commitment. They use divide and rule tactics to play military factions off of each other.
They develop counterforces with competing incentives, so that some soldiers will resist a
coup attempt.127 These counterforces also help to monitor and punish coup plots. In sum,
regimes attempt to reduce military disposition and ability to coup by tightly controlling
the military while delegating it less authority with which it could pose a challenge.128
Research on the actual effectiveness of coup-proofing is inconclusive. Marcum
and Brown find that personalist regimes, though more likely to coup-proof, are not less
likely to experience coup attempts relative to other regime types. 129 Some analyses of
counterbalancing show it reduces the ability of coup plotters and lessens the risk of coup
attempts.130 Bohmelt and Pilster modify this conclusion slightly, finding a curvilinear
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relationship between the number of counterforces and coup attempts. 131 In this analysis,
the most effective regime strategy is to have two armed organizations, because coup
launchers would have to challenge the coercive capacities of another security
organization before seeking power. Others, however, challenge this relationship and
support a linear, more-counterforces-is-better view, though admitting the overall
quantitative research has produced inconsistent findings.132
In contrast to the scholarship’s expectations, my logic suggests coup-proofing
strategies should generate military disloyalty. Coup-proofing, as a form of delegated
authority, creates discontent and motivates defections because of its impacts on military
capabilities and functional authority. Coup-proofing that relies on personal loyalty
weakens the military organization’s autonomy and hierarchy. Coup-proofing through
counterforces challenges coordination but does not necessarily reduce military loyalty
shifts because they are unlikely to require the same level of coordination as military
seizures of power. Further, these threats to military functional authority occur in the
context of threats to regime legitimacy and military delegated authority. The military may
be more likely to shift loyalty in response to protest movements as a result. The particular
forms of coup-proofing the regime uses and the character of the protests might affect the
type of military loyalty shifts, though, and I take up this point next.
Tobias Bohmelt and Ulrich Pilster, “The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and
Coup Outcomes,” International Interactions 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-62.
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Alternate Explanations of Defections
Military defections from the regime in response to mass anti-regime protest
movements are different than military seizures of power through coups, which means
arguments that apply to coups may apply differently to defections. But observers and
scholars often use the term defections for military responses that are quite dissimilar. This
point has not been sufficiently acknowledged by the extant scholarship, and so many of
the competing explanations of military loyalty shifts are actually explanations of different
military behaviors. In the following section I detail what I view as the main source of
disagreement and offer my argument for types of military loyalty shifts as one way to
deal with it.
Though much research on the topic remains to be done, existing studies seem to
divide between arguments that defections are more likely when the military is
institutionalized (i.e. less coup-proofed, with the key mechanism being autonomy from
the regime), and that they are more likely when the military is more coup-proofed (the
key mechanism being divide and rule tactics and the intra-military competition they
generate). In the first set, militaries defect because they have a future apart from the
regime, as an independent institution.133 In the second, militaries, specifically “losing”

Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57; Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of
Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2
(2012): 127-149; Risa Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the
Ben Ali Regime in January 2011,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 205-220; Derek
Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 39,
no. 1 (2013): 28-52.
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factions, defect because removing the regime also removes their rivals within the
military.134
The two arguments’ competing logics put them at odds. While the first can
explain why, for example, the full Egyptian military defected from Mubarak in 2011, it
has difficulty explaining how the split between junior and senior officers in the
Philippines helped to bring about defections by the junior officers from Marcos during
the 1986 People Power revolution. The second is useful for understanding why
marginalized Indonesian officers acted against Suharto in 1998, but cannot explain the
same behavior against Ben Ali by the full Tunisian military in the Arab Spring. Both note
the role of the regime’s structuring of the military in explaining disloyalty, but their
interests in different strategies of control leads them to partial explanations of only some
outcomes.
Makara goes some ways in bringing the two logics together by specifying the
military institutionalization argument and making the case that some control strategies
affect military motivations while others affect military opportunities. 135 This distinction
parallels that made in the coup scholarship. According to Makara, a military is more
likely to defect when it is it both motivated by intra-security apparatus competition and
autonomous from the regime. Though this research is an important contribution, it too
has limitations, starting with its limited case selection of the Arab Spring militaries. Its
outcome of interest is defections, broadly defined, which are present in Egypt and Tunisia
Terence Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” Comparative Political
Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69.
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but not in Bahrain and Syria – though loyalty shifts by non-Alawite officers and other
soldiers in Syria numbered in the thousands and came to significantly impact the course
of the anti-Assad campaign.136 More generally, this argument has trouble explaining
loyalty shifts by significant parts of militaries that are not autonomous from the regime.
I follow Makara that some regime structures of control and coup-proofing
strategies make loyalty shifts more likely, but go further by arguing different forms of
regime control make some types of loyalty shifts more likely than other types. These
effects depend in large part on the impacts of regime control on military authority and
organization, with protest movements playing an important moderating, and at times
independent, role. In other words, the military response depends on the form of regime
coup-proofing and the characteristics of the protest movement challenging the regime –
because of their impacts on military authority and the military organization. 137
A recent contribution that accounts for the role of both coup-proofing and
protester characteristics in explaining defections is Morency-Laflamme.138 He argues that
campaigns will be more likely to generate defections when they can offer credible
promises about respecting future military interests. Such promises only matter when the
military has been coup-proofed – specifically, when the regime has created
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counterweights to it. Then, factions that trust the campaign’s offers will defect. I follow
Morency-Laflamme’s call to bring these two strands of arguments together, especially
given the almost complete lack of attention to the protesters in existing work. I also
extend his effort significantly, beyond a comparison of two cases (Benin 1989-1990 and
Togo 1990-1993). This allows me to look at the effects of various forms of coupproofing, and to explain other types of loyalty shifts.
In the next section, I introduce my “type of loyalty shift” dependent variable.
Conceptualizing and measuring types of military loyalty shifts helps me adjudicate
between alternate explanations for military defections during protests. The defections
outcome the existing scholarship attempts to explain is in fact often different types of
military disloyalty. These types have different explanations, and I present my argument
for them in the final section of this chapter.
Conceptualizing Military Disloyalty
The above hypotheses are expectations about when militaries are more likely to
defect versus remain loyal. One contribution of this dissertation is my re-thinking
defections as a binary outcome to better account for the variety of observed military
responses to major anti-regime protest movements. These responses are observably
different and thus empirically interesting, but also likely explained by different logics and
to have different implications for post-protest political change (the focus of Chapter
Five). Thus, I use two outcomes of interest in this dissertation.
The first outcome, defections, refers to significant loyalty shifts by most of the
military. This conceptualization lines up with most scholarly and popular understandings
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of defections.139 The second outcome, type of loyalty shift, disaggregates military
defections and classifies them according to the extent of the military organization’s
involvement, in terms of number and rank. In addition to significant shifts of support, it
captures low level shifts by small groups of the rank and file or lower-ranking officers.
When a significant portion of upper-ranking officers shift loyalty, I differentiate
categories based on whether the shift was fragmented or united, and in this sense, the
quality of support shifted to the protest movement.
Below, I display the types as a continuum. I detail these categories and their
coding rules in Chapter Three.
Figure 2. Types of military loyalty shifts

In sum, type shift captures military responses to protests that span from loyalty to
low level shifts to high level defections. Disaggregating defections into various categories
allows me to explain, using my argument and new cross-national data, why some
militaries remain loyal, parts of some militaries are disloyal, divided upper ranks shift
loyalty, or the full military defects and offers its support to the protesters. The defections
variable aggregates this range into two categories - mostly loyal and significant shifts of
loyalty - and is an outcome that reflects my general logic for the impact of threats to
military authority on disloyalty.
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Explaining Types of Military Loyalty Shifts
The above, general argument about defections is useful for explaining types of
military loyalty shifts because of the implications that the forms of regime control have
for military authority as well as the military organization. While coup-proofing generally
threatens military functional authority and thus generates military discontent, some forms
compromise the military organization by weakening and dividing it. In the context of
different protest movements, then, some strategies will make loyalty shifts by the rank
and file more likely than the upper ranks. Others will affect the loyalty of a faction of
high ranking officers but not that of the senior leadership closest to the regime. The type
of loyalty shift depends on the forms threats to military functional authority take,
combined with the characteristics of the protest movement. I preview the logic of this
argument graphically below, in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Argument for types of military loyalty shifts

Most simply, the greater the threats to military functional authority, the more
likely are high level loyalty shifts. These threats can take the form of large amounts of
regime coup-proofing, or moderate coup-proofing in the presence of recent military
defeat. A regime coup-proofs to reduce military motivations and abilities for coups.
However, no regime can completely guard itself against disloyalty, even by members of
the ruling coalition.140 That is, military factions closest to the regime benefit from their
loyalty. But they and the rest of the military will recognize when forms of regime
delegated authority hurt military functional authority. Their power and positions
ultimately depend on the military as an organization and its capacity and effectiveness. In
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the context of major anti-regime protests, the military organization’s interests and
authority are at stake – especially if the military leadership fears loyalty shifts at lower
levels. Even militaries with divided upper ranks may defect because of the threats to
military authority.
Hypothesis 5: Greater levels of threat to military functional authority will increase the
likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.
When threats to military functional authority come primarily in the form of
institutional coup-proofing by the regime, united defections will be more likely.
Institutional coup-proofing negatively impacts military performance in conflict. 141 When
it involves the regime’s creation of forces like presidential guards and paramilitaries, it
also challenges the military’s monopoly on the use of force, a key military interest. 142
Institutional coup-proofing thus threatens military functional authority and generates
military discontent.
Importantly, institutional coup-proofing does not necessarily prevent the
coordination necessary for united defections. Lutscher143 extends Bohmelt and Pilster’s 144
argument regarding counterbalancing and coups to explain defections. He claims that
defections are more likely when the security apparatus is either minimally or highly
Biddle and Zirkle, “Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World”;
Pilster and Bohmelt, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1969-99”; Powell,
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divided, because of the effect of counterforces on a military’s ability to shift loyalty.
Though Lutscher’s logic is different, his finding that more counterforces make defections
more likely is consistent with my argument’s expectations. However, he does not
disaggregate defections such that he can analyze the effects of institutional coup-proofing
on types of loyalty shifts.
Institutional coup-proofing motivates disloyalty but does not compromise the
military organization or damage the military hierarchy. The upper ranks will be able to
direct the rank and file in shifting the full military’s loyalty. Low level shifts alone will
be unlikely, though, even if low ranking officers and the rank and file are discontent.145
These ranks run the risk of being sanctioned by their superiors in the military hierarchy,
or the counterforces that presumably have capabilities for monitoring and punishment.
Hypothesis 5a: Institutional coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of high level
loyalty shifts (and especially united defections), but not low level loyalty shifts.
Personalist coup-proofing has different implications for types of military loyalty
shifts. Because these strategies threaten military functional authority, they increase the
military’s motivations for disloyalty. But when regimes prioritize personal ties and divide
and rule by strengthening some factions and weakening others, the military organization
is more likely to be disunited. Regimes may achieve loyalty from the upper ranks or a
faction of it while increasing discontent and thus the likelihood of loyalty shifts among
the lower ranks or other factions. The military hierarchy has been compromised, so high
ranking officers are less able to monitor and direct the rank and file, allowing for more
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145

56

low- level loyalty shifts. The upper ranks may also shift loyalty, but their response will be
less coordinated.
Hypothesis 5b: Personalist coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of all loyalty shifts,
but low level and fragmented high level more than united defections.
Finally, large and nonviolent protest movements are an alternative source of
authority for coup-proofed militaries and so might be expected to increase the likelihood
of high level loyalty shifts. Threats to military functional authority do not have to be as
great in these cases, because such protests have positive implications for order and
stability, and the legitimacy of military delegated authority. A compromised military
organization may also not be as consequential, as the protests will provide further
motivation for disloyalty and help to coordinate the military factions – for shifts to the
protesters as an alternative.
Hypothesis 6: If the regime has used coup-proofing, protest movement size and
nonviolence will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts.
This discussion provides theoretical expectations for types of loyalty shifts and
helps to clarify some of the confusion generated by the existing scholarship and
summarized earlier. In the context of threats to military functional authority, military
loyalty shifts can occur whether the military is institutionalized and autonomous or
factionalized and weak. The loyalty shifts will just involve the military differently.
Regime coup-proofing has implications for military authority and the military
organization, with some forms making low level, fragmented high level, or united
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defections more likely. The protest movement’s characteristics further impact the
likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.
Conclusions and Introduction to the Quantitative Analysis
This chapter argues that militaries are more likely to respond to protests with
loyalty shifts when a regime has threatened the sources of military authority and antiregime protesters are a more promising partner in restoring this authority. Specifically,
authoritarian regimes that control their militaries using coup-proofing strategies hurt
military capabilities and threaten military functional authority. Major anti-regime protests
challenge regime legitimacy and the legitimacy of military delegated authority, putting
these sources of authority in tension. The military may choose to protect its functional
authority by shifting loyalty from the regime. This is more likely when the protest
movement is large and nonviolent and thus more supportive of military authority.
Unlike existing arguments, my argument’s logic explicitly applies to types of
military loyalty shifts via its implications for military authority and the military
organization. Higher level loyalty shifts are more likely when the military’s functional
authority has been more threatened. Yet some forms of coup-proofing compromise the
military organization, increasing military discontent but making full and united
defections less likely. Even in those instances, though, challenges to regime legitimacy
that are especially large and nonviolent can bring about significant loyalty shifts.
The next chapter assesses support for my argument by testing its hypotheses
against a new dataset of military responses to anti-regime protest movements. To
preview, I find preliminary evidence for my expectations of the effects of the regime and
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protest movement on military loyalty shifts. In later chapters, I use qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) to more directly assess my argument as a combination of
causal factors leading to various outcomes. I also examine three cases – Bangladesh
1990, Mali 1991, and Peru 2000 – that vary along the levels of threat to military
functional authority and as a consequence the extent of military loyalty shifts.
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CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
The argument I have introduced suggests that a military will shift loyalty away
from the regime and to protesters when military sources of authority are in tension and
the protesters are a better partner in restoring both. The type of military loyalty shift
depends on the degree to which the regime threatens the military’s functional authority
and its effects on the military organization. It also depends on the protest movement’s
size and commitment to nonviolence. The logic of this argument generated a number of
hypotheses.
I test these hypotheses through large-N statistical analysis, using new
quantitative data, in this chapter. This method provides preliminary support for the
relationships my hypotheses propose. The coup-proofing and protester characteristics
variables’ independent and conditional effects are in the direction I expect, and as
potential threats to military authority, they have meaningful impacts on the likelihood of
defections and military loyalty shifts. My number of observations is fairly small for
probabilistic regression techniques, though. This reduces the statistical power of my
study, potentially weakening the statistical significance of my findings. I focus largely
on the findings in substantive terms as a result. I also end the chapter with a discussion
of limitations to introduce the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the following
chapter.

60

I start by describing the cases and units of analysis and defining the main
variables, including the military response dependent variable, type shift. Then, I describe
the research strategy. I display and discuss the results for my tests related to defections,
followed by those for types of loyalty shifts, and conclude by summarizing my findings,
pointing to this analytical technique’s strengths and weaknesses, and introducing the
QCA.
Universe of Cases, Unit of Analysis, and Operationalization of Variables
My universe of cases for the quantitative analysis is major episodes of
nonviolent anti-regime campaigns from 1946 to 2015 as identified by the Major
Episodes of Contention (MEC) Dataset. 146 My unit of analysis is country-campaign, and
outcome of interest is military response. I do not include all campaigns identified by
MEC, though. I first drop those in countries without militaries. 147 Some occurred in
countries that could be considered democratic, according to their Polity IV scores or
regime type classification in the years prior. This matters for my argument because the
authority democratic regimes delegate to their militaries is derived from sources
independent of a particular leader or party. During popular regime challenges, that
source of military authority will be more secure. I thus drop democracies, defined as a
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Polity IV score above six (a conventional threshold). 148 The preceding logic also leads
me to drop Soviet Republic cases.149 The authority the Republics delegated to their
militaries was ultimately rooted in the Soviet government, to which they were
subordinate. Finally, I drop Slovakia (1989-1992) and Slovenia (1989-1990) because
they were not independent states at the time of their campaigns. Altogether, this
generates 112 observations. However, one of the main independent variables,
institutional coup-proofing, has a limited temporal coverage. The below analyses are
consequently of cases from 1970 to 2015, which number 98.
As described in the previous chapter, I use two dependent variables in this study:
one, defections, and two, type of military loyalty shifts (type shift). Conceptually,
defections measures the presence of military loyalty shifts, while type shift measures
loyalty shifts according to the extent and quality of the military organization’s
involvement. Type shift differentiates among low level, high level, fragmented, and
united loyalty shifts, specifically. I coded both variables by constructing a new dataset of
military responses to all campaigns in countries with militaries identified by MEC
(n=161).150
To code the dependent variable for each case, I conducted research using a
combination of primary and secondary sources, relying largely on academic journals but
148
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consulting with news and other reports when secondary sources were inconclusive. I
triangulated these sources to make an informed and detailed coding decision, which I
describe and justify using case narratives. These narratives are found in the Appendix.
In finalizing the categories and coding rules for my type shift variable, I
considered alternate conceptualizations, including those offered by other scholars.
Sharon Nepstad, for example, has theorized a “spectrum of security force responses.”151
This spectrum and its categories are shown in Figure 1. Basically, Nepstad defines and
differentiates the categories according to the level of military cooperation or
noncooperation with regime orders, as an indicator of the level of security force support
for the state versus the civil resisters.

Figure 1. Spectrum of security force responses to civil resistance. Nepstad 2015, 128.

Rather than levels of military cooperation with regime orders, however, I am
interested in the number and rank of the military involved in the shifts. From my
argument, I expect this variation to be explained by different logics and to have different
impacts on post-protest political outcomes. Military noncooperation is also difficult to
classify empirically, particular at the lower levels of shirking or selective compliance. It
can be hard to determine whether the regime gave orders, and if the observed military
behavior was in response to those orders.
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Accordingly, I developed my own categories and coding rules for the type
shift variable. I briefly summarize them below and display their variation across the
universe of cases in Figure 2.
Loyal: No part of the military shifts loyalty, and the military represses or
otherwise follows regime orders, indicating its support of the regime.
Neutral: No part of the military shifts loyalty, but the military does not actively
support the regime.
Low level loyalty shifts: There is dissent at low levels of the military, among the
rank and file or lower-ranking officers, involving a group of individuals or at most a few
units. The dissent typically takes the form of becoming unreliable to military or civilian
leaders or temporarily joining with the protesters.
Fragmented high level shifts: A significant part of the military, including some
middle- or high-ranking officers, removes support from the regime. This occurs either
in sections, with one exhibiting continued loyalty to the regime or disagreement with
the decision of the other to shift loyalty, or in a widespread but fragmented manner,
with no clear direction from military leadership.
United defections: The full military removes support from the regime, often
with a statement or declaration from the military leadership. There is no observable
disagreement within the military over this decision. At times, the shift is accompanied
by explicit support of the protesters; others, such support is effective but implicit.
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Figure 2. Types of loyalty shifts across the universe of cases
United
Defections
Loyal
14%
24%

Fragmented
High Level
17%

Low Level
14%

Neutral
31%

Reviewing the Hypotheses
The argument I develop in Chapter Two results in the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Defections will be more likely if the regime has used coup-proofing
strategies that threaten military functional authority.
Hypothesis 1a: Defections will be more likely in personalist regimes, because their forms
of control threaten military functional authority.
Hypothesis 1b: Defections will be less likely in single-party regimes, because their
forms of control do not threaten military functional authority.
Hypothesis 1c: Defections will be less likely in military regimes, because their forms of
control do not threaten military functional authority.
Hypothesis 2: Defections will be more likely if the protest movement is committed to
nonviolence and large in size.
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Hypothesis 3: In regimes that coup-proof, defections will be more likely if the military
was recently defeated in conflict.
Hypothesis 4: Defections will be less likely if the military is involved in an ongoing
conflict or the regime is facing a violent challenge.
Hypothesis 5: Greater levels of threat to military functional authority will increase the
likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.
Hypothesis 5a: Institutional coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of high level
loyalty shifts (and especially united defections), but not low level loyalty shifts.
Hypothesis 5b: Personalist coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of all loyalty shifts,
but low level and fragmented high level more than united defections.
Hypothesis 6: If the regime has used coup-proofing, protest movement size and
nonviolence will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts.
Before I describe the data, below is a summary table of my argument’s main
concepts along with their variable name, definition, operationalization, and source.
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Explanatory Variables
I measure my main explanatory variable, coup-proofing, in two ways. First, I use
a measure of institutional coup-proofing. This form likely spans all regime types and so
has effects independent of those proxied by regime type measures. 152 Hypothesis 5a
posits a relationship between this particular form and loyalty shifts. Following the extant
literature,153 I operationalize institutional coup-proofing as the level of counterbalancing,
measured as the number of effective armed organizations and calculated as an index of
ground-based regular militaries and ground-based forces parallel to the army. 154 I get
data on the level of counterbalancing from Bohmelt and Pilster,155 and calculate my
measure, EffectiveNumber, by averaging the number of effective armed organizations
(including the regular military) in a country during the five years prior to the
According to Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On
the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 4
(2012): 355-72, non-democracies generally are more likely than democracies to institutional coup-proof. In
the Appendix, I use descriptive statistics to show the level of institutional coup-proofing is quite similar
across regime types.
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campaign.156 In my analysis, EffectiveNumber ranges from 1 to 3.614155.157 Lutscher
claims that the number of organizations, or the level of security force fragmentation, has
a curvilinear relationship with military defections, and uses the original variable, a
squared term, and a measure of deviation from the equilibrium of two armed
organizations in his analysis. 158 I do the same. However, following normality tests, I
also calculated the square root, and end up using this measure (ICP) because it results in
the most normal data distribution. It is also the only operationalization of ICP that ever
reaches statistical significance in my models. (I discuss what this finding means for
Lutscher’s argument in the conclusion.)
I also measure coup-proofing using regime type, drawing on my argument that
generated Hypotheses 1a through c. For measures of regime type, I rely primarily on the
“Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions” data from Geddes et al. (GWF). 159 The
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gendarmerie, the Republican Guard, and the police. Both the gendarmerie and the Republican Guard were
under the Defense Department (“Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January
31, 1994, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html).
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Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A
New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-31. I update this data through 2015 using
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categorization of regime type in this dataset is useful my purposes: it captures the
differences in decisionmaking across regimes, based on the leadership group’s interests
and the leader’s exercise of power. 160 The regime type coding is determined by the
substantive characteristics of the leadership group, as well as how much the group can
actually constrain the leader. 161
GWF’s dataset uses and updates the regime type classification of Geddes. 162 It
codes regimes as dominant/single party rule (party), rule by the military as an
institution (military), or rule by personalist dictators (unconstrained by either a strong
party or unified military) (personal), among others.163 In my analyses, the other
categories, as well as the categories the effects of which I am not testing with that
model, form a base regime type. In other words, I assess the effects of the regime type
variables I include in each model relative to all other, excluded regime types. I code
each case according to its regime type in the year prior to the start of the campaign. 164

Jonathan Pinckney, “Expanding GWF Data,” unpublished dataset (2016) and my own research. Details are
provided in the Appendix.
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One concern might be that some regime types are more likely to experience campaigns, and that the
factors responsible for that relationship are unobservable characteristics driving any relationships between
regime type and loyalty shifts. However, as shown in the Appendix, the campaigns in my dataset are fairly
evenly distributed across regime types, particularly those of explanatory interest (i.e. personal, party, and
military).
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Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 314-5.

Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?”, Annual Review of
Political Science 2 (1999): 115-44.
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Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 317.
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In 23 cases, regime type changes in the five years prior to or during the campaign. I created an indicator
variable (gwfindicator) to control for this, but including it in the models changes the results very little.
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The GWF data attempts to differentiate between regimes where power is
concentrated in an individual, whether military or civilian, and regimes where military
rule is “collegial.”165 This differentiation is the basis for their coding of personalist
versus military regimes. However, in the course of my research I encountered some
regimes coded by GWF (using a typology that groups similar regimes together) as
military-personal that seemed more personalist than military. In such cases, the regimes
were controlled less by the military as an institution and more by a military strongman.
For this reason, I used Svolik’s Institutions in Dictatorships data to recode as personal
(PCP) the regimes GWF codes as military, when classified by Svolik as militarypersonal (rather than military-corporate).166 This change affected 8 cases (4 of which are
non-democracies) and also resulted in a new military regime variable that excludes the
re-coded cases (military).
As for the independent variables related to the protest campaign, I again use the
MEC data. It codes a variable for the highest recorded participation in the campaign. It
has many missing values, though, so I supplement its measures with a campaign size
estimate variable from the NAVCO 2.0 Data Project. 167 Following Chenoweth and
Stephan,168 I log these numbers and then divide them by the log of the country’s

165

Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 319.
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Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
For example, Geddes et al. and Svolik both code Pakistan 1967 as military-personal.
Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0
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population size at the start of the campaign to generate a measure of campaign per
capita (size).169 MEC also includes a binary indicator of whether the campaign had a
radical flank, which I use to measure the campaign’s commitment to nonviolence.
While all campaigns included in my universe of cases rely primarily on nonviolent
methods, some campaigns include incidental violence, and nearly a third do as shown
by the descriptive statistics in the Appendix. I reverse MEC’s coding so that “1” is the
absence of a radical flank (nonviolence).170
To measure loss, I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Conflict
Termination Dataset v.2-2015.171 I code this variable if the case-country government
lost an interstate or internal conflict in the 3 years prior to the start of the campaign, and
define loss broadly as non-victory. In the UCDP data, this includes loss, ceasefire, or
peace agreement outcomes (i.e. not win, low activity, or actor ceases to exist). The
broad definition is necessary to encompass any outcome short of defeat of the enemy;
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NAVCO uses an indicator variable for campaign size, with each category as a range. I recoded its values
as number of participants and found MEC and NAVCO disagree on approximately 25 cases. I use
NAVCO’s measures for these cases, and its lower bounds as the number. Given these complications (and
the challenges associated with counting the number of participants in a campaign), I advise caution in
interpreting size and its effects. I return to this point in the results below.
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I also include an indicator for institutionalized opposition, from V-Dem (Michael Coppedge, John
Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M.
Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L.
Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine
Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Johannes von Römer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman,
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of an opposition party provides the protest movement some institutional support, and is perceived as more
moderate and less threatening to order and stability and military authority than demonstrators in the streets.
However, I do not find any relations between this variable, opposition, and defections or types of loyalty
shifts.
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Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243-50.
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even so, it produces only 11 observations. Loss is rare in this dataset, which may affect
its statistical relationships with the dependent variables.
I also use this UCDP dataset for my variable indicating ongoing conflict
(ongoing), or the presence of a conflict during the campaign in which the case-country
government was a party. I measure ongoing conflict a second way – using the violsim
variable from the MEC dataset, which I rename violent. This variable is coded when a
violent campaign occurred independently from but simultaneously to the nonviolent
campaign.172
Control Variables
I include a number of control variables, or variables that likely impact either
loyalty shifts or the explanatory variables and could confound my results. The only
existing statistical analysis of military defections using quantitative data is Lutscher,173 so
I follow his lead in terms of control variables. I include some of his controls already, as
explanatory variables: military regime (military) and conflict, measured as loss, ongoing,
and violent following my argument’s expectations. Others that both Lutscher and I
include are: GDP per capita, military expenditure and personnel, regime leader’s years in
power, and level of democracy.
First, I control for GDP per capita. I calculate this measure (GDP per capita,
logged) by averaging a country’s GDP per capita over the five years prior to the start of
the campaign. I primarily use the World Bank’s data, but consult Gleditsch on 20 cases
172

MEC codebook, author’s copy, 3.

Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection
during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” 350-75.
173

73

on which the World Bank is missing information. 174 According to Powell, poor economic
performance reduces regime legitimacy, and could make military political interventions
more likely.175 It could also increase the likelihood of military loyalty shifts. Second, also
drawing on Powell, I control for the financial support of the military, or a country’s level
of military expenditure divided by its number of military personnel. I calculate this
variable indicating soldier quality (soldier quality, logged) from the Correlates of War
National Material Capabilities (v5.0) data 176 and use an average of these measures over
the five years prior to the campaign. According to Powell, the higher this number, the
more likely the military should be to support the status quo, or remain loyal to the
regime.177
I also control for the number of years the regime leader has been in power
(incumbent, logged), using the Archigos dataset from Goemans et al.178 This is different
than regime duration; as Geddes et al. find, the average time to regime failure is about
double the time to leader ouster, or 14 years. 179 My use of regime type as an explanatory
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The World Bank, World Development Indicators (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Kristian Skrede
Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade and GDP Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (2002): 712-24. The
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variable follows my argument that it is the regime’s characteristics that matter for coupproofing. Still, it is possible that leaders who have been in power longer have been better
able to implement and use coup-proofing strategies or other forms of military control. It
is also possible, as Lutscher notes, that a military is less likely to support a leader if he is
a lame duck, or going to leave power soon anyway. 180
I control for the level of democracy using the V-Dem dataset. 181 I code this for
each case by calculating the average polyarchy score in the five years prior to the
campaign (dem level, logged). In the V-Dem data, polyarchy is an index that measures
achievement of the ideal of electoral democracy. Military loyalty shifts might be less
likely in more democratic regimes for a couple of reasons: democracies have more
regime legitimacy, and they engage in less coup-proofing.182 However, because I only
analyze non-democracies, the higher this measure, the closer the regime is to anocracy.
From Powell, coups are more likely in anocracies than democracies or nondemocracies –
because democracies are more legitimate, and nondemocracies can prevent them. 183

Cited by Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on
Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” 350-75: Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy,
Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 58, no. 1 (2005): 140; Holger Albrecht,
“Revolution or Coup d’Etat? The Role of the Military in Egypt,” in Revolution and Regime Change in
Egypt, eds. Holger Albrecht and Thomas Demmelhuber (Baden-Baden: Homos, 2013), 69. Regime leaders
in some cases leave power in the five years prior to or during the campaign. Because I am interested in the
effects of regime type rather than individual leadership, I do not indicate when a leader has been in power
fewer than five years (though his or her time in power is measured by lincumbent. I do create an indicator
variable for when regime leadership changes during the campaign (leaderchange, coded for 24 cases).
Including it in the models does not change the overall results.
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Military loyalty shifts may also be more likely. Including this control allows me to
account for either impact of democracy level on disloyalty.
Lutscher also includes a dummy variable for voluntary recruitment, as a military
that is voluntarily recruited might be more likely to repress or remain loyal to the regime
than one that is conscripted. 184 However, the Military Recruitment Data Set, 185 which
provides this variable, is missing a significant number of observations. Consequently, I
only use it in simple, bivariate regressions, where I find it has no impact. These tests are
in the Appendix.
Unlike Lutscher, I also control for whether the country experienced a military
coup in the five years prior to the campaign. I use Powell and Thyne’s updated coup data
to code this variable, coup.186 Longstanding research shows that a history of military
intervention in politics leads to more military intervention in politics. 187 Thus, a recent
coup may increase the likelihood of military loyalty shifts. It may particularly increase
the likelihood of fragmented or disunited shifts, given that coups are often undertaken by
middle-ranking or junior officers188 or are the product of military factional rivalry.189

Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection
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Tables 2 and 3 below contain summary statistics of all of the independent and
control variables.
Table 2. Summary statistics: binary independent and control variables
Variable
Regime Type
Nonviolence
Loss
Conflict
Viol Campaign

0

1

32
99
77
78

80
10
32
34

Personal
36

Party
38

Military
23

Other
13

Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous independent and control variables
Variable
ICP
Size
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality

N
96
97
111
111
108
109

Mean
1.932995
0.6611237
0.2543
3870.252
3489.935
8489.819

Std Dev
0.6018629
0.1208322
0.1304003
3152.003
3354.155
7629.897

Min
1
0.3780322
0.0718359
0
232.25
147.8844

Max
3.614155
0.9207059
0.6949281
12236
18095.26
42163.1

Methods
I employ two estimation strategies, depending on my outcome of interest. I use
probit regression to determine the probability of defections, a binary variable. I use
multinomial logistic regression for type shift because it is a nominal variable. 190 I use
multinomial logit regression rather than ordered logistic regression because I do not
consider the categories of loyalty shifts to be ordered by rank. In tests using multinomial
logistic regression, I combine the loyal and neutral categories to form the omitted

Patrick J. McGowan, “African Military Coups d’etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends, and Distribution,”
The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 339-70.
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Multinomial logit regression is preferable to alternative models unless there is a very large-N, according
to Jay K. Dow and James W. Endersby, “Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of
Choice Models for Voting Research,” Electoral Studies 23, no. 1 (2004): 107-22.
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baseline category (n=60, or 54% of the dataset). This reflects my interest in explaining
types of military loyalty shifts versus no loyalty shift, which includes military neutrality.
The coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the effects on the log-odds of a type of
military loyalty shift relative to military loyalty/neutrality, for a one unit increase in the
predictor. I cluster robust standard errors around country, as some countries have multiple
cases.
Before presenting my multivariate results, I present some cross-tabulations of the
independent and dependent variables as a means of describing the data and assessing
non-probabilistic relationships. In Table 4, I show the mean EffectiveNumber or level of
institutional coup-proofing (ICP) across defections and types of loyalty shifts. It appears
that ICP is higher in militaries that defect, and higher for united defections than the other
shifts. The variation in defections and loyalty shifts across regime types in Table 5 is also
suggestive; defections and loyalty shifts occur often in personalist regimes, while shifts in
party regimes are rare. The variation in military regimes is less clear.
Table 4. Summary statistics for ICP across outcomes
Mean
No Defections
Defections
Loyal/Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented High Level
United Defections

Std Dev

1.889617
2.02395
1.882559
1.917845
1.921999
2.147747
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0.5787084
0.6480771
0.5621013
0.6650199
0.665045
0.6283252

Min
1
1
1
1
1
1.122787

Max
3.162959
3.614155
3.149361
3.162959
3.162959
3.614155

Table 5. Variation in outcomes across regime types
No Defections
Defections
No Shift
Low Level
Fragmented
United

Personal
Party
Military
Other
19 (25.7%) 32 (43.2%) 13 (17.6%) 10 (13.5%)
17 (47.2%) 6 (16.7%) 10 (27.8%)
3 (8.3%)
13 (22.4%) 26 (44.8%) 10 (17.2%) 9 (15.5%)
6 (37.5%) 6 (37.5%) 3 (18.75%) 1 (6.25%)
8 (40%)
2 (10%)
8 (40%)
2 (10%)
9 (56.25%)
4 (25%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.25%)

Total
74 (100%)
36 (100%)
58 (100%)
16 (100%)
20 (100%)
16 (100%)

Table 6 shows that mean campaign per capita, or the measure of protest
movement size, is larger in cases where militaries defect or shift loyalty versus remain
loyal. From Table 7, most instances of loyalty shifts occur when the protest movement is
nonviolent, though that seems to also hold for instances of loyalty. In all, the shape of the
data seems to fit my expectations, prior to the addition of covariates and measurement of
statistical significance.
Table 6. Summary statistics for size across outcomes
No Defections
Defections
Loyal/Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented High Level
United Defections

Mean
0.6566305
0.6702504
0.6418224
0.7158629
0.680569
0.6585559

Std Dev
0.1270985
0.1083313
0.1282201
0.1073814
0.1034155
0.1161367

Min
0.3780322
0.4408454
0.3780322
0.5323344
0.4465078
0.4408454

Max
0.9207059
0.8354856
0.9207059
0.8927312
0.8354856
0.8267764

Table 7. Variation in outcomes across nonviolence measure

No Defections
Defections
No Shift
Low Level
Fragmented High Level
United Defections

Nonviolence
0
1 Total
21 (27.6%) 55 (72.4%) 76 (100%)
11 (30.6%) 25 (69.4%) 36 (100%)
13 (21.7%) 47 (78.3%) 60 (100%)
8 (50%)
8 (50%) 16 (100%)
6 (30%)
14 (70%) 20 (100%)
5 (31.3%) 11 (68.8%) 16 (100%)
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Results
I begin by testing the hypotheses generated from my argument about military
disloyalty, or Hypotheses 1 through 4. I display the models with control variables here, as
they are the most theoretically and empirically interesting. The models without control
variables are in the Appendix, but I note in the text when they differ substantially from
the results with controls. These results are also limited to the subset of MEC campaigns
described above. Analyses of these cases offer the most valid tests of my argument for
the effects of threats to military functional and delegated authority on military loyalty
shifts, though at the expense of number of observations and thus the tests’ statistical
power. As previously noted, I report the results for the full dataset in the Appendix.
I first test Hypothesis 1, or the effects of coup-proofing on defections. Model H1H1a is also a test of H1a, or the independent effect of personalist regimes. The results in
Table 8, “H1-H1a” support H1 and H1a: coup-proofing in its institutional and personalist
forms threatens military functional authority and increases the probability of defections.
Some of the control variables also have their expected effects. The regime leader’s
incumbency and a recent coup positively impact defections, while greater financial
support of the military makes defections less probable. Surprisingly, higher GDP per
capita is positively associated with defections. The level of democracy does not seem to
matter either way.
This first model is additive, meaning it estimates the independent effects of the
variables. I also interact them and show the results in Table 1, under “Interaction.”191

191

In models with an interaction term, the main effects of the interacted variables may not be meaningful
and should be interpreted with caution.
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Here, I am interested if their effects are conditional: if PCP has greater effects on the
probability of defections in the presence of ICP, and vice versa, because together they are
more threatening to military functional authority. The interaction term is positive but not
statistically significant. In the model without control variables, it is statistically
significant, with a p-value of .046.
Table 8. Models of coup-proofing and defections
ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

H1-H1a
2.808***
(0.7280)
1.132**
(0.3920)
0.7710
(1.4420)
0.898**
(0.2990)
0.749**
(0.2570)
-1.146**
(0.3520)
1.542**
(0.5230)

PCP x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-8.069**
(2.8240)
94
0.289
100.726
121.072

Interaction
2.134*
(0.8620)
-0.9250
(1.7110)
0.6520
(1.4290)
0.862**
(0.2930)
0.734**
(0.2510)
-1.129**
(0.3470)
1.469**
(0.5140)
1.5150
(1.2570)
-6.803*
(2.7110)
94
0.296
101.86
124.75

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Despite the absence of statistical significance in Table 8, it is possible that the
variables’ conditional relationships with defections exist over part of the covariate space.
To investigate this, I calculate each variable’s marginal effects at substantively
meaningful values of the other – specifically, at personalist and non-personalist regimes
and ICP as an EffectiveNumber (of armed organizations) of 1, 2, and 3 - and display the
results in Figure 3. PCP and ICP both have greater effects on the probability of defections
in the presence of the other. Militaries that have been coup-proofed through personalist
control and the use of counterforces are more likely to defect than militaries that have
been coup-proofed through either form alone. Specifically, the probability of defections
increases to between .57 and .83 in personalist regimes with one or two counterforces.
Figure 3. Marginal effects of coup-proofing on the probability of defections

Note: All of the marginal effects are statistically significant besides PCP=0/EN=1.
Next, I test Hypotheses 1b and c, or the effects of other regime types on
defections. This follows from my argument that single-party and military regimes control
82

their militaries in ways less threatening to military functional authority. I test these
hypotheses separately from H1 and H1a because I am interested in the effects of each
regime type relative other regime types, including personalist. I do include ICP, since
single-party and military regimes may use institutional coup-proofing and I want to
assess the regime types’ independent effects. Both single-party and military regimes are
negatively associated with defections, but only single-party’s association is statistically
significant (Table 9). This supports H1b more than H1c. While single-party regimes
seemingly control their militaries in ways that do not threaten military functional
authority, decreasing the probability of defections, the structure and exercise of power in
military regimes cannot be said to impact defections. ICP remains positive and significant
in these models. Regardless of these regime types, institutional coup-proofing increases
defections’ probability.
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Table 9. Models of other regime types and defections
Party Regime
Military Regime
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

H1b
-1.270**
(0.4050)
-0.4480
(0.4470)
2.516***
(0.6930)
0.9380
(1.4250)
1.007***
(0.2980)
0.667**
(0.2440)
-1.048**
(0.3500)
1.436**
(0.5070)
-7.882**
(2.8190)
94
0.307
100.659
123.549

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
I test Hypothesis 2, or the relationship between protester characteristics and
defections, and display the results in Table 10. In an additive model including size and
nonviolence (“H2”), I find that neither the size of the campaign nor the absence of a
radical flank (commitment to nonviolence) has a significant, positive impact on the
probability of defections. (Their interaction also has no impact. I show this in the
Appendix.) PCP and ICP maintain their effects in this model. However, my argument
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overall contends that a military will be more likely to shift loyalty when the regime has
threatened its sources of authority and the protesters are an alternative. In other words,
Hypothesis 2 implies the effects of coup-proofing and protester characteristics on
defections are conditional on each other. As such, I first interact the two protester
variables with the coup-proofing variables. None of the interaction terms are significant,
as I show in the Appendix. In a combination of these models, though, I calculate a threeway interaction between PCP, ICP, and size, and display the results under “Interaction”
in Table 5. (I also interacted PCP and ICP with nonviolence, but the resulting conditional
relationships are not interesting. I include them in the Appendix.)
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Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and
conditional on coup-proofing
Size
Nonviolence
PCP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

H2
0.1450
(1.2360)
-0.4650
(0.3310)
1.182**
(0.4200)
2.409**
(0.7450)
0.5940
(1.4450)
0.953**
(0.3260)
0.775**
(0.2860)
-1.1760**
(0.3780)
1.785**
(0.6160)

PCPxICPxSize
ICP x Size
PCP x Size
PCP x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-7.6330**
(2.7970)
90.00
0.31
99.87
124.86

Interaction
-25.3730
(13.9060)
-0.4350
(0.3330)
-10.4320
(11.6660)
-10.4040
(6.4450)
0.9440
(1.4070)
1.032**
(0.3620)
0.853**
(0.2960)
-1.271**
(0.4140)
2.153**
(0.7680)
-9.5440
(13.5800)
18.3910
(10.2160)
14.1450
(17.5150)
7.9780
(9.0430)
9.6130
(8.9910)
90.00
0.34
104.37
139.36

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Three-way interactions are challenging to interpret, so I also create two graphs:
the marginal effects of the interaction between ICP and size when the regime is not
personalist (Figure 4), and of the same interaction when the regime is personalist (Figure
5). In calculating marginal effects, I use ICP’s values at EffectiveNumber 1, 2, and 3, as
above, and protest movement size at small, medium, and large values of campaign per
capita (.40, .65, .90).
The conditional effects of these two-way interactions in non-personalist regimes
and personalist regimes is evident in their different shapes. In substantive terms, the
probability of defections is greater with more counterforces and larger protests, and the
effects of counterforces and protests are greater in personalist regimes. High levels of
threat to military functional authority, in the context of medium and large protests, have a
large effect on the probability of defections – increasing their predicted probability to
between .55 and .99 with one or two counterforces and medium or large protests.
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Figure 4. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in non-personalist regimes

Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size;
EN=3/Medium Size; EN=3/Large Size.
Figure 5. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in personalist regimes

Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size;
EN=3/Medium Size; EN=2/Large Size; EN=3/Large Size.
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I next test for the effects of recent military defeat (loss) on defections. My
argument and specifically Hypothesis 3 expects that coup-proofing will have a larger
effect on defections in the presence of military defeat. I first test for a relationship
between loss and defections, and find none, as shown in Table 11. Next, I test H3 more
directly by interacting loss with the coup-proofing variables (“Interaction”). The
interaction terms are not significant, but when I calculate their substantive effects I find
that in personalist regimes with two counterforces, recent military loss increases the
probability of defections from .518 to .938, and in personalist regimes with three
counterforces, recent military loss increases the probability of defections from .875 to
.999. This information is displayed in Table 12. Militaries that have been coup-proofed
(through personalist and institutional forms) and defeated in conflict are more likely to
defect.
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Table 11. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing
Loss
ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

Loss
0.0600
(0.5420)
2.805***
(0.7250)
1.126**
(0.3870)
0.7700
(1.4340)
0.899**
(0.3030)
0.745**
(0.2470)
-1.142***
(0.3420)
1.540**
(0.5240)

Interaction
3.289
(2.805)
2.570*
(1.195)
-0.175
(2.148)
0.695
(1.437)
0.925**
(0.304)
0.770**
(0.268)
-1.173**
(0.363)
1.552**
(0.558)

-8.070**
(2.8390)
94
0.289
102.713
125.603

7.554
(3.980)
-2.921
(2.005)
-8.334
(5.312)
0.907
(1.562)
-7.825**
(2.962)
94
0.317
107.422
140.484

Loss x PCP x ICP
Loss x ICP
Loss x PCP
PCP x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC
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Table 12. Predicted probability of defections in coup-proofed militaries, by whether or
not have recently been defeated in conflict
No loss
Personalist regime with 1 counterforce
(EN=2)
Personalist regime with 2 counterforces
(EN=3)

Loss

0.518

0.938

0.875

0.999

Lastly, I test Hypothesis 4 and show the results in Table 13. Ongoing conflict
measured as violsim does have a statistically significant effect on the probability of
military defections, though in the opposite direction than expected. However, this
positive relationship disappears when controlling for coup-proofing and protester
characteristics, in the “Full Model.” The presence of an ongoing conflict or violent
campaign does not seem to concentrate the military in a way that makes it more
supportive of the status quo and thus less likely to defect. Neither does civil conflict
increase the probability of defections when accounting for factors related to the military’s
authority.
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Table 13. Models of ongoing conflict and defections
Conflict
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

Ongoing
0.1740
(0.3030)
0.2380
(1.1490)
0.473*
(0.1870)
0.2090
(0.1560)
-0.476**
(0.1560)
0.8700
(0.4750)

Violent

Full Model

0.1490
(1.1420)
0.504**
(0.1840)
0.2380
(0.1550)
-0.498**
(0.1580)
0.9080
(0.4660)
0.639*
(0.2690)

-1.8950
(2.0640)
103
0.12
129.005
147.448

-2.3170
(2.0200)
103
0.153
124.606
143.049

0.3160
(1.3780)
0.951**
(0.3170)
0.765**
(0.2860)
-1.174**
(0.3680)
1.838**
(0.6210)
0.5640
(0.3100)
2.298**
(0.8030)
1.201**
(0.4470)
0.2270
(1.2940)
(0.5260)
(0.3530)
-7.548**
(2.8400)
90
0.333
99.282
126.78

Viol Campaign
ICP
PCP
Size
Nonviolence
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
To summarize this section, I find support for my argument’s expectations that
coup-proofing (ICP and PCP alone and together) increases the probability of military
defections. I also find that single-party regimes and their forms of military control matter
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for military defections, making them less probable. I do not find evidence that the
protester characteristics independently impact defections. However, when I consider the
conditional effects of size, it seems that larger protests increase the probability of
defections in the presence of coup-proofing (personalist regimes with counterforces). I
find a similar conditional relationship between military loss and defections. Coupproofed militaries that have been defeated recently are much more likely to defect. The
overall results are interesting, especially when I explore them substantively. These threats
to military functional authority and the protest movement as an alternative matter for
defections, even when controlling for the influence of other factors.
With some support for my hypotheses on general defections, I move on to test
those that propose a relationship between coup-proofing and protester characteristics and
type of military loyalty shifts. In Table 14, I show the results of my tests of Hypotheses
5a and 5b – the independent effects of the forms of coup-proofing on types of loyalty
shifts. I find some support for both. ICP increases the likelihood of high level but not low
level shifts. Counterforces threaten the military, leading to loyalty shifts by the upper
ranks. The lower ranks may be unable to shift loyalty because they risk punishment by
these counterforces or their superiors. PCP has a positive and statistically significant
effect on all shifts, and especially fragmented high level. In terms of control variables, the
longer the regime leader has been in power, the more likely are high level shifts. A recent
military coup increases the likelihood of military disloyalty, but only of the disunited type
– perhaps because of the deleterious effects of coups on the military organization.
Surprisingly, greater soldier quality is only negatively and statistically significantly
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associated with fragmented high level shifts. This may indicate that financial support of
the military does not prevent all loyalty shifts, just those by a weakened military
organization. The impacts of higher GDP per capita are also limited to fragmented high
level shifts, but in the opposite direction than expected. The level of democracy is weakly
associated with low level shifts.
Table 14. Model of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types
PCP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
1.933*
(0.8770)
2.2290
(1.8510)
-5.185*
(2.3230)
0.3180
(0.4310)
0.3120
(0.3840)
0.1050
(0.7660)
2.358*
(1.1400)
-9.9430
(6.3870)
94
0.246
218.519
279.558

Fragmented
2.869***
(0.8630)
5.865**
(1.9180)
-1.5030
(4.7940)
2.060*
(0.8560)
2.139**
(0.7740)
-2.540**
(0.9670)
4.548**
(1.4110)
-21.452*
(8.5000)

United
2.111*
(0.9140)
5.443***
(1.5870)
1.4820
(3.6010)
1.203*
(0.5480)
0.6000
(0.5070)
-1.4250
(0.8570)
1.3710
(1.3510)
-11.917*
(5.1890)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Next, I test Hypothesis 5 directly by interacting coup-proofing with loss. Here,
threats to military functional authority are greatest, and high level loyalty shifts should be
especially likely. In Table 15, I specifically interact PCP with loss; I report the absence of
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results for the interaction between ICP and loss in the Appendix. (This may be a product
of the data, given the rareness of loss.) As shown by the interaction terms, loss increases
PCP’s effects on all types of loyalty shifts, when controlling for ICP.
Table 15. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types
Loss
PCP
Loss x PCP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
0.0960
(0.9670)
1.7170
(0.8770)
15.315***
(1.3930)
2.2020
(1.8020)
-4.7240
(2.4640)
0.3320
(0.4390)
0.2600
(0.3930)
0.1110
(0.7660)
2.356*
(1.1420)
-9.7670
(6.4420)
94
0.264
226.301
302.6

Fragmented
-0.4020
(1.3280)
2.817**
(0.9210)
14.776***
(1.6390)
5.842**
(1.9650)
-1.5350
(4.9460)
2.047*
(0.8540)
2.163**
(0.8000)
-2.557*
(0.9960)
4.585**
(1.4570)
-21.332*
(8.3960)

United
-13.732***
(1.6680)
1.7390
(0.9580)
29.732***
(1.9520)
5.278***
(1.5760)
1.5270
(3.3920)
1.286*
(0.5570)
0.6020
(0.4870)
-1.3850
(0.8240)
1.6060
(1.4250)
-12.641*
(5.2830)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
However, when I calculate the marginal effects of PCP at substantively
meaningful values of loss (0 and 1), they are only statistically significant for united
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defections. This finding is shown graphically in Figure 6: a military that has been coupproofed using personalist forms is more likely to defect as a united organization when it
has recently been defeated in conflict. Here, its threatened functional authority is
especially evident.
Figure 6. Marginal effects of PCP and military loss on united defections

Next, I evaluate support for Hypothesis 6, or the effects of the protest movement
on types of loyalty shifts. So far, I have only considered the role of threats to military
functional authority – without considering how the protest movement as an alternative
might further impact a military’s response. I first assess the variables individually. Then,
I use interactions to test the overall argument for high level loyalty shifts: militaries that
have been coup-proofed are more likely to shift loyalty through united defections when
protests are large and nonviolent. Conversely, lower levels of coup-proofing, or coupproofing with smaller protests not necessarily committed to nonviolence, may impact the
likelihood of lower level loyalty shifts.
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I find support for H6 as well as other hypotheses with the additive model (Table
16). As concerns H5a and 5b, when controlling for protester characteristics, ICP
independently increases the likelihood of high level but not low level shifts. Personalist
coup-proofing increases the likelihood of all shifts, but fragmented high level and low
level more than united defections, perhaps because of its effects on the military
organization.192 Size only has a positive, statistically significant effect on low level shifts
– without taking into account any interactions with coup-proofing, anyway. Larger
protests may be more likely to require the involvement of the rank and file and lowranking officers, and thus provide them motives and opportunities to disobey regime
orders or join the opposition movement.193 Nonviolence does not seem to matter, at least
not as measured and included here. From the summary statistics in Table 2, MEC codes
most of the protest movements in this dataset as nonviolent (67%), so perhaps
nonviolence is defined overly broadly as to have significant impacts.
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These findings are further borne out when I do individual probit regressions for types of loyalty shifts,
as binary outcomes. I report the full results in the Appendix, but summarize them here. On low level shifts,
PCP has a positive and weak effect (p-value .083), while ICP’s association is far from statistically
significant. For fragmented high level shifts, PCP has a positive and strong effect (p-value .007). ICP also
has a positive effect, but statistically, it is not significant (p-value .071). For united defections, PCP is
positive but not statistically significant, while ICP is positive with a p-value of .022.
Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in
Authoritarian Regimes,” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52.
193
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Table 16. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coupproofing
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
10.138***
(3.0760)
-0.8500
(0.8330)
2.9200
(1.8710)
3.048**
(1.0710)
-4.7060
(2.8740)
0.1610
(0.2640)
0.1650
(0.5020)
-0.1960
(0.7140)
1.6030
(0.9610)
-12.627*
(6.2840)
90
0.306
211.506
286.5

Fragmented
3.5970
(2.6160)
-1.0370
(0.8280)
5.576**
(2.0220)
3.561**
(1.0920)
-2.5890
(4.9360)
2.119*
(0.9940)
2.227*
(0.8810)
-2.722*
(1.1550)
4.941**
(1.6430)
-22.143**
(8.5870)

United
3.1900
(3.8550)
-0.9670
(0.8850)
5.508**
(1.6990)
2.630*
(1.1890)
1.0370
(4.7730)
1.268*
(0.5700)
0.7020
(0.5740)
-1.6320
(0.8860)
1.5950
(1.4930)
-12.882*
(5.4970)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
In the model shown in Table 17, I interact ICP and size. (I interact the other
combinations of coup-proofing and protest movement variables and find that their
interaction terms and marginal effects are insignificant or not meaningful. I include the
results in the Appendix. Nonviolence as measured does not seem to matter for loyalty
shifts, and large protests may be unable to generate united defections by a military whose
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organization has been damaged by personalist coup-proofing.) I am interested in whether
higher levels of ICP combined with large protests will increase the likelihood of united
defections. At first glance, I find additional support for H5b and the effects of PCP.
Personalist coup-proofing threatens military functional authority but also negatively
impacts the military organization, having greater effects on low level and fragmented
shifts than united defections.
For H6, the interaction term of ICP and size is negative and statistically
significant on low level shifts. Its negative coefficient along with size’s positive
coefficient seems to indicate that as ICP get larger, the positive effect of size on the
likelihood of low level shifts gets smaller. When I calculate the marginal effects at the
variables’ substantively meaningful values, few are significant but generally align with
my argument. I show the results in the Appendix and summarize them here: the predicted
probability of low level shifts increases to .75 with large protests when there are no
counterforces. Size is explanatory of low level shifts, but only at low levels of ICP. The
presence of more counterforces seems to reduce the ability of the rank and file and lowranking officers to shift loyalty, regardless of protest size.
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Table 17. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on
ICP
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Size x ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
44.200*
(17.5580)
-0.7920
(0.8250)
20.914*
(8.5290)
3.146**
(1.0480)
-24.630*
(12.1650)
-4.9080
(2.8640)
0.1340
(0.2900)
0.1400
(0.5250)
-0.1990
(0.7150)
1.1150
(0.8050)
-37.163**
(13.1170)
90
0.328
212.681
295.175

Fragmented
-7.1010
(17.6110)
-1.0470
(0.8620)
0.4660
(8.9090)
3.704***
(1.1080)
8.4070
(13.0000)
-2.4200
(5.5460)
2.227*
(1.0410)
2.325*
(0.9250)
-2.851*
(1.2410)
5.337**
(1.8130)
-16.3530
(14.1930)

United
-34.9000
(27.0280)
-1.0740
(0.9170)
-11.9830
(12.5600)
2.469*
(1.1860)
27.8550
(19.7730)
2.3940
(4.3830)
1.325*
(0.5340)
0.7940
(0.5670)
-1.824*
(0.9270)
1.8140
(1.5770)
11.1730
(17.3440)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
The interaction term on united defections is not statistically significant, but the
variables have marginal effects. It is clear, based on Figure 7, that the effect of each on
the predicted probability of the outcome is conditional on the values of the other. Further,
these effects of ICP and size are statistically significant at their highest values. United
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defections are up to 84 percent likely when the regime uses two counterforces and the
protests are large. Here, the military’s functional capabilities and authority are threatened
by the existence of other security forces. That the protests involve large numbers of the
population indicates to the military that the movement for regime change is widely
supported, and a new government may be more legitimate.
Figure 7. Marginal effects of ICP and size on united defections

Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size;
EN=3/Medium Size; EN=3/Large Size.
Lastly, I calculate the marginal effects of PCP on the predicted probability of each
outcome (holding the other covariates at their means) and display them in Figure 8. As
suggested by the coefficients and signs, personalist coup-proofing increases the
probability of fragmented high level shifts most, followed by low level shifts, with only a
small effect on united defections. This supports my expectations – because militaries that
have been personalist coup-proofed are more likely to shift loyalty, yet are
organizationally weakened and may struggle to defect as united organizations.
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Figure 8. Marginal effects of PCP on types of loyalty shifts

These final statistical results and substantive effects provide support for my
overall argument regarding the relationship between threats to military functional
authority and types of military loyalty shifts, and the protest movement as affecting
military disloyalty by being more supportive of military authority. Large protests increase
the likelihood of united defections by a military that has been coup-proofed because they
indicate the opposition movement is widely supported and perhaps more legitimate than
the regime that has threatened military functional authority. Large protests also increase
the likelihood of low level shifts, at least when there are few counterforces to monitor and
punish disloyalty at this level. Coup-proofing through personalist control primarily
affects fragmented shifts because of its impacts on the military organization in addition to
its threats to military functional authority. I discuss these findings’ contributions and
limitations and introduce the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to conclude.
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Conclusions
To summarize, militaries that have been coup-proofed do appear more likely to
shift loyalty from authoritarian regimes in response to anti-regime protest movements,
and the positive effects of coup-proofing on defections are stronger when the military has
recently been defeated in conflict or when the protest movement is large in size.
Militaries that have been coup-proofed are also more likely to shift loyalty at higher
levels, but different forms of coup-proofing have different effects. Personalist coupproofing makes low level and fragmented high level shifts (and to a lesser extent, united
defections) more likely, and my argument suggests this is because of its impacts on the
military organization. Institutional coup-proofing makes high level shifts and especially
united defections more likely, but has no effect on low level loyalty shifts. This is
probably because the presence of more counterforces makes it difficult for small numbers
of the rank and file or low ranking officers to shift loyalty without being detected or
punished. Low level shifts are more likely during large protests, perhaps because such
protests are likely to involve these sections of the military and provide them the
motivation and ability to act. Finally, large protests increase the effect of institutional
coup-proofing on united defections.
In this chapter, then, I used quantitative data and regression analyses to generate
preliminary support for my argument’s empirical expectations. These findings come
about through statistically significant relationships between the independent and
dependent variables. The explanatory factors related to coup-proofing and protester
characteristics (in particular, size) have the hypothesized effects on defections and types
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of loyalty shifts. The relationships hold even when accounting for the influence of other,
potentially confounding factors. This method – regression analysis – is particularly useful
for demonstrating the independent effects of the variables, such as personalist and
institutional coup-proofing, for which I have specific sub-hypotheses. It is also capable of
testing for the conditional effects of variables. The results confirm that the coup-proofing
and protester characteristics’ effects are stronger when considered together, and that they
interact differently for the types of loyalty shifts. The models with interactions pose
challenges for my analysis, though, given that the terms are either statistically
insignificant or substantively difficult to interpret. Including them also reduces the
statistical degrees of freedom in an already small set of cases/number of observations.
This evidence altogether provides backing for my overall argument that militaries
are more likely to shift loyalty to the protesters when the regime has threatened military
sources of authority and the protesters offer an alternative. Greater threats to military
functional authority increase the likelihood of high level shifts, as does regime coupproofing along with large protests. The regime’s forms of military control matter for
military authority and thus loyalty. This is further demonstrated by the negative
relationship between single-party regimes and defections. The protest movement is also
important – as the military’s ultimate source of delegated authority, and the regime
challenge to which it responds. The protests’ characteristics affect whether and how the
military shifts loyalty. But protest size and nonviolence are not sufficient for explaining
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military disloyalty, particularly at higher levels. The military must be facing threats to its
functional authority, too. 194
This evidence also challenges the existing scholarship on defections. Though
small, it offers some key propositions: military loyalty shifts are more likely when the
regime has used a) identity-based ties;195 b) divide and rule tactics;196 c) either no
counterforces or many counterforces;197 or d) counterforces, and the opposition is
credible.198 I find support for the analyses’ general intuition, that coup-proofing by the
regime increases the likelihood of defections. However, I challenge any of these singular
explanations by finding that they vary depending on the type of loyalty shifts. I organize
them into a more coherent whole with my argument on military sources of authority. I
also bring in the protest movement and show that protester characteristics (in particular,
size) meaningfully condition the effects of coup-proofing on military disloyalty.
As a transition to the next chapter, I address the shortcomings of the above
analysis. First, the data has some issues. As I mentioned above, the data on institutional
coup-proofing and protest size are spotty and may be mismeasured or unreliable. I also
194

This is against the expectations of Chenoweth and Stephan, who find that the probability of defections
increases as campaign membership increases (Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conflict, 48).
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recognize that my other coup-proofing variable – personalist regime type – is a very
imperfect proxy measure of the actual coup-proofing strategies in which I am interested. I
believe the variable captures important aspects of regime exercise of authority, that vary
across regime types. But I cannot point to the variable and its effects in my models and
know exactly what part of “personalist regime” is doing the explanatory work.
Fortunately, there are ongoing efforts to improve data on these concepts. One
exciting project is De Bruin’s Security Force Dataset, which collects data on coupproofing in more clearly defined and disaggregated forms. 199 MEC is also ongoing and
perhaps its updated version will have new data on campaign membership. I look forward
to the release of these datasets so that I can see if my findings using the coarser measures
hold, and to generate new insights regarding my argument and its observable
implications.
Finally, all probabilistic statistical analyses encounter the same issues: the
possibility of omitted variable bias and endogeneity, and the challenge of drawing causal
inferences from correlational data. The first set of issues are in some ways compounded
here because of my relatively small sample size. In the qualitative case study chapters I
better evaluate the causal mechanisms. First, though, I use Qualitative Comparative
Analysis to assess my argument’s propositions as combinations of causal conditions,
using a smaller number of especially comparable cases. The relationships I have
hypothesized are more complicated than the linear, additive ones regression analysis
assumes. QCA’s strengths as a technique allows me to build on the preliminary evidence

Erica De Bruin, “Mapping Coercive Institutions: A New Data Set of State Security Forces, 1960-2010”,
forthcoming.
199
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gathered in this chapter while more directly assessing the configurations of factors that
produce outcomes.
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CHAPTER FOUR: QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Because I have a relatively small number of cases and my argument concerns
factors related to regime-military relations and the protest movement that combine to
produce threats to military functional authority, in this chapter I use another method to
assess empirical support: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This method is
recommended when the number of cases is less than 100, because probabilistic
statistical analyses and results could be unstable and underpowered. QCA is also a
configurational rather than regression approach, so it can assess the multiple causal
pathways or combinations of conditions that lead to an outcome. Using logical inference
or Boolean analysis, it produces configurations that describe the data and suggest causal
relations.
To review, I argue that militaries will be more likely to shift loyalty when the
regime has compromised their functional capacities and the protest movement is an
alternative source of military authority. It follows that both regime coup-proofing and
protester characteristics matter. In conjunctural terms, regime coup-proofing and a large
and nonviolent protest movement combine as different levels of threat to military
authority that produce different military responses. Because the variables matter for
their impacts on military authority, they may be substitutable and conditional. For
example, regime coup-proofing in both its institutional and personalist forms may
threaten military functional authority and increase the likelihood of defections. But
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nonviolent. Further, other variables such as military loss may not have independent
effects on defections but could increase their likelihood if the military has been coupproofed.
In the previous chapter, I presented preliminary evidence for my argument and
the hypothesized relationships using quantitative data and regression techniques. I also
acknowledged that approach’s shortcomings. The models without interactions assume
the variables’ relationships are linear and additive – that the more independent variables
present, the more likely the dependent variable - and not true tests of my theoretical
expectations. When I added interactions to the models, the terms were either
statistically insignificant or substantively difficult to interpret. The additional terms also
reduced the statistical degrees of freedom in an analysis of an already relatively small
number of cases. Lastly, loyalty shifts likely occur as a result of multiple causal
processes, but such complexity is challenging to unravel using regressions.
I use QCA to explicitly evaluate my argument and hypotheses in terms of
conjunctural causation that is contextual, where causal factors may substitute for each
other. In particular, I generate findings for necessary and/or sufficient conditions and
sufficient combinations of conditions, for each of the outcomes. This differs from
testing whether independent variables have statistically significant positive or negative
effects on the dependent variable while controlling for other factors. Rather, it is a
means to assess how causal conditions combine to produce an outcome. I find that the
explanatory factors related to coup-proofing and protester characteristics matter because
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they combine, in multiple ways, to affect military functional and delegated authority
and thus cause military loyalty shifts.
Brief Introduction to QCA as a Method
In the social sciences, theories often imply or expect equifinality (i.e. multiple
causal pathways to the same outcome) or multicausality (i.e. many causal factors matter
for an outcome). Such theories are difficult to evaluate empirically, and especially using
probabilistic statistics. A classic example to illustrate the shortcomings of such analyses
is explaining why an employee was fired from her job. She could be fired for
committing various infractions, each being enough: skipping work, stealing from the
copyroom, lying to her boss. In regression analysis, the relationship between these
factors and the outcome is modeled such that the more infractions she commits, the
more likely she will be fired. QCA enables researchers to conclude that these factors or
conditions are in fact causally equivalent: the presence of each is sufficient for her
firing.200 An outcome can result from different factors or combinations of factors.
QCA was designed to assess the causal contributions of different conditions to
an outcome. It takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of both quantitative and
qualitative approaches, aiming to “allow systematic cross-case comparisons, while at
the same time giving justice to within-case complexity.”201 Its focus on causal
complexity aligns it with qualitative research, but its ability to examine evidence across

This is a common illustration, but here I draw on Chan’s use of it. Steve Chan, “Explaining War
Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 1 (2003): 49-66.
200
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Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, eds., Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), xviii.
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a larger set of cases means it can identify more generalized relationships. Given these
features, it is useful for analysis of small to medium-N sets of data.202
QCA’s main weakness is that is does not provide estimates of the statistical
significance and magnitude of independent variables’ effects on the dependent
variable.203 Social scientists such as Braumoeller (2015) have criticized QCA for this
reason and others. 204 However, the QCA program I use below allows me to calculate
solutions’ coverage and consistency, which provide parameters of fit and indicate
empirical relevance. I employed regression methods in the previous chapter to analyze
and assess the variables’ statistical relationships. These approaches together provide
support for my argument’s empirical expectations.
This Chapter’s QCA Strategy
The primary goal of QCA is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for
the outcome.205 Necessary conditions are those that are shared by cases with the same
outcome, while sufficiency is determined by investigating whether cases with the same
conditions also have the same outcomes. 206 In QCA, the researcher creates a truth table

Benoit Rihoux, “Case-Oriented Configurational Research Using QCA (Qualitative Comparative
Analysis)”, in Oxford Handbook of Political Science: Methodology edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier,
Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 423.
202

203

However, as Chan points out, estimating the statistical effects of independent variables may be
problematic if the “relevant causal processes are not mutually exclusive.” Chan, “Explaining War
Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes,” 63.
Bear F. Braumoeller, “Guarding Against False Positives in Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Political
Analysis 23, no. 4 (2015): 471-487. Specifically, he says that QCA is vulnerable to type I error and multiple
inference.
204

205

Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

Rihoux, “Case-Oriented Configurational Research Using QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis),”
724.
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with all possible combinations of conditions and outcomes and the cases that fit them.
She then analyzes the truth table for combinations sufficient for the outcome and
assesses the findings in terms of the hypothesized causal relations. In this chapter, I
follow these steps using a Stata package, fuzzy. It produces solution terms for the
sufficient configurations by performing various tests with standards that I specify.
I use the same data that I did for the regression analyses. Following my
discussion in Chapter Three, I do not include democratic, Soviet Republic, or nonindependent cases. QCA does not allow for “control variables,” so I apply a number of
scope conditions to further restrict my dataset to cases that are especially comparable.
Specifically, I include only post-Cold War cases that did not experience a coup in the
five years prior to the campaign, as these two factors were theoretically interesting and
at times statistically important controls in the previous chapter. 207 This reduced dataset
has 58 cases. In sum, I analyze two medium-n datasets of conditions and outcomes: one
of countries that are independent, non-democratic, and non-Soviet Republic; and one of
countries that are also post-Cold War with no recent coups.
Most of the conditions are dichotomous variables; in QCA terms, they are
calibrated as crisp sets. I calibrate the two continuous variables, EffectiveNumber and
size, as crisp sets as well. I do this because I am interested in the effects of presence of
institutional coup-proofing (ICP) versus absence of ICP, and large campaigns (SIZE)
versus small campaigns. Dichotomous variables and crisp sets measure differences in
type rather than degree. As I detail below, I define the specific set membership scores
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I also applied a scope condition related to the incumbent variable, but it did not change the
below findings.
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(i.e. whether an observation is coded 1 or 0) depending on the particular outcome of
interest. Importantly, though, I define membership and code observations based on my
argument and knowledge of the cases, rather than by relying on “internal criteria” like
mean or mode.208
Empirical Propositions
Here I list the empirical propositions I test with QCA. They are essentially the
hypotheses from Chapter Two, but more explicitly identify the presence or absence of
conditions, in particular combinations, under which the outcome is likely to occur. The
key defines the conditions’ abbreviations. In standard QCA notation, “*” denotes “and”,
“+” denotes “or”, upper-case letters denote the presence of a condition, and lower-case
letters denote the absence of a condition.
Key:
ICP = institutional coup-proofing
PCP = personalist coup-proofing
SIZE = protest movement size
NV = protest movement nonviolence (or absence of a radical flank)
OPP = institutionalized opposition (see footnote 170 in Chapter Three)
LOSS = recent military loss
VIOL = ongoing violent conflict
Defections = ICP * SIZE * NV + PCP * SIZE * NV + ICP * OPP + PCP * OPP
Interpretation: Defections are likely in cases with coup-proofing (either form)
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Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2008), 30.

113

and large, nonviolent protests, or coup-proofing (either form) and an
institutionalized opposition.
Low level loyalty shifts = icp * PCP * loss * medSIZE + icp * PCP * loss * medsize *
VIOLSIM
Interpretation: Low level shifts are likely in cases with personalist coup-proofing (not
institutional coup-proofing), medium-sized (or larger) protests, and no recent military
loss, or personalist coup-proofing (not institutional coup-proofing), small protests and no
recent military loss but ongoing violent conflict. Protest movement nonviolence will not
matter.
Fragmented high level loyalty shifts = PCP * modICP * loss * medSIZE + PCP *
modICP * loss * NV + PCP * icp * medSIZE * NV
Interpretation: Fragmented high level shifts are likely in cases with personalist coupproofing, moderate institutional coup-proofing, and medium-sized (or larger) or
nonviolent protests, or personalist coup-proofing and medium-sized (or larger),
nonviolent protests.
United defections = ICP * PCP * lgSIZE * NV + ICP * PCP * OPP + ICP * LOSS *
SIZE * NV + PCP * LOSS * SIZE * NV + ICP * LOSS * OPP + PCP * LOSS * OPP
Interpretation: United defections are likely in cases with both forms of coup-proofing (or
one form and military loss) and large, nonviolent protests (or an institutionalized
opposition).
My goal with QCA is to uncover the combinations of conditions under which
defections and types of military loyalty shifts occur. As suggested by Schneider and
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Wagemann,209 I also analyze the conditions under which the outcomes do not occur. I
take each outcome in turn in the following sections.
Findings: Defections
First, I analyze defections. I start with the conditions I expect to be most
explanatory for the outcome and use the full set of cases (i.e. independent nondemocracies, non-Soviet Republics). Because I am interested in the effects of any amount
of institutional coup-proofing and large campaigns, I assign ICP a score of 1 if the
effective number of armed organizations is greater than 2, and SIZE a score of 1 if the
campaign per capita is greater than .7. 210
Before assessing the conditions’ combinations, I test if any of them is individually
necessary for defections. Necessity is a high bar, and following Ragin, I set the minimal
consistency benchmark for necessity at a level of .9. 211 I use fuzzy to produce a
sufficiency and necessity matrix and display it in Table 1. Sufficiency scores are in the
upper left, and necessity in the lower right. The matrix shows that no conditions qualify
as necessary for defections. The closest is NV, at .677. In terms of the overall dataset,
though, NV is present in 70 percent of the cases, so it is unsurprising that it is almost
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Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide
to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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An effective number of two means there is at least one ground based force parallel to the regular
military. A campaign per capita of .7 is higher than the mean (.659), and is roughly equivalent to a nonlogged campaign size divided by total population value of .006. In case terms, the campaign against the
military dictatorship in Thailand in October and November 1973 was roughly this size, with approximately
250,000 participants relative to a population of just over 4 million. It was considered a “massive student
protest” (Frank C. Darling, “Student Protest and Political Change in Thailand,” Pacific Affairs 47, no. 1
(1974), 15) that included a “large sector of the citizenry” (Clark D. Neher, “Stability and Instability in
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always present in defections. As for sufficiency, PCP scores highest with .469. This
condition is the one that individually is most sufficient for defections.
Table 1. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for defections outcome
OPP
NV
SIZE
PCP
ICP
Defections

Defections
0.321
0.339
0.455
0.469
0.389
1.000

ICP
0.434
0.387
0.364
0.344
1.000
0.452

PCP
0.415
0.371
0.273
1.000
0.306
0.484

SIZE
0.377
0.371
1.000
0.281
0.333
0.484

NV
0.642
1.000
0.697
0.719
0.667
0.677

OPP
1.000
0.548
0.606
0.688
0.639
0.548

Next, I examine the configurations’ consistency with sufficiency for the
outcomes, or the degree to which the configurations are sufficient for defections. The
fuzzy program analyzes the truth table and evaluates the combinations of conditions that
are sufficient for the outcome, using various tests and standards. I set a consistency
threshold of .75, the minimal value suggested by Ragin. This produces a complex
solution of six configurations. It is likely that some conditions are irrelevant, so fuzzy uses
inferential logic/Boolean algebra to simplify or reduce the results. This yields a “final
reduction set” or solution of five configurations, as well as measures of coverage and
consistency. I show the results in Table 2.
Table 2. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (full dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
ICP*pcp*SIZE*nv*opp
1.000
0.032
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP
1.000
0.097
PCP*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.097
ICP*PCP*NV*opp
1.000
0.065
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV
1.000
0.097
Total coverage = 0.323
Solution consistency = 1.000
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Unique
0.032
0.097
0.065
0.032
0.065

The solution consistency is 1.000, meaning that all cases with these
configurations have defections. (Consistency is analogous to model fit in a regression
analysis.) The total coverage is quite low, at .323. The configurations leave many cases of
defection unexplained; they are not very empirically relevant. Though disappointing, this
result is perhaps unsurprising, given that so far I have included only the main conditions
and am using the full set of cases.
Rather than interpret these results, I scope the dataset to post-Cold War cases with
no recent coups, to reduce the influence of other factors. Using the same processes as
above, I get four configurations, with a consistency score of 1.000 and better coverage of
.538. I show them in Table 3. The first insight from the solution is that PCP is present in
every configuration. This means that in the presence of PCP, the other conditions’
combinations are causally equivalent. Against my expectations, the other form of coupproofing, ICP, is not individually important. But that neither PCP alone nor PCP and ICP
together are sufficient for defections supports my overall argument that coup-proofing
must be combined with either large, nonviolent protests or an institutionalized opposition
for this outcome. The only configuration in which SIZE and OPP are absent, both forms
of coup-proofing are present, with NV.
Table 3. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP
1.000
0.231
PCP*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.154
ICP*PCP*NV*opp
1.000
0.154
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV
1.000
0.154
Total coverage = 0.538
Solution consistency = 1.000
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Unique
0.231
0.077
0.077
0.077

Lastly, I attempt to achieve a higher coverage score – or explain more cases of
defections - by adding other conditions. Specifically, I add VIOL (expecting it to be
absent in cases of defection) and PARTY (expecting it to be either absent, or present in
combination with ICP and large, nonviolent protests).212 The fuzzy analysis produces
nine configurations that reduce to six. Together, they have a consistency score of 1.000
and coverage of .692. Including the additional conditions does explain more cases. They
also make the configurations more complex and interpretation of them challenging. I
show the results in Table 4. In brief, however: PCP is again nearly always present. The
only configuration in which it is absent includes PARTY (with NV and OPP, but not
ICP surprisingly). SIZE/NV and OPP again seem to substitute for each other. Further, if
NV is present but SIZE and OPP are absent, both forms of coup-proofing must be
present, too. VIOL does not seem to matter, though it may be an important condition in
party regimes.
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From Chapters Two and Three, single-party regimes are less likely to experience defections, when
controlling for institutional coup-proofing. Though these regimes do not use personalist coup-proofing,
they may use institutional, and may experience defections when protests are especially large and
nonviolent.
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Table 4. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset with
additional conditions)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*SIZE*NV*viol*opp*party
1.000
0.077
ICP*PCP*size*NV*viol*opp*party
1.000
0.077
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*viol*OPP*party
1.000
0.077
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*VIOL*opp*party
1.000
0.077
icp*pcp*NV*VIOL*OPP*PARTY
1.000
0.154
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP*party
1.000
0.231
Total coverage = 0.692
Solution consistency = 1.000

Unique
0.077
0.077
0.077
0.077
0.154
0.231

In sum, then, coup-proofing and protester or opposition characteristics combine in
various ways to produce defections. For these cases, personalist coup-proofing and either
large, nonviolent protests or an institutionalized opposition must be present for defections
to occur. Defections may occur in party regimes, but only when protests are nonviolent,
there is an institutionalized opposition, and a violent campaign is ongoing. Perhaps a
violent campaign generates military discontent with the regime in ways similar to coupproofing. It is important to remember that the defections outcome groups both types of
high level shifts together, even though they are likely explained by different causal
processes. I assess such differences below, but first analyze the conditions under which
defections do not occur.
Findings: No Defections
I follow an abbreviated version of the above steps to get a basic explanation of the
absence of defections. I limit my reporting of findings to those for the main conditions
and the reduced set of cases. Using the .75 threshold, the conditions result in 15
configurations that reduce to six. The solution has a coverage score of .805 and
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consistency of 1.000. It seems that these combinations of conditions explain the absence
of defections well. Coup-proofing (specifically ICP) is present in only one configuration.
OPP, NV, and SIZE are present in varying combinations, but absent coup-proofing, they
are sufficient for no defections (not sufficient for defections).
Table 5. Sufficient configurations for no defections outcome (reduced dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
ICP*pcp*NV*OPP
1.000
0.098
icp*pcp*opp
1.000
0.171
pcp*size*OPP
1.000
0.268
icp*size*NV
1.000
0.341
size*NV*OPP
1.000
0.341
icp*SIZE*nv
1.000
0.098
Total coverage = 0.805

Unique
0.049
0.073
0.122
0.049
0.073
0.073

Solution consistency = 1.000
Findings: Low Level Loyalty Shifts
I follow the same steps for the other outcomes, starting with low level loyalty
shifts. I score ICP and SIZE differently because I expect low level shifts to be unlikely
in cases with any amount of institutional coup-proofing, and likely in cases with at least
medium-sized protests. I calibrate ICP as a fuzzy set by standardizing the continuous
measure. I assign SIZE a 1 if campaign per capita is greater than .65. 213 From the
empirical proposition above, I add conditions for military loss (LOSS) and ongoing
violent campaign (VIOL). I do not expect LOSS to matter but add it to begin

This is close to the mean value of campaign per capita and corresponds to a case such as Kyrgyzstan’s
Tulip Revolution in spring 2005. Around 20,000 protesters participated in the campaign, relative to a
population of 5.16 million, for a campaign per capita of .004. According to analysts, the campaign did not
generate as much participation as similar movements in neighboring countries, and its success owed more
to state weakness than “extremely large demonstrations” (Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in
Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives
on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007)).
213

120

differentiating solutions for low level versus high level shifts. I do not have clear
expectations for VIOL. Violent conflict is likely to involve the rank and file, though, so
perhaps its presence will have an effect.
Using these conditions, I test for sufficiency and necessity with a matrix that I
show in Table 6. No conditions are necessary, though SIZE, at .727, comes close. A
medium-sized (or larger) protest movement is almost necessary for low level loyalty
shifts. No condition is close to sufficient; LOSS scores highest, but only .222.
Table 6. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for low level loyalty shifts outcome
VIOL
NV
SIZE
LOSS
PCP
ICP
Low level

Low level
0.188
0.094
0.154
0.222
0.182
0.121
1.000

ICP
0.566
0.476
0.530
0.513
0.427
1.000
0.492

PCP
0.344
0.375
0.288
0.444
1.000
0.314
0.545

LOSS
0.156
0.094
0.115
1.000
0.121
0.103
0.182

SIZE
0.562
0.562
1.000
0.667
0.455
0.615
0.727

NV
0.750
1.000
0.692
0.667
0.727
0.680
0.545

VIOL
1.000
0.375
0.346
0.556
0.333
0.404
0.545

I examine the configurations’ sufficiency, again applying the .75 consistency
threshold. Running this test in fuzzy produces a complex solution of five sets, which
logically reduce to three. The solution consistency is .929, and total coverage .333. The
results are in Table 7. At first glance it is evident that ICP is either absent or missing in all
of the solutions, as expected. PCP is not always present; when it is absent, either LOSS,
SIZE, and NV are present (with VIOL absent), or SIZE and VIOL are present (with
LOSS and NV absent).
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Table 7. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (full
dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*pcp*LOSS*SIZE*NV*viol
0.767
0.083
pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL
1.000
0.167
PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*VIOL
1.000
0.083
Total coverage = 0.333
Solution consistency = 0.929

Unique
0.083
0.167
0.083

I scope my dataset before interpreting the results further. For these cases, seven
configurations consistent with sufficiency at .75 reduce to three, plus a set of two
alternates. As shown in Table 8, the consistency is now 1.000, but the coverage
improves very little. Overall though this is an improvement. ICP is again absent or
missing in the configurations. PCP is often present; when it is absent, SIZE and VIOL
are present, and LOSS and NV are absent. SIZE is almost always present. VIOL is
present in every configuration – for low level shifts to occur, it is therefore important
that a violent conflict is ongoing. This is interesting, especially since the factor was not
statistically significant in my regression analyses. Perhaps VIOL provides the rank and
file motivation or opportunity for disloyalty in the context of protests. In sum, it seems
that low level loyalty shifts are likely under conditions of ongoing violent conflict along
with either medium-sized (or larger) protests or personalist coup-proofing. Protest
movement nonviolence and recent military loss do not have clear effects.
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Table 8. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL
1.000
0.125
PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL
1.000
0.125
PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*VIOL
1.000
0.125
Total coverage = 0.375
Solution consistency = 1.000
And one of:
icp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL
icp*PCP*SIZE*nv*VIOL

Unique
0.125
0.125
0.125

The findings support my expectations in some ways but not others. Low level
shifts are likely to occur when protests are at least medium-sized and a violent conflict is
ongoing. Perhaps the probable involvement of the rank and file or low ranking officers in
such protests and conflict provides them the motivation and opportunity to shift loyalty.
In terms of coup-proofing, the shifts are unlikely under institutional coup-proofing, and
somewhat likely under personalist coup-proofing in the context of other conditions.
Overall, the low coverage scores indicate this outcome might be partly explained by
factors that I am not considering, that are perhaps less structural and even more context
specific.
Findings: No Low Level Loyalty Shifts
I show findings for the absence of low level loyalty shifts in Table 9, following an
analysis with the theoretically informed conditions on the reduced set of cases. 27
configurations have consistency scores higher than .75. They reduce to eight, resulting in
a solution with coverage of .948 and consistency of .926. In terms of insights, one
configuration includes PCP and SIZE, but ICP, NV, and VIOL are also present. Low
level loyalty shifts are unlikely to occur when PCP and SIZE are absent, or when they are
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present along with other conditions. In the latter configurations, the cases may be higher
level loyalty shifts.
Table 9. Sufficient configurations for no low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced
dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*VIOL
1.000
0.022
icp*loss*size*viol
0.891
0.198
pcp*loss*SIZE*viol
1.000
0.196
LOSS*size*nv*VIOL
1.000
0.043
pcp*loss*NV
0.950
0.413
pcp*NV*viol
loss*NV*viol
loss*SIZE*NV
Total coverage = 0.948
Solution consistency = 0.926

1.000
0.905
0.889

0.217
0.413
0.348

Unique
0.022
0.056
0.109
0.043
0.130
0.043
0.027
0.021

Findings: Fragmented High Level Shifts
Next up for analysis is fragmented high level shifts, and from the above I expect
a combination of personalist coup-proofing, moderate ICP, and medium-sized or
nonviolent protests to be sufficient. Personalist coup-proofing alone may be sufficient if
it is accompanied by protests that are both medium-sized (or larger) and nonviolent.
Accordingly, I assign ICP a score of 1 when the effective number of armed
organizations is greater than 2.25, and SIZE a score of 1 when campaign per capita is
larger than .65.214 I first produce a sufficiency and necessity matrix (Table 10). NV is
close to necessity, at .722, but does not meet the benchmark of .9. PCP has the highest
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For ICP, this is a higher threshold than previous calibrations. It indicates that on average, cases have
more than one counterforce to the regular military.
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consistency score, .242. After determining that no conditions are individually necessary
or sufficient, I move on to assessing the configurations’ sufficiency.
Table 10. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for fragmented high level loyalty shifts
outcome
VIOL
NV
SIZE
LOSS
PCP
ICP

Fragmented
0.219
0.203
0.212
0.222
0.242
0.200

ICP
0.375
0.266
0.327
0.333
0.242
1.000

PCP
0.344
0.375
0.288
0.444
1.000
0.320

LOSS
0.156
0.094
0.115
1.000
0.121
0.120

SIZE
0.562
0.562
1.000
0.667
0.455
0.680

NV
0.750
1.000
0.692
0.667
0.727
0.680

VIOL
1.000
0.375
0.346
0.556
0.333
0.480

Fragmented

1.000

0.278

0.444

0.111

0.611

0.722

0.389

At the consistency threshold of .75, the fuzzy program returns five
configurations that reduce to four. They are shown in Table 11. The consistency of the
solution is 1.000, and the coverage is .278. Somewhat surprisingly, PCP is not present
in all of the configurations. VIOL may substitute for it, given that it is present in both
configurations that PCP is absent. As expected, cases with PCP, SIZE, and NV (and
absent ICP) are cases with fragmented high level shifts, but LOSS is present too, and
the cases are few in number. The only configuration in which both forms of coupproofing are present also has NV and VIOL and an absence of LOSS. While VIOL was
not a statistically significant independent variable in Chapter Three, it seems to be an
important condition here.
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Table 11. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome
(full dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*pcp*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL
1.000
0.056
icp*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*viol
1.000
0.056
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL
1.000
0.056
ICP*PCP*loss*NV*VIOL
1.000
0.111
Total coverage = 0.278
Solution consistency = 1.000

Unique
0.056
0.056
0.056
0.111

Now I do the analysis with the scope conditions. However, because fragmented
high level shifts so often occur in cases that have recently experienced military coups, I
cannot drop cases according to that indicator. I instead add it as a condition for postCold War cases. This produces three configurations, with a consistency score of 1.000
and coverage of .375 (Table 12). COUP is present in every configuration. In the
presence of COUP, the combinations of the other conditions are causally equivalent.
Together, PCP, SIZE, and NV (and COUP, with LOSS absent) are sufficient for some
fragmented high level shifts, as expected. Similar to the above, VIOL may substitute for
PCP, and the presence of both forms of coup-proofing is combined with NV, VIOL,
and COUP, and an absence of LOSS (as well as SIZE).
Table 12. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome
(reduced dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*COUP
1.000
0.125
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL*COUP
1.000
0.125
ICP*PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP
1.000
0.125
Total coverage = 0.375
Solution consistency = 1.000
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Unique
0.125
0.125
0.125

Lastly, I add OPP, to see if doing so might explain more cases. I do not expect it
to be necessary for fragmented high level shifts, but it might substitute for campaign size
and nonviolence in the presence of moderate coup-proofing. I keep COUP as a condition.
Five configurations are consistent with sufficiency at .75, and five configurations are part
of the reduction set shown in Table 13. The addition of OPP increases solution coverage
by quite a lot, to .714. These results suggest that the forms of coup-proofing substitute for
each other – fragmented high level shifts may occur under PCP or (moderate levels of)
ICP, but at least one must be present. When both are present, so are conditions indicating
the protest movement as an alternative. Recall though that SIZE here is measured broadly
and refers to medium-sized (and larger) protests. Also, institutionalized opposition is
present only when there has been a recent coup. Perhaps coups’ detrimental effects on
military organizations outweigh the effects of an institutionalized opposition on military
sources of authority that could otherwise generate united defections. As above, when PCP
is absent, VIOL is present. This may indicate that ongoing violent conflict divides the
military or fragments the military response in ways comparable to personalist coupproofing.
Table 13. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome
(reduced dataset with additional condition)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*COUP*OPP
1.000
0.143
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL*COUP*OPP
1.000
0.143
ICP*pcp*loss*size*NV*VIOL*coup*opp
1.000
0.143
ICP*PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP*OPP
1.000
0.143
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*coup*opp
1.000
0.143
Total coverage = 0.714
Solution consistency = 1.000
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Unique
0.143
0.143
0.143
0.143
0.143

Findings: No Fragmented High Level Shifts
To assess the conditions under which fragmented high level shifts do not occur, I
perform the steps with the main conditions (including COUP) on the reduced set of cases.
This produces 28 solutions that reduce to 15, with a coverage of .821 and consistency of
.979. The solution is complicated, but from Table 14 yields a few insights. PCP is mostly
absent, but when it is present, it is often combined with ICP or LOSS, which I would
expect to produce united defections (i.e. not fragmented high level). No configurations
include the presence of PCP, SIZE, and NV, which also supports my expectations. Many
are simply the absence of the main conditions – personalist coup-proofing (and its
substitute, ongoing violent conflict) along with medium-sized (or larger), nonviolent
protests.

128

Table 14. Sufficient configurations for no fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome
(reduced dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
ICP*pcp*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP
1.000
0.018
ICP*pcp*LOSS*size*nv*VIOL*coup
1.000
0.018
ICP*pcp*LOSS*size*NV*viol*coup
1.000
0.018
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*viol*coup
1.000
0.018
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL*coup
1.000
0.018
icp*pcp*SIZE*NV*viol*coup
1.000
0.071
PCP*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL*coup
1.000
0.036
icp*PCP*LOSS*nv*VIOL*coup
1.000
0.036
ICP*pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*COUP
1.000
0.054
icp*pcp*loss*viol*coup
1.000
0.214
icp*pcp*loss*nv*viol
1.000
0.161
icp*loss*size*NV*viol
0.917
0.196
pcp*loss*SIZE*NV*coup
1.000
0.179
icp*loss*size*NV*coup
0.933
0.250
icp*loss*NV*VIOL*coup
1.000
0.179
Total coverage = 0.821
Solution consistency = 0.979

Unique
0.018
0.018
0.018
0.018
0.018
0.018
0.036
0.036
0.054
0.089
0.018
0.018
0.054
0.000
0.018

Findings: United Defections
To finish, I analyze united defections. I expect them to occur under conditions of
moderate to high levels of ICP (an effective number greater than 2.25), personalist coupproofing, and large protests (campaign per capita greater than .7) that are nonviolent, with
military loss and an institutionalized opposition combining or substituting in various
ways. This follows from my argument that united defections, as the highest level of
military loyalty shifts, are explained by major threats to the military’s functional
authority together with a protest movement that is committed to nonviolence and widely
supported. I test for necessity and sufficiency among the individual conditions. As shown
by the matrix in Table 15, NV and OPP score highest for necessity, at .643. In terms of
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sufficiency, all conditions score fairly low, but the highest is PCP at .250, followed
closely by ICP at .240.
Table 15. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for united defections outcome
OPP
NV
SIZE
LOSS
PCP
ICP
United

United
0.170
0.145
0.212
0.222
0.250
0.240
1.000

ICP
0.283
0.274
0.242
0.333
0.250
1.000
0.429

PCP
0.415
0.371
0.273
0.444
1.000
0.320
0.571

LOSS
0.075
0.097
0.152
1.000
0.125
0.120
0.143

SIZE
0.377
0.371
1.000
0.556
0.281
0.320
0.500

NV
0.642
1.000
0.697
0.667
0.719
0.680
0.643

OPP
1.000
0.548
0.606
0.444
0.688
0.600
0.643

I test these conditions’ combinations for consistency with sufficiency for united
defections. Four configurations meet the .75 threshold, and they remain after performing
the reduction. Overall, they have a consistency score of 1.000 and coverage of .357. At
first glance and in contrast to fragmented high level, PCP is always present. ICP often is;
when it is absent, LOSS (as an additional threat to military functional authority) and OPP
or SIZE and NV are present. OPP and SIZE/NV are substitutable. These findings align
with my expectations fairly well, but the configurations do not explain many cases.
Table 16. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (full dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.071
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*NV*OPP
1.000
0.071
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP
1.000
0.143
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.071
Total coverage = 0.357
Solution consistency = 1.000

Unique
0.071
0.071
0.143
0.071

I examine the configurations’ consistency scores on the reduced set of cases. This
produces five configurations, with a fairly good coverage of .667, relative to those
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previously. The findings in Table 17 are similar to the above. PCP is again present in
every configuration, and when ICP is absent, LOSS and OPP are present or SIZE and NV
are present. The most explanatory of the configurations (with a coverage score of .222)
has both forms of coup-proofing and an institutionalized opposition; in this context, an
institutionalized opposition substitutes for large and nonviolent protests. LOSS is present
in some configurations.
Table 17: Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced
dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.111
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*nv*OPP
1.000
0.111
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP
1.000
0.222
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*OPP
1.000
0.111
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.111
Total coverage = 0.667
Solution consistency = 1.000

Unique
0.111
0.111
0.222
0.111
0.111

Lastly, I add the ongoing violent conflict (VIOL) condition as well as a
condition for party regimes (PARTY) to see how they might combine with the others to
produce united defections. On the smaller set of cases, the test for sufficiency produces
eight configurations that reduce to six. Overall, they have a very high coverage score of
.899, with consistency at 1.000 (Table 18). These conditions explain united defections
very well, and combine in ways almost identical to above. Both forms of coupproofing, large and nonviolent protests, and military loss (as well as ongoing violent
conflict) are sufficient for united defections. All of these conditions need not be present,
though; personalist coup-proofing combined with large and nonviolent protests also
produce united defections, if there is no ongoing violent conflict. Institutional coup131

proofing is not necessary, but can produce united defections when personalist coupproofing and an institutionalized opposition are present. United defections also occur in
party regimes in the context of nonviolent protests, institutionalized opposition, and
ongoing violent conflict.
Table 18. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced dataset with
additional conditions)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*opp*party
1.000
0.111
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*nv*VIOL*OPP*party
1.000
0.111
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*OPP*party
1.000
0.111
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL*opp*party
1.000
0.111
icp*pcp*loss*NV*VIOL*OPP*PARTY
1.000
0.222
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP*party
1.000
0.222

Unique
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111

Total coverage = 0.889
Solution consistency = 1.000
Findings: No United Defections
The analysis of the absence of united defections results in 21 configurations that
reduce to eight, shown in Table 19. The solution’s coverage score is .886 and its
consistency score is .975. Of the configurations, the two that are most explanatory
(coverage of .273) include only one form of coup-proofing, an institutionalized
opposition but small protests, and no loss or violent conflict. In no configurations are
both forms of coup-proofing present, or one form and military loss with large, nonviolent
protests/an institutionalized opposition. In sum, these findings support my expectations
for cases unlikely to have united defections.
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Table 19. Sufficient configurations for no united defections outcome (reduced
dataset)
Coverage
Consistency
Raw
icp*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*opp
1.000
0.023
pcp*loss*SIZE*NV*opp
1.000
0.091
pcp*LOSS*size*NV*opp
1.000
0.045
ICP*pcp*size*nv*OPP
1.000
0.045
icp*PCP*loss*OPP
1.000
0.273
PCP*loss*size*NV
1.000
0.250
icp*pcp*loss*size
0.923
0.273
icp*pcp*loss*nv
1.000
0.136
Total coverage = 0.886
Solution consistency = 0.975

Unique
0.023
0.091
0.045
0.045
0.114
0.091
0.182
0.045

Conclusions
This chapter provides additional empirical support for my argument through
application of a second analytic technique, one that is well-suited to my theoretical
expectations and cases: QCA. I have now used multiple methods to assess the validity of
my findings and reach tentative conclusions regarding my causal claims. In Ragin’s
terms, I have “explore[d] alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between
ideas and evidence.”215 I am more confident in the results as a consequence, given that
both QCA and regression analyses have strengths and weaknesses.
Using QCA in particular, I demonstrated that the outcomes of interest in this
study cannot be explained by a single factor or even a single combination of factors.
Military defections and loyalty shifts are complex phenomena. In the regression analyses,
coup-proofing and protester characteristics independently affected loyalty shifts and
varied in terms of the statistical significance of their associations. But as explanatory
215
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factors they also combine and substitute in different ways to affect overall military
authority, as I would expect from my argument. I now have a better understanding of the
causal processes that produce the outcomes, particularly in the medium-N set of cases.
More specifically, I confirmed that military sources of authority are important for
explaining military loyalty shifts. General loyalty shifts, or defections, occur when the
regime has threatened military functional authority and the protest movement or
opposition is an acceptable alternative. Fewer threats to military functional authority may
lead to low level shifts when the lower ranks are motivated – by personalist coupproofing, or large protests – and there is opportunity because of an ongoing violent
conflict and an absence of counterforces to monitor and punish disloyalty. Fragmented
high level shifts are likely when a military with a recent history of coups or compromised
organization faces threats to its functional authority, and the opposition is medium-sized
or nonviolent protests or institutionalized. Finally, the highest level shifts, united
defections, require greater threats to functional authority plus a large, nonviolent, or
institutionalized opposition. Overall, the high consistency scores of the configurations
confirm that these combinations are highly associated with the outcomes. But, the low
coverage scores indicate there are cases that the conditions do not explain, and other
factors that matter.
The combinations of conditions and their relations of necessity and sufficiency
support my theoretical claims. I cannot infer causal relations from them, though, because
I cannot assess causal processes using QCA. I also cannot account for those factors I did
not measure quantitatively and cross-nationally, even though I was able to eliminate the
influence of some extraneous factors by using a more comparable set of cases. Following
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the next chapter and my quantitative analysis of the impact of types of loyalty shifts on
democratization, I use three case studies to better establish the causal mechanisms linking
the conditions and outcomes. I trace how forms of regime coup-proofing actually threaten
military functional capabilities, and how the protest movement does or does not support
overall military authority. In the context of the movement’s challenge to the regime, the
military shifts loyalty according to the level of threat to its authority.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF MILITARY LOYALTY
SHIFTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION
In 1989, students, teachers, and civil servants in Benin began a pro-democracy
strike that continued on-and-off for the next year. While a minority remained loyal to the
authoritarian regime of President Mathieu Kerekou, large sections of the military
removed their support. By the end of 1989, Kerekou was forced to agree to a National
Conference, and in 1990, the body stripped him of his power and installed a new
executive. At the start of 1991 the transitional government held successful elections,
beginning a process of democratization. 216 Sudanese protesters were similarly successful
in overthrowing autocrat President Muhammad Numeiri in 1985. Student protests were
followed by a general strike and culminated in large demonstrations. The military’s
leadership shifted loyalty from the regime and then established a military council to
oversee the transition. General elections were held a year later, but in 1989 Colonel Omar
al-Bashir seized power and continues to rule as dictator. 217
So far in this dissertation, I have focused on when and why militaries shift loyalty
in response to anti-regime protest movements. The above examples and scholarly
research demonstrate that military loyalty shifts frequently play an important role in such
movements. The research also shows that successful movements can overthrow autocrats
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and usher in regime change and democracy. But when does military support for antiregime protests also support democratization as it did in Benin? Beyond the link between
military defections and movement outcomes, we know little about how military responses
to anti-regime protests matter for future political outcomes.
In this chapter, I present an argument for the effects of types of military loyalty
shifts on post-protest movement democracy. It draws on the theoretical puzzle I identified
in the introduction, or the conflicting expectations over the role of the military in politics.
The literature on civil-military relations claims that civilian control of the military is
necessary for democratization. This would lead us to expect a politically active military –
such as the one in Benin – to have damaging effects on democracy. The democratization
literature, particularly that on pacted transitions, finds that military involvement (through
cooperation with other elites) can help to bring about democracy. Yet that is not always
the case, as this failed in Sudan. While the civil resistance literature has demonstrated the
importance of military defections for the success of anti-regime campaigns, it has yet to
focus on whether this works to support political change.
Following these literatures’ key insights, I argue military loyalty shifts in response
to anti-regime protests can be supportive of political change, but that some types are
more supportive of democratization than others. Loyalty shifts by a unified military
organization allow the military leadership to influence the democratic transition and
challenge the establishment of civilian control. Loyalty shifts that are fragmented indicate
a weaker military that will have less influence over the transition, making post-campaign
democracy more likely. This logic follows from my explanation of military loyalty shifts
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that draws in part on the relations between authoritarian regimes and militaries. Regime
control strategies may threaten military functional authority as well as weaken the
military organization. Regimes’ use of coup-proofing thus affects both the likelihood and
quality of the military’s loyalty shifts, with implications for civilian control and
democratization following mass, nonviolent protests.
I use this theoretical framework to generate two hypotheses that I test through
statistical analyses of my quantitative data. I find support for my expectations, even after
controlling for campaign outcomes and other determinants of democratization, as well as
partially accounting for possible endogeneity between military response and
democratization. In what follows, I review the literature on the role of militaries in
democratic change, present my argument for the effects of types of military loyalty shifts,
and describe my empirical strategy and the evidence the analyses provide. I close with a
discussion of this research’s implications and shortcomings, in part as a transition to my
examination of the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between military shifts
and democratization using the case studies in the next chapters.
Understanding the Military’s Role in Democratization
In earlier chapters, I developed an argument for why militaries shift loyalty in
response to anti-regime protest movements. I leveraged my general argument to also
explain types of military loyalty shifts, following my contention that militaries defect or
shift loyalty in various ways. My motivation for explaining military loyalty shifts is the
demonstrated link between their presence during protests and the success of such protests
in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Implicit in this link and in my discussion of them
is that militaries’ support of pro-democracy protesters also supports democratization. In
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the introduction I questioned whether civilian control is a necessary precursor to
democratic change, given the findings of the pact and civil resistance literatures. In this
chapter I directly interrogate the claim that loyalty shifts support democratization, but
first review the competing expectations of the literatures and the theoretical puzzle they
generate.
The military is an important actor in processes of political change, and so has had
a prominent position in research on democratization. Much of this research came about as
a result of the Third Wave of democratization across Latin American and Southern
Europe, where “…scholars inquired when and under what circumstances leaders of
military regimes would abdicate and initiate a transition to democracy.” 218 Yet frequent
military seizures of power through coups and ongoing military prerogatives leading to
democratic backsliding over the same period led scholars of civil-military relations to
focus on the deleterious effects militaries can have on new democracies. The impact of
the military on democratization outcomes thus remains uncertain; as Kuehn notes in his
recent introduction to new research on the topic, it can be midwife or gravedigger of
democracy.219
Militaries can be supportive of democratization through elite-led agreements,
according to research on Third Wave democratic transitions. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 220

David Kuehn, “Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military’s Impact on Democratic
Development,” Democratization 24, no. 5 (2017): 785.
218

219

Ibid., 783-800.

Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
220

139

Przeworski,221 Burton, Gunther, and Higley, 222 and Mainwaring,223 among others focus
on the processes leading from a breakdown in the authoritarian regime to negotiations for
political change leading to a new democratic system. These analyses stress the
interactions among elite actors during the contingent and uncertain transition from
authoritarian rule, in which the military was often heavily involved, to democracy. In
successful transitions, elites strategically decide to pursue liberalization, opening the way
for democratization.
The military was an important elite actor in many Third Wave transitions and
scholarly explanations of them. Many of the countries that underwent transitions had
been military regimes, and the military’s decision to give up power to civilians was
necessary for political change. In other, non-military regimes, militaries had the capacity
and resources to affect democratization. On the basis of this research, prior to a transition,
the military must be included in or tolerant of an authoritarian regime’s decision to
liberalize. During the transition, the military, as a powerful institution with coercive
capabilities, may exercise greater influence than other, pro- or anti-democracy actors.224
Because the military is such a key player, its support of democratization can be
crucial for political change. For instance, one form of particularly successful Third Wave
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transitions involved agreements among the military and elites that made democratization
more acceptable by guaranteeing the military’s future interests. 225 In some cases, these
“pacts” between military softliners and the civilian opposition led to democracy. 226 In
others, “…military leaders took the lead, at times in response to opposition and popular
pressure, in bringing about the change in regime.” 227 More generally, this research
suggests that the military can support democratization by initiating political change and
making transition processes possible.
Yet, as a powerful actor with organizational interests, the military can also
threaten new democracies and democratic consolidation. This is a key claim of the civil
military relations literature. In democracies, civilians must control government policy
decisions, including those concerning the military. 228 Military intervention in politics
challenges civilian policymaking. Military involvement in democratic transitions, in
particular, interferes with the establishment of civilian control and impedes civilian-led
democratization.229 A more normative claim of the literature follows: the role of the
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military during and after the transition should be minimized so that civilians are able to
create and manage the institutions and rules of a new democratic regime.
Military involvement in politics takes various forms, from direct military
intervention in politics, with coups as the extreme, to military influence over political
decisionmaking.230 In all, a lack of civilian control generally means that the military is
not secondary to democratically-elected leaders and their appointed officials. As
Chambers et al. explain, civilian control is “…that distribution of decision-making power
in which civilians alone have authority to decide on national policies and their
implementation.”231 A lack of civilian control threatens all aspects of democracy,
including elections, political rights, civil rights, and horizontal accountability. 232 This
logic suggests, counter to the above, that a politically active military will be harmful to
democratization.
In sum, democratization and civil-military relations scholars point to the
importance of militaries in politics and political change, but reach different conclusions
regarding their impact on democracy. Militaries sometimes act to bring about a transition
from the authoritarian regime, but in doing so can exercise influence over the transition
processes and outcomes.233 Specifically, in the transition period, powerful militaries can
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expand their autonomy, claim institutional privileges, exercise decision-making authority,
veto particular policies – and remain outside civilian control going forward. 234 A military
may support democratization by partnering with pro-democracy actors, but its active role
during the transition can hurt the civilian control that is critical to consolidating
democracy.
Military Political Roles in the Context of Anti-Regime Protest Movements
The civil resistance literature has shown the military can play a supportive role in
a different form of political change, and this dissertation aims to understand when this is
more likely. Classic analyses of democratic transitions pay little attention to civil society
or nonelite actors, but recent research has focused on the importance of civil resistance
for democratization with military loyalty shifts as a key determinant of campaign success.
Transitions driven by civil society are more effective at promoting democracy than those
controlled by elites.235 While both violent and nonviolent action can bring down
authoritarian regimes, nonviolent action is more likely to force regime change that leads
to democracy.236 Lastly, nonviolent movements have a positive effect on short- and longterm democracy regardless of campaign success. 237
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To recall from earlier, military support through defections from the authoritarian
regime makes the success of nonviolent campaigns 46 times more likely. 238 In marked
contrast, military defections have no effect on the success of violent movements. 239
However, despite defections’ importance, the link between them and other political
outcomes is uncertain. The insights from the democratization and civil-military relations
literatures lead to conflicting expectations. Militaries can support democratization in
cooperation with other elites. They are also crucial to the success of anti-regime protest
movements; yet, in these contexts, democracy is “…only one potential outcome.” 240 In
what follows, I draw on my explanation of types of military loyalty shifts to develop a
logic for how the types differently impact democratization. Some forms of regime control
threaten the sources of military authority and compromise the military organization.
Loyalty shifts therefore reflect to some extent military organizational strength or
weakness, with implications for the military’s role in politics.
Authoritarian Regime Control and the Quality of Military Loyalty Shifts
When militaries respond to mass nonviolent protests by shifting support to the
protesters, their disloyalty to the regime may be supportive of political change and
democratization. But military defections and successful anti-regime movements do not
always end in democracy. Understanding this variation requires attention to my
explanation of types of military loyalty shifts, and particularly my focus on military
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, NY: Columbia University Press,
2011).
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sources of authority. To review: I argue that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty
when the authoritarian regime, through coup-proofing, has threatened military functional
capacities and the military’s functional claims to authority. Militaries may be able to rely
on their delegated authority, but mass protests challenge regime legitimacy, and this
source of military authority, too.
Authoritarian regimes that control their militaries using coup-proofing strategies
threaten military functional authority. These strategies also affect the military
organization, which helps to explain the types of military loyalty shifts – in particular,
whether loyalty shifts involve high- ranking officers, and whether they are united or
fragmented. Forms of coup-proofing that structure the military primarily on the basis of
personalized control weaken the military organization, making low level and fragmented
high level shifts more likely than united defections. Forms such as institutional coupproofing that increase military discontent but do not divide the military organization
increase the likelihood of united defections, especially when the protest movement is
large. I find support for this argument in Chapters Three and Four.
The ways militaries respond to anti-regime protest movements, ranging from
loyalty to united defections, is therefore explained by threats to military authority and
reflects the impact of regime control strategies on the military organization. A military
that responds to protests with high level but fragmented shifts is relatively weak. This
type of disloyalty may make both campaign success and democratization more likely,
even though it amounts to military involvement in politics outside the regime’s delegated
authority in the civil-military relations literature’s sense of civilian control. A military
that shifts loyalty as a united military organization will support protesters without
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positively impacting democratization, because the military leadership will be more able
to influence the transition and, in line with the classic literature’s expectations, hurt
civilian democracy.
These expectations follow the logic of my earlier argument and are grounded in
the literatures reviewed above. In general, militaries that shift loyalty to the protesters
support political change by virtue of removing backing from the authoritarian regime,
often leading to its collapse. Loyalty shifts that go beyond the rank and file to involve
significant parts of the military at higher levels mean most of the military is in favor of
regime change. These shifts make campaign success more likely, 241 and similar to cases
of military-opposition pacts, may provide the conditions for democratic transition. 242
Thus, democratization will be more likely when militaries shift significant support from
the regime to the protesters.
Hypothesis 1: High level military loyalty shifts positively impact democratization.
Conversely, military involvement in regime change may harm democratization
because it is political involvement outside of civilian control. Civilian actors need space
during transitions to operate free from military interference. When a military has
influence over the transition, the establishment of civilian control by newly-elected
civilians will be more difficult. 243 As Aguero writes, “…transitions have decisively
influenced the varying degrees to which the militaries retain or are given prerogatives in
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the successor regime and, in turn, the nature of civil-military relations in the new
democracies.”244 Without civilian control, these new democracies will struggle to
consolidate and may regress.245
Thus, types of high level loyalty shifts likely vary in their impact on
democratization. Those that are directed over a united organization indicate a relatively
strong military that, while supportive of protesters, may be able to involve itself in the
transition in ways that challenge the establishment of civilian control. Democratization
may still occur, through the efforts of civilian protesters and opposition elites, but
military support through its response will have less impact. In contrast, high level,
fragmented loyalty shifts indicate a relatively weak military organization that is both
supportive of political change and easier for the new civilian authorities to control.
Hypothesis 2: High level, united military defections have less of an impact on
democratization than high level, fragmented military loyalty shifts.
This argument breaks with the existing civil-military relations literature and posits
that militaries, though outside of civilian control, may support democratization by
supporting popular, nonviolent calls for political change. Yet it also acknowledges the
challenges a powerful military can pose to democratization, and makes clear that not all
military loyalty shifts have the same post-protest impacts. I test these hypotheses below,
using my data on military responses and regression techniques. I attempt a few strategies
to tease out the loyalty shifts’ independent impacts on measures of democracy. I find
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some evidence for Hypothesis 2, or the positive effects of fragmented high level shifts.
These shifts’ effects become less clear when I control for other determinants of
democratization, but remain greater than those of united defections or other shifts.
Empirical Strategy
Earlier, I made the case for disaggregating military defections into types of
military loyalty shifts, in order to better understand the military organization’s
involvement. I continue that discussion here by claiming that the way scholars have so far
conceptualized and measured military defections is a barrier also to understanding the
impact of militaries post-protests. Broadly categorizing military shifts of support as
defections masks important variation in the likely role of a military in the political
transition. Thus, I use my data on military responses and the type shift variable as the
main explanatory factor in this analysis.
As in Chapter Three, my universe of cases is all maximalist anti-regime,
nonviolent campaigns from 1946 to 2015 as identified by MEC, less those that occurred
in democracies, Soviet Republics, non-independent countries, or countries without
militaries. I again show the results for all cases in the Appendix. The unit of analysis is
country-campaign, which produces 112 observations. As shown in Table 1, 52.68% of
the campaigns in the dataset were successful at achieving regime change according to
MEC’s definitions.
Table 1. Anti-regime campaign success
Success

Freq.

Percent

Unsuccessful 53
Successful
59

47.32
52.68

Total

100.00

112
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To review, type shift indicates the military response to the overall anti-regime
protest movement. A military can respond with loyalty to the regime by defending it. A
military can be neutral, and neither actively support the regime nor shift support to the
protesters. Parts of a military’s rank and file or low ranking officers can shift loyalty. A
military can shift loyalty at high levels but as a fragmented organization. Or, a military
can shift loyalty through united defections. For this analysis, I keep the loyal and neutral
categories separate, to consider the possibility that a military’s non-involvement in the
protests impacts democratization. I show the frequencies of these categories across the
cases in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Frequencies of categories of type shift
United
Loyal
Defections
24%
14%

Fragmented
High Level
17%

Low Level
14%

Neutral
31%

As shifts of support from the regime, all military responses besides loyalty and
neutrality might be expected to help bring about campaign success. I illustrate the
associations between categories of type shift and campaign outcomes in Table 2. Success
is more likely for some responses than others. Success does not necessarily result in
democracy, but there is evidence that nonviolence has a positive effect on democracy
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regardless of campaign outcome. 246 In any case, I control for campaign success in my
analyses to ensure the relationships between loyalty shifts and democratization do not
depend on this outcome.
Table 2. Frequency of campaign outcomes per type shift
type_shift

Unsuccessful Successful

Loyal
Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented High Level
United Defections

19 (35.85%)
19 (35.85%)
13 (24.53%)
1 (1.89%)
1 (1.89%)

6 (10.17%)
16 (27.12%)
3 (5.08%)
19 (32.2%)
15 (25.4%)

Total

53 (100%)

59 (100%)

In evaluating the effects of categories of type shift, I include a number of other
factors that might also affect democratization and could confound my results. Though
many possible determinants of democracy have been proposed, I lean on the results of
Teorell.247 He tests social, economic, international, and agency-related factors and
identifies those that are the most robust predictors of democratization. Some of these
predictors act as triggers to democratization; one such trigger is peaceful demonstrations,
the context of this study. It is the slower-moving variables that have the most explanatory
power, though, so I concentrate on these as controls.
Impediments to democratization include large geographic size (area, the log of a
country’s area in 1000s of square kilometers), and economic dependency on foreign trade
(trade, or the sum of exports and imports of goods and services expressed as a fraction of
GDP). I calculate both from World Bank data. Other impediments are Muslim
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populations, driven by the Arab region and accounted for by region dummies, and fuel
exports (also from the World Bank). Sustainers of democratization include
socioeconomic modernization and economic freedom. I do not replicate Teorell’s
measures of these variables, but use GDP per capita from the World Bank (supplemented
by Gleditsch),248 a proxy for development that is associated with democracy. 249
I include a Cold War dummy to capture changes in the international system over
time. The end of the Cold War marked a new normative commitment to democracy by
the international community, resulting in increased pressures for the spread and
institutionalization of democratic forms of government and against coups and other forms
of military intervention. 250 I also include a control for the country’s Polity IV score in the
year prior to the campaign (Dem Level).
I measure my dependent variable of democracy in two ways: the country’s Polity
IV score in year five after the campaign (politypost5), and the change in its Polity IV
score from the year prior to the campaign to year five after (politychange5). Polity scores
range from -10 to 10. In the first measure, greater values indicate more democratic in
absolute terms, while in the second, greater values indicate more democratic relative to
pre-campaign levels. Together they provide a sense of the explanatory factors’ effects on
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overall democratization and ensure that the effects are not limited to one measure of
democracy. As further robustness checks, I include tests using a binary measure of
democracy (with democracy defined as Polity scores of six or higher) and continuous
measures using V-Dem’s polyarchy measure in the Appendix.251 The results generally
hold up, though as below, the effects of the shifts (in particular, Fragmented High Level)
are much stronger in the absence of controls.
Tables 3 and 4 contain summary statistics for the dependent and control variables.
Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous dependent and control variables
Variable

N

Mean

politypost5
politychange5
V-Dem post

110
110
97

1.6455
5.9000
0.4466

V-Dem change
Dem Level (Polity)
Dem Level (V-Dem)
GDP per capita

97
112
111
108

Trade
Fuel Exports
Area

87
70
105

Min

Max

6.2142
6.4764
0.2386

-9
-11
0.0722

10
19
0.9025

0.2014
-4.2321
0.2543
7.6995

0.2426
4.0758
0.1304
1.0900

-0.3494
-10
0.0718
5.2843

0.7731
5
0.6949
10.3414

66.7387
15.7901
12.7033

43.1989
26.6837
1.3880
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Std Dev

0.2177 280.3610
0.0000 99.9134
9.9451 16.0550
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Table 4. Summary statistics: binary dependent and control variables
Variable

0

1

dempost5
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa

62
48
82
93
89

48
64
30
19
23

Europe
FSU
MENA

94
107
95

18
5
17

Exogenous Methods and Results
I start by running basic tests of the relationship between categories of type shift
and democracy, with some models that include success and the other determinants of
democracy as controls. Here, I am in effect assuming that military loyalty shifts are
exogenous to democratization. I enter in type shift as a set of dummy variables, each
representing a category or type of military loyalty shift. Loyal serves as the omitted
baseline category. The resulting coefficients are then the effect of the other categories of
type shift on democracy, relative to loyalty. I use OLS regression and calculate robust
standard errors with cases clustered by country, to account for the fact that some
countries experienced multiple campaigns over the period of analysis.
In Table 5, Model 1 reports the results of a simple regression between categories
of type shift and politypost5, controlling for Dem Level. Fragmented High Level has a
positively, statistically significant effect on democracy, while the other military responses
(including United Defections) do not. This supports Hypothesis 2 but not 1. In Model 2,
which includes control variables, the effect of Fragmented High Level disappears. The
number of observations also dramatically decreases. I drop Trade and Fuel Exports for
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Model 3 because neither is associated with democracy at a statistically significant level
and their data has many missing observations. Here, Fragmented High Level is again
positive and statistically significant. None of the other categories are statistically
significant, though United Defection’s (and Neutral’s) coefficient is positive.
Table 5. type shift and democratization measured as politypost5
Model 1
Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United
Dem Level (Polity)
Success
GDP per capita
Trade
Fuel Exports
Area
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
FSU
MENA
Europe
Constant
Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

1.7100
0.4760
6.752***
2.5510
0.528***

1.7440
110
0.199
700.685
716.888

Model 2
(1.4720)
(2.1180)
(1.6580)
(1.5530)
(0.1260)

-0.8090
-0.3510
2.6190
-0.1030
0.3240
3.807*
-0.0100
0.0050
0.0180
-0.7700
2.8260
2.0640
4.7410
-3.6240
-3.0490
-3.4200

(1.1300) 9.2770
67
0.408
417.053
454.533

Model 3
(1.7620)
(2.5560)
(2.8080)
(2.3060)
(0.2120)
(1.6970)
(1.3730)
(0.0160)
(0.0320)
(0.5250)
(2.2690)
(3.9500)
(4.0600)
(5.3690)
(4.8220)
(4.8130)

0.2720
-0.5260
3.991*
0.8760
0.462*
3.889**
0.8510

(1.3640)
(1.8340)
(1.9590)
(1.9120)
(0.1850)
(1.3690)
(0.8040)

-0.5070
3.5820
4.167*
5.434*
0.2700

(0.4280)
(1.8100)
(2.0370)
(2.5230)
(2.0260)

-1.9090
3.0120
(14.7560) -3.4630
101
0.454
617.554
656.781

(2.3880)
(3.1330)
(8.7430)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
The results are similar in Table 6, when the dependent variable is politychange5.
Fragmented High Level has a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy,
relative to loyalty. Its effect is no longer statistically significant but still positive in the
154

presence of control variables in Model 2, and returns to significance in Model 3. In
response to anti-regime protests, then, military loyalty shifts that are high level and
fragmented positively impact democratization, while military neutrality, low level shifts,
and united defections do not. These findings support Hypothesis 2 – high level military
loyalty shifts differ in their impacts on democratization. A significant loyalty shift by a
weaker military organization is more likely to bring about democracy because of the
implications it has for the protest movement as well as civilian control and democratic
consolidation.
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Table 6. type shift and democratization measured as politychange5
Model 1
Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United
Dem Level

1.710
0.476
6.752***
2.551
-0.47***

Model 2
(1.472)
(2.118)
(1.658)
(1.553)
(0.126)

Model 3

-0.809
-0.351
2.619
-0.103
-0.676**

(1.762)
(2.556)
(2.808)
(2.306)
(0.212)

Success
GDP per capita
Trade
Fuel Exports

3.807*
-0.010
0.005
0.018

(1.697) 3.889**
(1.373) 0.851
(0.016)
(0.032)

(1.369)
(0.804)

Area
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa

-0.770
2.826
2.064
4.741
-3.624

(0.525)
(2.269)
(3.950)
(4.060)
(5.369)

-0.507
3.582
4.167*
5.434*
0.270

(0.428)
(1.810)
(2.037)
(2.523)
(2.026)

FSU
MENA
Europe
Constant

-3.049
-3.420
1.744

(4.822)
(4.813) -1.909
3.012
(14.76) -3.463

(2.388)
(3.133)
(8.743)

Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

110
0.262
700.685
716.888

(1.130) 9.277
67
0.598
417.053
454.533

0.272
-0.526
3.991*
0.876
-0.538**

(1.364)
(1.834)
(1.959)
(1.912)
(0.185)

101
0.519
617.554
656.781

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
To assist with interpretation of these results, I calculate the predicted values of
politychange5 at each category of type shift (holding the other covariates at their mean
values) and plot them in Figure 2. This graph more clearly demonstrates the substantive
impacts of Fragmented High Level versus the other military responses on democracy.
The predicted value of policychange5 is between 4.66 and 5.46 (the maximum possible

156

value being 20) for the categories of Loyal, Neutral, and Low Level, reflecting the
positive impact overall of civil resistance on democracy. It increases to approximately 9
when militaries shift loyalty through Fragmented High Level shifts, compared to 6 for
United Defections. In substantive terms, both high level shifts positively impact
democratization, but in line with Hypothesis 2 the effects of Fragmented High Level
shifts are greater.
Figure 2. Predicted values of politychange5 at different categories of type shift

Endogenous Methods and Results
Importantly, the above models do not account for the possibility of endogeneity
between military loyalty shifts and democratization. Military loyalty shifts may emerge in
contexts where democratization is already underway, meaning that military responses to
anti-regime protests have no real effect on democratization beyond campaign outcome. I
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want to be confident that shifts, and particularly fragmented high level shifts, do not only
occur in conditions where democracy is already present or developing.
To deal with potential endogeneity, I first set up a model that includes both
determinants of democratization and determinants of military loyalty shifts, based on the
findings of Chapter Three. To review, these latter factors include institutional coupproofing (ICP), personalist coup-proofing (PCP), and protest size or campaign per capita
(Size). A coup in the last five years was also an important predictor of Fragmented High
Level shifts (Coup).252 Testing the hypotheses with this model allows me to control for
any effects they may have on democratization, not limited to their relationship with the
types of loyalty shifts. Table 7 displays the results for politypost5 (Model 1) and
politychange5 (Model 2).

252

I include summary statistics of these variables for this analysis in the Appendix.
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Table 7. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift
Model 1

Model 2

Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United
Dem Level (Polity)

1.1410
-1.2770
2.6690
0.5140
0.600***

(1.3890)
(2.1250)
(1.9280)
(2.1570)
(0.1340)

1.4140
-1.2770
2.6690
0.5140
-0.40***

(1.3890)
(2.1250)
(1.9280)
(2.1570)
(0.1340)

ICP
PCP
Size
Coup

-0.9750
3.1330
5.3200
0.4080

(3.1080)
(1.7070)
(5.6530)
(1.1290)

-0.9750
3.1330
5.3200
0.4080

(3.1080)
(1.7070)
(5.6530)
(1.1290)

Success
GDP per capita
Area
Cold War
Asia

3.800**
0.7960
-0.1800
2.0570
6.200*

(1.1370)
(0.6710)
(0.6280)
(1.7600)
(2.6680)

3.800**
0.7960
-0.1800
2.0570
6.200*

(1.1370)
(0.6710)
(0.6280)
(1.7600)
(2.6680)

Americas
Africa
Europe
MENA

7.526*
0.8720
7.692*
-0.3710

(3.2230)
(2.2180)
(3.0010)
(2.6350)

7.526*
0.8720
7.692*
-0.3710

(3.2230)
(2.2180)
(3.0010)
(2.6350)

Constant

-10.2250

(12.0940) -10.2250

Observations
R2
AIC

89
0.526
537.971

89
0.607
537.971

BIC

585.255

585.255

(12.0940)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Unfortunately, none of the categories of type shift have a statistically significant
relationship with democracy when accounting for factors related to the regime, protest
movement, or structural determinants of democratization. Neutral, Fragmented High
Level, and United Defections have positive coefficients. However, when I drop Success,
the effect of Fragmented High Level shifts returns, as shown in Table 8. United
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Defections also has a positive effect on democracy, but it is not statistically significant,
and Fragmented High Level’s coefficient is larger. This supports Hypothesis 2.
Table 8. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift and no
success
Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United
Dem Level (Polity)
ICP
PCP
Size
Coup
GDP per capita
Area
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe
MENA
Constant
Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

Model 1
1.6100
-1.6290
5.053**
2.8140
0.611***
-1.3120
2.8110
7.6940
0.0900
0.6490
-0.0620
2.5800
5.0620
7.668*
0.1320
7.656*
-2.0060
-9.8300
89
0.465
546.713
591.509

(1.4800)
(2.1730)
(1.8520)
(1.8300)
(0.1450)
(3.2730)
(1.7980)
(5.8950)
(1.1680)
(0.7690)
(0.6540)
(1.9260)
(3.1610)
(3.5560)
(2.7180)
(3.3970)
(3.0740)
(12.6480)

Model 2
1.6100
-1.6290
5.053**
2.8140
-0.389**
-1.3120
2.8110
7.6940
0.0900
0.6490
-0.0620
2.5800
5.0620
7.668*
0.1320
7.656*
-2.0060
-9.8300
89
0.556
546.713
591.509

(1.4800)
(2.1730)
(1.8520)
(1.8300)
(0.1450)
(3.2730)
(1.7980)
(5.8950)
(1.1680)
(0.7690)
(0.6540)
(1.9260)
(3.1610)
(3.5560)
(2.7180)
(3.3970)
(3.0740)
(12.6480)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Given these findings, I move on to a two-stage model in an attempt to more
directly account for potential endogeneity in the relationship between Fragmented High
Level and democracy. In the first stage, I set up an equation to determine Fragmented
High Level shifts. Again, I draw on the results of Chapter Three. I use multinomial logit
regression with type shift as the dependent variable, but limit my interest and the result to
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the relationship between this type of loyalty shift and its determinants. The model is a
good predictor of Fragmented High Level, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9. First stage model, for Fragmented High Level instrument
PCP
ICP
Size

4.326***
6.250**
5.3660

(1.2720)
(2.2710)
(2.9570)

Nonviolence
Viol Conflict
Dem Level (VDem)
Incumbent

-1.3270
1.952**
-3.3910
2.317*

(0.9260)
(0.7030)
(5.3100)
(1.0890)

GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant

2.293*
-2.784*
5.526**
-26.314**

(0.9240)
(1.1750)
(1.8430)
(9.7680)

I save the predicted probability generated from this first equation and use it as an
instrument for my second equation, an OLS regression with politychange5 as the
dependent variable. 253 I also include a range of covariates between the models. 254 Table
10, Model 1 includes Success, and Fragmented High Level is positively but not
significantly associated with democratization (its p-value is .078). Model 2 does not
include Success and here Fragmented High Level’s instrument has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the outcome. This supports Hypothesis 2 while partially
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dichotomous endogenous variable and a continuous dependent variable. However, because calculating the
instrument for Fragmented High Level requires modeling it relative to the other categories of type shift, I
must use a separate equation. Standard errors should be interpreted with caution. Omar M.G. Keshk,
“CDSIMEQ: A Program to Implement Two-Stage Probit Least Squares,” The Stata Journal 3, no. 2
(2003): 157-67; G.S. Maddala, Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983). The correlation between the predicted probability for Fragmented High
Level and a dummy variable for Fragmented High Level is .5135.
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I do not include Dem Level and GDP per capita because I use these covariates to determine the
instrument for Fragmented High Level.
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allaying endogeneity concerns. 255 This type of loyalty shift appears to have an
independent impact on democracy.
Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (politychange5)
Model 1

Model 2

Pr(Fragmented) 3.2410
Success
4.842***

(1.8080)
(1.1130)

5.365*

(2.1500)

Area
Cold War
Asia
Africa

-0.0550
0.8080
-2.2070
-6.127*

(0.5460)
(1.8650)
(2.2810)
(2.4070)

0.1600
0.8760
-3.8850
-6.568*

(0.6590)
(1.8570)
(2.3180)
(2.5010)

Europe
FSU
MENA
Constant

1.5350
-7.745**
-8.522***
7.2320

(2.9390)
(2.6970)
(2.2890)
(8.7100)

1.2460
-8.097*
-10.43***
7.7790

(3.0690)
(3.1640)
(2.3020)
(10.0900)

Observations

88

88

R2
AIC
BIC

0.515
533.537
558.31

0.396
550.735
573.031

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
In summary, this evidence generally supports my argument and hypotheses. High
level military loyalty shifts can positively impact democratization, even when controlling
for campaign outcome and other determinants of democracy. The type of loyalty shift
matters, though: full defections by a united military organization have less of an impact
than high level shifts by a fragmented military. This is because united defections allow
the military leadership to influence the democratic transition and challenge the
establishment of civilian control, compared to militaries that are disunited and weaker
255

However, this result does not hold in models with politypost5 as the dependent variable. Thus, this twostage technique is an imperfect means of addressing endogeneity.
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and will likely have less influence. These findings challenge the civil-military relations
literature’s claims that a politically active military is harmful for democratization, while
supporting its overall intuition that civilian control is necessary for democratic
consolidation.
Conclusions
This analysis confirms the importance of military loyalty shifts for both antiregime protest movement outcomes and post-protest democratization. Through it, I
support the claim I have implicitly been making throughout the dissertation: that military
support for anti-regime protests can support democratization. I add to the insights of the
existing literatures on the military’s role in politics, as well as my earlier argument
regarding the effects of strategies of regime control on the military’s authority and
organization. The forms authoritarian regime control of the military takes impacts
military responses to protests, which in turn impact democratization. I also further
demonstrate the value of considering types of loyalty shifts, because differences in the
extent and quality of military organizations’ loyalty shifts have varying impacts on
democracy.
These findings speak to the literatures on civil-military relations and
democratization. The military may play a positive role in democratization, especially
when it partners with other elites or offers support to nonelites. During mass, nonviolent
challenges to an authoritarian regime, the military’s role is often crucial – both in terms
of campaign success and democratization. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom
among civil-military scholars that a military acting outside of its authority delegated by
civilians is problematic for democracy. There are ways a military may involve itself in
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political transitions that challenge the establishment of civilian control and democracy,
though. This analysis provides insights as to when this is more likely in the context of
protest movements. Authoritarian regime control of the military impacts the nature of
military support for protesters, and thus the likelihood of democratic civilian control and
democratic consolidation. I examine these relationships in more detail and as causal
processes through the case studies in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER SIX: MALI – AUTHORITY THREATS, UNITED DEFECTIONS,
AND MILITARY-LED DEMOCRATIZATION
In Mali, major protests against President Moussa Traore began in fall 1990. They
ramped up in January 1991, shortly after a conflict between the national government and
a Tuareg rebel movement ended in negotiations. The Malian military’s poor performance
during this conflict owed to the effects of Traore’s coup-proofing strategies on military
capabilities and put its functional authority in question. In the context of threats to the
military’s functional authority, large, nonviolent protests challenged the regime as the
source of the military’s delegated authority. My argument would expect high level
military loyalty shifts in response. Given the Malian military’s united defection, my
argument would also expect it to have influence over the post-Traore transition,
challenging the establishment of democratic civilian control.
This chapter uses the Malian case to demonstrate the logic of my argument for
high level united defections and their impacts on democratization. In what follows, I
show that the Traore regime exercised control over the military such that when faced with
mass protests, the military shifted loyalty. In particular, Traore’s use of institutional and
personalist coup-proofing and the effects his control had on military effectiveness during
conflict led the military to fully defect in response to large anti-regime protests. The
military’s disloyalty was responsible for the protest movement’s success but put military
leaders in a position to control the initial post-campaign transition period. The Malian
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military acted outside regime control and in support of protesters and political change, yet
created some challenges for post-protest democratization.
Traore’s Regime and Control of the Military
In 1991, the Malian military was under the control of a former military regime
whose civilianized, one-party rule had little legitimacy. Moussa Traore came to power in
a 1968 military coup against President Modibo Keita. Traore’s regime transitioned to
military-backed civilian rule over the next decade. A new constitution was approved in
1974, and Traore created the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UPDM) party in
1979.256 He was elected president in June 1979, receiving 99 percent of the vote,257 and
reelected in 1985.258 In spite of the UPDM, he exercised mostly personal authority, ruling
largely through decree259 and “...control[ing] all aspects of Malian life.”260
Traore controlled the military with the potential threat it posed against him in
mind. It was President Keita’s poor management of this threat that had led to his
downfall. Traore and other officers seized power partly in response to Keita using the
military to serve his regime and ideology. For example, Keita set up Communist party
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sections within military units and employed them for development projects.261 He also
created a People’s Militia that acted as his personal guards. It numbered approximately
9,000 by late 1968 and received paramilitary training.262
The military resented its position in Keita’s regime. In particular, it resented the
Militia and considered it a political move out of line with military interests.263 In the
military’s view, the Militia was set up “...to neutralize the army’s technical monopoly of
violence.”264 Prior to the coup, Traore and other junior officers expressed their
displeasure regarding the Militia to Keita and requested he either disband it or put it
under army control. They claimed it was “...creating mass insecurity and discontent
through intimidation.”265 Keita did not heed their advice, and soon after seizing power,
the military council headed by Traore liquidated the MP as well as the Comite National
de Defense de la Revolution, Keita’s Communist party body.266
Traore understood these sources of military discontent when he took power, yet
structured the military primarily to secure his rule. Following early military unrest,
Traore used his rising position in the anti-Keita coup coalition to purge those who
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disagreed with him, replacing them with loyalists.267 According to later writings by
retired officers, he regularly imprisoned members of the military suspected of
disloyalty.268 He engaged in institutional coup-proofing, dividing the Republican Guard,
or “Red Berets”, from the regular army “Green Berets”. The Red Berets were outside the
army chain of command and answered directly to Traore.269
These strategies protected Traore but did not provide for military interests.
Despite high security expenditures (in part to fund the Red Berets), the living conditions
of military personnel were poor.270 Rank and file soldiers frequently went unpaid. His
weakening of the military and the military hierarchy through personalist coup-proofing
created tensions between senior officers and the rank and file, and fears of mutiny.271
Though the Traore regime remained in power, military discontent was evident, with
multiple coup attempts reported during the 1980s.272
The effects of Traore’s control on military capabilities and their implications for
military functional authority became clear in its performance against Tuareg rebels. The
northern conflict, though ongoing, flared up in June 1990. Poorly armed members of the
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People’s Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) attacked a police station,
seeking to free rebels that had been captured by Malian security forces earlier in the year.
The attack was successful, and the rebels stole weapons and vehicles.273
As the conflict continued, the military was forced to become more engaged, using
arrests and violence.274 By the final months of 1990, though, the MPLA had won “...a
number of resounding victories over the Malian army.”275 This was despite the rebels
numbering only around 200, and the army deploying 4000 soldiers, or two-thirds of its
total strength, to the region.276 The military did not have sufficient resources, equipment,
or overall capacity to defeat the Tuaregs. 277
The military’s ineffectiveness was largely tied to its organizational weakness,
which was a product of Traore’s personalist control and support of forces counter to the
military. The military leadership had problems directing increasingly unreliable units
stationed in the north.278 The rank and file were not certain to follow orders from the
military hierarchy. Intra-military disagreements between soldiers and officers
“...significantly weakened their loyalty and collective strength.”279 The military was not
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powerful or cohesive, and so unable to carry out its functional role – providing for a
secure society.
Because of the link between military capabilities and regime control, the Tuareg
conflict strained the regime-military relationship. “Continuous losses produced
exhaustion and resentment on the part of the army, which...could not successfully
continue the military struggle.”280 As a result, the military stopped supporting the
government’s efforts in the area. 281 The Tuaregs, while not an especially formidable
threat to the state, had resisted military defeat. In the process, the military had suffered
losses to military personnel and reputation. According to public opinion, the army had
given up.282
The Traore regime signed a ceasefire in January 1991 that gave northern Mali
some autonomy.283 At that point, victory was unlikely because the regime “...had no
control over the army.”284 Further, a matter of greater urgency was growing anti-Traore
protests in the capital. Traore needed to move elite troops from the north to Bamako to
defend his regime.285 The ceasefire was then part of a decision to “...focus on efforts to
hold on to power.”286 It also became another source of discontent for the military: “It was
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widely believed that [the signing of the peace agreement] was done so the military could
be turned on the increasingly restless population... As well as resenting this role, the
military felt slighted by the speedy settlement with the Tuaregs.”287
Traore moved to negotiate in part to secure his rule, but the ceasefire had the
effect of further undermining his popular legitimacy. The agreement was reached with
little input from many northern communities, or the political opposition.288 It was far
from an acceptable resolution to the conflict, for either the larger Malian population or
the military. Both “...were enraged by the pledges of the agreements and perceived the
concessions made to the Tuaregs as a threat to the integrity of the country.”289 Traore
sought to keep the details of the agreement secret, knowing the “special status” for the
Tuaregs would be controversial. As expected, protests broke out as details of the
agreement were leaked.290
In sum, the conflict served to make the regime’s threats to military functional
authority especially clear, putting the military’s delegated and functional authority in
tension. Traore’s coup-proofing had damaged military capabilities, decreasing military
effectiveness in conflict and threatening military functional authority. Further, he ended
the conflict partly to delegate some authority to the military to end the growing popular
protests against it. The challenge to the regime’s legitimacy also challenged the
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legitimacy of the military’s delegated authority, in the context of already diminished
military functional authority.
Anti-Traore Protests and the Military’s Response
The failure of the Traore regime to support Mali’s territorial integrity only further
challenged its claims to authority. The UPDM had been unable to solve many of the
country’s problems over the previous decade, and “...very early on, Malians began to
question its legitimacy.”291 Though initially Traore himself had been popular, corruption
undermined his rule. It was well known that his family and those close to him were
benefiting from power.292 Groups began to demand multi-partyism in 1990, but the
regime refused to make reforms.293 Opposition took the form of demonstrations and
strikes and escalated in 1991. On January 21, the extent of the opposition to Traore
became clear; hundreds of students rioted in Bamako after authorities banned marches
calling for multiparty democracy.294
Traore took a hardline stance in response to the unrest, offering no concessions.
He asserted control over the situation by reshuffling his cabinet and putting some of his
military supporters in charge of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior.295
The Interior Minister, General Sekou Ly, had previously served in the position but left
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due to rumors of corruption. His first tenure was marked by the severe suppression of
strikes by teachers and students in 1979 and 1980.296 This move thus signaled Traore
would again use repression if needed.
The regime’s reaction to the January demonstrations encouraged a renewed
challenge to the regime in mid-March.297 The protests required security force
involvement, and at this point, the military seemed loyal to Traore and willing to repress
on his orders. On March 22, soldiers fired on protesters in Bamako, killing at least 22,
wounding hundreds, and setting off widespread rioting. Following this violent episode,
Traore indicated he was willing to discuss the protesters’ grievances, but declared alleged
violence on the part of the protesters unjustified. He announced a state of emergency and
imposed a curfew in an attempt to tamp down the situation.298
The next day, March 23, saw more military repression and a new stage in the antiTraore movement. Large groups of women marched in the streets of Bamako to protest
the previous day’s killings. Soldiers shot and killed five of them, then chased the rest and
other demonstrators into a building and set it on fire, killing another 65.299 Such
egregious and indiscriminate violence shocked Malians and observers around the world.
It is unclear whether the regime or military leadership ordered the killings. In response,
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though, the opposition demanded Traore resign, because he “...had no moral right to
remain as president of the country” 300 after such violence on his behalf.
Traore agreed to talks with opposition leaders and lifted the state of emergency
and curfew. He remained confident in his position, at least partly because he believed he
had the support of the army. He told a radio station that he would not step down from
power, instead urging calm from the protesters so that the security forces could stop using
lethal force.301
The military’s loyalty was not absolute, however. So far, military support of the
regime through repression had not ended the popular challenge. The opposition,
including the National Union of Malian Workers and students, called for more
demonstrations on March 25. 45,000 people took to the streets, and for the first time in
four days, troops did not fire on the protesters.302 The unrest challenged the military’s
interest in order and functional authority, but was due to Traore’s refusal to resign. The
leaders of seven civil society associations had the day before released a statement
threatening an indefinite strike until Traore left power.303 More repression may have
ended the protests, but would have further compromised military delegated authority –
the ultimate source being the population.
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Importantly, the protesters were committed to nonviolence, large in size, and
diverse in support, indicating they might be an alternative source of military authority. In
the later stages of the protest movement, the opposition set up an umbrella group labeled
the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition (CCAOD). It brought together
students, trade unionists, opposition politicians, and human rights activists. Earlier, the
Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), a major opposition organization, had
proclaimed itself a political party. It had strong, broad-based support in both urban and
rural areas.304 At the protests’ height, tens of thousands of people were demonstrating
against the regime.305 The regime was facing a major challenge, would likely need
military support to withstand it.
On March 26, military leaders opted to preserve the military’s functional authority
by shifting loyalty to the protesters. A group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel
Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) informed a human rights activist and representative of
the opposition that they had arrested Traore.306 ATT was commander of a paratrooper
battalion and former head of the Red Berets.307 Later that day, he explained the military’s
loyalty shift to a press conference, saying, “We just did what the people wanted... We
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completed what they started.”308 The arrest largely had the support of the rest of the
military.309
The operation to arrest Traore involved a small number of high ranking officers.
However, no members or factions of the military remained loyal to Traore or expressed
disagreement with ATT’s decision. It does not seem that the rank and file or low ranking
officers shifted loyalty prior to Traore’s arrest, but their resentments towards him were
well known and mutiny rumors may have spurred ATT to act. As popular opposition to
the regime increased, security forces tasked to respond “...had to be constantly monitored
and frequently replaced.”310 Traore’s weakening of the military organization did not
prevent it from defecting in full, given the great threats to its sources of authority.
Rather, the Malian military responded to the anti-regime protests according to my
argument’s expectations regarding threats to military authority and military loyalty shifts.
In the military’s view, Traore was no longer able to keep the peace – either in the capital,
or the north.311 According to media reports, the military was especially affected when
Traore’s orders for tanks and soldiers on the streets of Bamako resulted in massive loss of
life.312 Continued loyalty would have meant further threats to military functional
authority from Traore’s control and the unrest for which his increasingly illegitimate rule
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was to blame. Instead, the military supported the protest movement as an alternative. In
the days following, military leaders committed to their new source of delegated by
authority by issuing an apology to representatives of the opposition for the atrocities
soldiers had committed against the protesters.313
The impacts of Traore’s control on military functional capabilities were especially
clear following the Tuareg conflict. Traore was unable to prevent the military from acting
against him to preserve its functional authority, even with the use of institutional coupproofing. ATT, a former commander of the Red Berets – the force tasked with guarding
the president – led the defections. In fact, ATT may have used his ties to the Red Berets
and access to the regime they gave him to mount the arrest.314 Traore’s counterforces did
not secure his regime, and generated further military discontent. And despite Traore’s
weakening of the military, these control strategies combined with the Tuareg conflict and
the large and nonviolent protests led to united defections.
Additional implications of the military’s concern with restoring its functional
authority were evident in its actions after Traore’s arrest, offering further support for my
argument. It moved to return order to the country, by closing Mali’s borders and
international airport. It also imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and with the civilian
opposition appealed for calm in the streets. Violence in the aftermath claimed the lives of
59 people – but most of the dead were alleged looters, killed by soldiers.315 ATT and the
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united military organization had supported the anti-Traore protesters by protecting its
sources of authority. Its loyalty shift had a less clearly positive impact on democratization
during the transition.
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes
The military remained united in the period following Traore’s arrest, allowing the
leadership to take decisive control of the situation. The military quickly arrested all of
Traore’s ministers. However, it did not arrest any army chiefs, even those involved in
repression.316 It then took the lead of the transition by setting up a National
Reconciliation Council (NRC) of 17 army officers, some of whom had been very close to
Traore. These included an aid, Lieutenant Colonel Oumar Dialloa, and the director of the
Defense Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Cheikh Oumar Diarra.317 This further signaled a
united military leadership whose discontent was with the Traore regime and not along
military divisions.
The NRC’s plans for the transition were initially unclear. The officers stated they
were going to replace Traore’s “bloodthirsty and corrupt regime” with a multiparty
democracy.318 They also met with pro-democracy leaders, promising to cooperate with
them. Yet a lack of details led to pressure from the CCAOD over military intentions and
civilian involvement.319 As a result, 10 officers and 15 representatives of the political
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organizations formed a new body, the Transition Committee for the Wellbeing of the
People (CTSP). It held a national conference from July 29 to August 12, during which it
developed a constitution and other governing documents.320 The new constitution was
adopted by referendum in January 1992.321
Throughout this period, there was concern about the military’s role in the
democratization processes, and whether it would accept rule by a new civilian
government. The CTSP included civilians, but ATT remained in control as president. In a
late August 1991 interview with Soumana Sako, interim and civilian prime minister,
Sako stated:
...the military is coming out of a period of 23 years in which it exercised power,
and we are now asking them, during this period of transition, to prepare to give up
power to civilian, democratically-elected politicians. This situation obviously
doesn’t please all the soldiers, officers, and junior officers.322
For the time being, the transitional government had a military head of state, ATT, and
civilian head of government, Sako. Problems had been avoided because, according to
Sako, “...there [was] perfect harmony between the two.”323 The goal was that the army
would respect the upcoming elections and then return to the barracks.324
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The transition ended fairly successfully with parliamentary and presidential
elections in 1992, and ATT’s relinquishing of power two months later.325 ADEMA won a
majority of legislative seats and Alpha Omar Konare, leader of ADEMA, won the
presidency.326 It did not take long for public dissatisfaction with the new government to
develop, especially given continued economic problems. This new unrest led to worry
about military intervention, with open fears of a possible coup in 1994.327 New
challenges followed in 1997, when the opposition boycotted a second round of elections
after the first had been canceled over poor organization.328 These tensions threatened the
consolidation of the civilian, democratic regime.
The military did not directly hurt consolidation nor formally return to politics
during this period, even though its leadership had been united in disloyalty. This owed
largely to continued civilian pressure against military intervention, as well as the military
hierarchy’s ability to prevent coup attempts. 329 Military leaders retained political
influence, however, and ATT in particular re-entered politics when he ran for and won
the 2002 presidential election. 330 ATT promised throughout his campaign that if elected
he would release Traore, who had been in prison since his arrest. Traore was released
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days before ATT took office. 331 Civilian-led democracy was further destabilized in
March 2012 when ATT’s term was cut short by a coup, partly in response to his
government’s failed efforts against a new Tuareg rebellion. 332 As one analyst writes,
“Ironically, for many Malians the only way to get democracy back on track was a coup
d’etat...”333 The intervention established the continued role of the military in the
country’s political trajectory and put the future of civilian control in question.
Conclusions
By 1991, the Malian military had a long history of involvement in politics, often
taking the form of repression against unarmed civilians. In fact, it was known for its
record of human rights abuse. It had used brutal force to repress student-led antigovernment demonstrations in 1980,334 and in July 1990, engaged in indiscriminate
violence against Tuareg rebels as well as non-combatants.335 It also killed protesters
during the 1991 uprising.
In the end, however, the military in 1991 supported democratic change by shifting
loyalty from the Traore regime to the protest movement. This response was not due to a
change of heart or a new normative commitment to democracy by the military, but rather
its concern with its sources of authority. Traore’s coup-proofing threatened military
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functional authority by reducing its effectiveness, which was especially evident through
conflict with the Tuareg rebels. The mass protests against Traore then challenged his
legitimacy and reduced military delegated authority. In this context, the military played a
supportive role in political change by preserving its functional authority and defecting to
the protesters.
This case study demonstrates that a politically active military can support prodemocracy protesters and political change, yet challenge civilian-led democratization.
Thus it both develops and confirms claims from the civil-military relations literature. The
Malian military’s disloyalty to the Traore regime was crucial to the success of the protest
movement. Further, it was Traore’s forms of control over the military that helped to
produce this outcome. Because the military organization was united in its defection,
however, the military leadership was able to involve itself in the transition process and
democratic politics. This was particularly notable in ATT’s 2002 election and
subsequent pardoning of Traore, and culminated in the coup of 2012.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: BANGLADESH – AUTHORITY THREATS, FRAGMENTED
SHIFTS, AND CIVILIAN-LED DEMOCRATIZATION
In December 1990, President Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh faced
mass protests that required he call on the military for support. While Ershad had exerted
some control over the faction-ridden military during his time in power, he did so by
establishing personal ties of loyalty based on cronyism. This control threatened military
functional capabilities by weakening the military organization. The protests that first
developed in October 1987 were large and nonviolent, but had difficulties uniting due to
longstanding tensions between the main opposition parties. My argument would expect
significant loyalty shifts to the protesters, but along military divisions or across a
disorganized military. It would also expect limited military influence over the democratic
transition.
In this chapter, I use the case of Bangladesh to assess the relationship between
medium levels of threat to military functional authority in the form of personalist coupproofing and high level, fragmented military loyalty shifts. I find that Ershad’s granting
of political and economic benefits to loyal senior officers generated discontent among
junior officers who worried that the military leadership was corrupt and ineffective. The
junior officers pressured the chief of army staff to shift loyalty from Ershad, though some
seniors were in favor of intervening on Ershad’s behalf. In the end, Ershad’s regime fell.
The military loyalty shifts supported the protesters and the subsequent political change
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was democratizing, because democratically-elected civilians were able to establish
civilian control over the fragmented military organization.
Ershad’s Regime and Control of the Military
Ershad was serving as army chief of staff when he seized power by coup in 1982.
His coup continued a long tradition of military intervention in politics. Beginning with
the Bangladesh military’s first post-independence coup in August 1975, it launched a
series of 22 coups, countercoups, and mutinies.336 Most of the coups were a result of a
sharp divide and competition for power between the “freedom fighters”, or irregular
troops who had fought in East Pakistan, and the repatriated troops that had served in the
Pakistani army prior to independence.337 The divide developed out of the war and
worsened with Bangladesh’s victory and the fusion of the two forces as one national
military in December 1971.
The coups represented a struggle for supremacy between the military factions and
furthered the military divide. They also challenged the military hierarchy because they
were often carried out by junior officers. Intra-military discontent was otherwise evident
in the large-scale mutinies and desertions that took place in 1975, 1976, and 1977.338
Throughout this post-independence period, the Bangladesh military intervened in politics.
The coups were however most associated with a fundamental weakness of the military
organization.
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Ershad was a repatriated officer, but his coup was not part of this factional
conflict. His predecessor, Ziaur Rhaman (Zia), had favored the repatriated officers and
put them in positions of authority.339 He eliminated many freedom fighters from the
military altogether; his “great purge” from 1977 to 1981 involved executing more than
1000 officers and other soldiers.340 Because of Zia’s heavy hand, the most intense
struggles over this division had ended by the time Ershad took power.
Still, Ershad sought to secure his regime by further stabilizing the military. He
followed Zia in weeding out the freedom fighters. He placed repatriated and other
favored military officers in positions of power, including political and administrative
positions.341 This increased military and political authority and provided the officers
positions to advance themselves. Under his control, officers were appointed to the federal
government, police, foreign service, and public corporations.342 By 1985, all seven
members of his cabinet and nearly 1500 other positions in the civilian administration
were filled by members of the military. He also increased military funding – the defense
budget as well as salaries and other benefits.343
Ershad’s strategies were effective for reducing intra-military conflict and
preventing military challenges to his rule. As Hakim writes,
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With handsome salaries, lucrative fringe benefits, the prospect of rapid
promotion, ever-increasing military budgets, and the opportunity of appointment
to the government bureaucracy, the armed forces seemed to be reasonably
satisfied. Ershad was considerably successful in maintaining control over a
faction-ridden and undisciplined military...344
Indeed, he faced no coup attempts or rebellions during his tenure.345 The military was
well provided for, and society was increasingly militarized as a result.
Ershad’s overall structuring of authority was fundamentally personalist, though.
While his rule was not unlike that of previous Bangladeshi leaders, its personalist nature
was deeper and more extensive. For example, Ershad’s political party, the Jatiya Party
(JP), relied on him completely, for its direction and organization.346 More generally,
Ershad did not rule through institutions but rather monopolized policy and personnel
decisions. He used his personal control of state resources to distribute political patronage
and create networks of loyal clients.347
His control of the military was similarly based on loyalty ties rather than meritbased standards. His personalist coup-proofing divided the repatriated military into
favored and disfavored factions, weakening military autonomy and hierarchy.
Specifically, he used divide and rule tactics to promote some officers and reward them
financially, while sending others to undesirable postings with inadequate salaries.348 He
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frequently reshuffled the military command to prevent a centralization of power and the
emergence of threats.349 His appointment of officers to civilian posts was “mainly
selective, discretionary, and limited to senior officers and Ershad loyalists.”350 The
military leaders he favored were political powerful, and corrupt.351
Ershad exercised control over the military. But the forms in which he delegated it
authority had negative implications for the military organization’s interests in its
functional capacity and authority. His personalist strategies created new divisions
between the upper and lower ranks, politicized the military leadership, and damaged the
military organization. The weak military institution with its lack of functional capacities
lost credibility in the eyes of medium and lower ranking officers.352 The senior officers’
political appointments gave them a stake in the regime, but took away from the military’s
focus on its ability to play a functional role in society. The military was not involved in
conflict over this period, though, and so not directly confronted by the effects of Ershad’s
policies. Growing protests against Ershad challenged his rule, and threatened the
military’s reliance on authority delegated by legitimate civilians.
Anti-Ershad Protests and the Military’s Response
The anti-Ershad protests that developed in the late 1980s challenged a regime that
had long struggled to legitimize its rule. Ershad took power just months after the election
Arthur Max, “Mass Demonstrations in Bangladesh in Defiance of State of Emergency,” The Associated
Press, November 30, 1990.
349

Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in
Bangladesh,” 559.
350

351

Ibid., 560.

Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in
Bangladesh,” 560.
352

178

of a new president. At the time, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was
having problems governing, and fighting within the party and between it and its main
political opponent, the Awami League (AL), had produced clashes.353 Still, his coup was
not the result of conflict between the government and military, or intra-military conflict.
Rather, it “...ruptured the civil-military elite consensus that had been nurtured by Zia, and
it also alienated the masses.”354
After seizing power, Ershad suspended the constitution and banned all political
parties. In 1983, he assumed the presidency. He civilianized the government by forming
the JP later that year.355 These initial steps to solidify his rule were unsuccessful; the JP
failed to generate support despite its participation in elections.356 Ershad’s close control
of the JP also weakened the parliament’s functioning.357 Ershad then attempted to bolster
his legitimacy by holding a referendum in March 1985, but the opposition responded by
demanding the withdrawal of martial law. The military had to use shows of force to keep
order during the vote.358 Ershad restored the constitution and full political activity in
1986, but this lasted less than a year.359
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Ershad was thus unable to legitimize himself through elections, most of which the
opposition boycotted or refused to accept when he did not meet their demands. He was
also unable to turn around the economic crisis and governance failures from which the
country was suffering when he took power. He almost immediately began to implement
structural adjustment measures, but these produced little economic stability or growth.
Under his rule, Bangladesh became increasingly reliant on foreign aid, as well.360
Though discontent was present from the start of Ershad’s regime, protests ramped
up in October 1987. He responded by declaring a state of emergency in November and
dissolving parliament in December. The regime regained some stability, and the BNP and
AL let up on their demands. This was partly because the AL’s leadership was concerned
that further instability would bring about a military coup, and that it could be sympathetic
to the BNP.361 In general, the two parties’ longstanding divisions prevented them from
putting substantial pressure on Ershad.362 Ershad withstood this particular challenge as a
result.
The opposition boycotted the 1988 elections but the anti-regime movement then
stalled, largely because of devastating natural disasters over the fall and winter that
displaced millions.363 Protests reorganized in spring 1990 though when Ershad
announced new elections for early 1991. Increasingly, students participated alongside the
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more established political organizations. A particularly violent confrontation between
security forces and demonstrators in October impelled twenty-two existing student
organizations to join to form the All-Party Students’ Unity group.364 Their determined
involvement ushered in a new phase in the campaign. In this period, “...political alliances
were under tremendous pressure from students and other sectors of civil society to be
united and announce programs that would keep the movement going to oust the
government.”365 Protests became more steady, and the BNP and AL’s division less
central.
As the protests’ momentum grew, the Ershad regime took aggressive measures to
limit their impact. It had mostly relied on the police and paramilitary forces, including the
Bangladesh Rifles, with little military involvement.366 At times, however, these forces
resisted being used by Ershad against unarmed protesters. The police could be unreliable,
and the Rifles were open about their discontent.367 Consequently, the regime began to
look to the military for support. This resulted in particularly violent confrontations such
as in October 1990 when soldiers killed five and injured several hundred
demonstrators.368
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Some of Ershad’s attempts to end the popular challenge only escalated the unrest.
First, he armed parts of the JP, including their student branches. These armed groups
came to be his main arm of repression – beyond the role of the military. They even
engaged in violent battles on the Dhaka University campus.369 Second, in late November
he released criminals who went armed to confront the students.370 This led to more
violence and generated more protests. Such efforts thus failed to restore regime
legitimacy (or military delegated authority), and further threatened military functional
authority with disorder and instability. It was at this point that junior military officers’
complaints about Ershad became public.371
Ershad had few options remaining. The opposition demanded that he transfer
power to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who would then form an interim
government and hold elections.372 After meeting with some senior military commanders,
he declared a state of emergency on November 27 to “safeguard internal security.”373 The
protests continued, and troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing up to 50.374 On
December 3, Ershad proposed concessions, but the emboldened opposition rejected
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them.375 Huq writes of this period: “...the movement for the removal of Ershad and
restoration of democracy reached its climax when many professional groups such as
university teachers, lawyers, journalists, doctors, engineers, artists, and others lent their
unequivocal support to the movement.”376 Under these conditions, it was increasingly
clear that Ershad needed the military to end the challenge.
However, from the start of the protests there were “...growing doubts about
[middle-ranking officers’] patience” with Ershad and his inability to restore his
legitimacy and societal order.377 Many were critical of the state of emergency and at least
two battalion commanders sent to reinforce the capital in late November refused to put
their troops on the streets to kill students.378 When Ershad attempted to move
reinforcement units to Dhaka, Chief of General Staff Major General Abdus Salam
resisted, saying he needed additional orders from other military leaders.379 As of early
December, the troops that had fired on demonstrations just a week previously now stood
by.380 The military’s loyalty was not absolute, but any loyalty shifts were disorganized
and temporary.
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In these later stages of the anti-Ershad movement, the demonstrations were
moderately large, numbering in the tens of thousands.381 They were also diverse,
involving workers, doctors, and intellectuals, from across ethnic and kinship groups.382
Notably absent, however, were organized laborers from the agricultural or industrial
sectors. Students continued to play an outsized role, maintaining pressure on the BNPand AL-led opposition groups to unite in their challenge to Ershad.383 Still, the leadership
of the organized parties remained important. Their conflictual history and the fact that the
AL was known to be anti-military likely affected the military’s view of them as
alternatives to Ershad.384
On December 6, Ershad called on the military to end the protests with force.
Chief of Army Staff Nuruddin Khan refused, and Ershad resigned as a result.385 Reports
emerged that Khan had acted largely as a middleman after junior officers advised him
they would not support an increasingly illegitimate government.386 These officers could
no longer rely on their delegated authority. They were also dissatisfied with Ershad’s
control of the military institution. According to media coverage of the situation, they
were specifically unhappy about Ershad’s patronage-based promotions and the constant
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changes in command.387 Consequently, they had come to “...assert the apolitical nature of
the military in its institutional interests.”388
This response by the military was divided, as one faction of the military supported
intervention on behalf of Ershad and pressured Khan to take power.389 “It was generally
known that the top army brass had been divided between Ershad loyalists and neutralists,
and that [Khan] had been performing a difficult balancing act in the early days of
December.”390 Khan himself succeeded an Ershad loyalist, Lieutenant General Atiqur
Rahman, and had only served as Chief since August 1990.391 In the aftermath of Ershad’s
resignation, Khan took care to remove the interventionist generals, as well as intelligence
chiefs who reported directly to the president, from positions of power. He also disbanded
Ershad’s elite officer guard.392 The loyalty shift was also disorganized, with junior
officers who had become increasingly unreliable pressuring Khan to refuse Ershad’s
orders.
In the end, Khan and a large section of the military refused to back Ershad,
effectively shifting loyalty from his regime to the opposition. Ershad attempted to control
the military and the threat it posed to his rule, but his strategies of coup-proofing based
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on ties of personal loyalty threatened military functional authority. For the lower and
middle-ranking officers, “...corruption and incompetence of top military and government
leaders, with whom the military as an institution came to be identified, cost dearly.”393
Ershad rewarded officers’ loyalty with political and economic benefits that took
from the military’s core competencies. Non-loyalist officers believed the military’s
institutional interests – “…a sufficient defense budget, a respectable image for the
soldiery, and lack of external interference in the army’s internal affairs” 394 - were better
served under a different form of regime control. After nearly three years of protests
against his regime, the military’s delegated authority was also increasingly in question,
even if the opposition was internally divided. Much of the military did not want to
support a regime that had failed to legitimize itself – and that had threatened both sources
of military authority in the process.
As my argument expects, Ershad’s forms of control generated high level yet
fragmented and disunited loyalty shifts. Those officers who expressed loyalty to Ershad
and preferred intervention did not act in a way that prevented the fall of the regime,
however. Consequently, the military response supported protesters and political change.
As Khan and Husain write, “It remains a reasonable speculation that without this

Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in
Bangladesh,” 560.
393

V.G. Kulkarni, “Armed Neutrality: Military Chief to Seek Apolitical Role for Forces,” Far Eastern
Economic Review 150, no. 52 (1990): 15.
394

186

response from the military, the bastion of power of Ershad, the fate of the uprising would
have been different.”395 How then did the loyalty shifts affect democratization?
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes
After Ershad resigned, a three-month transitional government was set up, headed
by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Shahbuddin Ahmed. It declared a state of
emergency, restored civil liberties, and organized elections for February 1991. They were
considered free and fair by observers, and the BNP won the most seats and formed a new
government.396 In some ways, Bangladesh’s democratic transition was against long odds.
The country had a literacy rate of 35.52% and a low per capita GDP: “[a]s such, it
seemed to lack several prerequisites to democracy.”397 Furthermore, the transition
followed military rule.
There were significant concerns that the military would play a major, and
negative, role in the newly established democracy. Of its 24 years of independence, the
country had been under military rule or significant military influence for 17.398 During
the protests, some of the opposition worried that military support for Ershad’s ouster
would result in the reimposition of military rule rather than democracy.399 In the run-up
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to the elections, both the AL and BNP expressed support for a democratic government
free of military interference.400 The AL threatened to reform the military if it were to take
control of the government.401
Yet the military did not involve itself in the new democracy, instead coming
under partial civilian control. The BNP prime minister Khaleda Zia immediately retired
or otherwise removed the senior officers closest to Ershad.402 A new parliamentary
system was implemented that provided for a stronger legislature and a head of
government with more power over the military; the presidential office traditionally
responsible for the military’s political involvement was reduced to mostly ceremonial
functions. In particular, the prime minister took over the Armed Forces Division, a body
that coordinated the three service branches, allowing the government to oversee military
affairs including personnel appointments and deployment decisions. It also subordinated
the Ministry of Defense.403
For its part, the military post-Ershad concentrated on “...restoring the military’s
image as a moral and efficient organization.”404 The military had a long history of
factionalism. In December 1990, some senior officers feared that supporting Ershad or
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taking power would lead to a renewal of the conflict from the 1970s and early 1980s.405
But factional divisions and rivalries owing to Ershad’s personal forms of control played
an even bigger role in the military’s stance. In fact, “Had the military been fully
professional and a tightly organized group...it would have managed to take control of the
government.”406 The military factions did not come together to either remain loyal to
Ershad or fully defect to the protesters, leaving divisions that reduced the military’s
overall political influence.
The military remained mostly out of politics and thus supportive of
democratization in the days and years following. Khan assisted Prime Minister Zia in
removing Ershad loyalists, in part to head off any attempts to seize power.407 A potential
civil-military confrontation that did not end up challenging the democratic system
occurred in May 1996. President Abdur Rahman Biswas sacked and interned Army Chief
Lieutenant General Abu Saleh Mohammed Nasim and some of his top military
colleagues for allegedly conspiring to topple the government. There were suspicions as to
Biswas’s motivations and the credibility of this claim, but Nasim and the rest of the army
did not challenge the civilian government’s decision.408 The military at times struggled to
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adjust to civilian control, but in the years following largely resisted a return to its former
political role.409
Conclusions
By 1990, the Bangladesh military was accustomed to involvement in politics –
whether through direct seizures of power over the first decades of independence or
service in the government bureaucracy and all its benefits as rewards for loyalty under
Ershad. Ershad seemed to have satisfied the military with this latter strategy and other
forms of coup-proofing, as he did not face any coup attempts during his tenure. What he
did face, though, was years of mass protest by a civilian opposition unhappy with his
autocratic rule.
The Bangladesh military supported democratization by supporting anti-Ershad
protesters in December 1990. Its loyalty shift was fragmented, across a disunited
organization. According to my argument, this is because Ershad controlled the military in
ways that threatened its functional authority – reducing its autonomy and weakening its
organizational integrity. Ershad’s policies prioritized loyalty over institutional quality.
The protest movement was disruptive, and dominated by two antagonistic opposition
parties. Even so, Ershad’s failure to restore his legitimacy threatened military delegated
authority. The officers most concerned with these developments pressured Khan to shift
loyalty, even without the support of some generals.
Though Bangladesh’s democratization faced many challenges after Ershad’s fall,
most of them resulted from ongoing tensions between the BNP and AL, rather than civilmilitary relations. The military, despite its long history in politics, remained largely under
409

Ghoshal, “The Anatomy of Military Interventions in Asia: The Case of Bangladesh,” 77.

190

democratic and civilian control. My argument and findings suggest this is in part due to
its divisions and relative weakness and its particular type of loyalty shift.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: PERU – FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITY, LOW LEVEL
DISCONTENT AND SHIFTS, AND CIVILIAN-LED DEMOCRATIZATION
In Peru, protests followed President Alberto Fujimori’s controversial 2000
election to what was widely considered an unconstitutional third term. The demonstrators
were not successful at preventing Fujimori’s inauguration, but continued as allegations
emerged regarding Fujimori’s close advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos was
head of the notorious national intelligence agency, and directly implicated in political
violence and corruption. These revelations, even more than the protests, put the
government’s legitimacy and the Peruvian military’s delegated authority at risk.
However, the military’s functional authority was less in question following a brutal yet
effective counterinsurgency against the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Fujimori’s
coup-proofing strategies, though personalist, ultimately did not threaten military
functional authority. My argument would expect less extensive military loyalty shifts,
with little role for the military in regime change or democratization.
This chapter draws on the Peru case to trace my explanation for low level loyalty
shifts, or shifts that involve limited numbers of the rank and file or low ranking officers. I
show that while Fujimori controlled the upper levels of the military through forced
retirements and non-meritocratic promotions, he rewarded its loyalty by increasing
military autonomy in the fight against the rebels. Its effectiveness here bolstered the selfconception it had had since ruling from 1968 to 1980: a professional military responsible
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for national security and development. Additionally, the anti-Fujimori protesters did not
represent an alternative source of military authority even as the regime’s legitimacy
waned. In the end, while the movement put important pressure on Fujimori, and low level
military loyalty shifts demonstrated discontent within the lower- and middle-ranks,
Fujimori’s regime fell as a result of other forces. Following this, the country
democratized, with little involvement by the largely discredited military.
Fujimori’s Regime and Control of the Military
Fujimori was unexpectedly elected to the presidency in 1990.410 Peru had
democratized in 1980, following years of military dictatorship, but the first two civilian
presidents presided over growing political and economic instability. Sendero Luminoso
threatened both rural and urban areas, while the country’s GDP declined by 12 percent
and inflation rose to 7,000 percent.411 This “disillusion with the political class, all major
parties, and a failing system of government” provided Fujimori, a political outsider, the
conditions for victory.412
Fujimori’s status as a non-establishment candidate meant he had little support
from political parties, civil society groups, or other elites. His lack of ties to traditional
political institutions also made his rule largely personalist; according to Barr, Fujimori
frequently used and abused executive decrees as a means to avoid dealing with Congress,
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creating a system that scholars came to term “delegative democracy.”413 From 1990 to
1992, for example, Fujimori issued an average of 29 constitutional decrees per month.414
Given Peru’s past with military rule, Fujimori also feared the military, and sought to gain
control over it with the help of Montesinos, a former army captain.415
The military had seized power from President Fernando Belaunde Terry in 1968.
It was motivated by a desire to advance the country and prevent another insurgency like
the one it had eliminated over six months in 1965 and 1966.416 In Stepan’s extended
analysis of the military over this period, he describes its “...new professionalism of
internal security and national development.”417 The military believed itself capable of
restructuring the state such to create stability. Despite the military regime’s efforts at
agrarian reform and industrialization, though, economic recession hit Peru in the mid1970s. The military institution decided to return to the barracks before it was completely
discredited. The military no longer ruled the country, but remained confident in itself as a
respected, reformist organization.418
Using Montesinos, Fujimori’s main strategy was to implement extensive military
personnel changes based around loyalty to him. Beginning in November 1991, using
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Legislative Decree 752, Fujimori assumed control over military promotions and
retirements.419 Fujimori made these decisions mostly with regards to the military’s upper
ranks. “By forcing out officers whose loyalty was suspect, and rewarding those whose
support was unconditional, Montesinos helped Fujimori secure the backing of the
military.”420 Most of these more “suspect” officers were from the institutionalist faction
of the military, which disagreed with Fujimori’s use of the military for political
purposes.421 The remaining loyalist officers formed a base of support for Fujimori’s
regime.
Much of the work of identifying the institutionalists was done by Montesinos and
the National Intelligence Service, or SIN. The SIN had a reputation of being “...highly
militarized, corrupt, conspiring, and free of judicial and legislative oversight.”422 Through
it, Fujimori “...gain[ed] complete control of the [military].”423 Fujimori also used the SIN
to monitor the political opposition and any threats it posed.424 He expanded the
organization’s power in April 1995, following his reelection. 425
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Fujimori’s auto-golpe or self-coup in April 1992 strengthened the perception that
he had a cooperative relationship with the military, despite his personalist control of it.
With the help of armored tanks on Lima’s streets, he suspended Congress, the courts, and
constitutional guarantees. He had been fairly popular leading up to this point, following
progress on the economy and security, but this move cemented his power.426 He
formalized his expanded executive authority with a new constitution that was approved
by referendum in 1993.427
In exchange for the military’s support in this instance and generally, Fujimori
provided for some military interests. Specifically, Fujimori used a series of executive
decrees to increase military power and autonomy in its fight against the Shining Path.428
The military had been fighting the Shining Path and the smaller Moviemento
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) since the 1980s, with little success.429 Under
Belaunde and Garcia, the government had no clear strategy, and consequently, “...neither
president gained control over guerrilla violence.”430 The military was frustrated by these
failures and the ongoing insecurity.431
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Under Fujimori, in contrast, the military got “carte blanche authority” 432 to fight
the rebels. Beginning in November 1991, Fujimori placed military commanders in charge
of the conflict’s emergency zones.433 This allowed the military to take all steps necessary
to secure the areas. Indeed, military officers allegedly involved in war crimes as part of
their missions were pardoned by Fujimori.434 Later, in June 1995, Congress passed two
amnesty laws that applied to all military operations in emergency zones since 1980.435 “In
all, Fujimori dealt with Sendero forcefully and militarized the counterinsurgency to a far
greater degree than previous administrations.”436
It took awhile for these policy changes to generate military successes, though. The
Shining Path launched a series of bombings in Lima during April and May 1992. The
military split between the institutionalists and loyalists worsened amid fears the rebels
were gaining strength, and the military was failing to create security. Soon after the
bombings, the institutionalists reportedly made plans to seize power from Fujimori.
“They believed a counter-coup would restore Peru to constitutional rule, rebuff the
impending threat of a Shining Path triumph, and end the political manipulation of the
armed forces that they perceived as a threat to the entire military institution.”437 These
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officers looked for support from the institutionalist generals who had been forced out of
the military in late 1991, as well as other frustrated lower and middle-ranking officers.438
Military discontent at these lower ranks was well known during this period. The
chief complaint among military institutionalists was Fujimori’s system of promotions and
rotations based on loyalty rather than professional merit.439 In their view, the system
“...endangered the autonomy and professionalism of the military.”440 They expressed
their dissent in various ways besides the rumored coup attempts; in one instance by
leaking information to the media that implicated Montesinos and high ranking officers in
the abduction and murder of students and a professor.441 The case was brought to a
military court, though, with no repercussions for the accused.442
The fight against the Shining Path and the position of the institutionalists changed
with the September 12, 1992 capture of the group’s leader, Abimael Guzman. This was a
major victory for Fujimori and his military allies. The institutionalists never attempted
their coup, but in November 1992 more than 40 of them were arrested.443 With these
arrests, many of Fujimori’s opponents in the military were gone. His attention to military
organizational interests further secured his position. According to Enrique Obando, “The
quid pro quo in the military’s support for Fujimori was his promise to broadly expand
438
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military power in the counterinsurgency effort.” 444 Over time, the military was able to
claim other successes in the fight against the rebels: violence associated with the
insurgency declined greatly over the mid- to late-1990s.445 The rebels’ presence was
reduced to just remote areas of the country. By 2000, the rebels posed little threat.446 The
military was still unpopular, but no longer seen as ineffective.447 A brutal
counterinsurgency had bolstered the military’s functional authority.
In sum, Fujimori used Montesinos to co-opt the military into his increasingly
authoritarian and personalist rule. Their personnel decisions generated military
discontent, particularly among officers who had not yet been retired or at lower ranks
concerned with the impact on military capabilities. Yet Fujimori also increased military
power and autonomy as part of his counterinsurgency policies. “Although weakened and
de-professionalized at the national level by Fujimori’s co-optative methods, at the
regional one the Army became stronger.”448 This allowed the military leadership to
reduce the threat of the Shining Path rebels. The military’s view of itself as an
organization capable of protecting national development was not threatened by
Fujimori’s control. By the late 1990s, then, the military had significant authority; at times
exercising issuing its own political proclamations or using tanks in the streets to
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“reinforce its positions.”449 Officers who disagreed with this approach had largely been
retired and replaced with Fujimori loyalists.
Anti-Fujimori Protests and the Military’s Response
Fujimori was generally popular during the early and mid-1990s, especially as
Peruvians began to attribute their country’s increased security and stability to him. After
1992, protests occurred annually on the anniversary of his auto-golpe. Still, most of the
population seemed to support his rationale for the power grab – that greater executive
power was necessary to carry out economic reforms and defeat the Shining Path – and he
was re-elected by a landslide in April 1995.450
Fujimori capitalized on this support to pursue a third term. In August 1996,
Congress passed a law allowing him to run again in 2000, reasoning he had only been
elected once under the 1993 constitution.451 But not long after, reports emerged on
growing opposition to Fujimori’s efforts: “...[Fujimori’s] economic policies have failed to
provide jobs and the fading threat of leftist rebels has ceased to justify his blatant
disregard for democratic checks and balance.”452 These criticisms were compounded by
Fujimori’s personalist rule, which lacked the political institutions to build up his
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legitimacy.453 He did not even use his governing party because Montesinos considered it
a threat.454
The 2000 election was held as scheduled, despite ongoing questions about its
legality and an investigation into Montesinos’s involvement in drug trafficking.455
Fujimori failed to secure 50 percent of the vote in the first round on April 9. When he
attempted to claim victory anyway, he was met with protests, forcing him into a second
round.456 Prior to the vote, the leading opposition candidate Toledo withdrew to protest
what he claimed was the government’s manipulation of the electoral process.457 This
opened the way for the military and police to declare Fujimori the winner on June 9. A
few days later the Peruvian Electoral National Jury confirmed their declaration.458
Fujimori was to be sworn into office on July 28.
After protests failed to prevent Fujimori’s election, plans were made to disrupt his
inauguration in late July. Protests had been ongoing in Lima since the elections, but on
July 26, the first of three days of planned demonstrations, 10,000 people turned out.459
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Concern over potential unrest led the government to set up barricades and bring in
thousands of police troops to the capital. Army units were put on standby.460 On July 27,
the police did not attempt to intervene.461 On July 28, though, at least 80 people, both
police and demonstrators, were injured.462 Fujimori named an opposition politician as his
prime minister, as some form of concession to demands.463 Otherwise, the protests had
little impact, and the situation settled somewhat.
In September, a series of events put Fujimori’s third term much more in question.
First, a video was leaked to the press that showed Montesinos bribing a member of
Congress. The congressman had been part of the opposition before switching parties to
support Fujimori, and Montesinos was seen handing him thousands of dollars in cash.464
This followed closely on reports that Montesinos had been involved in arms trafficking to
the FARC rebel group in Colombia.465 Both the opposition and ruling parties demanded
an investigation. Protests broke out to call for Montesino’s resignation.466 Fujimori
attempted to get control of the situation, and it was reported on September 15 that he had
fired Montesinos. The next day, however, Montesinos emerged and tried to arrest the
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assistant to the head of the SIN because he suspected him of being involved in the video’s
release. Perhaps seeking to distance themselves from Montesinos, the navy refused to
follow his arrest orders.467
The feelings of the rest of the military – and particularly the upper ranks loyal to
Montesinos – were unclear. Fujimori met with his cabinet on September 17, amid
continued protests, reportedly to make plans for leaving power. During this period,
“Rumors spread through Lima...that Fujimori decided to call new elections because of
resistance from high military officers when he tried to fire...Montesinos.”468 But in a
televised address, Fujimori announced that in addition to holding new elections in which
he would not be a candidate, he was deactivating the SIN.469
Montesinos’s faction demonstrated no resistance to or dissent over the SIN’s
deactivation. Experts weighed in that the military was unlikely to revolt over this
decision,470 perhaps because they expected Montesinos’s position, and their benefits, to
be unchanged. In fact, the loyalists in the upper ranks retained their positions, with the
general next in line for the post of commander of the armed forces a loyalist too.471
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Discontent middle-ranking officers were also likely supportive of Fujimori472 – for them,
the SIN’s deactivation was a move in the right direction.
Fujimori went a step further a few days later, when he fired Montesinos. This
generated considerable uncertainty, and concerns over a possible military coup – by
either officers seeking to remove both Fujimori and Montesinos or officers seeking to
keep Montesinos in place.473 Montesinos was detained on September 18 by soldiers
acting on the orders of the commander of the armed forces, General Jose Villaneuva
Ruestra.474 Then, on September 20, Fujimori declared that he would reduce his third term
to one year and hold elections ahead of schedule.475 There is no indication that the
military played a role in Fujimori’s decision. Though close to Montesinos, the military
leadership remained loyal to Fujimori over this period.
With these concessions – Montesinos’s arrest and the new elections – Fujimori
seemed to regain some stability for the rest of his term. According to analysts, he had
strong support in the parliament, the judiciary, and most of the military, and was likely to
remain in power.476 On September 21, the commanders of the army, air force, navy, and
police confirmed this view by issuing a statement in support of Fujimori, while urging

472

Monte Hayes, “AP Photos LIM101-102.”

473

Roland Flamini, “Global Impact News Alert,” United Press International, September 18, 2000.

Anthony Faiola, “Military is Focus of Peru Crisis; Fate of Ex-Official Remains Unclear,” The
Washington Post, September 19, 2000.
474

475

Taylor, “Alberto Fujimori’s Peripeteia: From ‘Re-Eleccion’ to Regime Collapse,” 18.

Abraham Lama, “Politics-Peru: Montesinos’ Return Heightens Crisis,” IPS-Inter Press Service, October
23, 2000.
476

203

calm from the population.477 Yet rumors of a coup led Montesinos to flee Peru on
September 23.478 Fujimori followed this news by quickly scheduling a number of visits to
military commands, to reassert his authority.479
Fujimori’s legitimacy took another hit when it came out that Montesinos had gone
to Panama and would not face corruption charges.480 This was the final straw for some of
Fujimori’s supporters in Congress; on September 26, five members of the Fujimori’s
Peru 2000 (P2000) party resigned, which cost him his majority.481 Soon after, lawmakers
from the ruling and opposition parties voted to officially deactivate the SIN. Emboldened,
protesters turned out to demand Fujimori’s immediate resignation and the extradition of
Montesinos from Panama to be subject to legal consequences.482
Montesinos returned to Peru in secret on October 22, after Panama refused to give
him asylum.483 Fearing for his continued influence over the military, Fujimori retired a
number of top officers in the days following.484 He then called an emergency cabinet
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meeting that included the heads of the army, navy, and air force, to discuss the events. 485
He also visited a number of military installations, likely to suggest control of the
situation.486
Yet opposition to Fujimori was increasing because it had become obvious that he
“...cannot control the military brass, nor Montesinos, who continues managing the
generals that he himself placed in the highest points of command.”487 In the view of the
protesters and others, Fujimori needed to remove the military leadership and replace them
with generals who were free from association with Montesinos. His inability to do so
weakened his position and led to calls for his resignation.488 In response, Fujimori
embarked on a highly publicized and widely mocked “manhunt” for Montesinos, while
insisting he was in charge of the military.489
In this context of ongoing protests and Fujimori’s illegitimacy, the military’s
delegated authority was compromised. The military’s functional authority was largely
intact, however, and so the challenge to Fujimori’s regime did not put the military’s
sources of authority in tension. The military’s effectiveness at providing order and
stability, and its functional role in society, was not in question given the Shining Path’s
defeat. The military was an organization capable of defending the national interest.
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The protest movement also did not represent an alternative source of delegated
authority for a military that could still rely on its functional authority. At the protests’
height, they numbered more than 100,000 and involved students, labor unions, peasant
organizations, NGOs, women’s organizations, and political parties.490 They never became
as large, or as sustained, as opposition leaders had hoped, though. Toledo vowed to put at
least 200,000 people on the streets on July 27 but ended up with a respectable but not
overwhelming 80,000, with a smaller crowd in the following days.491
Overall, it was difficult for the movement’s leadership to build popular opposition
in a country that was extremely de-politicized from the violence of a 20 year civil war
and the fracturing of democratic institutions, including political parties. Over the conflict,
68,000 people were victims of political violence by the state security forces or insurgent
groups.492 Peruvians were dissatisfied with the democracy that had failed to provide
solutions to societal problems.493 Their growing frustrations with Fujimori did not
necessarily translate into support for the opposition. As reported during this period,
“Many question whether Toledo’s star can continue to rise solely on cries of election
fraud, saying an opposition leader has yet to emerge who can rally a poor country around
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real demands for social and economic change.”494 The protest movement struggled to
present a capable challenge to the regime’s authority.
The only loyalty shifts that occurred in response to the anti-Fujimori protest
movement were low level, by a small section of low-ranking officers. On October 29, a
military garrison in the southern region of Peru rebelled against Fujimori and the military
leadership. The rebellion involved around 100 soldiers and was led by Army Lieutenant
Ollanta Humala Tasso, head of an anti-aircraft artillery unit. They took control of a
copper mine and from there made a number of demands: that Fujimori be unseated,
Montesinos jailed, and the armed forces general staff demoted.495 These demands
reflected the main sources of discontent for low to middle ranking officers in the Fujimori
military, and those of the protesters.
Though the loyalty shift involved few soldiers, it was the clearest and most
organized signal of anti-regime and pro-opposition sentiment from the military during the
protests. It also received a significant amount of attention throughout Peru, and observers
watched for indications that Humala’s broadcasted “Manifesto to the Peruvian People”
would set off a larger armed forces rebellion.496 Some army reservists and veterans of the
1995 conflict with Ecuador rallied and marched in support of the rebels, with plans to
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join them.497 Beyond this, though, the loyalty shifts did not spread – to other geographic
areas, or to other units or ranks of the military.498
Neither did the shift of support by the military have much of an impact on the
protest movement or its outcomes. The rebels and their demands had a receptive audience
in the protesters, and two small demonstrations that included former members of the
military were held in support of them. They were easily dispersed by police with tear
gas,499 and the rest of the country remained calm. Further, Toledo and others in the
opposition were hesitant to encourage rebellion, because doing so would have provided
cause to the claim that the country was unstable – and thus open to a coup by the upper
ranks.500 Along these lines, other politicians condemned the soldiers and called for the
military to stay in the chain of command.501
The Peruvian military responded to the anti-Fujimori protests according to my
argument’s expectations. That is, while Fujimori’s coup-proofing strategies were based
on personalist ties of loyalty, they did not clearly threaten military functional authority.
His other forms of control – providing for military autonomy and power in exchange for
its support – resulted in an effective (though brutal) counterinsurgency. This was
particularly important given the military’s legacy as a professional organization
497
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responsible for national security, an understanding of itself that survived Fujimori’s rule.
During the protests, the high level officers remained loyal to Fujimori, and, despite wellknown discontent among the mid- and low-ranking officers, only a small group of
soldiers far from Lima shifted loyalty from the regime. The military leadership issued an
order for troops to search for and put down the rebellion.502 In the end, it fizzled out
largely on its own.503
Even without significant military loyalty shifts, though, Fujimori’s regime was
near collapse. The release of a video showing Montesinos toasting military officers for
their assistance in the elections was the final, fatal blow to Fujimori’s legitimacy as
president.504 On November 19, Prime Minister Salas announced Fujimori would be
resigning soon, in part because the opposition had taken control of Congress and was
likely to remove Fujimori on grounds of ‘moral incapacity’. The Second Vice President,
Marquez, reported that he had met with the military high command to discuss next
steps.505 Fujimori stepped down and the military issued a statement saying it would
continue to show “...absolute respect to the decisions taken by the legitimately constituted
authorities.”506
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Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes
After Fujimori resigned, Congress started work on a political transition by naming
Valentin Paniagua interim president.507 The military’s role in democratization was an
immediate concern, given its many links to the former regime. However, the suddenness
of Fujimori’s fall prevented the military and other regime elites from reaching a formal
agreement with the opposition to protect their positions. Panigua’s new government had
more space to act as a result.508 Even more importantly, the military was discredited by
its association with Montesinos and its support of a regime whose corruption and
violence had now been exposed.
Paniagua got to work immediately and fired the armed forces chief and other top
military officers, as well as over a hundred other officers considered loyal to Montesinos.
He named General Carlos Tafur, a critic of Montesinos who had been forced into
retirement, head of the armed forces.509 Additionally, in the weeks following, 2000
representatives of 14 political groups signed a National Accord committing to
democratization. One point in the accord called for an official reorganization of the
security services with limits on the political role of the military.510
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The first post-Fujimori presidential election was held in spring 2001. Toledo was
declared the winner and took office in July.511 He followed Paniagua’s lead in
minimizing the former regime’s influence, most notably when his government convicted
and imprisoned Montesinos, and charged other military and civilian officials for their
involvement in corruption and human rights violations under Fujimori.512 Toledo’s
government also passed legislation to create a new, reformed intelligence agency, and in
December 2005 reduced the military’s involvement in intelligence.513 Under Toledo, a
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation began to uncover and report on the political
violence of the counterinsurgency.514
Toledo was quite unpopular, but this did not lead to major challenges from the
military or elements of the former regime. By the end of his term in 2006 his approval
ratings were in the single digits and overall support for democracy had declined.515 His
government was forced to declare a 30 day state of emergency in May 2003 due to
ongoing protests over economic issues. Yet the military remained uninvolved in politics.
Observers considered a coup unlikely, because the military was still disgraced by
Fujimori’s rule.516
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Indeed, despite the military’s past in politics, and its lack of support for regime
change, it did not inhibit the democratization process. As of 2005, “While remnants loyal
to the previous regime remain in the army and secret service, civilian control over these
organs is at its strongest since the 1920s.”517 This included even the role of the military in
counterinsurgency policy, where it went from having nearly complete control over all
aspects to just security in limited areas.518 The loyalty shift by the small section of lowranking officers had a minimal impact on Fujimori’s regime, but it fell anyway, with little
role for the overall military in the transition to democracy. The military’s position at that
stage of Peruvian history more than its response to the protests explained the successful
democratization.
Conclusions
In the years following Fujimori’s fall, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and other investigations revealed the Peruvian military’s brutal violence during the
counterinsurgency. Reports concluded that the military and other state security forces
were responsible for 40 percent of the nearly 70,000 instances of political violence
between 1980 and 2000, as well as many thousands of detainments and
disappearances.519 The extent of the military’s corruption also became clear, particularly
the wealth high-ranking officials had accumulated through their anti-narcotics work.520
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However, all of this occurred in the context of military success in the campaign against
the Shining Path. The military’s functional capacities were therefore not in question.
Montesinos’s involvement in this violence and corruption and Fujimori’s close
association with him were key to Fujimori’s rapid loss of power and consequent
resignation. The protest movement put important pressure on Fujimori and his supporters
despite its somewhat indirect link to the regime’s fall: “...the resurgence of civil society
played a very dynamic role in denying the regime the legitimacy it sought to ensure
through fraud and violence.”521 The military played a very limited role in the fall of
Fujimori’s regime because only a small section of troops and low-ranking officers shifted
loyalty.
The Peruvian military’s response to the anti-Fujimori protest movement follows
my explanation for low level loyalty shifts. The soldiers that rebelled and the wider group
of officers that favored political change were frustrated by Fujimori’s strategies of
military control, and Montesinos’s corrupting influence. But while Fujimori’s personnel
decisions benefitted loyal officers at the expense of others, they did not weaken military
functional capabilities in the context of the Shining Path insurgency. The protest
movement also did not sustain momentum such that the military viewed it as an
alternative source of authority, even as Fujimori’s legitimacy suffered. The military’s
upper ranks were able to wage the Shining Path conflict with little political interference
and remained loyal to Fujimori until the end, with long-term implications for the
military’s reputation.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION
“Just as the literature on the execution of coups stresses the role of ‘swingmen’ at crucial
conjectures, so the (nonexistent) literature on noncoups should emphasize the strategic
importance of ‘swingmen’ in making alternative outcomes possible. These officers may
support the transition much more because of what they believe is good for the armed
forces than because of any enthusiasm for democracy.”522
In this dissertation, I have offered answers to two questions: Why do militaries
shift their loyalty from non-democratic regimes in some instances of anti-regime protests
and not others, and why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic change? Existing
research shows that military loyalty shifts are significant determinants of the success of
civil resistance campaigns against authoritarian regimes. A body of work is developing to
explain such military defections, but it provides competing arguments and is based
largely on case studies of a few well-known instances of military responses to protests.
The other literatures on the military’s role in political change disagree on whether and
how the military can support democratization, and do not address the particular context of
civil society-led transitions.
I was motivated to explore these questions by the theoretical puzzle – that this
topic is one the literatures on the military in politics cannot fully explain. Perhaps more
important, though, is the topic’s major contemporary relevance. Civil resistance
campaigns have increased in frequency to become the primary means of challenge to
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authoritarian regimes. 523 They are an effective strategy of political contention, especially
relative to violent campaigns. 524 Thus, support for democratization today often takes the
form of support of unarmed civilians seeking to overthrow illiberal, repressive, and
autocratic regimes using tactics such as protests, strikes, and sit-ins. It requires paying
close attention to the response of the military and other regime security forces.
Understanding why militaries shift loyalty, and the impacts of shifts on democratization,
is key to the continued success of nonviolence. It requires a reassessment of militaries
and politics that takes the possibility of this particular military role seriously.
I developed an argument that is based in the military’s sources of authority: the
authority delegated them by leaders on behalf of the population, and the authority they
gain by virtue of their functional role in society. In delegating the military authority,
authoritarian regimes often structure it in ways that protect the regime by reducing
military functional capabilities. The authoritarian regime thus threatens military
functional authority. Popular challenges to the regime put the military’s delegated and
functional authority in tension. If the military’s functional authority is already in
question, supporting an illegitimate regime will not restore it or societal stability and
security. A protest movement that is large and committed to nonviolence may be more
supportive of military authority.
In these contexts, militaries do not just remain loyal or defect; they respond to
popular regime challenges with loyalty shifts that vary in terms of the extent and quality
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of the military organization’s involvement. Specifically, loyalty shifts may involve the
lower or higher ranks, and be fragmented or united. I also proposed an argument to
explain these different shifts, drawing on my general argument but specifying its
implications for the military organization. Some strategies of regime control, or forms of
coup-proofing, will just generate military discontent. Others – personalist, specifically will also compromise the military organization, making low level or fragmented loyalty
shifts more likely than united defections. Large protest movements lead to disloyalty by
the rank and file and together with coup-proofing produce high level shifts.
I used the logic of my argument to generate expectations for the effects of military
loyalty shifts on democracy. Military loyalty shifts during anti-regime protests are crucial
to movements’ success. Successful movements (and civil resistance generally) are likely
to positively impact democratization. I investigated whether military loyalty shifts also
impact democratization. The civil-military relations literature expects that a politically
active military will harm democratic consolidation. The scholarship on pacted transitions
views the military as potentially supportive of democracy. Thus, I argued that high level
shifts may positively impact democratization by supporting protest movement success. I
also argued that high level shifts that are fragmented will have more of an impact than
united defections because a civilian regime can more easily establish control over a weak
military organization.
I generated various forms of empirical support for these arguments and their
expectations. First, I employed new data on military responses to all major anti-regime
protests from 1946 to 2015 along with quantitative measures of coup-proofing and
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protester characteristics to test my hypotheses for military defections and types of loyalty
shifts. Based on regression analyses, threats to military functional authority have
significant impacts on the likelihood of military disloyalty. The explanatory factors’
conditional effects confirm that they interact to either threaten or support military
authority. Independently, they have the expected effects on types of military loyalty shifts
via their impacts on the military organization. These results hold in the presence of
various covariates, increasing my confidence in their explanatory power across space and
time.
I also used Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a medium-N strategy that
explicitly accounts for the complex causal relations between my argument’s conditions
and outcomes. The results support those from the regression analyses, while providing
new insights as to how coup-proofing and protest movement factors combine and
substitute to produce threats to military functional authority and thus military loyalty
shifts. Together, these analytical strategies provide a robust and meaningful assessment
of the importance of the factors for explaining military disloyalty.
Next, I tested the hypotheses related to the impact of military loyalty shifts on
democratization. From the regression analyses, the shifts do not have major independent
effects on democracy levels, when accounting for other determinants of democratization
and addressing potential endogeneity issues. Still, fragmented high level shifts have a
consistently positive and stronger impact on democratization than united defections (or
other shifts). A military that shifts support to the protesters but is unable or unlikely to
exercise significant influence over the new civilian-led political system is better for
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democracy. The limitations of regression and more general quantitative analyses hold
here, though: the challenges of dealing with possible omitted variable bias and
simultaneity, and the inability to establish causation from correlations or descriptive
inferences. Further, I propose a fairly long causal chain from regime control to military
responses to democratization. I therefore finished with three case studies that demonstrate
my argument’s processes in richer detail.
In the case studies, I used evidence from three instances of major anti-regime
protests and the military responses to them to show how authoritarian regime control of
the military, in the context of a particular protest movement, affected military authority
and led to military loyalty shifts. The cases – Mali 1990-1991, Bangladesh 1987-1990,
and Peru 2000 - varied along their independent variables, or levels of threat to military
functional authority, and as a result varied in terms of military loyalty shifts. The type of
shift reflected in part the strength of the military organization, and this affected the
military’s participation in post-protest politics.
Altogether, these findings support my argument, and contribute to existing
understandings of militaries’ roles in politics. Militaries can play positive roles by
shifting loyalty to anti-authoritarian regime protest movements and supporting
democratic change. They may be more likely to do so because of their particular
institutional interests related to the provision of societal stability and security. It is
through their performance of functional roles and creation of order that they gain
authority. But this functional authority is sometimes threatened by the civilian authorities
responsible for their delegated authority. When a regime faces a popular challenge to its
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legitimacy and rule, the military may choose to act outside its delegated authority to
preserve its functional authority by supporting the protesters. These conclusions suggest
theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions.
Theoretical Contributions
My focus on military sources of authority draws on the foundational scholarship
on militaries and military interests. The particular context of military responses to
prodemocracy protests brings in the insights of the pact and civil resistance literatures.
Militaries as organizations have particular institutional concerns, including the conditions
that provide for their effectiveness in maintaining a stable and secure society. A
longstanding claim across the work on militaries in politics is that militaries will act when
these concerns are not met, sometimes by seizing power. For militaries, “The desire to
maintain order can...prompt the removal of a regime and even the transformation of a
status quo that seems to be productive of disorder.”525 Regime coup-proofing is aimed at
reducing the threat of such military actions, in part by harming military functional
capabilities. This in turn generates military discontent. Militaries may not stage coups, or
successful ones, but they may respond to popular regime challenges with disloyalty.
Military involvement in this form of political change can support both its institutional
interests and civil society-led democratization.
In making this argument, I challenge the civil-military relations literature’s central
contention that a military acting against its delegated authority is problematic for
democratization. I do not disagree that a military outside civilian control will challenge
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democratic consolidation; in fact, I find support for this claim in Chapter Five. Rather,
through this dissertation I demonstrate a different starting point for analyses of the
military that has important implications for our understanding of the military and politics.
The pact literature describes how militaries and civilians can cooperate for political
change, while the civil resistance literature demonstrates the importance of military
defections to campaign success. The civil-military relations literature has so far not taken
these points seriously such that it recognizes the potentially positive role a politically
active military can play in democratic transitions. A military may act outside the regime’s
delegated authority - but in favor of its functional authority - to support democratization.
I have used this insight to explore military responses to protests, but it allows a
reconsideration of militaries and politics in general. Scholars should pursue more
nuanced understandings of the causes and impacts of military political activity short of
coups. There are many ways militaries can withdraw support from authoritarian regimes,
for example – some that bolster civilian control, others that undermine it. It is possible
that some can support democratic political outcomes, too. In the context of popular,
prodemocracy protests, both military disloyalty and loyalty to the regime are political, but
one may help to bring about democratic change.
Methodological Contributions
The most significant methodological contribution of this dissertation is my
development of a large-N dataset on military responses to anti-regime protest
movements. The minimal existing data on defections groups various types of loyalty
shifts together and does not specify the rank and size of the military involved. Some
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measure whether or not the military defects at all over the course of the campaign, while
others analyze defections at each campaign-year and thus answer a different empirical
question.
My dataset advances the empirical record on military responses to protests
significantly. My conceptualization of loyalty shifts as types provides new ways of
thinking about these responses, and forms a foundation from which other questions
related to the military organization can be asked and answered. In doing so, it follows
similar developments in the study of coups, where scholars are increasingly
differentiating them on the basis of which parts of the military hierarchy participate. They
then make claims as to the coups’ likelihood of success526 and their threats to particular
leaders versus overall regimes. 527 I have organized military responses in one way, for
theoretical and empirical reasons. Other conceptualizations will provide for new analyses
of determinants and implications.
Helpfully, the dataset narratives provide overviews of the main events of each
protest movement and additional details on the military responses. Using this foundation,
future scholars can collect and code new variables that further the research on military
involvement in anti-regime protests. Examples of fruitful areas of inquiry include:
specifics on the service and rank of the defectors; military involvement in particular
instances of repression; the temporal development of the protests and the military
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responses; the spread of disloyalty from individual soldiers to significant military
segments; and the role of other security forces and their relations with the military.
Importantly, I used the data to generate various forms of empirical support for my
argument. Each of the methods confirmed my general expectations but revealed
something new about the relationship between the explanatory factors and outcomes of
interest. Together, they allowed me to estimate the relative importance of coup-proofing
and protester characteristics, showed that they combine and condition each other, and
illustrate the causal processes linking them to loyalty shifts and from loyalty shifts to
democracy. The overall empirical strategy speaks to the value of using multiple
techniques to assess a theory’s claims, especially given the complexity of the particular
phenomena under study here. Despite the shortcomings of my evidence – the relatively
small number of cases, the fairly broad and structural independent variables, the
possibility of mismeasurement and the challenges of establishing causality – I am
confident in my findings because I triangulated methodological approaches to reach
them.
Policy Implications
Popular challenges to authoritarian regimes continue, from Venezuela to Iran to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Observers are closely watching their
developments, including how each country’s military responds. For example, recent
reporting on the protests has noted growing splits within the Venezuelan military, 528
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speculated whether the Iranian regime will deploy the army, 529 and worried about more
repression at the hands of security forces in the Congo. 530 Movement participants and
outside observers recognize that the military is key to whether the regime withstands the
challenge or the protesters succeed in overthrowing it. This dissertation’s argument and
findings will thus be of interest to policymakers who support civil-society led
democratization and recognize the vital role of the military in protests’ outcomes – and
who also have concerns about the military’s involvement in politics.
Indeed, practitioners have sought answers to the dissertation’s questions and at the
same time confirmed military defections’ importance. Sharp writes that protesters must
remove the regime’s pillars of support, one being the military, 531 while Ackerman and
Merriman include military defections on a “to-do” list for successful movements. 532 They
and others do not have a clear understanding of how to achieve this goal, drawn from the
experiences of many campaigns. According to this dissertation, whether loyalty shifts
occur is partly out of protesters’ hands. Much depends on the regime’s structuring of its
relations with the military – in particular, its use of strategies that protect itself at the
expense of military functional capabilities. However, it follows from this framework of
military interests and authority that the protest movement can present itself as more
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supportive of both than the regime. It can do so by involving more people, from diverse
yet organized groups, that are committed to nonviolence. Its leaders should highlight
these qualities. Protesters may also want to leverage the post-military defeat period as one
during which a military is especially concerned for its authority and perhaps more likely
to shift loyalty.
Protest movements and their supporters seek to generate military loyalty shifts
because they leave “even the most tyrannical leaders...powerless and vulnerable.”533 But
having achieved the overthrow of the dictator, some movements are disappointed in their
attempts to establish democracy. There are many reasons a transition to democracy may
fail. Military control over the transition processes is one possibility. This dissertation
shows that types of military loyalty shifts vary in their impacts on post-movement
political outcomes. Militaries are powerful organizations, and, for better or worse, their
involvement in the protests will matter for their involvement in the new civilian
governments.
Protesters and their external supporters likely cannot influence whether the
military shifts loyalty as a fragmented or united organization, or the strength of the
military going into the transition. Once the shift occurs, however, they can and should
seek to limit the military’s involvement. A united military organization is dangerous for
democracy even if it was supportive of pro-democracy protesters. The Mali case is
instructive here, for the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition pressured the
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military leadership to include civilians in the interim government. 534 This reduced the
military’s influence and created space for the democratically-elected civilian government
to establish some control over the military. Policymakers that recognize militaries can
play positive roles during protests should remain circumspect about the military’s
continued role in the democracy it helped to usher in.
Future Research Program
Studying the military as I have done here – its involvement in politics short of
seizing power, the implications for democratization in civil society-led or other forms,
and the effects of its relations with the authoritarian regime – offers a number of avenues
for future research. Some of these build on the data I collected for the dissertation; others
draw on the dissertation’s theoretical framework. First, the data and analysis are more
disaggregated than existing quantitative work on defections, yet the relationships could
be confirmed at other, some more micro, levels. As I noted in the conclusion of Chapter
Three, a number of scholars are collecting new data that measures the specifics of regime
control of the military. These efforts will prove useful to investigating more thoroughly
the links between particular forms of control and military loyalty shifts or other
behaviors, including during non-crisis periods.
Second, the dissertation’s argument and findings might be enriched with
fieldwork. Interviewing members of the military that did or did not shift loyalty could
provide fascinating details as to the “why” behind their individual and organizational
responses. The case studies provide some confirmation that militaries perceive coupproofing as threatening their functional capabilities and authority, but more evidence is
534
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needed that they recognize a popular challenge to the regime as a challenge to their
delegated authority. It would also be highly interesting to examine how views of the
tension between military functional and delegated sources of authority, and the protest
movement as an alternative, vary over the course of the protests and across military
forces and ranks.
In terms of other research questions, I noted in Chapter One that this study might
be extended to violent campaigns. While I would expect military loyalty shifts to be less
likely in response to violent anti-regime movements, it is possible that the military, or
parts of it, shift loyalty under certain circumstances. Military loyalty shifts during
nonviolent or violent campaigns might also have impacts on other post-protest outcomes,
such as civil conflict. Fragmented high level shifts are better for democracy, relative to
united defections, but a less cohesive military organization may make conflict more
likely – by either military factions, or actors which the weak military is unable to counter.
Finally, other security forces have different sources of authority, and likely shift loyalty
for different reasons than the military. The military’s interests in its provision of societal
order and stability means it might respond to security forces’ loyalty and disloyalty in
ways worthy of investigation.
Conclusion
The military is one of the regime’s pillars of support, and also the regime’s
biggest threat. The military can employ its capabilities for violence against elite and
nonelite civilians, but also to guard the state and its population from harm. The military
can remain loyal to the authoritarian regime in the face of a popular challenge, or remove
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loyalty and support democratic change. During major anti-regime protests, military
loyalty and disloyalty are both political actions, yet have very different implications for a
country’s political future. For the opposition, military loyalty shifts are “...a material,
psychological, and moral victory” 535 that creates the opportunity for a new system of
government. For the military, shifts are a way to ensure its role as guarantor of societal
stability and security, and the authority it produces.
Through this dissertation, I have offered an explanation for military loyalty shifts
that draws on military interests and authority. I have sought to further our understanding
of military roles in politics generally and in the important particular context of
prodemocracy civil resistance campaigns. Unarmed civilians will continue to take to the
streets in opposition to autocratic regimes, in hopes of a better future but at risk to their
lives. Perhaps it is too much to ask for a military in such circumstances to support
democratization – but a military that recognizes its authority is better served by regime
change may side with the people and bring it about anyway.
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APPENDIX A: MILITARY RESPONSE NARRATIVES
Albania 1/30/1990-3/31/1991 – loyal
After months of popular regime opposition, on July 2, 1990, police fired on people trying
to flee the country. The government declared a partial state of emergency.
Demonstrations were small, but police deployed to guard public buildings at times
clashed with protesters. President Ramiz Alia met with some students in the movement
on December 10, and then convened the Central Committee so it could declare the
introduction of political pluralism. Free elections were scheduled for February, but then
postponed until March 31. Protests developed in response, and on February 20, became
too large for the police and special troops to deal with. The police injured some
demonstrators by firing warning shots, but some members of the security forces
reportedly sympathized with them. Alia’s government resigned and a new Presidential
Council formed to rule until the elections. The military remained loyal to the regime
throughout, and was involved in repression, including during demonstrations on February
22. The military was weak though and so most of the repression was the responsibility of
internal security forces. The regime had reduced military funding because of economic
crisis and used the secret political police and intelligence organizations to purge the
military according to loyalty to the Communist party. Some accounts of these events
report the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, refused Alia’s orders that the police
and security forces end the February unrest. Others dispute this narrative and conclude
Alia himself decided against using force. The communists won the mostly free and fair
March 1991 elections but their government fell within six months, opening the way to a
new, non-communist government.
Sources:
Austin, Robert C. and Jonathan Ellison. “Post-Communist Transitional Justice in
Albania.” East European Politics and Society (2008).
Biberaj, Elez. “Albania at the Crossroads.” Problems of Communism 40, no. 5 (1991): 116.
Chiodi, Luisa. “Mass Migration, Student Protests, and the Intelligentsia Popullore in the
Albanian Transition to Democracy.” Cosmos WP 2 (2012).
Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Konstantinos S. Skandalis. “The Military and its Role in
Albania’s Democratization.” Armed Forces and Society 37, no. 3 (2011): 399-417.
Tarifa, Taos. “Albania’s Road from Communism: Political and Social Change, 19901993.” Development and Change (1995).
Algeria 1/22/2011-5/2/2011 - loyal
Riots by mostly young men began in early January. On January 20, some of the country’s
political and social organizations started a new anti-regime campaign that held a march
for democracy on January 22. This was quickly broken up by a large police force. The
protest movement succeeded at getting the government to give some concessions,
including lifting the state of emergency. But continued demonstrations in early February
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were unsuccessful and outnumbered by the security forces, mostly riot police. The
protesters were also highly internally divided at this point. The military remained loyal to
the regime, and overall reacted with restraint, especially relative to earlier protest
movements. At this stage the military had a large budget and was involved in economic
activities in both the public and private sectors. President Bouteflika had brought the
military under his control by forcing some high level resignations in the mid-2000s. At
the same time, he promoted a new generation of officers. The military intelligence
service (DRS) remained powerful, though, and there was some speculation that the head
of the DRS, General Medience, was angered by the resignations.
Sources:
Entelis, John P. “Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?” The Journal of North African
Studies 16.4 (2011): 653-678.
Layachi, Azzedine. “Algeria’s Rebellion by Installments.” Middle East Research and
Information Project, March 12, 2011. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031211.
Ulrich, Marybeth P., and Carol A. Atkinson. “The Arab Spring and Arab Militaries: The
Role of the Military in the Transitioning Middle East.” Paper presented at the biennial
meeting of the International Political Science Association World Congress, Madrid,
Spain, July 8-12, 2012.
Volpi, Frederic. “Algeria versus the Arab Spring.” Journal of Democracy 24.3 (2013):
104-115.
Argentina 4/20/1977-12/10/1983 – fragmented high level
Anti-regime protests began in 1977, but the military junta went through many changes
between then and when it fell in 1983. General Roberto Eduardo Viola succeeded
General Jorge Rafael Videla as president through regular processes on March 28, 1981.
Viola’s tenure was cut short when he was ousted by a December 11 coup led by General
Leopoldo Galtieria, the Army’s Commander in Chief. Viola had begun some political
reforms, and Galtieri and other hardliners were opposed to them. The military’s divisions
remained. Galtieri was a weak leader, but on April 2, 1982, invaded Malvinas, starting
the Falklands War. Argentina lost two months later, and Galtieri (presently serving as
president, junta member, and army commander) and three other service commanders
were forced to resign. General Cristino Nicolaides replaced him as commander of the
army, and a caretaker government led by retired General Reynaldo Bignone took power
in June. Bignone scheduled elections in line with the recommendations of a multiparty
coalition. Military conflicts rose to the surface again, though. Most of the army wanted a
continuation of military rule, and Bignone as president meant the army controlled the
transition. The air force and navy withdrew from the junta because they wanted a transfer
of power. After negotiations, the junta was reestablished in early September, including
new air force and navy high commands. It then began negotiations with the opposition.
During this time pressure began to build in the lower ranks for an end to military rule. On
December 4, 1983, for example, hundreds of conscripts protested against the junta during
a military ceremony. This dissent, plus the high level divisions within the military
institution, was a fragmented loyalty shifts from the military regime. It agreed to hold
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elections and transfer power and in December 1983 Raul Alfonsin, a civilian, became
president.
Sources:
Arceneaux, Craig L. “Institutional Design, Military Rule, and Regime Transition in
Argentina (1976-1983): An Extension of the Remmer Thesis.” Bulletin of Latin American
Research 16, no. 3 (1997): 327-350.
Goetz, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. “Argentina: A Country Study. US Army War
College (1983).
Pion-Berlin, David. “The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983.” Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 2 (1985): 55-76.
Zagorski, Paul W. “Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy.” Armed Forces
and Society 14, no. 3 (1988): 407-432.
Armenia 2/20/2007-3/1/2009 - loyal
Protests ramped up in response to the February 2008 presidential election, which the
ruling party candidate (Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan) won. During protests on March 1,
2009, hundreds of security personnel moved into the city center to break up the crowd,
setting off violent clashes. In response, the incumbent president declared a state of
emergency. The protests effectively ended at that point. The overall security apparatus
was known to be large and experienced, and was effective in ending the popular
challenge to the government.
Sources:
Hess, Steve. “Protests, Parties, and Presidential Succession.” Problems of PostCommunism 57.1 (2010): 28-39.
Bahrain 2/15/2011-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - loyal
Calls for reform led to demonstrations starting on February 14, 2011. On February 17, the
king ordered the police to attack the protesters. This set off an escalatory dynamic, where
the regime increased repression, strengthening the demonstrations as well as the
protesters’ demands. They came to call for an end to the monarchy. While the protests
weren’t sectarian, they mostly involved Shiites, and one of their demands was for the
regime to end its practice of recruiting Sunni foreigners to join the armed forces to
increase the Sunni proportion. Sunnis dominated the highest political and military posts,
as well as the officer and rank and file positions. The king’s concessions and the police’s
efforts did not end the protests, so on March 15 the regime declared a state of emergency.
The military and other security forces, along with troops from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Qatar, forcefully cleared the main square of demonstrators. There were divisions within
the regime over how to respond, but these did not seem to be reflected in the military. A
report was commissioned in the months following in an attempt to bring about
reconciliation. It criticized the government’s repression, but put most of the blame on
unnamed, low-ranking officers.
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Sources:
Ambrosio, Thomas. “Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls.” Contemporary
Politics 20, no. 3 (2014): 331-346.
Josua, Maria and Mirjam Edel. “To Repress or Not to Repress.” Terrorism and Political
Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 289-309.
Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring.” Journal of
Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.
Bangladesh 6/23/1987-12/6/1990 – fragmented high level
Protests against President Hussain Muhammed Ershad went on for more than three years
before requiring that he call on the military for support in December 1990. Over that
period, Ershad’s regime held a number of illegitimate elections. The opposition went
from divided between the Bangladesh National Party and the Awami League to united
with the participation of twenty two student organizations. Ershad deployed the police
and paramilitary forces, and sent in other armed groups to university campuses as
demonstrations gained momentum in November. The police could be unreliable and the
paramilitary (the Bangladesh Rifles) were open about their discontent, though. Ershad
declared a state of emergency on November 27, and troops opened fire on new
demonstrations, killing up to 50. Discontent middle-ranking officers were critical of the
state of emergency. Troops deployed to the protesters stood by. When Ershad called on
the military to end the protests with force on December 6, Chief of Army Staff Nuruddin
Khan refused. Ershad then resigned. Khan apparently acted as a middleman after the
middle ranks told him they would no longer support Ershad. Some senior generals,
however, remained loyal and were in favor of following Ershad’s orders. Ershad had
provided political and economic benefits to the seniors, generating discontent for others
in the military who felt the institution was becoming corrupt and ineffective.
Sources:
Codron, Jeremie. “Putting Factions ‘Back In’ the Civil-Military Relations Equation.”
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal Free-Standing Articles (18 October
2007).
Huq, Parvaz Azharul. “Civil Society and Democracy in Bangladesh.” Social Change 35,
no. 2 (2005): 85-100.
Kabir, Bhuian Monoar. “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the MilitaryAuthoritarian Government in Bangladesh.” Armed Forces and Society 21, no. 4 (1995):
553-572.
Kulkarni, V. G. “Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle.”
The Far Eastern Economic Review. December 6, 1990.
Rizvi, Gowher. “Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society.” The World Today 47, no. 8/9
(1991): 155- 160.
Wilkinson, Steven I. “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh
and Pakistan.” Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000): 203-226.
Bangladesh 2/12/2004-4/29/2004 – loyal
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The anti-Bangladesh National Party (BNP) government protests were led by the main
opposition party, the Awami League (AL). The AL backed down from its demands at the
end of April 2004. Though the military doesn’t seem to have responded to the protests
directly, throughout 2004 parts of the army were deployed to maintain “law and order” as
part of an anti-crime drive. Interestingly, in March 2004, the BNP-led government
established a Rapid Action Battalion under the police but including military personnel.
The Rapid Action Battalion was used to suppress the protests.
Sources:
Freedom House. “Bangladesh: Freedom in the World 2005.”
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/bangladesh.
Perera, Wimal. “Bangladesh: Awami League Wins Election Landslide After Military
Regime Relinquishes Power.” World Socialist Web Site, January 3, 2009.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/01/bang-j03.html.
Rahman, Waliur. “Police Hold 5,000 in Bangladesh.” BBC News, April 23, 2004.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3654129.stm.
Bangladesh 10/28/2006-1/11/2007 – united defections
Prime Minister Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) ended his term in October
2006. Power was transferred to a caretaker government in advance of the new elections.
Unrest developed over the neutrality of the head of the caretaker government, K.M.
Hasan; he was a former chief justice and thus head according to the constitution, but had
been an active member of the BNP before joining the judiciary. He declined to accept the
position. This did not resolve the issue, and there was widespread rioting and even
violence during December. On January 3, 2007, the Awami League (AL) party
announced it would boycott the elections scheduled for January 22. In addition, it
planned strikes and blockades. On January 11, President Iajuddin Ahmed, on the orders
of the military leadership, declared a state of emergency and cancelled the elections.
Under the military’s guidance, a new caretaker government was put in place with Chief
Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed and lasted until elections in December 2008. The protests
were against the caretaker government of Hasan and the elections under Ahmed. The
military leadership removed its support from the caretaker government, and transferred it
to a new interim ruling body.
Sources:
Ahmed, Nizam. “Party Politics Under a Non-Party Caretaker Government in
Bangladesh.” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2010): 23-47.
Ghosahl, Baladas. “The Anatomy of Military Interventions in Asia.” India Quarterly 65,
no. 1 (2009): 67-82.
Quadir, Fahimul. “Consolidating Democracy Without Trust: Bangladesh’s Breakdown of
Consensus in 2007.” Round Table 99, no. 406 (2010): 65-73.

253

Vaugh, Bruce. “Bangladesh: Political and Strategic Developments and U.S. Interests.”
Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2010,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520780.pdf.
Belarus 10/30/1988-12/8/1991 - neutral
Protests and overall popular mobilization against the Communist regime increased over
this period, as the government opened space for political contention. The demonstrations
were relatively peaceful, and the state was reluctant to repress them. During this period,
the military in Belarus consisted of units of the Soviet Belorussian Military District; that
is, the forces were under control of the Soviets. The most important event during the
protest movement was the August 1991 failed coup attempt in Moscow, which provoked
large demonstrations in Minsk. Still, in Belarus generally, there was no confrontation
between the protesters and the military. There is also no evidence that any parts of the
Belarus forces shifted support to the protest movement.
Sources:
Potocki, Rodger. “Dark Days in Belarus.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 142156. Sanford, George. “Nation, State, and Independence in Belarus.” Contemporary
Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 225-245.
Titarenko, Larissa, John D. McCarthy, and Clark McPahil. “The Interaction of State
Repression, Protest Form and Protest Sponsor Strength During the Transition from
Communism in Minsk, Belarus, 1990-1995.” Mobilization: An International Journal 6,
no. 2 (2001): 129-150.
Belarus 3/19/2006-3/26/2006 – loyal
Protests began in the lead-up to the 2006 presidential election. On election day March 19,
over 100,000 paramilitary and other special forces were put on alert. None were actually
deployed to the streets though, besides Colonel Dmitry Pavlinchenko’s special police
force squad. This group was used to disband protests on March 25th, or Freedom Day.
Overall, though, the regime used limited force in response to the unprecedented levels of
public protest. Much of the army was ready to act and security forces were responsible
for some casualties, but the movement ended relatively peacefully, though
unsuccessfully.
Sources:
Etkind, Alexander and Andrei Shcherbak. “The Double Monopoly and its Technologists:
The Russian Preemptive Counterrevolution.” Demokratizatsiya: 229-239.
Korosteleva, Elena. “Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus’ Response to the Color
Revolutions.” Democratization 19, no. 1 (2012): 37-59.
Marples, David R. “Outpost of Tyranny? The Failure of Democratization in Belarus.”
Democratization 16, no. 4 (2009): 756-776.
Benin 1/9/1989-4/20/1990 – fragmented high level
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Protests developed throughout 1989, but really presented a challenge to the regime in
November and December. When five protesters were killed December 4, President
Mathieu Kerekou and other key actors agreed to a national conference. The conference
met in February and was intended to be advisory. But it almost immediately declared its
right to take binding decisions, and, against opposition from a minority in the military, its
right to dismiss the government. Kerekou threatened the conference with military action,
but he probably could not rely on much of the military by that point. Kerekou had
controlled the military through ethnic balancing, pay and promotions, manipulating
postings, and the use of counterforces. Discontent had grown in recent years, evidenced
by two coup attempts in 1988, involving military officers and personnel from the
presidential guard. From then there was mounting criticism of the political system by
officers. By the conference, then, much of the military had withdrawn its support, though
not in a direct way. The president of the conference persuaded Kerekou to back down
from his threats.
Sources:
Allen, Chris. “Restructuring an Authoritarian State: ‘Democratic Renewal’ in Benin.”
Review of African Political Economy 54 (1992): 42-58.
Bierschenk, Thomas. “Democratization Without Development: Benin 1989-2009.”
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22, no. 3 (2009): 337-357.
Lange, Holly. “Civilian Participation and Respected Culture: A Comparative Analysis of
the Democratization and Subsequent Governments of Benin and Cameroon.” The Orator
Undergraduate Journal of Political Science 2 (2007): 48-60.
Bolivia 12/28/1977-9/17/1982 – fragmented high level
In late 1977, President and General Hugo Banzer announced elections for July 1978. The
military’s candidate General Juan Pereda was supposed to win, and when he did not, he
launched a coup instead. Anti-military protests escalated due to the apparent electoral
fraud and then military coup. The situation further destabilized when General David
Padilla Arancibia overthrew Pareda on November 24, with the goal of transitioning the
country to democracy. Elections were held on July 1, 1979, but no candidate received an
absolute majority. The newly- elected Congress named civilian Walter Guevara Arze
interim president until June 1980. In November though Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch
launched another coup. Guevara Arze refused to step down, though, and protesters took
to the streets to support him. Busch conceded. The June 29 elections were won by
civilian Siles Zuazo. A rightist faction of the military led by General Luis Meza Garcia
Tejada seized power to prevent him from taking office, though. Garcia Meza ruled for a
year and was replaced by a new, more reformist, military regime led by General Celso
Torrielo in August 1981. The continual instability had created deep divisions within the
military and the following July General Guido Vildoso Calderon took over with the
mandate of transitioning the country to civilian-led democracy. Congress then put Siles in
the presidency because of his 1980 electoral victory, and the military stepped aside. The
military institution removed support from the military regime in response to popular
regime opposition, but in a disorganized and divided manner.
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Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia.” Comparative Political Studies 46,
no. 11 (2012): 1366- 1393.
Bolivia 3/7/1985-3/23/85 - loyal
Protests against President Hernan Siles Zuazo took place in the context of economic
crisis, including hyperinflation. The military’s support of Zuazo had been less than
absolute in recent years, with a failed military coup in June 1984 and rumors of other
coup attempts. But the military was unhappy with the protesters’ violence. Zuazo called
on the military to restore order, likely because of military pressure for an end to the
violence. The continued demonstrations and strikes led Zuazo to agree to concessions
including a special election in July 1985, which he lost. One source said the military was
active in Zuazo’s resignation, but most others characterize the military as loyal to
Zuazo’s orders and neutral to the unrest, with rumors of but no actual dissent.
Sources:
Bolivia Diplomatic Handbook. International Business Publications, 2005.
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March 20, 1985. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/03/20/Troops-and-police-movedthrough-the- Bolivian-capital-Wednesday/2500480142800/.
Bolivia 9/29/2003-10/18/2003 – low level
These protests against President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada turned violent when the
military and police followed the government’s orders to repress. According to some
reports, 80 civilians were killed by the security forces. The protesters did not back down,
though. And, as a result of the violence, military divisions came to the surface. Mid-level
officers were upset with the senior command’s loyalty to the government, including over
the repression orders. These disagreements didn’t translate into significant loyalty shifts,
however. Though some sources state that the military denied Lozada their full support,
there is no documentation of actual disloyalty. The most evidence comes from a single
source that claims on October 17th (the day with the largest protests) some unit
commanders voiced their disagreements. The known discontent and wavering in loyalty
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at the lower ranks of the military produces the low level shift classification. Lozada was
forced to resign, because of loss of support from his political allies, including the vice
president. The military’s relations with the public suffered in the years following, because
of its involvement in repression.
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4 (2008): 110-124.
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Bolivia 3/18/2004-7/18/2004 – neutral
Opposition to President Carlos Mesa developed into anti-regime protests in March. They
escalated in April, when he signed a natural gas export deal with Argentina without
waiting for the results of a referendum on gas exports scheduled for July. The political
left was hoping to approve greater state involvement in the industry. The referendum
passed, and Mesa regained some popular support. The military was not involved in the
protests, and Mesa decided against using police force too.
Sources:
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Turner, Blair. World Today (Stryker): Latin America 2016-2017. Roman and Littlefield,
2016.
Bolivia 5/23/2005-6/6/2005 - neutral
Protests developed over a new Hydrocarbons Law that, while rejected by the opposition,
was implemented by President Carlos Mesa using his executive powers. Over the same
period, the government wavered in holding elections for a new Constitutional Assembly,
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despite its wide support, including from the military. After a delay, Mesa announced
elections and other concessions, but demonstrations continued. He resigned rather than
use violence. He did not order the security apparatus to intervene, and no parts of it
supported the protest movement.
Sources:
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Bosnia 2/4/2014-10/12/2014 - neutral
These anti-government protests were particularly large and disruptive in the beginning,
especially February. During this stage, demonstrators set buildings on fire, and engaged
in violent clashes, resulting in injuries to nearly 150 police officers. As they continued,
the protests became smaller and more peaceful. But they did not have clear leadership or
organization, and did not generate any concessions from the government. It remained in
power. They also did not generate a response from the military.
Sources:
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Brazil 1/25/1984-1/15/1985 – fragmented high level
This protest movement, directed against the military regime, demanded direct elections
for the presidency. It failed to achieve this goal, but did force the military to agree to a
transition. Part of the armed forces was significantly opposed to democratization, yet
most of it recognized that the institutional costs of remaining in power were no longer
acceptable. This division played out within the junta and the military institution. Because
a major faction of the military institution supported democratization, the junta peacefully
transitioned from power. In the elections of 1985, the protesters and overall opposition
supported a candidate from outside the ruling party, and he took office March 15.
Sources:
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Reform versus Democratic Rupture.” In Democratic Transition and Consolidation in
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Roett, Riordan. “Review: The Transition to Democratic Government in Brazil.” World
Politics 38, no. 2 (1986): 371-382.
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Bulgaria 10/16/1989-1/15/1990 – neutral
Pressure for democratization came from the protest movement and through more
institutionalized channels. The Club for the Support of Glasnost and Reorganization in
Bulgaria was established in late 1988 as a challenge to the regime. All of its founding
members had also been members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). The desire
for reform within the party was evident in other ways too; in October 1989, for example,
minister of foreign affairs Peter Mladenov used an open letter to call for change. At a
politburo session on November 9, 1989, a majority of the BCP forced General Secretary
Todor Zhivkov to hand in his resignation. Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov said the army
would not support Zhikov, but it remained loyal to the party. The army was under the
control of the BCP, with the highest ranks members of the BCP. In early February 1990,
a purely communist government was formed because no other parties wanted to
collaborate with the BCP. The BCP was the most organized political group and thus
highly involved in the transition.
Sources:
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Bulgaria 1/14/2009-1/21/2009 - neutral
Protests against the Socialist-led government’s handling of the financial crisis (which
included proposed austerity measures) lasted for a short period in January 2009. At times,
demonstrators clashed with the police; in one instance on January 14, so-called extremists
attacked police, and they responded with arrests and some violence. The protests
remained small (in the low thousands) and did not see any response from the military.
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http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-world/bulgaria-anti-government-protest-turns-into-riot/224068.
Ciobanu, Claudia. “Bulgaria: Protests Rise Above Parties, and Against Them.” IPS –
Inter Press Service. January 26, 2009.
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International Labor Organization, 2012. 19-45.
Bulgaria 6/14/2013-7/24/2014 – neutral
The coalition government of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski faced protests for a
number of reasons, one of them being its appointment of a media mogul to head the
national security agency. The mogul resigned, but the protests continued and demanded
the government’s resignation too. After 14 months, the government agreed to hold new
elections. The security forces remained loyal throughout. Violence was fairly minimal,
with the exception of a few clashes between protesters and police. The military was not
involved.
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Burkina Faso 10/21/2014-10/31/2014 – fragmented high level
Protests began when President Blaise Compaore proposed an amendment to the
constitution that would have allowed him to stand for re-election in 2015, for a fifth term
of office. They continued for a year then escalated in late October 2014 when the
proposed amendment was scheduled for a vote. The state security forces, including the
most elite unit within the army, the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), killed at least
30 demonstrators. In response, the protesters burned down a parliamentary building. They
were receiving signals that the military might not use force against them – dozens of
soldiers had joined the protests. On October 30, Compaore agreed to withdraw the
amendment and to dissolve the government, but not to resign. That same day Army Chief
of Staff General Honore Traore issued a communique that he was in charge of the
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country. It was unclear whether he was following Compaore’s orders, though, given
Compaore was still president. The protests continued and on October 31 Compaore
resigned after the RSP (led by vice commander Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida)
informed him it wouldn’t use violence against the demonstrators. Zida, a largely
unknown figure, declared himself head of state, largely because he was at the presidential
palace with the main opposition leaders when Compaore resigned. This declaration
obviously conflicted with Traore’s earlier, and the high level shift was marked by
confusion and indecision. The security forces negotiated and on November 1 endorsed
Zida. Traore had been close to Compaore, but the RSP was also a feared force in society.
The armed forces had a history of infighting, particularly between March and May 2011,
when various military units and the presidential guard staged mutinies. This infighting
continued post-campaign.
Sources:
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Burma 3/1/1988-5/27/1990 – low level
Anti-regime protests began in March 1988 and were broken up by a combination of riot
police and army troops, with many resulting casualties. In July, Burma Socialist
Programme Party Chairman (and regime leader) Ne Win stepped down because he was
angry over the handling of the protests. He was replaced by Sein Lwin, who assumed the
presidency at this time as well. Amid continued unrest, General Saw Maung (the Minister
of Defense and Chief of Staff) and the intelligence chief Colonel Khin Nyunt went to Ne
Win for advice. Ne Win ordered the senior officials of the party to hand power over to a
military council. This preceded the massacre of August 8 (8/8/88), when the military
opened fire on demonstrators with machine guns. On August 12, Sein Lwin resigned
from his positions and Maung Maung was named the new party chairman, but protests
continued. Finally, on September 18, a group of generals organized by Ne Win and led by
General Maung Aye announced the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC). With its new authority, the military imposed martial law and used
extreme brutality to end the ongoing protests. SLORC held elections on May 20, 1990, as
promised, but when the opposition won, SLORC refused to honor the results and the
military remained in power. At the start of the protests, Ne Win had been in power since
1962, and was largely responsible for the senior military officers’ positions. The military
command was united. However, there were reports of loyalty shifts from lower level
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personnel; disloyalty within the air force and navy in early September 1988, and
discussions among individual soldiers and their units and some movement leaders about
joining the demonstrations on September 15.
Sources:
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Burundi 4/23/2015-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – fragmented high level
On April 25, the ruling party (National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for
the Defense of Democracy) named incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza as its
candidate in the presidential elections, meaning he would be running for a third term.
Protests started soon after and lasted for several weeks, and were repressed by the police.
His decision to do so had the support of the Supreme Court, though. On May 13, while
Nkurunziza was out of the country, a faction of the military under the command of Major
General Godefroid Niyombare attempted a coup. Niyombare had been an ally of
Nkurunziza but was recently dismissed from his position as director of national
intelligence after a document in which he called Nkurunziza’s third term unconstitutional
went public. The protesters celebrated the regime’s overthrow, but soon troops loyal to
Nkurunziza regained control and arrested some rebels but not Niyombare. (Niyombare
became head of a new armed group, the Republican Forces of Burundi.) The failed coup
put a damper on the protests, and gave the regime more reason to be repressive of them.
The coup involved senior generals and was a high level loyalty shift.
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Cambodia 7/26/1998-9/14/1998 – loyal
The protests were in response to alleged irregularities in the 1998 elections, and pitted the
opposition parties (SRP and FUNCINPEC) against the ruling party (CPP). After weeks
of demonstrations, the protesters called for a sit-in. Following a grenade explosion near
Prime Minister Hun Sen’s home, he dispatched riot police to clear the site, which resulted
in violence. There were also confrontations between the police and protesters in other
parts of the capital. Hun Sen then banned demonstrations. When the protesters put 8000
people in the streets in defiance, the government crackdown continued, until the
movement subsided. The movement was already struggling prior to this, because of
growing opposition to Vietnamese influence within Cambodia, and violent attacks on
ethnic Vietnamese. The core of the security forces was formed by CPP officers and
soldiers, and the military in particular remained loyal.
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Chile 7/21/1931-7/27/1931 - neutral
Regime leader Colonel Carlos Ibanez del Campo came to power in a 1924 coup. In
January 1931, he assumed the power to take control during economic crisis. This lost him
the backing of his once-allies in the traditional political parties and strained his relations
with the military institution. Massive demonstrations broke out in July, resulting in some
violence between the protesters and police. Ibanez used the police because he didn’t want
to send the army into the streets. But, his decision to involve the opposition in a new
cabinet had opened the political system such that there was no turning back. Ibanez left
power on July 26 to avoid more conflict with the opposition, and because he believed it
best the military stay out of politics. The military did not act during the campaign. But,
Ibanez’s resignation set off a period of instability, with nine different governments over
the following 15 months.
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1931- 1937.” MA thesis, University of Texas-Austin, 2012.
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Scott, Sam. “Transition to Democracy in Chile: Two Factors.” MA thesis, University of
Montana, 2001.
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1930s.” Journal of Contemporary History 28, no. 2 (1993): 269-296.
Chile 5/11/1983-12/14/1989 – united defections
May 11, 1983 was the official start of organized “days of protest” against President
Augusto Pinochet. Such demonstrations occurred roughly once a month until September.
Pinochet reacted with heavy repression, including arrests, and as the protests failed to
achieve their goals in the initial years, they dwindled to involve mostly discontent lower
classes. Anti-Pinochet mobilization re-developed from 1985 to 1987 but was divided
between Marxists and non- Marxists. Though there were dissenters within the military
during this period, they did not see the civilian opposition as an alternative. In accordance
with the 1980 constitution, a plebiscite on Pinochet’s regime was held in 1988. The vote
was an overwhelming no, and Pinochet was forced to step down when the military
leadership refused to intervene to keep him in power. Pinochet could not impose martial
law because the military institution had defected from him. However, he remained in
control of the military until 1998, which complicated the democratic transition.
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China 5/2/1956-7/31/1957 – loyal
This campaign followed from Chairman Mao’s Hundred Flowers “experiment”, in which
he allowed criticism of the Communist Party. For instance, in January 1957, factory
workers in Chongqing demanded pay raises from party officials. Soldiers were called in
to disperse them using force, but the workers took their calls directly to the municipal
party committee headquarters. By May 1957, Mao realized the criticisms had developed
too far, and come to challenge the Party’s rule. One notable demonstration on May 19
involved Peking University students, which set off demonstrations in other cities. In early
June, Mao and the party issued directives that turned the movement into an anti-Rightist
campaign. The process of rounding up intellectuals and others for rehabilitation was
brutal.
Sources:
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Perry, Elizabeth J. “Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution.”
Mobilization: An International Journal 7, no. 2 (2002): 111-128.
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China 4/5/1976-12/31/1979 – neutral
These protests against the Communist regime began when a large crowd gathered in
Tiananmen Square on April 5. They gathered to pay homage to late premier Zhou Enlai,
but developed into a demonstration against the regime and especially the Cultural
Revolution. At this point the regime was dominated by an ultra-left faction of the
Communist Party, and it employed state militias to brutally repress the gathering. The
militias killed and injured many and arrested hundreds. Deng Xiaoping, a reformist
within the Central Committee, was sidelined and forced to resign as a result of the
protests. After Chairman Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976, the Party was purged
and Deng re-emerged. The protests had continued and starting in 1978 Deng reinterpreted them as revolutionary acts acceptable to the regime. This development led to
more demonstrations in early 1979, which became known as the Democracy Wall
Movement. However, as the protests and their aims became more radical, Deng and a
united Party leadership cracked down. The military was mostly uninvolved in the
campaign, with the militias carrying out the repression. In part this was because Deng
supported the military and it was demoted with him in favor of the militias and their
allies. When Deng regained power, he put the militias under the control of the military
and the Party. One source mentioned that 11 military officers and soldiers “identified as
activists” during the first demonstrations. It included few details, though, and the
information was not corroborated by any other sources.
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China 4/16/1989-6/4/1989 – low level
Ongoing protests were met at various points with violence from the police and army. On
May 20, the government declared martial law, ordering troops to occupy the main protest
site, Tiananmen Square. The troops soon retreated, though, and two weeks went by. Over
this period, the Communist Party was divided over how to respond. Its leaders were
concerned about a coup. The military leadership was dissatisfied over the Party divisions
and did not want to be used by one side over the other. Some members of the army had
reportedly joined the demonstrations, and so the military was also concerned about force
disintegration. On June 4, the army, including troops transferred in from other provinces,
forced its way into Tiananmen Square, killing hundreds. This was probably at the orders
of Deng Xiaoping and other Party leaders. Some within the Party, such as the General
Secretary, did not want to use force, but they had been sidelined. By the crackdown,
seniors within the Party and the army were in consensus. There were some reports of
military disloyalty, though. Some soldiers went missing; it is likely many young, poorly
trained troops deserted. Some individual officers and commanders resisted orders to
deploy their troops, but details are difficult to confirm. Also, in late May, in response to
the Party’s indecision, over a hundred military officers and several generals signed a
petition calling on the Central Military Commission to not use troops against civilians.
Once the Party united, the army leadership did too, and followed Deng’s orders.
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China 9/22/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - neutral
This anti-regime campaign was known as the Umbrella Movement and concentrated in
Hong Kong. The protests were highly disruptive, and lost significant public support by
the end of 2014. The police were active in repressing them, at times clashing with and
injuring demonstrators. In early October, a violent mob attacked demonstrators and the
police were accused of failing to protect what was mostly students. The military was not
involved.
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Croatia 5/25/1999-10/10/2000 - neutral
This protest movement was successful at forcing the authoritarian regime of Franjo
Tudman and his Croation Democratic Union party to hold free and fair elections, and
thus to democratize. This process of political reform was helped along with Tudman’s
death in December 1999, opening up divisions within the ruling party and space for the
opposition. There was no major threat of suppression of the demonstrations by the
military or other security forces, or other military response to the protest movement. The
military had achieved victory in the war of independence of 1991-1995, though internal
forces were rumored to have committed war crimes during it.
Sources:
Kuzio, Taras. “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist
Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave.” Demokratizatsiya 16, no. 1
(2008).
Czechoslovakia 11/16/1989-12/10/1989 – loyal
On November 17, nearly 50,000 students rallied together against the Communist regime.
In response, riot police used unprecedented violence, setting off new demonstrations. A
general strike on November 27 involved millions of people. The regime was unable to
end the challenge. It offered minor concessions, but they were seen as a sign of
weakness; the party general secretary (also the Commander in Chief of the army) ordered
the People’s Militia, or the party paramilitary units, to march on the capital, but it was
reported the militia refused to use action. The military was not involved. While both
civilian and military leaders considered using force, events changed quickly, and the
Central Committee decided on a political solution. Support for the protest movement
began to spread among the military in mid-November, and this threat to military
discipline led the minister of defense (Milan Vaclavik) to threaten military force. He was
also critical of the protesters. The regime never gave intervention orders to Vaclavik, and
it never lost control of the security forces. The military was domestically-controlled at
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this time though Soviet occupation forces were also present. In December, a reformist
government took over the party leadership. Vaclavik was also replaced.
Sources:
Barany, Zoltan D. “Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central
and Southeastern Europe.” Political Studies 41, no. 4 (1993): 594-610.
Green, Peter S. “Defense Minister Reportedly Wanted Army to Stop Revolt.” UPI.
October 18, 1990.
Hrdina III, Otakar. “Study of Civil-Military Relations in Crises of Czechoslovak
History.” MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.
Karklins, Rasma and Roger Petersen. “Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes:
Eastern Europe 1989.” The Journal of Politics 55, no. 3 (1993): 588-614.
Mares, Miroslav. “The Armed Forces and Political Extremism in the Process of
Democratization in East Central Europe.” Paper presented at the International Political
Science Association Congress, Madrid, July 8-12, 2012.
Ritter, Daniel P “Civil Society and the Velvet Revolution.” Cosmos WP 4 (2012).
Watts, Larry L. “Reform and Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations in 1989-1999.”
Armed Forces and Society 27, no. 4 (2001): 597-622.
Djibouti 1/28/2011-3/4/2011 – neutral
Protests against President Ismail Omar Guellah that began in late January became violent
in mid-February. They involved only a couple of thousand people, mostly youths.
Because of the clashes and rioting, the government deployed police, who arrested
opposition figures and other activists. The government also banned demonstrations or
other meetings of the opposition. Beyond the police, it doesn’t seem other security forces
were involved.
Sources:
Mesfin, Berouk. “Elections, Politics, and External Involvement in Djibouti.” Institute for
Security Studies Situation Report. April 14, 2011.
https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/15Apr11Djibouti.pdf.
Styan, David. “Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub.” Chatham
House Briefing Paper. April 2013. http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/8681/1/0413bp_djibouti.pdf
East Germany 5/31/1953-6/17/1953 – loyal
This protest movement against the Communist regime involved more than 500,000
people, across 560 East German towns. By June 17, the East German police and security
forces were no longer able to contain the uprising. In response, the regime declared
martial law and the Soviet army (in particular, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in
Germany, or GSOVG) entered Berlin to put down the challenge. They mostly relied on
intimidation but in a few instances fired on demonstrators directly. The Soviets were
assisted by the military arm of the East German People’s police, and all reports point to
subordinates following orders. It later emerged that some troops, junior officers, and even
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senior officers of the GSOVG were unhappy with being used against civilians – but no
loyalty shifts occurred during the campaign. Many within the military believed the Nazis
and their Western patrons organized the riots, and supported ending them with force.
Sources:
Ingimundarson, Valur. “The Eisenhower Administration, the Adenauer Government, and
the Political Uses of the East German Uprising in 1953.” Diplomatic History 20, no. 3
(1996): 381- 410.
Gobarev, Victor. “Soviet Military Planning and Activities During the East German
Uprising of June 1953.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10, no. 4 (1997): 1-29.
Ostermann, Christian F. “‘Keeping the Pot Simmering’: The United States and the East
German Uprising of 1953.” German Studies Review 19, no. 1 (1996): 61-89.
East Germany 12/15/1956-12/22/1956 – neutral
The Second East Germany uprising against the Communist regime was part of the
general crisis in Eastern Europe after Premier Nikita S. Khruschev’s February 1956
“secret speech”. In the remarks to a closed session of the Soviet Union’s Communist
Party Congress, he criticized deceased Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin. In East
Germany, the shock and disillusionment these remarks set off and the resulting period of
liberalization saw increased dissent and a wave of strikes. The regime offered minor
concessions but was overall united and strong enough to withstand the challenge. The
military was not involved.
Sources:
Dale, Gareth. Popular Protest in East Germany. New York: Routledge, 2005.
East Germany 9/4/1989-11/7/1989 – low level
The protest movement brought together members of the opposition and reformers within
the Communist party. In late September through early October, demonstrations remained
small, and the regime relied mostly on preemptive coercion. On October 4, though, there
were reports of police repression, which brought out thousands of demonstrators in the
following days. More repression as well as arrests followed. The October 9 protests in
Leipzig were a turning point, as the regime chose not to use force against 70,000
nonviolent demonstrators. There had been dialogue between the movement and lower
party officials, and indecision in the politburo. In fact, Erich Honecker, the East German
party boss, had signed an order to use force against the protests, but other officials were
unwilling to issue the order. There were also reports that a security chief had told
Honecker the police would not be able to beat up hundreds of thousands of people; in the
end, the police and military did not act. By October 15, some security forces were siding
with the protesters. Low level dissent had been evident since August, including dozens of
desertions. In mid- to late-October, some soldiers refused or resisted their officers’ orders
to deploy to demonstrations. The military leadership did not shift loyalty, but rather was
neutral as the regime conceded to some liberalization.
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Dale, Gareth. “The East German Revolution of 1989.” PhD diss., University of
Manchester, 1999.
Hadjar, Andreas. “Nonviolent Political Protest in East Germany in the 1980s.” German
Politics 12, no. 3 (2003): 107-128.
Karklins, Rasma and Roger Peterson. “Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes:
Eastern Europe 1989.” The Journal of Politics 55, no. 3 (1993): 588-614.
Lohmann, Susanne. “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991.” World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994):
42-101.
Popplewell, Richard. “The Stasi and the East German Revolution of 1989.”
Contemporary European History 1, no. 1 (1992): 37-63.
Sharman, Jason Campbell. “Culture, Strategy, and State-Centered Explanations of
Revolution, 1789-1989.” Social Science History 27, no. 1 (2003): 1-24.
Thompson, Mark R. “Reluctant Revolutionaries: Anti-Fascism and East German
Opposition.” Germany Politics 8, no. 1 (1999): 40-65.
East Timor 6/6/2006-6/26/2006 – neutral
Unrest in East Timor began in March 2006, when 600 of the army’s 1,400 troops striked
and then abandoned their barracks, alleging discrimination because they were from the
country’s west. Most promotions in the army did in fact go to easterners. The government
dismissed the troops, with support from Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. President Xanana
Gusmao, on the other hand, was believed sympathetic to the disaffected soldiers. Gusmao
had left the ruling party in the 1980s. He was elected president in 2002, but unable to
cultivate personal loyalty from the army whose leadership was loyal to the Fretilin party
of Alkatiri. Protests developed during this period, too, and in April turned violent because
of clashes between the dismissed soldiers and the increasingly splintered military and
police forces that the government had deployed to restore order. Another group of
soldiers as well as police (led by Major Alfredo Reinado) abandoned their posts in protest
of such a deployment on April 28. They then ambushed loyal soldiers and police on May
23, which generated more violence and riots. Also in May, international troops arrived to
help calm the situation. On May 31, Gusmao declared a state of emergency and took
control of the army and police forces. The situation was indeed at crisis levels by late
June; more than 30 people had been killed, and people were fleeing their homes. Alkatiri
stepped down on June 26, partly as a result of allegations that the Minister of Internal
Administration had armed civilians for the conflict (he resigned June 1). He faced
pressure from the political opposition that included Catholic Church figures, as well as
Gusmao. The new prime minister, Jose Ramos- Horta, was sworn in July 10.
Sources:
Anderson, Tim. “Timor-Leste: The Second Australian Intervention.” Journal of
Australian Political Economy 58 (2006): 62-93.
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Nevins, Joseph. “Timor-Leste in 2006: The End of the Post-Independence Honeymoon.”
Asian Survey 47, no. 1 (2007): 162-167.
Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. “The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor.” Asian Survey
46, no. 4 (2006): 575-596.
Ecuador 4/13/2005-4/20/2005 – united defections
Lucio Gutierrez was elected president and took office in January 2003 but soon adopted
conservative policies that gradually angered the indigenous movements that had formed
the backbone of his campaign. Leftist groups took to the streets, first under the direction
of political parties, then becoming more spontaneous. They faced repression by the police
and newly-trained Special Forces. Gutierrez also mobilized his supporters. But, on April
20, the Command of the Armed Forces publicly announced it could no longer support
him. The opposition parties in Congress then met and declared that Gutierrez had
abandoned his duties. Gutierrez resigned and Vice President Castillo assumed the
presidential office.
Sources:
Pallares, Amalia. “Mass Mobilization and Presidential Removal in Ecuador.” LASA
Forum 37, no. 1 (2006).
Thoresen, Beate. “Rebellion Without a Shot-Peaceful Conflict Management in Ecuador.”
Conflict, Security, Development 9, no. 3 (2009): 361-385.
Egypt 9/30/2000-12/7/2005 - neutral
These anti-President Hosni Mubarak protests were long lasting. But, they never involved
the institutionalized opposition parties, and often met with massive displays of force by
the Egyptian security forces. One of the largest demonstrations took place February 21,
2005. In response to this particular incident, Mubarak offered some concessions, but he
also cracked down, in particular with arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. More
demonstrations occurred on May 25, 2005, the day of a referendum on constitutional
reform. Security forces engaged in brutal repression of the protesters. Mubarak then won
a fifth term in September, and the opposition, and especially the protest movement,
became less active. The opposition was diverse and had supported different presidential
candidates rather than presenting a united challenge to Mubarak. Mubarak was fairly
tolerant of later protests, but used the police against them on occasion.
Sources:
Browers, Michaelle. “The Egyptian Movement for Change: Intellectual Antecedents and
Generational Conflicts.” Contemporary Islam 1, no. 1 (2007): 69-88.
Clarke, Killina. “Saying ‘Enough’: Authoritarianism and Egypt’s Kefaya Movement.”
Mobilization: An International Journal 16, no. 4 (2011): 397-416.
Meital, Yoram. “The Struggle Over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 Elections.” The
Middle East Journal 60, no. 2 (2006): 257-279.
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Egypt 10/29/2007-2/11/2011 – united defections
Ongoing protests against President Hosni Mubarak grew in momentum in the wake of
other uprisings in the region. Throughout January 2011, Mubarak deployed his security
forces to deal with them. While the police did most of the repressing, the military units
did not stop them. The military leadership also issued a number of statements calling on
the protesters to give up and go home. On February 2, armed pro-government groups
unleashed violence on the demonstrators, and the military did not interfere. In the
surrounding days, some soldiers in the streets joined the protests. There were also internal
military reports around this time about a potential mutiny within the lower ranks. These
low level shifts, combined with Mubarak’s failure to make sufficient concessions to end
the protests, led the generals to shift the full military’s loyalty. On February 10, the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (a body that convenes in times of national
emergencies) announced it was taking control of the situation, thus not cracking down on
Mubarak’s behalf. Mubarak resigned and left the country the next day. The Council then
declared it would temporarily lead the government.
Sources:
Ashour, Omar. “Collusions to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt.”
Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 14 (2015).
Barany, Zoltan. “The Role of the Military.” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 2435.
Bellin, Eva. “Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions: Possibilities of Political
Transformation in the Middle East?” Crown Center for Middle East Studies 50 (2011).
Hilal, Leila. “Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and
Egypt.” Insight Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012): 1-12.
Lutterbeck, Derek. “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations.” Armed
Forces and Society 39, no. 1 (2013): 28-52.
Egypt 6/24/2013-7/3/2013 – united defections
This period saw large protests against President Mohammed Morsi, but also large
protests in support of him. On July 1, the military issued a two-day ultimatum to Morsi,
demanding that he call early presidential elections to end the political crisis. The next
day, Morsi gave some concessions, but refused to call early elections, or step down. He
attempted to form a consensus government, except the opposition would not join. In fact,
all of the non-Freedom and Justice Party ministers within the government had resigned
after the military’s ultimatum. On July 3, Minister of Defense General Abdel Fattah elSisi, on behalf of the military, overthrew Morsi, disbanded the legislature, and suspended
the constitution. He then appointed a new interim president. Prior to the coup, Sisi had
met with leaders from a number of organizations to get support, including the Coptic
Christian Church, youth groups, and other political parties.
Sources:
Borge-Holthoefer, Javiar, Walid Magdy, Kareem Darwish, and Ingmar Weber. “Content
and Network Dynamics Behind Egyptian Political Polarization on Twitter.” Proceedings
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of the 18th Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.3097.pdf.
Krayem, Hassan. “Five Years After the Arab Spring: What Happened?” Arab Network
for the Study of Democracy Policy Papers 3 (September 2015).
Martin, Dominic W. “Political Transition in a Post-Arab Spring Middle East: A
Comparative Analysis of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen.” BA thesis, University of Central
Florida, 2014.
Egypt 7/4/2013-6/7/2014 - loyal
Protests in support of President Mohammed Morsi continued after his overthrow by
General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in July 2013. The crackdown under the interim government
of Adly Mansour was brutal, employing violence and arrests. The most notable incidents
were August 2013 massacres at the Rab’a and el Nahda Squares, but the Republican
Guards killed over 70 in protests in late July, too. The demonstrators themselves were at
times violent; they weren’t unarmed at Rab’a, and they used violence when provoked by
others during marches. Most of the protests included the Muslim Brotherhood, but others,
particularly in January 2014 in commemoration of the revolution, involved students.
They were crushed by security forces, with police storming university campuses.
Through this period, there were no signs of pro-democracy (or pro-protester) members of
the military, or actions by them.
Sources:
Ashour, Omar. “Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt.”
Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 14 (March 2015).
Tadros, Mariz. “Settling after the Revolts? Egypt’s Political Settlements and Violent
Transition.” Institute of Development Studies Evidence Report 57 (March 2014).
El Salvador 4/15/1944-5/7/1944 – low level
On April 2, 1944, the air force and two army regiments launched a military revolt against
the regime of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez. President Hernandez Martinez
was able to put it down with the help of loyal troops, consisting largely of the National
Police and National Guard. These events set off a general strike, though. Demonstrations
culminated on May 7 when a policeman killed a young boy. The military government did
not take action to end the protest movement, in part because of divisions and discontent
within the military institution. Junior military officers in particular were unhappy with
Martinez’s dictatorial rule, though their discontent did not translate into widespread
loyalty shifts. Hernandez Martinez resigned on May 9 and was replaced by interim
president General Andres I. Menendez, who had been Hernandez Martinez’s minister of
defense.
Sources:
Desilets-Bixler, Nicole Louise. “Security in Transition: Police Reform in El Salvador and
South Africa.” MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002-03.
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Griffith, Kati L. and Leslie C. Gates. “A State’s Gendered Response to Political
Instability: Gendering Labor Policy in Semiauthoritarian El Salvador, 1944-1972.” Social
Politics: International Studies in Gender, State, and Society 9, no. 3 (2002): 248-292.
Kruegler, Christopher and Patricia Parkman. “Identifying Alternatives to Political
Violence: An Educational Imperative.” Harvard Educational Review 55, no. 1 (1985):
109-118.
Lamperti, John. “El Salvador’s Holocaust Heroes.”
https://math.dartmouth.edu/~lamperti/Holocaust_Heroes.pdf.
El Salvador 2/21/1977-11/27/1980 – low level
Mobilization against the military regime developed following the 1977 presidential
elections, becoming disruptive and at times violent. Some early demonstrations were met
with repression, such as when 50 to 100 protesters were killed on February 28. A group
of progressive military officers launched a coup on October 15, 1979, because of General
Carlos Humberto Romero’s refusal to institute reforms. The resulting military-civilian
junta incorporated some opposition leaders, but largely failed to institute reforms.
Further, because it proposed reforms more radical than most of the military preferred,
conservatives within the military blocked its efforts. A new junta formed in January 1980
with the goal of defeating the leftist opposition with force. In order to accomplish this,
the mostly rightist leadership purged progressive officers from the government and the
military leadership. Those close to Colonel Adolfo Majano, a key participant in the
October 1979 coup, fared especially badly. Yet most of these elements remained loyal to
the military regime and institution. When Majano defected in early 1980, he led only a
small group that included few officers. The disloyal forces also had few ties to the protest
movement. The protest movement peaked in early 1980, in part because of unrelenting
repression. Further, opposition in the form of the Farabundo Martin National Liberation
Front (FMLN) rebel group had begun a violent campaign.
Sources:
Almedia, Paul D. “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest
Waves in Authoritarian Settings.” The American Journal of Sociology 109, no. 2 (2003):
345-400.
Foran, John. “A Theory of Third World Social Revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua, and El
Salvador Compared.” Critical Sociology 19, no. 2 (1992): 3-27.
LeoGrande, William M. “A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador.”
International Security 6, no. 1 (1981): 27-52.
Peceny, Mark and William D. Stanley. “Counterinsurgency in El Salvador.” Politics and
Society 38, no. 1 (2010): 67-94.
Petras, James F. and Morris H. Morley. “Supporting Repression: U.S. Policy and the
Demise of Human Rights in El Salvador, 1979-1981.” In The Socialist Register 1981,
edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville, 47-71. London: The Merlin Press, 1981.
Estonia 8/24/1987-8/22/1991 – neutral
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The first stages of this anti-Communist regime campaign saw opposition in Estonia (as
well as other Baltic nations) expanding their demands and ramping up their dissent. In
January 1991, the USSR warned Baltic nations that they must comply with military draft
laws. This was followed by an influx of USSR troops. The particularly violent events to
come (pro-Soviet paramilitary attacks) were mostly concentrated in Lithuania, and
Estonia remained largely calm. Estonia and Russia actually signed an agreement that
recognized each other’s sovereignty. Protests continued in Estonia until the failed coup in
Moscow on August 21. The day before, it was reported that the Soviet army was ready to
move into Tallinn, which prompted the Supreme Council to declare independence.
(Estonia had been in a transition to independence since March 30.) The coup attempt
formalized this declaration. The Soviet military had little involvement in these events,
and throughout, the fear of a massive military crackdown was relatively low given the socalled Gorbachev doctrine. In October 1989, the Soviet Union had indicated it would not
interfere in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies.
Sources:
Rossi, Federico M. “The Unintended Consequence of the Struggle for Independence: The
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Ulfelder, Jay. “Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics
3.3, no. 4 (2004): 23-43.
Fiji 5/16/1987-6/3/1987 – neutral
On May 14, while the Commander of the Army and his second in command were away,
third in command Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka led a coup against the newly
elected National Federation Part-Labor Party Coalition government led by Timoci
Bavadra. This coalition was multiracial and Indo-Fijan and threatened the hegemony of
the Fijan-dominated Alliance Party. It was rumored that Bavadra would reform the
military in ways unacceptable to most officers: reducing its role in internal security and
admitting more Indians (the military was more than 90% Fijan at this time). Protests
broke out against the coup, and quickly became violent. This led the rest of the military
and the Great Council of Chiefs (Fiji’s constitutional assembly) to back Rabuka. The
anti-coup movement was soon subdued and no part of the military shifted loyalty in
response to the protests.
Sources:
Clements, Peter. “Coups and the Fiji Military.” Peacekeeping and International Relations
30, no. 1-3 (2001).
Ratuva, Steven. “The Military Coups in Fiji: Reactive and Transformative Tendencies.”
19, no. 1 (2011): 96-120.
275

Fiji 4/24/2000-5/29/2000 – low level
In April, indigenous Fijians began protests to call on President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara
to dismiss Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry’s government. A civilian named George
Speight led a coup against Chaudhry on May 19. Immediately, there were suspicions of
military complicity, since it was slow to react, by securing parliament or securing the area
from Speight’s accomplices. It emerged that the coup was in fact supported by members
of the Army’s Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) unit, a guard that former prime
minister Sitiveni Rabuka had established in 1987 as a coup-proofing force. Its personnel
were viewed as rogue elements of the military. There were rumors that the military coup
leader, Colonel Ilisoni Ligairi, a retired armed officer, was a hired gun. Senior military
officers did not support the coup, but also seemed unable to prevent the crisis, and the
security situation quickly deteriorated. Prime Minister Chaudhry and his cabinet and
colleagues were incarcerated by Speight’s forces for almost eight weeks. The commander
of the military, Frank Bainimarama, told the president that the constitution did not offer a
framework for resolving the crisis, and so he needed to step aside. The military leadership
then declared martial law on May 29. Only one military unit – the CRW – shifted loyalty
from the regime to the protest movement, by supporting Speight’s coup.
Sources:
Alley, Roderic. “The Coup Crisis in Fiji.” Australian Journal of Political Science 35, no.
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Georgia 11/4/2003-11/23/2003 – low level
The protest movement against President Eduard Shevarnadze was short in duration but
intense. Demonstrations started after parliamentary elections on November 2 that were
considered unfair. On November 22, the day of the new parliament’s opening session, the
protesters seized parliament. Shevardnadze had deployed hundreds of soldiers to the
streets in advance. The protesters were confident some security forces wouldn’t intervene
but didn’t know how the president’s special units would respond. When Shevarnadze
declared a state of emergency, the elite military forces refused to comply. Further, many
soldiers in the streets laid down their guns. Shevarnadze resigned on November 23, and
then senior officers from the military and police defected publicly.
Sources:
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Ghana 11/13/2000-12/7/2000 - neutral
The presidential election was held on December 7, 2000. It followed almost a month of
protests, some of which the police dispersed violently. The candidate of the ruling party,
the National Democratic Congress, did not win outright, and was forced into a run-off
with that of the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party. The opposition won.
Neither round of the election was disputed and the contest ended peacefully. The military
was not involved in the protests.
Sources:
Ayee, J.R.A. “The 2000 General Elections and Presidential Run-Off in Ghana: An
Overview.” Democratization 9, no. 2 (2002): 148-174.
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Greece 5/28/1963-6/16/1963 - neutral
Protests started in part in response to the May 1963 assassination of leftist politician
Gregores Lambrakes by right-wing extremists. Most involved students under the banner
of the Democratic Youth Movement. Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis’s rightist
government repressed them, at times brutally. Meanwhile, Karamanlis had been pushing
constitutional changes that would increase his position’s power. The monarchy disagreed.
The military worried that the split between the government and the monarchy would give
political space to the leftists. According to some reports, Greek officers actually asked the
US Embassy for American support for a (possible) coup – they did not receive it,
though. The monarchy forced Karamanlis to resign on June 11. While it indicated it
might look to the military for support, such was not needed. A caretaker government took
power, led by Panagiotis Pipinelis, until elections in November.
Sources:
Asimakoulas, Dimitris. “Translating ‘Self’ and ‘Others’: Waves of Protest under the
Greek Junta.” The Sixties 2, no. 1 (2009): 25-47.
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Greece 2/1/1973-11/17/1974 – fragmented high level
Dictator Georgios Papadopoulos had seized power through military coup in April 1967.
Growing opposition to the military regime and intra-regime conflicts led him to begin
transferring power to a civilian government in early 1973. The opposition developed into
popular protests involving students during February and March 1973. On May 23, a
group of naval officers supported by some politicians and the king (who was at this time
in exile) attempted a coup to hasten the junta’s end. The coup was frustrated by other
security forces, and colonels purged about 400 officers for their involvement or disloyalty
to the junta. Papadopoulos officially launched the transition on June 1 by negotiating with
Spyros Markezinis of the Progressive Party on the formation of the civilian government.
Reform was very limited though, as Papadopoulos soon introduced constitutional
amendments which would give him more power, especially over foreign policy. This
created tensions between him and Markezinis. After more negotiations, Papadopoulos
agreed to hold elections in September. This liberalization increased popular mobilization
over the summer. The military became involved after the police failed to control the
growing protests. While lower and middle ranking officers were frustrated with the
military junta, they also worried about leftists taking power. High ranking officers were
also discontent yet resistant to civilian government. Markezinis did not have a good
relationship with the military and exercised little control over it at this point. On
November 25, Dimitrios Ioannides, a hardliner and head of the military police, led a coup
that ousted Papadopoulous. He was unopposed by the rest of the military and reestablished full military rule. Ioannides’s regime was soon enveloped in crisis, though; he
decided to interfere in Cyprus, which threatened war with Turkey in late July. Large
sections of the navy and air force disagreed with Ioanniades’s strategy. This strengthened
softliners within the weak military institution. Further, popular opposition to the regime
was still high. Later that month, 250 or more officers from the Third Army Corps signed
a declaration demanding the regime create a transitional government. The regime and the
forces’ commanders agreed to do so and met with opposition politicians to start the
process.
Sources:
Asimakoulas, Dimitris. “Translating ‘Self’ and ‘Others’: Waves of Protest Under the
Greek Junta.” The Sixties 2, no. 1 (2009): 25-47.
Barany, Zoltan D. The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in
Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
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Gursoy, Yaprak. “Civilian Support and Military Unity in the Outcome of Turkish and
Greek Military Interventions.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 37, no. 1
(2009): 47-75.
Tzortzis, Ioannis. “Fake or Failed? A Greek Would-Be Reforma Pactada.” Journal of
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, no. 2 (2012): 315-333.
Guatemala 5/1/1944-7/1/1944 – fragmented high level
Demonstrations against the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico grew throughout May and June.
The situation got interesting in late June; first, in response to protests on June 24, the
security forces did not intervene. When they got even bigger the next day, the police and
army did act, and killed some women. In spite of this event, the military overall began to
disobey Ubico’s orders. Junior army officers played an especially key role in forcing
Ubico to resign on July 1. Senior officers were not yet ready to give up power to
civilians. Before leaving office, Ubico chose an ally General Frederico Ponce Vaides to
take power with two other generals. Vaides stepped up repression against the opposition.
Sources:
Dosal, Paul J. “The Political Economy of Industrialization in Revolutionary Guatemala,
1944- 1954.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 15, no. 29
(1990): 17-36.
Little, Todd R. “Populism and the Guatemalan Revolution: Politics and Power in
Transition, May 1944-March 1945.” MA thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1990.
McGehee, Richard V. “Revolution, Democracy, and Sport: The Guatemalan ‘Olympics’
of 1950.” Olympika 3 (1994): 49-81.
Trefzger, D.W. “De Guatemala a Guate-Poor? Guatemalan Military Interventionism,
1944- 1970.” Armed Forces and Society 28, no. 1 (2001): 77-97.
Guinea 1/10/2007-11/17/2010 – united defections
Mobilization against the regime of former military leader Lansana Conte took the form of
strikes in 2006 and 2007, often with violent responses from the security forces, resulting
in many casualties. In 2008 the situation became tense because of unrest within the
security forces. In May, junior army officers led an uprising at a military base that
headquartered the army’s elite commando parachutist unit. They were angry over pay and
promotions. After a few weeks, Conte met with the leader of the mutiny and reached an
agreement on concessions. In June, police officers mutinied, but were crushed by army
troops. In December, Conte died, and hours after it was announced, the army (in
particular, junior officers) took over, putting Captain Moussa Dadis Camara in power.
They faced little resistance from more senior officers, and the population generally was
supportive after years of Conte’s unpopular rule. The junta was supposed to oversee a
transition ending in January 2010, but in April 2009, Camara announced he would run for
president. This set off demonstrations that were brutally repressed by the security forces.
The most notable instance of repression took place on September 28, 2009, and involved
Camara’s forces as well as some rogue sections within the military. The commander of
the Presidential Guards, Lieutenant Aboubacar Diakite, feared he would be blamed for
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the violence so he made an assassination attempt on Camara in December. Camara left
the country for medical treatment, and the military considered its options. In the end, led
by vice president and Minister of Defense General Sekouba Konate, it decided to support
civilian rule. This united decision to shift loyalty from the regime was preceded by
military factionalism including tensions between Camara’s junta and the armed forces
over reports that the government had recruited irregular fighters to form a militia. A
semi-military transitional government was put in place, and opposition leader Alpha
Conde was elected president in November 2010.
Sources:
Arieff, Alexis and Nicolas Cook. “Guinea: Background and Relations with the United
States.” Congressional Research Service. March 22, 2010.
Bah, Mamadou Diouma. “The Military and Politics in Guinea: An Instrumental
Explanation of Political Stability.” Armed Forces and Society 41, no. 1 (2013): 69-95.
Iqbal, Zareen. “Guinea: Breaking the Dictatorship Domino Effect.” International Institute
for Justice and Development. June 27, 2010. http://iijd.org/news/entry/guinea-breakingthe- dictatorship-domino-effect.
Guyana 9/16/1990-10/7/1992 - neutral
Following years of anti-regime protests, the October 1992 presidential elections put
Cheddi Jagan of the opposition People’s Progress Party (PPP) in power. This followed an
election period that saw fears the military would declare martial law to guarantee a ruling
party (People’s National Congress, or PNC) victory. It didn’t, and after, the PNC made
no attempt to get military support. The military command at one point indicated it did not
want to be involved in politics. Because it is not clear whether the regime planned or
wanted to use the military, the military’s noninvolvement is best considered neutrality.
Sources:
Griffith, Ivelaw L. “Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana.” Third
World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 267-285.
Singh, Chaitram. “Changing the Basis of Civilian Control over the Military in Guyana.”
Journal of Third World Studies 14, no. 2 (1997): 113-131.
Haiti 11/27/1985-2/17/1986 – united defections
Regime opposition first took the form of food riots in fall 1985. In November, students
joined in the streets. Troops sent in to guard the demonstrators did not know how to
respond and ended up killing a number of them. This ignited other protests, and calls for
President Jean-Claude Duvalier (“Baby Doc”) to step down and the army to take over – it
was likely the only institution able to run the state in Duvalier’s absence. While the army
did not explicitly support the movement, officers began to distance themselves from
Duvalier, concluding he was on his way out, and by January 1986 were not acting against
the demonstrations. Yet neither did the army want to take power. According to some
reports, it was only following pressure from the US and other Haitian politicians that
General Henri Namphy first removed support from Duvalier and then took power in a
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new military government. Duvalier fled in February. His father and predecessor,
Franqois, had controlled the military by promoting loyalists and removing potential
threats, as well as through counterforces (including a paramilitary force, the National
Security Volunteers or VSN). Some in the VSN supported Baby Doc to the end, but the
military organization was disillusioned with his rule.
Sources:
Mock, Ron. 1989. “Promoting Social Change in Authoritarian Regimes through Active
Nonviolence.” Paper presented at the Conference on Quaker Studies on Human
Betterment, Friends Association of Higher Education, 1989, 91-103.
Nicholls, David. “Haiti: The Rise and Fall of Duvalierism.” Third World Quarterly 8, no.
4 (1986): 1239-1252.
Haiti 6/29/1987-7/31/1987 – loyal
Following the overthrow of Baby Doc, General Namphy remained in charge of the
transitional government (the National Governing Council, or NGC) and moved only
slowly from military rule to democracy. In June 1987, he and others in the NGC tried to
take control of the November elections from an independent electoral council. This
prompted major protests, which the military repressed throughout June and July. It killed
many demonstrators. At no point did any of the military support the protest movement.
The NGC eventually backed down from the decrees related to the council, but it also
cancelled the upcoming elections. These months of unrest were followed by a series of
coups, one of which overthrew the NGC and another that attempted to oust the new
rulers. This intra-military discord took place post-campaign and was not in support of the
opposition.
Sources:
Buss, Terry F. “Foreign Aid and the Failure of State Building in Haiti under the
Duvaliers, Aristide, Preval, and Martelly.” WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/104
(2013).
Lundahl, Mats. “History as an Obstacle to Change: The Case of Haiti.” Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 31, no. 1/2 (1989): 1-21.
Rotberg, Robert I. “Haiti’s Past Mortgages its Future.” Foreign Affairs 67, no. 1 (1988):
93-109.
Haiti 12/10/2003-2/9/2004
Haiti had no military during this period; it was disbanded in 1995 by President JeanBertrand Aristide.
Sources:
Shamsie, Yasmine. “Building ‘Low-Intensity’ Democracy in Haiti: The Contribution.”
Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 1097-1115.
Haiti 2/28/2005-5/17/2010
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Haiti had no domestic military during this period. The country was militarily occupied by
a US- French-Canadian force, then a UN pacification force.
Sources:
Hallward, Peter. “Haiti 2010: Exploiting Disaster.” Adapted from Damming the Flood:
Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment. Verso, 2008. Reprint, Verso, 2008.
Honduras 6/29/2009-9/28/2009 – loyal
On June 28, President Manuel Zelaya was arrested by the military, in response to tensions
over whether to hold a referendum about adding a question on convening a constituent
assembly to the November ballot. Critics viewed the referendum and the question as an
attempt by Zelaya to expand executive power, and the judicial branch declared it illegal.
Zelaya continued with his referendum plans and ordered the military to help him carry it
out. When head of the military General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez refused, Zelaya fired
him. The army, navy, and air force commanders resigned in solidarity with Vasquez, and
the Supreme Court reinstated him. Then, the Supreme Court issued the warrant for
Zelaya’s arrest, following a request from the Chief Prosecutor. Instead of turning Zelaya
over for trial, though, the military took him to Costa Rica. It then turned power over to a
civilian interim government, in line with the constitution. Protests organized by Zelaya’s
National Resistance Front Against the Coup (FNR) soon began, and brought together
trade unions, peasant groups, and leftist popular organizations. They failed to remove the
interim government and its president, Roberto Micheletti, however. An anti-Zelaya
coalition of traditional political parties, the business sector, and the armed forces held
strong. While Zelaya claimed to have support in the lower and middle levels of officers,
no divisions emerged. The army, along with the police, also put down the FNR’s protests,
and were accused of using excessive force in doing so.
Sources:
Ruhl, J. Mark. “Honduras Unravels.” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (2010): 93-107.
Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. and Joseph Daniel Ura. “Public Opinion and Conflict in
the Separation of Powers: Understanding the Honduran Coup of 2009.” Journal of
Theoretical Politics 25, no. 1 (2013): 105-127.
Hungary 8/19/1989-9/11/1989 – neutral
Though the start of the protest movement was August 1989, processes of political
liberalization had begun long before. This is one reason the military was mostly
uninvolved in the challenge to the regime. The military leadership was less than
supportive of democratization, but did not want to be involved in politics, either. Also
important were indications from Soviet leaders that it preferred peaceful negotiations. As
a result, the transition was peaceful, with little violence. Soviet forces were stationed in
Hungary during this time, but did not act. The Hungarian security forces were largely
passive, though there were known to be reform-minded sections in each organization.
Sources:
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Barany, Zolton D. “Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central
and Southeastern Europe.” Political Studies 41, no. 4 (1993): 595-610.
Mares, Miroslav. “The Armed Forces and Political Extremism in the Process of
Democratization in East Central Europe.” Paper presented at the International Political
Science Association World Congress, Madrid, Spain, July 8-12, 2012.
Szabo, Mate. “From a Police State to a Demonstration Democracy: Policing Mass
Demonstrations in Hungary Before, During, and After the Regime Change.”
https://www.ajk.elte.hu/file/SzaboMate-Police.pdf.
Iceland 10/10/2008-1/26/2009
Iceland did not have a military during this time. Anti-regime protests there were mostly
peaceful but at times involved riot police.
Source:
Boyes, Roger. “Protests Tip of Iceberg as Europe Braces for Chaos.” The Australian.
January 23, 2009.
India 6/14/1975-6/26/1975 – neutral
Popular opposition to Indira Ghandhi’s government grew in the lead-up to elections on
June 11. When the votes were counted on June 12, her party lost, and the same day a high
court ruled that she had engaged in corrupt electoral practices in 1971. Instead of
appealing the court’s decision, Indira informed President Fakhruddin Ali that she was
going to declare a state of emergency. The president signed it into law on June 25. This
marked the end of the protest movement, but throughout, the military was uninvolved in
repression. Most was carried out by the police and internal paramilitary forces such as the
Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police (both headed by senior police
forces). The military also refused to act on behalf of the people by opposing the
government. The state of emergency gave Indira the constitutional authority to use the
army to enforce it. The army had a reputation as professional and competent, especially
after its December 1971 victory over Pakistan. One contentious military issue that didn’t
come to cause problems for Indira was the appointment of General Tapeshwar Nath
Raina as Army Chief of Staff over other generals in line for the position. Some younger
officers likely opposed Indira, but they didn’t shift loyalty, either.
Sources:
Kizer, Justin. “Lessons Learned in India: Indira Gandhi Sees Power in Democracy.”
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Indiana Political Science Association,
Westville, Indiana, March 28, 2008.
Klieman, Aaron S. “Indira’s India: Democracy and Crisis Government.” Political Science
Quarterly 96 no. 2 (1981): 241-259.
Kozicki, Richard J. “The Demise of Indian Democracy.” Asian Affairs 2, no. 6 (1975):
349-362.
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Pardesi, Manjeet S. “India and Pakistan: The Origins of Their Different Politico-Military
Trajectories.” India Review 9, no. 1 (2010): 38-67.
Staniland, Paul. “Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Environments: India
and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective.” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 322-362.
Misra, K.P. “Paramilitary Forces in India.” Armed Forces and Society 6, no. 3 (1980):
371-388.
India 1/20/1977-3/21/1977 – neutral
Elections were held in the midst of the state of emergency, on March 16. Indira
Ghandhi’s party, the Indian National Congress, lost. After the results were announced,
Indira instructed the president to end the state of emergency and then resigned. According
to one report, she was ready to suspend the constitution, cancel the elections, and declare
martial law, but some officers refused. However, this was not corroborated by other
sources. Thus, the military did not act to support the regime or the protest movement.
Sources:
Green, Josclyn C. “Indira Gandhi: India’s Destined Leader.” MA thesis, SUNY Buffalo,
2013.
Palmer, Norman D. “The Two Elections: A Comparative Analysis.” Asian Survey 17, no.
7 (1977): 648-666.
Indonesia 10/28/1997-5/21/1998 – fragmented high level
Protests against President Suharto developed as the financial crisis worsened. Student-led
protests grew throughout February and March 1998. Suharto’s party, Golkar, had won the
1997 People’s Consultative Assembly elections, and in March 1998 Suharto was elected
for a seventh term by the legislature. Suharto was a former army general, and the military
formed a key base of support for him. However, a rivalry had developed between two
generals (both Suharto loyalists) over control of the military: Wiranto and Probowo
Subianto, who was also Suharto’s son in law. On May 12, Indonesia’s elite combat units,
the Kopassus, killed four demonstrating students in Jakarta. This was likely at the order
of Prabowo and set off mob violence. In the aftermath, he advocated for more repression
of the protests, while Wiranto disagreed. Under Wiranto, the military facilitated a transfer
of power from Suharto to his vice president, B.J. Habibie on May 21. Wiranto still
supported Suharto and wanted him to leave peacefully, but Suharto had factionalized the
military as a way to balance it. In the process, Suharto had increased the standing of
Subianto, a relatively junior general. While Wiranto offered Suharto a plan forward,
Suharto considered a new military command – until the army chief of staff General
Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo refused to lead it. Subagyo accompanied Wiranto when he met
with Suharto over stepping down.
Sources:
Alagappa, Muthiah. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the
Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
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Case, William F. “Revisiting Elites, Transitions, and Founding Elections: An Unexpected
Caller from Indonesia.” Democratization 7, no. 4 (2000): 51-80.
Webber, Douglas. “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in PostSuharto Indonesia.” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 396-420.
Indonesia 5/21/1999-10/19/1999 – neutral
Before stepping down, Suharto transferred power to his vice president B. J. Habibie.
Habibie came to rely heavily on the military over his term because of his lack of popular
support. His government undertook a number of military reforms, to reduce its political
participation, but also made concessions to Minister of Defense and Commander of the
Armed Forces Wiranto and the leadership, allowing it continued influence. Politics
overall were contentious and Habibie as well as other parties looked to the military for
support. But the political competition combined with divides in the military made
Wiranto and others unwilling to intervene, on the side of Habibie or the opposition.
Habibie held parliamentary elections in June 1999. His Golkar party came in second.
Then in September, after demonstrations, he was forced to drop a new bill that would
have provided the president and military greater latitude for handling unrest. Security
forces killed several protesters during these events. Habibie ended up losing backing
from Golkar and as a result did not attempt re-election.
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King, Blair Andrew. “Empowering the Presidency: Interests and Perceptions in
Indonesia’s Constitutional Reforms, 1999-2002.” PhD diss., Ohio State University,
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Tornquist, Olle. “Dynamics of Indonesian Democratization.” Third World Quarterly 21,
no. 3 (2000): 383-423.
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Iran 11/16/1977-2/11/1979 – fragmented high level
This anti-Shah Reza Pahlavi protest movement was massive, consisting of students, the
intelligentsia, merchants, clergy, laborers, and professionals. The first major involvement
of the military was in February 1978, when the regime ordered it to take over Tabriz to
restore order. In August and September, the military became further involved when the
regime declared martial law in Esfahan and then Tehran, as well as other major cities.
Demonstrations continued despite the orders. Earlier, the Shah had appointed General
Gholam Ali Oveissi as Tehran’s military governor, and now Oveissi ordered tanks
downtown and troops to fire. This culminated on September 8, or Black Friday, when
troops killed 400 to 500 people. Protests continued, and a small faction of the movement
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started using violence. The first sign of disloyalty among the military was November 4,
when an army conscript tried to join the demonstrators and was killed by officers. This
set off rioting. The Shah responded with some concessions and by dismissing Oveissi.
However, the military and especially the rank and file were becoming less and less
reliable, and desertion rates were increasing. During rallies on December 10 and 11, the
protesters reached out to the military for support. December 11 also saw a dozen upperranking officers shot by their own troops as rival military factions faced off. The situation
was extremely confused when the Shah left the country on January. Some senior officers
remained loyal to him, and even followed him; other officers remained but stopped
following the orders of their superiors of other civilians. Religious and opposition leader
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came back to Iran from exile on February 1, 1979 and
declared a provisional government under Mehdi Bazargan. Then, he called on the
protesters to go into the streets and prevent any security forces still loyal to the Shah
(especially the Imperial Guards) from staging a coup. More intra-security forces conflict
occurred on February 9, inside an air force base. The fighting came to involve other
armed groups. Soon after, the Army’s Supreme Council recognized the Bazargan
government. Finally, on February 11, chief of staff of the armed forces Abbas
Gharabaghi announced that the military would remain neutral as the new regime
struggled to take control. The military was not cohesive by this point. While in power, the
Shah had employed various coup-proofing strategies, including personally controlling
military personnel decisions and putting place barriers to communication among military
segments.
Sources:
Abrahamian, Ervand. “The Crowd in the Iranian Revolution.” Radical History Review
105 (2009): 15-38.
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State: Iran as a Case Study.” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 2 (1997): 269-288.
Edwards, Holli. “Laws of Armed Conflict and Civilian Participation in Intra-State
Revolutions: The Iranian Revolution 1979.” Bond University Student Law Review 4, no.
1 (2016).
Moazami, Behrooz. “The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution,
1963- 1979.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 29, no. 1
(2009): 47-62.
Ritter, Daniel P. “On the Role of Strategy in Nonviolent Revolutionary Social Change:
The Case of Iran, 1977-1979.” EUI Working Paper WMP (2011).
Schahgaldian, Nikola B. The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic. The RAND
Corporation, 1987.
Iran 7/9/1999-7/31/1999 - neutral
Student protests against President Mohammad Khatami took place in July, leading to a
July 9th attack by security forces on a dormitory at Tehran University. Hundreds of
students were arrested, and at least one was killed. The attack, however, was against the
orders of the interior minister. It also prompted more protests that set off violence
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between the protesters, police, and other armed groups. The Basij volunteer paramilitary
played a major role and was able to end the unrest, without need to call on the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or the army. The IRGC did threaten to intervene if
necessary, and 24 of its commanding officers wrote to Khatami to criticize his failure to
recognize the demonstrations as a threat to national security. Khatami then called on the
protesters to cooperate with the government and backed a counter rally in support of the
regime. At this point, the Iranian military was poor, weak, and disorganized following the
war with Iraq. The armed forces overall were divided between the regular military and
the IRGC.
Sources:
Abootalebi, Ali. “State-Society Relations and Prospects for Democracy in Iran.” Middle
East Review of International Affairs 5, no. 3 (2001): 20-37.
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Golkar, Saeid. “Organization of the Oppressed or Organization for Oppressing:
Analyzing the Role of the Basij Militia of Iran.” Politics, Religion, and Ideology 13, no. 4
(2012): 455-471.
Kurzman, Charles. “Student Protests and the Stability of Gridlock in Khatami’s Iran.”
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 1 (2001): 38-47.
Iran 6/12/2009-6/14/2013 – neutral
Over this period, the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) gained power, and the regime
became increasingly reliant on it for its security. The IRGC had been set up as a parallel
force to the military for coup-proofing purposes, but the regime continued to invest in it
to prevent popular opposition. This was evident in the IRGC’s repression of these
demonstrations against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Basij, a network of social,
professional, and militia groups used to mobilize support for the regime, was also
involved in repression. Both forces were brutal and fully committed to regime orders.
The IRGC (as well as the military) relied on conscripts, so there were some concerns over
the rank and file’s loyalty. But, no loyalty shifts occurred. Most officers had been
promoted on the basis of their loyalty to the regime.
Sources:
Golkar, Saeid. “The Islamic Republic’s Art of Survival.” The Washington Institute for
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of Iran’s Theocratic Left During Ahmadinejad’s Second Term.” Journal of Georgetown
University – Qatar Middle Eastern Studies Student Association 4 (2014).
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Iraq 3/3/1991-3/28/1991 – low level
Anti-Saddam Hussein protests by Sunni Arabs occurred in the midst of an uprising by
Shiite Arabs and Kurds. For two weeks, both of them seemed on the verge of success;
they overthrew various local governments, and put local army garrisons in disarray. At
the same time, many in the army were exhausted from war and angry with Saddam over
Iraq’s very recent defeat. Further, when Saddam announced his withdrawal from the war,
he made no agreement on the safety of his retreating forces. His Republican Guard had
already safely withdrawn, leading to suspicions that he wanted the enemy forces to wipe
out those he suspected of disloyalty. Many soldiers, both Sunni and Shiite, deserted and
joined the protesters in the streets. There was also a large anti-Saddam section in the
higher levels of the military, in part because of the conflict. These officers were more
cautious in their criticism, though, given that in late 1990 Saddam had executed disloyal
officers. The deserting soldiers took up arms in revolt against the government, but overall
their efforts were spontaneous, with little leadership or organization, and did not spread
to Baghdad. The opposition never fully won over the military, either; the limited loyalty
shifts were more in the form of disintegration than defection. In the end, the remainder of
the army saved Saddam’s regime.
Sources:
Jabar, Faleh A. “Why the Uprisings Failed.” Middle East Research and Information
Project. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer176/why-uprisings-failed.
Iraq 2/12/2011-12/2/2011 - loyal
The climax of this protest movement against the government of Prime Minister Nouri alMalaki seems to have been February 26, when tens of thousands participated in
nationwide demonstrations. In response, soldiers shot into the crowds, and the security
forces arrested hundreds. Army intelligence units were the main force involved in
repressing the protests. After this incident, the protests became more aggressive, though
most of the violence was on the part of the security forces.
Sources:
McCrummen, Stephanie. “Iraq’s Day of Rage Protests Followed by Detentions,
Beatings.” Washington Post. February 25, 2011.
Van Heuvelen, Ben. “Iraq’s Nouri al-Malaki: The Man Who Would Be King.” Foreign
Policy. June 13, 2011.
Iraq 12/28/2012-9/8/2014 – low level
These anti-Maliki protests mostly involved Sunnis. The Iraq Security Forces (ISF) first
fired on the demonstrators in late January 2013. They continued, including as part of a
protest camp at al-Hawijah. The security forces raided this camp in April 2013, which
provoked some Sunnis to become more militant. In May 2013, Maliki reshuffled the top
command of the security forces, likely to remove from view the individuals that Sunnis
blamed for the violence. After months of continued protests, though, Maliki sent in the
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army to shut down protest camps in Anbar, and also to secure the area from al Qaeda,
which was encroaching. Sunni tribal forces repelled the troops and forced Maliki to
withdraw. Many Sunnis did not feel safe under Malaki’s security forces, and formed their
own instead. Starting in 2006, Maliki had steadily gained power as minister of defense, or
the interior, of the state for national security, and the commander in chief of the armed
forces. He replaced high ranking military officials with his allies, and created provincial
command centers headed by loyal generals. He also integrated Shiite militias into the
ISF. There were some instances of military disloyalty. A local army unit helped civilians
flee the camp raid in April, and the mostly Kurdish 16th brigade of the army refused
Maliki’s orders to fire on protesters. Maliki dismissed the brigade’s commander, which
led it to defect to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s forces.
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Japan 5/21/1960-7/15/1960 – united defections
Protests started when the Nobusuke Kishi government attempted to revise the country’s
Mutual Security Treaty. They grew over how Kishi handled the situation, including
police violence against mostly students who were part of the demonstrations. During one
protest on June 15, rightist “hoodlums” attacked the protesters. President Dwight
Eisenhower of the United States was scheduled to visit Japan on June 19, so Kishi asked
the defense agency chief to deploy the Self Defense Force Troops (the Japanese military)
against the movement in advance. The chief refused the request and later said his
decision had the support of the rest of the military. Kishi had lost significant support from
his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, in the lead-up. The Treaty ended up being
reformed, but Kishi resigned on June 23.
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Sources:
Berger, Thomas U. “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of AntiMilitarism.” International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 119-150.
Fakuda, Kanichi. “The May-June Incident.” Far Eastern Survey 29, no. 10 (1960): 146151.
Saruya, Hiroe. “Protests and Democracy in Japan: The Development of Movement Fields
and the 1960 Anpo Protests.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2012.
Jordan 1/14/2011-1/23/2013 – neutral
These Arab Spring protests followed on others in the region, but here, the armed forces
remained loyal. The regime mostly allowed the demonstrations under heavy police
presence, and used the security forces (mainly the paramilitary) to clamp down when
necessary. It also responded with minor concessions. The regime consisted mostly of East
Bank Jordanians, and the same went for the armed forces. There were rumors of
discontent among military veterans that disapproved of the regime, and the protests at one
point involved loyalty tribes affiliated with the military. Still, no part of the military ever
shifted loyalty, or acted in the protests on regime orders.
Sources:
Barany, Zoltan. “Revolt and Resistance in the Arab Kingdoms.” Parameters 43, no. 2
(2013): 89-101.
El Kurd, Dana. “The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally.” Parameters 44, no. 3
(2014): 47-55.
Lang, Courtney. “The Influence of Democracy Aid on the Arab Spring Protests: Did
Western Democracy Assistance Help Nations Respond Positively to the Protests?” BA
honors thesis, Duke University, 2013.
Makara, Michael. “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring.” Democracy
and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 334-359.
Kenya 2/18/1990-12/31/1991 – neutral
Pro-democracy protests began in February 1990, and the crackdown against them began
in June. The regime used violent repression in July. The demonstrations continued for
more than a year, though, and on December 2, 1991, the government announced a change
to the constitution that would allow competitive multiparty politics. This occurred in the
absence of any military loyalty shifts.
Sources:
Kuria, Gibson Kamau. “Confronting Dictatorship in Kenya.” Journal of Democracy 2,
no. 4 (1991): 115- 126.
Riley, Stephen P. “Political Adjustment or Domestic Pressure: Democratic Politics and
Political Choice in Africa.” Third World Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1992): 539-551.
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Kyrgyzstan 5/1/1990-4/19/1991 – neutral
Ongoing inter-ethnic violence (including a June 5, 1990 incident where more than 500
were killed) increased the opposition to the Communist regime. In May, the opposition
formed the Kygyzstan Democratic Movement as an anti-Communist bloc. The protest
movement forced parliament to hold new presidential elections in October. The
Communist Party’s candidate, Absamat Masaliyev lost in an upset to Askar Akayev. He
was tasked with navigating the transition to independence, and was re-elected in October
1991.
Sources:
Kyrgyzstan: The Transition to a Market Economy. World Bank Publications, 1993.
Melvin, Neil. “Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes
and Legacies of Violence.” Open Society Foundations Occasional Paper Series 3 (2011).
Kyrgyzstan 2/27/2005-3/24/2005 – low level
Demonstrations began in February but escalated in March. On March 20, President Askar
Akayev ordered soldiers to clear protesters from an administrative building in Jalalabad.
This resulted in some injuries, with rumors of many more, and the protesters devolved
into a violent mob. Some police were sympathetic to the protesters, and when ten
thousand of them gathered in the capital on March 21, they were able to break through
security force lines to flood the main government offices. Akaev decided against
declaring a state of emergency, likely because he couldn’t rely on the security apparatus.
He then fled the country. Violence was limited because the military and police dissolved
rather than use force. These deployed soldiers resisted acting against the protesters and
thus shifted loyalty from the regime in this limited instance.
Sources:
Beachain, Donnacha O. “Roses and Tulips: Dynamics of Regime Change in Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25, no. 2-3 (2009).
McGlinchey, Eric. “Exploring Regime Instability and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan.”
Asia Policy 12, no. 1 (2011): 79-98.
Radnitz, Scott. “What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2
(2006): 132-146. Way, Lucan. “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions.” Journal of
Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 55-69.
Kyrgyzstan 4/6/2010-4/20/2010 – united defections
After two days of major demonstrations, on April 7, Prime Minister Daniar Usenov
declared a nationwide state of emergency. Thousands of protesters gathered anyway,
overwhelming the police. They surrounded the presidential offices and demanded Usenov
and President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to come out. When the officials refused, the protesters
stormed the building. The police opened live fire, but the protesters continued, and
occupied other buildings. The police ended up killing 85 and then abandoned their
positions. The military defected from Bakiyev to the opposition on April 8, after the
release of former Defense Minister Ismail Isakov from prison. Bakiyev left the country in
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the days following. Bakiyev was already out of the country at this point, but this sealed
his fate. His other security services also gave him little support. An interim government
was declared after Bakiyev was overthrown.
Sources:
Cherniavskiy, Stanislav. “The Kyrgyz Revolution of 2010: The Causes and Possible
Post- Revolutionary Developments.” Central Asia and the Caucasus 11, no. 2 (2010).
Cooley, Alexander. “Kyrgyzstan on the Brink.” Current History 109, no. 729 (2010):
301-307.
Marat, Erica. “Bakiyev, The Security Structures, and the April 7 Violence in
Kyrgyzstan.” CACI Analyst. April 29, 2010.
McGlinchey, Eric. “Exploring Regime Instability and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan.”
Asia Policy 12, no. 1 (2011): 79-98.
Nichol, Jim. “The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and
Implications for U.S. Interests.” Congressional Research Service, 2010.
Latvia 8/23/1989-8/31/1991 – loyal
Anti-regime opposition in Latvia developed in late 1989, but in January 1991, the
situation became more dramatic. First, on January 14, the plenum of the Latvian
Communist Party Central Committee issued an ultimatum: it would call on the pro-Soviet
Latvian National Salvation Committee (NSC) to take over unless the government
resigned and the legislature disbanded. The headquarters of the Baltic Military District
supported the NSC takeover, and its Commander in Chief Fyodor Kuzmin called on the
government to comply with the Soviet Constitution. Then, Moscow, using Soviet security
forces and specifically Black Berets, stepped up its attacks on the Latvian independence
movement. On January 20, for example, the Black Berets attacked the Latvian Ministry
of the Interior building. The struggle continued, though, only ending with the failed
August coup in Moscow. Then Latvia declared its transitional period over and became an
independent, non-Communist state.
Sources:
McFaul, Michael. “Political Transitions: Democracy and the Former Soviet Union.”
Harvard International Review 28, no. 1 (2006): 40-45.
Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky. “The Crisis of Perestroika.” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2
(1991): 47-53.
Lasas, Ainius. “Bloody Sunday: What Did Gorbachev Know About the January 1991
Events in Vilnius and Riga?” Journal of Baltic Studies 38, no. 2 (2007): 179-194.
Lazda, Mara. “Reconsidering Nationalism: The Baltic Case of Latvia in 1989.”
International Journal of Politics Culture Sociology 22 (2009): 517-536.
Lebanon 11/23/2006-5/21/2008 – united defections
Tensions emerged within Lebanon’s coalition government in November 2006. Hizbollah
and its allies, which held 6 out of the 24 cabinet seats, resigned over issues related to the
292

investigation of former prime minister Rafic Hariri’s 2005 assassination. The resignations
set off a larger political crisis, including the start of anti-government demonstrations by
Hizbollah and its supporters. President Emile Lahhoud sided with the opposition, saying
that the government had no legitimacy without Shiite representatives. But, Lahhoud’s
term was ending in November 2007, and the government could not decide on his
successor. Meanwhile, two of the largest demonstrations occurred on December 1 and
December 10, and a sit-in continued over the next two years. Though there was the
potential for communal violence between the Shiites and Sunnis, the protest movement
itself remained peaceful. For its part, the army killed a few protesters from Hizbollah in
January 2008. Tensions grew in early May 2008, when the government decided to
investigate and take control of a wireless communications network operated by
Hizbollah. The army remained neutral to avoid supporting the government, and partly
because of rumors that a number of Sunni officers were considering resigning in
opposition to it. Violence became more likely at this stage as Hizbollah mobilized its
supporters and went on an offensive against its opponents. Hizbollah and the army
largely stayed separate, though; Hizbollah avoided clashing with it, and the army didn’t
intervene to end Hizbollah’s operations. The army was tired and disorganized after its
conflict in Nahr al Bared (although it had won). The political deadlock ended with an
agreement on May 5, 2008, that named Lieutenant General Michel Sleiman president. He
was a consensus pick because of his perceived neutrality.
Sources:
Hajjar, Sami G. “The Convoluted and Diminished Lebanese Democracy.” Democracy
and Security 5, no. 3 (2009): 261-276.
Rowayheb, Marwan George. “Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War: The Case
of Lebanon.” Civil Wars 13, no. 4 (2011): 414-436.
Lithuania 12/24/1988-9/1/1991 – neutral
The protests were aimed at the Communist government, but the Lithuanian state was also
seeking independence from the Soviet Union. In December 1990, the Soviet Union
ordered troops into Lithuania to enforce conscription, following growing resistance to the
draft. Protests had been ongoing since late 1988, but escalated in January 1991 when
Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene raised the prices of food staples. A rally on January
8 forced Prunskiene and her cabinet to resign. The same day, Soviet Defense Minister
Dmitry Yazov ordered a special paratroop division to enter Lithuania. On January 10,
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev threatened to introduce direct presidential rule in
Lithuania. Events developed rapidly. On January 11, the National Salvation Committee
(NSC) announced its existence and Soviet troops and KGB units arrived in Lithuania. On
January 12-13, the NSC demanded the Lithuanian Supreme Council’s resignation and
announced direct Soviet presidential rule, with the chief of the Vilnius military garrison
as Vilnius’s military commander. Soon after, military, interior, and KGB units were
deployed to occupy the city’s television and radio buildings (Gorbachev’s role in this
decision is disputed). Soviet soldiers killed 14 and injured 200 protesters who were
attempting to defend the buildings. Soviet tanks also moved towards the parliament, but
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thousands of protesters blocked them and then erected barricades. The situation then
stabilized for a few months. The crucial event was the failed August 18, 1991 coup in
Moscow. In Lithuania, putschist military forces also seized communication centers.
Tensions rose when Soviet tanks and troops moved towards the Supreme Council
buildings. More violence occurred on August 19 when protesters and Soviet soldiers
clashed outside the KGB headquarters. The Soviets departed soon, though, and the
Supreme Council remained in session.
Sources:
Balaban, Milos. “Armed Forces and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union.” Acta
Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialia 4 (2002): 65-58.
Karklins, Rasma. “Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union.” Europe-Asia Studies
46, no. 1 (1994): 29-45.
Ulfelder, Jay. “Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era: Movement Content and Dynamics.”
The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3, no. 3-4 (2004): 23-43.
Madagascar 5/13/1972-5/19/1972 – united defections
The anti-President Philibert Tsiranana protests were largely student-led but expanded into
a general strike in early 1972. The situation escalated on May 13, when security forces
opened fire on demonstrators, leading Tsiranana to declare a state of emergency. This did
not end the crisis; on May 18, Tsiranana dissolved the government and handed power to
Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Ramanantsoa was a leader in the military, separate
from the gendarmerie under Tsiranana’s authority and commanded by Colonel Jean
Bocchino. The Les Forces Republicaines de Securite (FRS) was an additional security
force under the control of the Interior Ministry and designed to protect Tsiranana. During
the protests, the army committed against being involved, while the gendarmerie deployed
into the streets refused to use violence. The military hierarchy was important here, though
lower ranking officers put pressure on them. The FRS remained loyal to Tsiranana and
shot into the crowds.
Sources:
“Ethos of Exploitation: Insecurity and Predation in Madagascar.” In Small Arms Survey
2011. 161-191. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/AYearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms- Survey-2011-Chapter-06-EN.pdf.
Hauge, Wenche. “Madagascar Between Peace and Conflict – Domestic Capabilities for
Peaceful Conflict Management.” Conflict, Security and Development 11, no. 5 (2011):
509-531.
Kim, Tongfi. “The Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of Military Alliances.”
International Interactions 41, no. 2 (2015): 279-308.
Madagascar 6/10/1991-2/10/1993 – united defections
An opposition group, Forces Vives, began in 1991 to organize strikes and demonstrations
across the country. On August 10, a massive group of protesters (between 100,000 and
400,000) marched to the presidential palace of Didier Ratsiraka. The Presidential Guard
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(RSEP) sought to disperse them and ended up opening fire on the crowd, killing 10 to 20
people. The RSEP was known to be loyal to the president, and as a result, was resented
by the regular army and its officer corps. In response to the violence, the Forces Vives
stepped up its opposition and was joined by the National Council of Christian Churches.
The military’s support of the president also began to wane, according to reports. On
October 30, 1991, General Desire Philippe Ramakavelo made a statement on behalf of
senior officers, asking that the politicians solve the crisis through dialogue. The next day,
Ratsiraka made some concessions, including a new constitution and multiparty elections.
He did not resign, instead inviting the opposition to a convention, which resulted in a
coalition government and transition process. A new constitution was approved in August
1992, with first round elections in November, and a run-off in February 1993. Albert
Zafy was elected. Overall, the military, and particularly the senior leadership, was
important in the transfer of the power. Ratsiraka had completely restructured the army
after coming to power, to protect himself from it. He promoted loyalist generals and
generated divisions and competition within the military.
Sources:
“Ethos of Exploitation: Insecurity and Predation in Madagascar.” In Small Arms Survey
2011. 161-191. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/AYearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms- Survey-2011-Chapter-06-EN.pdf.
Hauge, Wenche. “Madagascar Between Peace and Conflict – Domestic Capabilities for
Peaceful Conflict Management.” Conflict, Security, and Development 11, no. 5 (2011):
509-531.
“Madagascar Citizens Force Free Elections, 1990-1992.” Global Nonviolent Action
Database. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-citizens-force-freeelections-1990-1992. December 10, 2011.
Madagascar 1/28/2002-7/5/2002 – fragmented high level
The protests against President Didier Ratsiraka developed in January after a disputed
presidential election in December, where opposition candidate and mayor of
Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana declared himself winner. By February, the protests
had led to the resignations of the country’s prime minister and some of Ratsiraka’s
cabinet. However, Ratsiraka also had supporters willing to take to the streets, which
generated some clashes with those demonstrating against him. On March 1, Ratsiraka
declared martial law and appointed General Raveloarison as governor of Antananarivo.
But, Raveloarison did not follow Ratsiraka’s orders there. Ravolomanana took this as a
sign of Ratsiraka’s weakness and named his cabinet. More demonstrations occurred in
support of Ravolomanana and the military did not attempt to end them. On March 7,
Ravalomanana’s allies (namely General Jules Mamizara) took over the ministry of
defense. Ratsiraka’s defense minister General Marcel Ranjeva recognized
Ravalomanana’s authority and resigned. Yet as of March 15 the army chief of staff
General Ismael Mounibou was still loyal to Ratsiraka. It took a few more months for the
rest of the military to move to support Ravalomanana. On June 8, under the leadership of
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pro-Ravalomanana officers, the army (as well as the gendarmerie) pledged loyalty to the
new government. Ratsiraka finally gave up and left the country in early July.
Sources:
Cornwell, Richard. “Madagascar: First Test for the African Union.” African Security
Review 12, no. 1 (2003): 40-53.
“Madagascar Army Chiefs Replaced.” News 24. March 15, 2002.
https://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Madagascar-army-chiefs-replaced20020314.
“Madagascar: Presidential Claimant Gains Ground in Madagascar as Threats Loom.” All
Africa. March 10, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200203110509.html.
Marcus, Richard R. “Political Change in Madagascar: Populist Democracy or
Neopatrimonialism by Another Name?” Institute for Security Studies Occasional Papers
89 (2004).
Randrianja, Solofo. “‘Be not afraid, only believe’: Madagascar 2002.” African Affairs
102, no. 407 (2003): 309-329.
Madagascar 1/24/2009-3/18/2009 – fragmented high level
This protest movement was aimed at ousting President Marc Ravalomanana. Andry
Rajoelina, Ravalomanana’s main rival, was mayor of the capital Antananarivo and
backed by a group of opposition parties. The protests were violent almost from the
beginning, with rioting and looting in late January. On February 3, Ravalomanana
removed Rajoelina from his position. On February 7, the presidential guard killed around
30 protesters who were marching near the presidential palace. The defense minister
resigned in protest. While some talks took place in mid-February, so did more protests,
some of which were suppressed by the security forces. As the military became more
involved in violence, divisions developed. On March 8, a unit of paratroopers announced
it would no longer take orders from the government, and on March 10, a group of officers
forced the resignation of the defense minister over his involvement in repression. The
army chief of staff warned the military might take power if the situation did not calm
down, and was promptly replaced. But then a pro-Rajoelina officer claimed to assume the
post, while a pro-Rajoelina unit deployed tanks to the capital city. They denied they were
seeking to oust Ravalomanana by force, but then seized the presidential palace, with no
interference from the rest of the military. Other key military leaders had shifted towards
Rajoelina over this period, and on March 14, he announced the military was obeying his
orders. On March 16, it was reported elements of the presidential guard had defected
from the president. These events led Ravolomanana to announce his resignation on
March 17. He tried to transfer authority to a navy admiral, though, but he refused to take
power. The military overall recognized Rajoelina as president of the transitional
government.
Sources:
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Hauge, Wenche. “Madagascar Between Peace and Conflict – Domestic Capabilities for
Peaceful Conflict Management.” Conflict, Security, and Development 11, no. 5 (2011):
509-531.
Ploch, Lauren. “Madagascar’s 2009 Political Crisis.” Congressional Research Service,
2009.
Madagascar 3/23/2009-1/17/2014 – neutral
These protests were against the High Transitional Authority government, which
repeatedly called and then cancelled elections during this time. Presidential elections
were finally held on October 25, with a runoff on December 20. The results were
confirmed by an electoral court on January 17, 2014, ending the anti-regime movement.
The military did not act and there are no signs the transitional regime asked it to.
Sources:
Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martinez I Coma. “The Year in Elections,
2013.” Electoral Integrity Project. February 2014.
Razafindrakoto, Mireille, Francois Roubaud, and Jean-Michael Wachsberger. “The
Puzzle of Structural Fragility in Madagascar: A Political Economy Approach.” January
2015. http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/79_-ABCDA_2015__Madagascar_Structural_Fragility.pdf.
Malawi 3/15/1992-5/17/1994 – fragmented high level
Anti-President Hastings Banda protests began in March 1992. At this point, there were
reports of junior army officers stationed near the demonstrators (mostly students) offering
them encouragement and protecting them from the police. In April, middle- and seniorranking officers met with Banda to tell him they were neutral and wouldn’t be used to
repress civilians calling for democracy. Banda announced a referendum on the one-party
rule of his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in October, and the next June it passed. This
set the country up for elections in May 1994. In December 1993, though, with protests
ongoing, junior military officers forcefully disarmed the paramilitary wing of the ruling
party. This was the culmination of long- standing tensions between the military and the
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and followed an attack of the MYP on demonstrators. As
part of the mutiny, the junior officers also demanded the removal of senior commanders,
who were linked to Banda’s regime, the MCP, and the MYP. They returned to the
barracks to support the transition. In response, Banda retired a top army general. He and
the MCP then lost the elections, and the military did not defend the regime. Sources point
to the December 1993 conflict as being the key event in the military’s response to the
anti-regime movement; because it involved junior officers, the shift is best classified as
fragmented. Further, it is unclear whether the April 1992 meeting between army and
Banda meant senior officers would’ve refused to support him had junior officers not
removed their support and Banda asked.
Sources:
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Brown, Stephen. “‘Born-Again Politicians Hijacked our Revolution!’: Reassessing
Malawi’s Transition to Democracy.” Canadian Journal of African Studies 38, no. 3
(2004): 705-722.
Chirambo, Reuben. “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s
Hegemony in Malawi.” Nordic Journal of African Studies 13, no. 2 (2004): 146-163.
Ihonvbere, Julius O. “From Despotism to Democracy: The Rise of Multiparty Politics in
Malawi.” Third World Quartery 18, no. 2 (1997): 225-248.
Phiri, Mphatso Jones Boti. “Institutional Challenges to Viable Civil-Military Relations in
Malawi.” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008.
Posner, Daniel N. “Malawi’s New Dawn.” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 131145.
Malawi 7/20/2011-4/6/2012 – united defections
On July 20, 2011, some anti-President Bingu wa Mutharika demonstrators were killed by
the police. This set off a nearly year-long protest movement. In a surprising turn of
events, Mutharika suffered a heart attack on April 5, 2012. Joyce Banda was sworn in as
his successor, in line with the constitution. Mutharika’s son tried to take power but was
opposed by cabinet members and other officials and Army Commander General Henry
Odillo. Both Banda and Mutharika reached out to Odillo, seeking his support, with
Mutharika urging Odillo and the rest of the military to seize power. Odillo pledged the
army’s support to Banda in the end.
Sources:
Dionne, Kim Yi and Boniface Dulani. “Constitutional Provisions and Executive
Succession: Malawi’s 2012 Transition in Comparative Perspective.” African Affairs 112,
no. 446 (2013): 111-137.
Malaysia 9/5/1998-9/20/1999 – neutral
These short-lived protests sought to oust Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed and his
government. The police were deployed to repress them, while the military was not
involved. Mahathir’s power was never really threatened by the popular opposition.
Sources:
Freedman, Amy L. “Economic Crises and Political Change: Indonesia, South Korea, and
Malaysia.” Asian Affairs 31, no. 4 (2005): 232-249.
Funston, John. “Malaysia’s Tenth Elections: Status Quo, “Reformasi”, or Islamization?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 23-59.
Maldives 9/20/2003-10/29/2008 – fragmented high level
Protests against the government of President Maoumoon Abdul Gayoom developed
following a September 2003 prison riot, when guards (also members of the military)
opened fire and killed three and injured 17. A state of emergency was declared in
response to the resulting unrest, and the military repressed the movement. The protests
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continued, though, and included a mass rally that became violent in August 2004. A
member of the crowd stabbed a police officer, and other participants set a government
building on fire. The security forces forcibly dispersed the protesters. The military and its
leadership was divided between support of Maumoon and of the opposition or in
particular Mohamed Nasheed, a founder of the Maldivian Democratic Party. Both sides
supported democratic government, though. The new constitution of early 2008 confirmed
that the military would stay out of domestic politics. Nasheed unseated Gayoom in the
second round of the October 2008 presidential election.
Sources:
Zubair, Ahmed. “Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy: A Case Study of the
Maldives.” MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.
Maldives 1/17/2012-2/7/2012 – united defections
On January 16, President Mohamed Nasheed sent soldiers to arrest the chief judge of the
Criminal Court. The judge, and other members of the judiciary, were corrupt and had ties
to the former regime. Still, this bold move was opposed internationally and domestically,
and protests developed soon after. The Supreme Court declared the military did not have
the authority to arrest and detain civilians and ordered it to release the judge, but it
refused. On February 6, demonstrations turned into riots between pro- and antigovernment groups. Some police mutinied, and when the military was assigned crowd
control, some soldiers defected. The defectors numbered less than a hundred, and none
were commissioned officers, but the military leadership seemed to have lost some
control. On February 7, the military said Nasheed had to go. Nasheed claimed this was at
gunpoint, but a commission investigated and decided it was not a coup. Rather, Nasheed
resigned after using the security forces for illegal purposes. In another, earlier, instance,
Nasheed had ordered the military to detain two parliament members on bribing
allegations. This was far outside its mandate. The security forces also violated the rule of
law and human rights during the protest movement.
Sources:
Ashraf, Ibrahim. “Civil-Military Challenges for a Consolidating Democracy: The
Maldives.” MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.
Musthaq, Fathima. “Tumult in the Maldives.” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 2 (2014):
164-170.
Zubair, Ahmed. “Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy: A Case Study of the
Maldives.” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.
Maldives 2/8/2012-11/16/2013 - loyal
Demonstrations began after President Mohamed Nasheed’s February 2012 resignation,
demanding the reinstatement of his government. The new president, Mohammed Waheed
Hassan, used repression in response; including police violence on February 8. The police
remained the key repressive force but at times requested assistance from the military,
such as for the demonstrations following the annulled September 2013 elections. Former
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president Nasheed won the first round, and Supreme Court annulled it after allegations of
vote rigging. The opposition hoped the military would block the annulment, but it
refused.
Sources:
Didi, Aminath. “The Maldives in Transition: Human Rights and Voices of Dissent.” PhD
diss., Curtin University, 2012.
Zubair, Ahmed. “Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy: A Case Study of the
Maldives.” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.
Mali 10/25/1990-3/26/1991 – united defections
Opposition to President Moussa Traore’s regime began in fall 1990 and ramped up in
January 1991, following Traore’s unpopular decision to sign a ceasefire with Tuareg
rebels in the north of the country. Protesters demanded Traore’s resignation as well as
multiparty politics. From the beginning, Traore responded with repression. As
demonstrations continued into March, Traore deployed the military, and soldiers killed
hundreds. In a particularly egregious episode, on March 23 soldiers killed five women
who had been mourning the victims. The soldiers then chased other protesters into a
building and set it on fire, killing 65. Traore still refused to resign. When the opposition
launched a new strike on March 25, troops did not use violence. Then, on March 26, it
was reported that a group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure
had arrested Traore. No part of the military remained loyal to Traore or expressed
disagreement with Toure’s decision. The military leadership issued an apology to the
opposition for the violence and then formed a government of civilian and military
reformers. Traore had divided the military and put the Republican Guard directly under
his rule. There were tensions between the senior officers and rank and file over pay, and
these worsened when the rank and file was deployed as part of the unsuccessful operation
against the Tuaregs.
Sources:
Clark, Andrew. “From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The Democratization Process
in Mali.” Journal of Third World Studies 12, no. 1 (1995): 201-219.
“Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993.” U.S. Department of State. January 31, 1994.
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html
.
Lecocq, Baz and Georg Klute. “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.” International Journal 68,
no. 3 (2013): 424-434.
Lode, Kare. “The Peace Process in Mali.” Security Dialogue 28, no. 4 (1997): 409-424.
Smith, Zeric Kay. “Mali’s Decade of Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3
(2001): 73- 79.
Turrittin, Jane. “Mali: People Topple Traore.” Review of African Political Economy 52
(1991): 97-103.
Mauritania 1/17/2011-6/20/2014 – loyal
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These protests were against the military regime of General Mohamed Ouid Abdel Aziz
and mostly involved youths. In one notable event on October 13, 2011, Aziz was shot and
wounded. Rumors spread that it was an assassination attempt by a group of soldiers, but
details are difficult to confirm. Aziz agreed to some limited constitutional reforms in
March 2012, but otherwise held on to power. He was believed to have the respect of the
overall army and used it to repress the protesters.
Sources:
Buehler, Matt. “Continuity Through Co-optation: Rural Politics and Regime Resilience in
Morocco and Mauritania.” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 (2015): 364-385.
Jedou, Ahmed Ould. “Mauritania: Dreaming About the Fall of the Military State.”
African Futures. September 18, 2012. http://forums.ssrc.org/africanfutures/2012/09/18/mauritania- dreaming-about-the-fall-of-the-military-state/.
Rao, Sumedh. Conflict Analysis of Mauritania. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham, 2014.
Mexico 10/14/1987-7/2/2000 – neutral
Protests against the domination of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexican
politics achieved a number of electoral reforms beginning in 1987. Opposition parties and
in particular the National Action Party (PAN) gained political strength through elections,
which forced additional concessions by the PRI. In the July 2000 presidential elections,
the PRI was defeated by Vicente Fox of the PAN.
Sources:
Schedler, Andreas. “The Democratic Revelation.” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4
(2000): 5-19.
Mexico 7/8/2006-9/1/2006 - neutral
In Mexico’s July 2006 presidential elections, Felipe Calderon was declared the winner
over Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador by a very slim margin. Obrador’s supporters took to
the streets of Mexico City to protest the result. After months of demonstrations, the
electoral courts noted some irregularities in the vote, but ruled that Calderon was
officially the president. Calderon took office in December. At times the protesters clashed
with the federal police, but the military was seemingly not involved.
Sources:
Carlsen, Laura. “Mexico’s Youth Protest a Return to the Past.” Dissent 60, no. 1 (2013):
10-15.
Klesner, Joseph L. “The July 2006 Presidential and Congressional Elections in Mexico.”
Electoral Studies 26, no. 4 (2007): 803-808.
“Mexican Citizens Massively Protest Presidential Election Results, 2006.” Global
Nonviolent Action Database. March 3, 2013.
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https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexican-citizens- massively-protestpresidential-election-results-2006.
“Polity IV Country Report 2010: Mexico.” Systemic Peace.
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Mexico2010.pdf.
Mexico 10/2/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – loyal
As these protests against governmental corruption continued, President Enrique Pena
Nieto mobilized the army to take full control of public security in 32 municipalities. The
military and other security forces was involved in repression of protests and more general
human rights abuses, including the disappearance and likely massacre of 43 student
teachers in September 2014.
Sources:
Darlington, Shasta. “Clashes Erupt in Mexico City Protests Over Missing Students.”
CNN. Friday, November 1, 2014.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/world/americas/mexico-missing- studentsprotests/index.html.
Perez, Carlos Antonio Flores. “Between Mutual Suspicion and Fear: Civil-Military
Relations in Mexico.” CMI Working Paper (2015).
Moldova 4/7/2009-4/15/2009 – neutral
Parliamentary elections took place on April 5. The opposition declared them fraudulent,
and it along with young demonstrators took to the streets to protest the Communist
Party’s eight-year rule. The protest movement was disorganized, though, and made no
declarations or written demands. Consequently, the government did not respond. On
April 7, the demonstrators stormed past police troops to the parliament building. The
police then engaged in some violence and detained hundreds. The president ordered a
recount of the vote, but in the end, it didn’t change the election results. The military does
not seem to have been involved.
Sources:
Szajkowski, Bogdan. “Social Media Tools and the Arab Revolts.” Alternative Politics 3,
no. 3 (2011): 420-432.
Mongolia 12/10/1989-5/10/1990 - neutral
As one of the first groups organized in opposition to Communist rule in Mongolia, the
Mongolian Democratic Union launched protests in early 1990. The ruling Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary Party was unsure how to respond, but decided against clamping
down, especially since the Soviet Union had signaled it wouldn’t support it. The
hardliners pushed for the use of force, even though they knew the police and internal
security troops likely wouldn’t be sufficient. The Mongolian armed forces didn’t act, and
Soviet troops had been removed from Mongolia over 1986 to 1989 as it lessened in geostrategic importance. The protests strengthened the reformers in the party; General
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Secretary Jambyn Batmonkh resigned, and a new general secretary and Central
Committee were put in place.
Sources:
Bilskie, Julia S., Hugh M. Arnold. “An Examination of the Political and Economic
Transition of Mongolia Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union.” Journal of Third World
Studies 19, no. 2: 205-218.
Chuluunbat, Narantuya. “Why Was Mongolia Successful? Political and Economic
Transition in 1990-1996.” PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2013.
Fritz, Verena. “Mongolia: The Rise and Travails of a Deviant Democracy.”
Democratization 15, no. 4 (2008): 766-788.
Myanmar 8/19/2007-9/29/2007 - loyal
Early protests against the military regime were met with mass arrests. The regime mostly
used the Swan Arr Shin, a civilians’ militia controlled by the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (the junta’s political party). The militia and other security
forces beat a small number of Buddhist monks during a demonstration on September 5.
As a result, an All Burma Monks Alliance formed and held demonstrations across the
country. The growing protests led the regime to announce a night-time curfew on
September 25. When protests continued the next day, soldiers and police opened fire on a
large demonstration in Rangoon. Later, they raided a number of monasteries and forcibly
detained hundreds of monks. The crackdown ended the protests, which had been in
response to the initial repression and spontaneous. There were some reports of tensions
within the military, including unconfirmed instances of soldiers who refused shooting
orders. Within the upper command, General Shwe Mann (Chief of Staff of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force) began chairing the National Security Council meetings over Maung
Aye, and there was speculation that this was because Maung Aye didn’t approve of using
the militia. These rumors are not sufficient for loyalty shifts.
Sources:
Croissant, Aurel. “Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-Making and
Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar.” Asian Journal of Political Science
21, no. 2 (2013): 105-125.
Selth, Andrew. “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence.”
Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 (2008): 281-297.
Skidmore, Monique and Trevor Wilson, eds. Dictatorship, Disorder, and Decline in
Myanmar. ANU Press, 2008.
Nepal 2/18/1990-4/8/1990 – neutral
In January 1990, the Nepali Congress political party issued a call for the peaceful
restoration of democracy. It formed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy by
allying with leftist parties and began demonstrating. Some of the subsequent protests
included violence by young communists, including on March 30 when a group damaged
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property. The police response was brutal, which generated more resistance to the
government. At least 50 people were killed by the police, such as on April 6, when
thousands of demonstrators broke through barricades to the palace and the security forces
opened fire. The government then imposed strict curfews. King Birenda decided to lift
the ban on political parties following negotiations with opposition leaders. Throughout,
the army remained supportive of the regime but uninvolved.
Sources:
Davis, Carol C. “Decade of Dreams: Democracy and the Birth of Nepal’s Engaged
Stage.” Asian Theatre Journal 26, no. 1 (2008): 94-110.
Dhungana, Shiva K. “Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal.” Journal of
Peacebuilding and Development 3.2 (2007): 70-78.
Kantha, Pramod. “Nepal’s Protracted Democratization in Terms of Modes of Transition.”
Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 28, no. 1-2
(2010): 59-70.
Nickson, Andrew. “Democratization, and the Growth of Communism in Nepal.” The
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 30, no. 3 (1992): 358-386.
Nepal 11/26/2002-4/24/2006 – united defections
In 2001, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and assumed all power in an
effort to defeat the Maoist rebels. In late 2002, he dismissed the prime minister, assumed
temporary executive authority, and chose a new prime minister. Though there was
opposition to these moves throughout, demonstrations really ramped up in April 2006.
The police responded with violence. The army, though providing backup, remained
uninvolved. The middle-ranking officers sided with the pro-democratic forces. The senior
command was less supportive of them. The army overall helped to persuade the king to
restore Parliament and to allow the political parties to choose the prime minister. Its
leadership had indicated it probably could not continue to protect the palace.
Sources:
Dhungana, Shiva K. “Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical
Reflection.” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 3, no. 2 (2012): 70-78.
Gellner, David N. “Nepal and Bhutan in 2006: A Year of Revolution.” Asian Survey 47,
no. 1 (2007): 80-86.
Moorcraft, Paul. “Revolution in Nepal: Can the Nepalese Army Prevent a Maoist
Victory?” The RUSI Journal 151, no. 5 (2006): 44-50.
Vaughn, Bruce. “Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations.” CRS Report for Congress
(2006). http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a461402.pdf.
Wennmann, Achim. “Socio-Economic Inequalities and Peace in Nepal.” The Centre on
Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding CCDP Working Paper.
Nepal 5/1/2010-6/30/2010 - neutral
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These two months of protests against Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal were met
with counterprotests. Nepal had become Prime Minister in June 2009 after a Maoist,
Pushpa Kamal Dahl Prachanda, resigned because of his sacking of an army chief. Nepal
refused to resign and deployed the riot police, though they did not use violence. Overall,
the security forces did not interfere with the protests, and allowed the opposition to
peaceably assemble. The violence was limited to clashes between the Maoist
demonstrators and youths from the Communist parties that supported Nepal.
Sources:
“Freedom in the World: Nepal.” FreedomHouse.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- world/2011/nepal.
Parajuli, Kalpit. “Civil War Looming Over Nepal as UN Urges Govt to Find a Solution.”
AsiaNews. May 6, 2010. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Civil-war-looming-over-Nepalas-UN- urges-govt-to-find-a-solution-18341.html.
Shrestha, Manesh. “Maoists Threaten Strike to Force Out Nepal PM.” CNN. May 2,
2010. http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/nepal.protests/index.html.
Tharoor, Ishaan. “After Maoist Protests, Nepal Faces a Murky Future.” Time. May 12,
2010. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1988455,00.html.
Nepal 5/30/2012-12/31/2012 - neutral
Nepal’s Constituent Assembly was tasked with drafting a new constitution, but
repeatedly missed its deadline to do so and dissolved on May 27, 2012. This was in part
because of growing demonstrations by supporters of the NEFIN and JSC-NIEG. A
caretaker government led by the Maoist prime minister Baburam Bhattarai was put in
place. Protests continued, with reports of security force use of rubber bullets, but no signs
of involvement by the military.
Sources:
Adhikari, Krishna P. and David N. Gellner. “New Identity Politics and the 2012 Collapse
of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly: When the Dominant Becomes ‘Other’.” Modern Asian
Studies 50, no. 6 (2016): 2009-2040.
“Nepal Protests Heighten Tensions Ahead of Election.” The Guardian. November 4,
2013. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/nov/04/nepal-protestsheighten- tensions-election.
Nicaragua 1/23/1978-2/7/1978 – neutral
This stage of the anti-President Anastosia Somoza Debayle campaign was nonviolent. It
was also separate from, and much less organized than, the Marxist rebellion of the Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion. The protest movement ended on February 7. On February 10,
those participating in the continuing demonstrations started to fight back, especially after
they were attacked by regime security forces.
Sources:
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Tatar, Bradley. “Emergence of National Identity in Armed Insurrections: A Comparison
of Iraq and Nicaragua.” Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 1 (2005): 179-195.
Nicaragua 8/25/1978-9/24/1978 - loyal
This anti-regime movement was closely related to the one earlier in the year, and by this
point had come to involve the Sandanistas. In August 1978, the violent rebels of the
Sandanistas staged a palace raid and took over 1000 hostages. Some in the National
Guard (Nicaragua’s military) felt President Somaza had caved in to the Sandinistas, and
dozens of the disgruntled troops attempted a coup soon after. The Guard became
increasingly violent over this period, killing thousands of civilians as it sought to stem the
Sandinistas’ gains.
Sources:
Cuzan, Alfred G. “Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan
Revolution: The Praxis.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 50, no. 1
(1991): 71-83.
Waldorf, William C. Jr. “Sanctions, Regime Type, and Democratization: Lessons from
US- Central American Relations in the 1980s.” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 4
(2014-2015).
Niger 2/8/1990-11/27/1992 – loyal
Protests against the military regime of President and Chief of Staff Colonel Ali Saibou
led him to announce a national conference that would transition the country to civilian
rule. In November 1990, the government approved a multi-party system and other
reforms. It repeatedly postponed the conference, though, leading to protests. The
conference eventually took place between July and November 1991 and involved about
1200 delegates. The military refused to attend. In August, Colonel Toumba Boubacar, the
Army Chief of Staff, threatened a coup against it because it had agreed to debate crimes
committed by the government with the help of the army. Boubacar called this a
humiliation. The conference took other major steps: it suspended the constitution,
cancelled Saibou’s executive powers, and voted to dissolve the government. Meanwhile,
the regime stopped paying its soldiers, and in February 1992 a group of them mutinied.
This followed other mutinies over the government and military leadership’s handling of
the Tuareg rebellion. However, none were supportive of the protesters or regime change.
A transitional government came into power in July 1991, and a new constitution that
provided for multiparty elections was approved by 90 percent of voters in December
1992. The military cooperated with these developments, though it used force against
demonstrators on July 17, 1992.
Sources:
“Chronology for Tuareg in Niger.” Minorities at Risk Project, 2004.
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38c2104.html.
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Elischer, Sebastian. “Contingent Democrats in Action: Organized Labor and Regime
Change in the Republic of Niger.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working
Papers (2013).
“Niger: Ethnic and Political Conflict Since 1990.” In Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since
World War II, edited by James Ciment. Routledge, 2015.
Zunes, Stephan. “Unarmed Insurrections Against Authoritarian Governments in the Third
World.” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1994): 403-426.
Nigeria 7/5/1993-5/29/1999 – fragmented high level
Protests began when the military regime voided the June 1993 elections. In the ensuing
rioting, security forces killed more than 100 demonstrators. The increased pressure from
the opposition, as well as parts of the military, led General Ibrahim Babangida to resign
from the presidency and the military in August. He transferred power to a civilian-led
interim national government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, in line with a timeline of
political transition. The interim government made little progress, though, which
generated more protests. Sani Abacha, the government’s Defense Minister, forced
Shonekan to resign in November 1993. Abacha had already started to use his position to
consolidate power within the military. His strategies followed Babangida’s, which
politicized and factionalized the military, and personalized politics overall. Abacha
shifted top personnel and arrested his opponents, including in March 1995, after his
government announced it had foiled a coup attempt. Presidential elections were
scheduled for August 1998, with Abacha as the sole candidate. In June 1998, though,
Abacha died of a heart attack. This brought about renewed questions of whether the
military government should give up power. The ruling military council followed the
chain of command and named General Abdulsalami Abubaker rather than an Abacha
loyalist as successor. Abubaker announced a democratic transition. Abubaker had once
been close to Abacha and his supporters, but distanced himself after Abacha’s
crackdowns, and from a realization that the military needed change. He faced pressure
from the pro-democracy forces as well as retired military elites (led by General Olusegun
Abasanjo) who supported a return to civilian rule. Under Abacha generally there was a
widening of divisions within the military, between the hardliners and softliners, though
the softliners were increasingly marginalized. Abubaker’s decision was crucial, but also
allowed the military heavy control over the transition.
Sources:
Anene, John N. “Military Elites and Democratization: Ghana and Nigeria.” Journal of
Political and Military Sociology 28, no. 2 (2000).
Lewis, Peter Michael. “Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime.” Journal of Democracy
14, no. 3 (2003): 131-144.
Lewis, Peter Michael. “Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?” Journal of
Democracy 10, no. 1 (1999): 141-156.
Mustapha, Abdul Raufu. “The Nigerian Transition: Third Time Lucky or More of the
Same?” Review of African Political Economy 26, no. 80 (1999): 277-291.
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Obi, Cyril. “Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Political Transition.” African
Journal of Political Science 5, no. 2 (2000): 67-86.
Pakistan 10/1/1968-3/26/1969 – united defections
Protests against Ayub Khan led to negotiations and concessions from his regime to the
mostly student-led movement. The anti-regime campaign further developed in January
1969, when nearly all the opposition groups joined to call for direct elections. The regime
employed some repression in response, which led to the death of a Dacca student. The
military started patrolling town curfews. On February 21, Ayub announced he would not
run in the next election. From the beginning, Ayub’s willingness to engage with the
protesters rather than declare martial law led to questions over whether the military
supported him. In November 1968 the protesters had been joined by Air Marshal Asghar
Khan, former Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and General Azam Khan, a former
member of Khan’s cabinet. On March 25, Khan handed control of the country over to
Commander in Chief of the Army General Agha Humahhad Yahya Khan. Though Yahya
was a Khan loyalist, he did not want to impose martial law to keep Khan in power,
especially because Khan no longer had the support of other army leaders.
Sources:
Sobhan, Rehman. “Pakistan’s Political Crisis.” The World Today 25, no. 5 (1969): 203211.
Rizvi, Arshad Javed. “Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan: From
Barracks to Corporate Culture.” International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary and
Multidisciplinary Studies 1, no. 8 (2015): 34-44.
Pakistan 3/12/1977-7/5/1977 – united defections
In the March 1977 parliamentary elections, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party
won a majority of the seats. The opposition immediately claimed fraud, and anti-Bhutto
protests began. They soon devolved into armed clashes between the demonstrators
(supported by the Pakistan National Alliance party) and PPP-aligned gangs. The police
did not interfere. As the unrest continued, Bhutto imposed martial law in three major
cities on April 21 and suspended civil liberties nationwide. The military supported him in
these efforts. Bhuto and the opposition engaged in some negotiations in late June and
early July but failed to reach an agreement. The military, led by General Zia al-Haq,
launched a coup against Bhutto on July 5. Then Zia became caretaker ruler and imposed
martial law. Though Zia and Bhutto were close (Bhutto had promoted Zia), Zia seized
power after other senior military officials said they would do so with or without him. The
coup was a collective decision among the Army commanders. Recently, the military had
been defeated by India and lost Pakistan. Bhutto had also responded to the opposition by
establishing a 20,000 strong guard, the Federal Security Force, as a counterweight to the
army.
Sources:
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Schofield, Julian. “Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in Pakistan.”
Defense and Security Analysis 26, no. 2 (2010): 181-192.
Syed, Anwar H. “Pakistan in 1977: The ‘Prince’ is under the Law.” Asian Survey 18, no.
2 (1978): 117-125.
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin. “The Military in Contemporary Pakistan.” Armed Forces and Society
6, no. 4 (1980): 639-653.
Wilkinson, Steven I. “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh
and Pakistan.” Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000): 203-226.
Weinbaum. M.G. “The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost.” Asian
Survey 17, no. 1 (1977): 599-618.
Pakistan 1/5/1983-8/28/1983 – loyal
Though protests against Zia al-Huq began in January they escalated – and became more
militant – in August. The army was deployed to take control of some areas. This reduced
the protests’ momentum, and they ended and Zia’s regime survived. The military did not
shift loyalty, but there was some discontent in the ranks. Some officers were unhappy
with Zia’s use of religion to gain support, and the army’s loss of prestige. There was a
coup attempt against him in early 1983, but it does not seem linked to the protests.
Sources:
Bin Sayeed, Khalid. “Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses More Serious than External
Problems. Asian Survey 24, no. 2 (1984): 219-228.
Noman, Omar. “Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy.” Third World Quarterly 11,
no. 1 (1989): 28-54.
Richter, William L. “Pakistan in 1984: Digging In.” Asian Survey 25, no. 2 (1985): 145154.
Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. “The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan.” Asian Survey 24, no. 5
(1984): 534-555.
Pakistan 1/5/1986-8/28/86 – loyal
The regime of Zia al-Huq lifted martial law in January 1986, allowing space for political
opposition. By summer, the opposition parties and other pro-democracy forces were
engaging in mass protests. The regime re-imposed political limits and the police
responded to the demonstrations with repression. The movement became violent as a
result; in mid-August, for example, police killed at least four and injured hundreds when
they defied the regime’s orders. Protests had failed to gain in size or strength, though, and
the military remained loyal to Zia, who was still serving as the army’s Chief of Staff.
Sources:
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Newberg, Paula R. “Pakistan’s Troubled Landscape.” World Policy Journal 4, no. 2
(1987): 313- 331.
Weisman, Steven R. “4 Die in Pakistan in Wide Protests; Bhutto is Jailed.” The New York
Times. August 15, 1986.
Pakistan 3/12/2007-8/18/2008 – united defections
This protest movement began when President Pervez Musharraf sacked Chief Justice
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on March 9, 2007. He claimed Chaudhry was guilty of
corruption, but Chaudhry had challenged Musharraf’s ability to be both president and
army chief. Protests largely involved members of the legal community and resulted in the
Supreme Court’s reinstatement of Chaudhry on July 20. Musharraf was reelected by the
Electoral College in early October and promised then to give up his military position. He
expected the Supreme Court to find him ineligible given that he hadn’t yet resigned from
the military, so on November 3 he suspended the constitution. He used the ongoing
instability between the army and Islamists as pretext. Under emergency rule, he purged
the courts and packed them with his loyalists. This increased the opposition and united
the two main opposition parties (the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim
League). On December 15, Musharraf lifted the state of emergency in advance of
legislative elections in January 2008. Protests continued over spring and summer 2008,
and in early August the PPP and PML-N in parliament moved to start impeachment
proceedings against Musharraf. Given the events of the past year, including the
December 27 assassination of PPP candidate Benazir Bhutto, the military high command
withdrew its support from Musharraf. The new army chief, General Afshaq Kayani,
ordered the force to stand aside from politics, in response to pressure from middleranking and junior officers. Musharraf resigned August 18. The military also was not
involved in repressing the protests.
Sources:
Goodson, Larry P. “The 2008 Elections.” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008): 5-15.
Shah, Aqil. “Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan
(2007- 2013).” Democratization 21, no. 6 (2014): 1007-1033.
Synnott, Hilary. “What is Happening in Pakistan?” Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): 61-80.
Pakistan 2/25/2009-3/15/2009 - neutral
These protests followed the developments of 2008, when Pervez Musharraf resigned in
August and Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People’s Party was elected in September. In
February 2009, the interim Supreme Court reinstated corruption charges against Nawaz
Shari, who had been locked in a dispute with Zardari over Chief Justice Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry’s status. Zaradari then dismissed the government of Sharif’s
brother. This, along with Zardari’s failure to increase the freedom of the judiciary, led to
new protests by the lawyers’ movement. Zardari put the military on standby for a mass
demonstration planned for March 15. But, Zardari was forced to reinstate the chief justice
on March 16. This was largely as a result of pressure from army chief General Afshaq
Kayani. He urged Zardari to fix the mess because of growing unrest on the streets and
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discontent within the military. At this time, he was working to address the military’s
demoralization stemming from its unpopular military operations in FATA. Zardari didn’t
leave power, though, and the military did not shift loyalty from him to the anti-regime
protesters.
Sources:
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Governance.” International Affairs 87, no. 3 (2011): 571-588.
Shah, Azil. “Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan.”
Democratization 21, no. 6 (2014).
Singh, Anita. “Pakistan’s Stability/Instability Complex: The Politics and Reverberations
of the 2007 November Emergency.” Strategic Studies Quarterly (2009): 22-48.
Pakistan 6/23/2014-12/17/2014 - neutral
These protests demanded that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign. At their height (on for
example August 15), they numbered 30,000, and brought together the main opposition
parties. Throughout, it was suspected that they had the tacit support of the military. The
army and Sharif had a long history; it seized power from Sharif in 1999, and in recent
years Sharif had allowed legal efforts against Musharraf on charges of treason. Sharif
also pursued control over national security policies, a traditional domain of the military.
Some violence occurred in late August, when the paramilitary Frontier Corps and police
killed at least three demonstrators. Soon after, on August 29, the army announced it
would facilitate a resolution to the crisis. It said it was taking this role at the request of
the government, but Sharif denied being involved. An army spokesman also issued a
social media message in early September that called for patience from all actors. The
army did not shift loyalty, though. The protests lost some support as they continued
despite Sharif showing a willingness to negotiate with opposition parties and to consider
reforms.
Sources:
Katoch, Dhruv C. “Pakistan: Crisis of Legitimacy.” Centre for Land Warfare Studies
Journal (2014).
Kronstadt, K. Alan and Samir Kumar. “Pakistan Political Unrest: In Brief.”
Congressional Research Service (2014).
Yamin, Saira. “Pakistan: National Security Dilemmas and Transition to Democracy.”
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 2, no. 1 (2015): 1-26.
Panama 6/9/1987-12/20/1989 – low level
The anti-Norieja movement began in June 1987, when the Panamanian Defense Force’s
(PDF) former second in command (Diaz Herrera) accused him of corruption, electoral
fraud, and murder. Herrera was likely partly motivated by the fact that Noriega had not
promoted him according to standard personnel practices. The PDF killed and injured
protesters on July 10, 1987. But, reports of dissent within the officer ranks emerged
throughout 1988 and 1989. This set off more opposition to Noriega, culminating in a
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failed coup attempt against him on October 3, 1989. It was led by Major Moises Giroldi
(chief of security at the PDF headquarters in Panama City) and seriously undermined the
military’s integrity and commitment to Noriega. Noriega was rapidly losing power, and
had to annul September elections when it was clear the government’s candidate was
going to lose. The United States had increased economic sanctions against the country
during this period, and Noriega decided to declare war in response and on December 15,
1989. The George Bush administration ordered troops to Panama; Noriega hid but
eventually surrendered in January.
Sources:
Priestley, George. “Panama: Obstacles to Democracy and Sovereignty.” Radical History
Review 48 (1990): 88-110.
Robinson, Linda. “Dwindling Options in Panama.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 5 (1989): 187205.
Peru 7/26/2000-11/17/2000 – low level
Alberto Fujimori was a political outsider when he was elected president in 1990. He
gained a lot of popular support by getting a grip on the country’s economic and security
crises, and was reelected in 1995. His pursuit of a third term generated opposition,
though, and this increased with allegations of fraud in the spring 2000 elections. Protests
developed in late July to disrupt his inauguration. The police and army troops were put on
standby, but did not have to act. The situation settled until information came out about
the corruption of Fujimori and his government. Then, demonstrators began to call on
Fujimori to resign. Fujimori relied on the military for his power and used the national
intelligence agency to control the military’s senior ranks. The only loyalty shifts were
low level; on October 29, a military garrison in the southern region of Peru staged a
rebellion against Fujimori and the military leadership. This was led by Army Lieutenant
Ollanta Humala and involved around 100 soldiers. There were concerns the shift would
set off a broader rebellion, especially when Humala broadcast a “Manifesto to the
Peruvian People.” But the rest of the military remained loyal, and two small
demonstrations held in support of the rebellion were dispersed by police with tear gas.
The rebellion itself fizzled. In mid-November, though, a video was released that showed
an advisor of Fujimori, Vladimiro Montesinos, toasting military officers for their
assistance in the election. Opposition parties in Congress were ready to remove Fujimori
when he resigned.
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Demise of Fujimori in 2000.” University of Florida, 2004.
Crabtree, John. “The Collapse of Fujimorismo: Authoritarianism and its Limits.” Bulletin
of Latin American Research 20, no. 3 (2001): 287-303.
Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Renique. “Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and
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Philippines 6/28/1983-2/25/1986 – fragmented high level
Protests against President Ferdinand Marcos had been ongoing for a month or two when
Benigno Aquino Jr., a longtime political opponent of Marcos, returned to the Philippines
and was killed almost immediately. The resulting protests in support of Aquino were
massive. They were also violent; on September 21, marines deployed against the
demonstrators fired on them, killing 11. Protests continued throughout 1984, in part in
response to May parliamentary elections. Over this period, Marcos began to lose military
support, especially from his Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. There was a growing
rivalry between Enrile (and vice chief of staff of the armed forces Lieutenant General
Fidel Ramos) and Ver, who had risen in the ranks only because of his personal loyalty to
Marcos. Ramos had the support of junior officers, and over 1984 Enrile joined the
Reform the Armed Forces (RAM) movement with the goal of organizing low level and
middle ranking officers against Marcos’s regime. In 1985, some within RAM talked
about but did not follow through with assassinating Marcos, while the opposition parties
unsuccessfully attempted to impeach him. Marcos announced that November that
presidential elections would be held early, in 1986. This set off campaigning by Corazon
Aquino that included large rallies. When Parliament declared Marcos the winner on
February 15, Corazon’s supporters staged another the next day. On February 22, Enrile
and Ramos with hundreds of soldiers barricaded themselves in the Ministry of Defense.
RAM had been planning a coup but was thwarted. They asked Ramos for his help, and
together staged the mutiny. Marcos sent loyal troops to attack the rebels, but thousands of
civilians from the protest movement responded to a Catholic Cardinal’s call to protect
them. Enrile and Ramos then gave a press conference where they resigned and declared
their support for Corazon. Marcos announced a state of emergency on February 24, but
by this point most of the military had joined the mutiny and civilian politicians were
siding with Corazon. Marcos had the support of some troops, but he left the country.
Sources:
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Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-669.
Montiel, Cristina Jayme. “Social Representations of Democratic Transition: Was the
Philippine People Power a Non-Violent Power Shift or Military Coup?” Asian Journal of
Social Psychology 13, no. 3 (2010): 173-184.
Overholt, William H. “The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos.” Asian Survey 26, no. 11
(1986): 1137-1163.
Schock, Kurt. “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization
and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma.” Social Problems 46, no. 3 (1999): 355-375.
Philippines 1/16/2001-1/20/2001 – united defections
This crisis began when House minority members brought impeachment proceedings
against President Joseph Estrada. The Senate heard the case, and given Estrada’s
supporters there, was likely to acquit him. But, his supporters went further by attempting
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to keep evidence sealed. This set off massive demonstrations. Within days, Chief of Staff
General Angelo Reyes visited Estrada to inform him that the military no longer supported
him. Reyes declared Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the rightful president. According to
reports, Reyes did this knowing members of the rank and file and low level officers were
planning to desert and join the demonstrators. Retired generals also urged Reyes to shift
loyalty. While some feared Reyes would launch a coup or install a military government,
the military’s divisions into pro- and anti-Estrada groups would have made such
intervention difficult. However, there appears to be no instances of conflict between these
groups over Reyes’s decision.
Sources:
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Neoliberalism: EDSA II.” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 5 (2001): 777-793.
Philippines 4/16/2001-5/1/2001 - loyal
This protest movement was termed EDSA III, following the Philippines’ two previous
People Power Revolutions. It sought to reinstate Joseph Estrada, after Gloria MacapagalArroyo was declared president as a result of the January 2001 demonstrations. The
military came together with the police to crush the protests. Intra-military dissent existed,
and emerged in later mutinies, but did not affect the military’s response to this
movement. For the upper ranks, Arroyo rewarded those generals who had named her
president by giving them senior civilian positions post-retirement.
Sources:
Chambers, Paul. “A Precarious Path: The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in the
Philippines.” Asian Security 8, no. 2 (2012): 138-163.
Poland 6/25/1956-8/1/1956 – low level
The anti-Communist regime protests occurred largely in Poznan and were especially
violent in late June, when fighting between the demonstrators and security forces left at
least 73 dead and hundreds seriously wounded. The politburo approved Marshal of
Poland and Defense Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky’s recommendation to use force.
While a few Polish officers tried to refuse using force, Soviet commanders dominated the
Polish military and remained loyal. The other security forces also followed orders. There
were no Soviet troops in Poland during this period, and First Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev decided not to send Soviet troops to address
the crisis. A reformist in the Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was elected First
Secretary of the Communist Party in Poland in October.
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Studies 58, no. 8 (2006): 1261-1284.
Poland 1/31/1968-3/25/1968 – loyal
The main event in these anti-Communist regime protests was a student rebellion in
March. The regime declared it was led by Zionists, and used the ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane
Odwody Miliciji Obywatelskeij) militia units as well as police to repress the
demonstrations. In early March First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka, Chief of Staff
Wojciech Jaruzelski, and others were out of the country, and rumors spread about coup
attempts and troop defections. None of them were substantiated, however. The mostly
student protesters also failed to gain much outside support. While the military did not
directly respond to the movement, the leadership gave statements of loyalty to Gomulka.
Sources:
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Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report 0038769 (September 5, 1969).
Poland 12/13/1970-12/20/1970 – low level
This short period of anti-regime activity saw violent clashes between the protesters and
the police and military. 44 people were killed, and hundreds injured. December 17, or
“Bloody Thursday” was especially violent. Internal security troops had been deployed on
December 14, and were joined by military units on December 15. First Secretary
Wladyslaw Gomulka authorized military force when Deputy Defense Minister General
Grzcgorz Korcynski and Deputy Interior Minister Franciszek Szlachcic reported the
situation hadn’t stabilized. There were concerns with the troops’ reliability and
effectiveness, though. The first troops used against the demonstrations, the marines or
Blue Berets, were withdrawn when the division commander Edward Weiner refused to
order them to use force. Gomulka had a heart attack on December 18 and was replaced
by Edward Gierek on December 20. Gierek took a less hardline approach to the
opposition and tensions eased. There is some debate about the Soviets’ role in the
protests; they might not have been willing to send Gomulka military support.
Sources:
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315

Holtsmark, Sven G. “Challenge and Retreat: The Erosion of Soviet Power in Poland
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US Army Europe Intelligence Estimate (2010).
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d.pdf.
Poland 6/24/1976-6/30/1976 – neutral
The Polish army did not respond to these protests against the Communist regime. Police
forces were deployed, but the army was not involved, and the crisis resolved. Polish
United Workers’ Party leader Edward Gierek agreed to dismiss Prime Minister Piotr
Jaroszewicz and did not go forward with a plan to increase prices. The regime remained
in power, though, and did not need to call on the military to act against the demonstrators.
Sources:
Barany, Zoltan D. “East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond.” East
European Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1992).
Bernhard, Michael. “The Strikes of 1976 in Poland.” Eastern European Politics and
Societies 1, no. 3 (1987): 363-393.
Moreton, Edwina. “The Soviet Union and Poland’s Struggle for Self-Control.”
International Security 7, no. 1 (1982): 86-104.
Poland 7/1/1980-6/18/1989 – neutral
The military was largely involved in this protest movement and its overthrow of the
Communist regime. This is partly because the regime voluntarily surrendered its power in
a gradual process, and never asked the military to support it against the protesters. It
considered doing so but for one thing the Soviet Union was unlikely to support a
crackdown. The armed forces themselves underwent reform towards the end of the
campaign and as part of the transition.
Sources:
Barany, Zoltan D. “Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central
and Southeastern Europe.” Political Studies 41, no. 4 (1993): 594-610.
Kramer, Mark. “The Dynamics of 1989: Reassessing a Momentous Year.” Journal of
Cold War Studies 15, no. 4 (2013): 148-152.
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the Future of Eastern Europe.” PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 1 (1991): 20-24.
Portugal 4/9/1973-4/25/1974– fragmented high level
The ruling party, the National Union, swept the legislative elections of October 1973.
This result, alongside anti-Estada Novo regime protests that had been going on since
April, convinced moderate General Antonio de Spinola to join a group of left-wing
military officers in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). They believed a coup was the
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only way to end the decades-long colonial war in Africa. The MFA and Spinola
connected with the civilian opposition, including Ala Liberal, an organization of regime
politicians who wanted democratization. It had become steadily more pro-democracy and
anti-regime when it became clear President of the Council of Ministers Marcello Cateano
would not allow reform. This put Ala Liberal on the side of the protest movement. In
response to military discontent, Caetono resigned a number of military officers in March
1974, including Spinola. On April 25, the MFA, a group of young, low- to middleranking officers led by Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho overthrew the regime. People
went out into the streets to celebrate, leading to the surrender of the secret police on April
26. The National Salvation Junta under Spinola took power. The junior officers defected
and were responsible for the regime’s fall, but most of the senior officers such as Kaulza
de Arriaga remained loyal. The MFA may have been planning for the coup prior to the
protests, but the protests ensured its pro-democratic end. The regime had been civilianled but heavily military- involved. Caetono, who replaced Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in
1968 after Salazar’s almost 50 years in power, was unable to secure full military support.
In July 1973, for example, he implemented a law that provided privileges to conscript
officers. This generated criticism from academy officers, and it was eventually revoked.
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Military Interventionism in Portugal.” Portuguese Journal of Social Science 13, no. 2
(2014): 215-231.
Romania 11/15/1987-12/25/1989 – fragmented high level
The protests against Nicolae Ceausescu started around the time of his reelection as leader
of the Romanian Communist Party in November 1987. He thought he could survive
them, and did for the next two years as they spread across the country. The security
forces (especially the Securitate) were brutal in their suppression of them, resulting in
hundreds of deaths. The military first became involved in December 1989, when on
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December 17 it joined the other forces and opened fire on demonstrators. In the days
following, though (particularly December 19), army units resisted direct intervention.
The movement staged a general strike on December 20 and the army did not intervene at
all. Importantly, the rank and file had started to refuse their superiors’ orders and join
demonstrations. Soon after, the army began to withdraw to its barracks. Army Major
Viorel Oancea claimed he was removing soldiers from the streets to maintain the army’s
integrity, but by this point mid-level officers were mostly acting independently. On
December 22, Oancea became the first officer in Timisoara to publicly support the
protesters. The army with other forces repressed demonstrators in Bucharest through
December 22, but soon also fragmented. Military officers withdrew their units from
guarding the Central Command building, which allowed protesters to occupy it. The
military’s highest command was unable to launch a retake of the building. The Securitate
attempted a counter-revolution, but gave up when the newly installed National Salvation
Front decided to execute Ceausescu. Over this period, the Soviet Union did not have
troops in Romania, and the Romanian military did not depend on Soviet support.
Ceausescu was known to be distrustful of the military, and used the Securitate in place of
it and as a counterforce. He also froze all military promotions in 1989.
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Russia 3/3/2007-12/14/2008 – neutral
Protesters sought to oust Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and staged some of the largest
demonstrations ever against Putin despite such gatherings being illegal. The regime used
riot police and OMON (special police) forces to repress the anti-Putin movement, and
they ended with no military loyalty shifts.
Sources:
Harding, Luke. “Protesters Turn on Putin.” The Guardian. April 14, 2007.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/15/russia.chess.
“Political Unrest in Russia.” GlobalSecurity.org.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/political-unrest.htm.
Russia 1/19/2010-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – neutral
Anti-Vladimir Putin protests re-developed and continued over this period, which included
allegedly fraudulent legislative elections in December 2011 and Putin’s presidential
inauguration in May 2012. They were characterized by large-scale arrests, and some
violence, such as early May 2012, when clashes between the police and protesters
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resulted in injuries for 80. The regime also made use of the Interior Ministry’s elite
Dzerzhinsky division, but not the military.
Sources:
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Senegal 3/16/2000-4/1/2000 – united defections
This protest movement was against President Abdou Diouf and his attempt to secure the
presidency for another term. He ended up conceding defeat to opposition leader
Abdoulaye Wade after the second round of elections. It is likely the military played a role
in this decision; reportedly, senior officers told Diouf they would not back his attempts to
stay in power, and when interviewed later mid-level officers said the military would not
have supported him.
Sources:
“When Military Leaders Do the Right Thing.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
October 28, 2015. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/military-leaders-right-thing-threelessons-ethical- leadership-africa/.
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International Studies (2011).
Serbia 11/17/1996-10/5/2000 – united defections
There was evidence of the potential for military disloyalty already in 1996, at the start of
anti-President Slobodan Milosevic protests. The Army Chief of Staff Pavkovic sided with
Milosevic at this point but after the disputed 2000 elections declared the military would
respect the electorate’s decision. The movement had attempted to reach out to the
military, but never clearly communicated. The special paramilitary units also cooperated
with the opposition. In a well- known event on October 4, the police responded to strikers
at the Kolubara coal mine but ignored orders to use force against them. Milosevic then
gave up power. Milosevic had reorganized the military’s top ranks in ways favorable to
him, but it maintained some autonomy. The growing power of the police and paramilitary
forces was a source of military discontent, though.
Sources:
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36-50.
Slovakia 11/16/1989-6/6/1992 - neutral
The police and military police repressed protests throughout 1989, and in particular on
November 17. On November 21, the prime minister announced the regime wouldn’t use
force to disperse the demonstrations, but would protect the socialist system. Over this
period, though the army was mostly uninvolved, the People’s Militia reportedly refused
to take action. Further, in December, the new Defense Minister Vacek announced the
army supported democratization and wouldn’t repress demonstrators or stage a coup.
Later that month, the party disbanded the militia. While some within the party supported
more repression, the regime rejected it, and opted for a political rather than military
solution. It was clear the Soviet Union would not intervene, but the Czechoslovak state
had its own military. The military remained passive, as the regime realized the rapidly
shifting events meant it probably couldn’t make a difference. Protests continued to
achieve the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
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Slovenia 5/8/1989-4/8/1990 – neutral
These anti-communist government protests were accompanied by a broader effort at
Slovenian independence. In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed various
amendments that asserted its sovereignty. For example, only it could declare a state of
emergency, and it had authority over the presence of Yugoslav military forces and
command over the Slovenian military forces, or the Territorial Defense (TD). The
Yugoslav military leadership wanted to disband the TD, and tensions over the TD’s
future became particularly serious in April 1990 during the transition to the first freelyelected, non-Communist government. These processes followed the parliament’s
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December 1989 adoption of laws that legalize political pluralism. The TD was not
involved in the protests or the decision to move closer to democracy.
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South Korea 3/16/1960-4/28/1960 – united defections
Protests followed President Syngman Rhee’s re-election on March 15, 1960. They
became incredibly violent in mid-April, and on April 19, 186 people were killed, and
hundreds injured. The regime declared martial law and the 15th Division of the South
Korean Army took control of Seoul, with other units in other cities. Military commanders
believed putting an end to the protests would require a massive use of force, but it never
happened. Instead, the military refused to carry out shoot to kill orders. On April 26,
despite the ban on demonstrations, a small group of protesters came out. By later that
day, hundreds of thousands of people were in the streets demanding Rhee’s resignation
and also engaging in the destruction of property. Rhee worried the protests would
continue the next day and so resigned on April 27. The US government was involved
because at this time General Carter B. Magruder and the American Army Command in
Korea had operational control of the South Korean forces. It urged an end to the unrest,
and allowed army tanks but not live ammunition in the enforcement of martial law.
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South Korea 10/17/1979-5/27/1980 - loyal
The government of President Park Chung Hee offered some reforms as political
opposition grew throughout 1979. However, regime hardliners prevented meaningful
change, and were increasingly harsh towards popular shows of discontent. On October
17, 1979, five students were killed as they demonstrated in Pusan. The government
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declared martial law for the region in response. On October 26, the director of the Korean
Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chae Kyu, assassinated Park. Kim had disagreed with
the regime’s use of force on October 17 and feared he and other regime softliners were
losing influence. Kim also believed he had the support of the military, but the Army
Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander General Chung Song- Hwa refused to seize
power on his behalf. The emboldened regime hardliners implemented martial law for the
country. In December, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, the commander of the Defense
Security Command who had been close to Park, initiated a purge of military reformists.
This included Chung, who had refused Kim but wanted to remain neutral. There were
reports that Chung had also prevented the promotions of Chun’s faction to the upper
ranks. Some within the factions actually fought in Seoul on December 12. Meanwhile,
Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah was named interim president, and began a process of
liberalization. In April 1980, the protest movement staged massive demonstrations,
leading to clashes between them and military troops in early May. This only strengthened
the opposition, and at the urging of the military Choi extended martial law, giving the
military direct control of the country. The protests ended on May 27, when the military
entered Kwangju, a key site of the demonstrations, and killed at least 200. Chun ruled for
the next six years. No parts of the military shifted loyalty to the protesters, though it was
divided prior to Chun’s purge.
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South Korea 2/4/1986-6/29/1987 – fragmented high level
The protest movement first demanded a constitution with direct elections. The regime
started dialogue, but the demonstrations continued, and their demands became more
radical. Reformers within the military hoped to reach a compromise before the radicals
within the opposition overthrew the regime. The reformists persuaded the hardliners that
repression wouldn’t succeed; this made the difference when President Chun Doo-hwan, a
hardliner former army general, mobilized the military to crack down on June 19, 1987.
On June 26, General Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, broke
with Chun to announce direct presidential elections. Chun likely expected Roh to win and
went along with Roh’s announcement because it kept the military intact. However, the
army had also become less reliable during this period, because younger generals and
colonels were concerned about being ordered to repress the demonstrators. The US also
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pressured the military against using force and into talks with the opposition. Roh won the
free and fair elections on December 16, 1987.
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South Korea 2/25/1988-12/1/1992 - neutral
President Roh Tae-woo made gradual reforms while in power. These included
restructuring the military leadership by replacing the soldiers who had been close to
former president and general Chun Doo-hwan. He also reduced the power of the National
Intelligence Service. In the 1992 presidential elections, all the candidates were civilians,
for the first time in almost 30 years. The military was not involved in the election or
surrounding protests, and the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-sam, won.
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South Vietnam 11/22/1964-1/27/1965 – fragmented high level
These anti-regime and Prime Minister Tran Van Huong protests were largely comprised
of students and Buddhists, while other Buddhists were using more militant means. Huong
deployed troops against the demonstrations, and on November 27 declared a state of
emergency. This brought some order to the situation, but Huong was also losing support
in his cabinet and in the military. Those against him were cooperating with Tri Quang.
On December 19, Khanh and a group of young generals known as the Young Turks asked
the High National Council to retire military officers that had been in the service more
than 25 years, believing them sympathetic to the militant Buddhists. When the Council
refused, the Young Turks dissolved it. Although unclear at first, Huong supported the
Young Turks’s move as a way to get more power himself, and this was their intent. On
January 6, the military turned power over to a new civilian government led by Huong.
This prompted new demonstrations led by Khanh and Tri Quang. By mid-January they
had escalated to demand Huong’s removal. Huong used troops against the protesters, but
troops in the areas controlled by Khanh and (his principal co-conspirator) General
Nguyen Chanh Thi refused to act. Khanh and the Buddhists had agreed at this time that
the Buddhists would support Khanh if he and the military took control of the government
from Huong. Khanh ousted Huong on January 27, with support from General Thi and Air
Marshal Ky. The Armed Forces Council put Khanh at the head of the state.
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Moyar, Mark. “Political Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movements During the Vietnam
War.” Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (2004): 749-784.
Smyth, Edward Albert. “The Effect of War on the South Vietnamese Economy.” MA
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1970.
South Vietnam 3/12/1966-6/23/1966 – low level
This movement followed from the earlier one and pitted the Buddhists (as well as other
opposition, including students) led by Tri Quang against the South Vietnamese
government of General Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Theiu. The situation
reached crisis levels when the movement claimed it controlled the military in Quang Nam
Province. This followed Ky’s March 1966 dismissal of Lieutenant General Nguyen
Chanh Thi, a Buddhist commander of the I Corps (the most northern region of South
Vietnam), for supposed Buddhist support. The opposition formed the Military-Civilian
Struggle Committee to support Thi and spread demonstrations against the government.
Beginning in April, some soldiers and even senior officers joined the demonstrations, and
eventually most of I Corps was out of the government’s control. As the country’s
Premier, Ky launched operations throughout April and May to retake the region. The
movement collapsed after this use of force by the rest of the South Vietnamese military,
at times assisted by American troops.
Sources:
Moyar, Mark. “Political Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movement During the Vietnam
War.” Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (2004): 749-784.
Sullivan, Patricia. “S. Vietnamese General Nguyen Chanh Thi.” Washington Post. June
27, 2007. “The 1966 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam.” History Net. May 12, 2006.
http://www.historynet.com/the-1966-buddhist-crisis-in-south-vietnam.htm.
Sri Lanka 7/15/2001-9/2/2001 – loyal
This protest movement was aimed at President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s suspension of
parliament and proposed referendum on constitutional reforms. The police and
Presidential Security Division cracked down on the demonstrators, particularly on July
19, killing two and wounding about a hundred. In response, Kumaratunga banned
processions until the referendum results were released. Military troops deployed to
Colombo to assist the police and remained loyal. During this time, Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam suicide bombers attacked the country’s airport. Kumaratunga postponed the
referendum because of the instability, but remained in power.
Sources:
“Amnesty Condemns Police Killings, Ban on Demonstrations.” TamilNet. July 20, 2001.
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6174.
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Ferdinando, Shamindra. “Year of Political Turmoil and Treachery.” The Island.
November 6, 2012. http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=articledetails&page=article- details&code_title=65453.
“Massive Opposition Protest in Colombo.” TamilNet. July 19, 2001.
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6171.
Sudan 3/26/1985-4/7/1985 – united defections
Protests developed while President Gaafar Nimeiri was out of the country. In the
beginning, the police arrested many demonstrators, and killed a few. As they continued
into early April, there were signs the police had begun to support them. For example, an
outlawed police officers’ association distributed leaflets that indicated they were prepared
to help bring down the regime. Soon senior military officers met with Vice President
Omar Mohammed El Tayeb to insist the troops shouldn’t be used as back ups to the
police unless the protests became violent. The rank and file’s loyalty couldn’t be
guaranteed. On April 6, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, General Abdel
Rahman Swar al Dahab, took control of the country as head of the Transitional Military
Council. The army leadership had planned to support the regime and police, but the field
commanders refused. It was they and junior and non-commissioned officers that pressed
the leadership to withdraw troops from demonstrations, takeover the government, and
announce a return to democracy. There were concerns about clashes between the military
and the General Security Organization, which had favored a crackdown on protesters, but
these didn’t occur.
Sources:
Abdelkarim, Abbas, et al. “From Popular Protest to Military Take-Over: An Analytical
Chronology of Recent Events in Sudan.” Review of African Political Economy 33 (1985):
82-89.
De Waal, Alex. “Making Sense of the Protests in Khartoum.” African Futures. October
11, 2013. http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/10/11/making-sense-of-the-protestsin-khartoum/.
El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. “Revolutionary Anatomy: The Lessons of the Sudanese
Revolutions of October 1964 and April 1985.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 5, no. 2
(2012): 292-306.
Salih, Kamal Osman. “The Sudan, 1985-9: The Facing Democracy.” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 28, no. 2 (1990): 199-224.
Sudan 1/30/2011-10/6/2013 - neutral
Over the course of these anti-Omar al-Bashar protests, the police and ruling-party linked
security forces often responded with violence. The latter units were responsible for 200
demonstrators’ deaths in September 2013, for example. The military itself was not
involved, and there were no loyalty shifts, despite known military discontent with the
regime. The military was concurrently engaged in conflict with the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army, part of the Sudan Revolutionary Forces. The protest movement did not
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coordinate with the rebels. Yet, the protesters were at times overshadowed by their
violence. Eventually, the movement fizzled out.
Sources:
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Rebellion, and Chameleon Dictatorships.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 31,
no. 2 (2013): 213-234.
Mbaku, John Mukum, Temesgen Deressa, and Bryce Campbell. “Will the al-Bashir
Regime in Sudan Survive Recent Pressures?” Brookings. November 1, 2013.
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Suriname 12/19/1983-1/18/1984 - neutral
Thousands of striking workers demanded an end to the regime of President Desi
Bouterse, who had come to power in early 1980 through a military coup. Bouterse
dismissed his prime minister, Errol Alibux, but did not hand power over to civilian
democrats. There is very little information on the military’s involvement, but no signs of
loyalty shifts.
Sources:
Blum, William. “Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II.”
Zed Books, 2003.
Singh, Chaitram. “Re-Democratization in Guyana and Suriname: Critical Comparisons.”
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 84 (2008): 71-85.
Syria 3/15/2011-10/31/2011 – low level
When anti-regime protests started in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad immediately
responded with violence, deploying the army and its tanks. On June 4, some security
forces fired at a funeral demonstration. The mourners set fire to the building on which the
forces were posted, killing eight personnel. They also seized weapons from a police
station. This event saw the first notable loyalty shifts, when some soldiers posted with
their army units refused to fire on civilians. More followed after the secret police and
intelligence officers accompanying the army executed the soldiers for their disobedience.
Overall, most loyalty shifts took the form of desertions by low-ranking Sunni conscripts.
They were disorganized and had problems coordinating with a disorganized opposition.
Generally when soldiers left they did not join the unarmed protesters but either sought
asylum abroad or joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which officially formed July 29
under the leadership of Colonel Riyad al-Assad. The FSA began fighting government
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forces in late September. Loyalty shifts never extended beyond the non- Alawites, and
were very limited in the upper ranks. Most of the army was composed of conscripts that
served 18 months, leaving career military officers appointed according to their regime
loyalty with most of the power. The regime rotated senior officers often, and used the
most loyal divisions and forces (including the Republican Guard) for repression. This
prevented regular conscripts from sympathizing with the protesters.
Sources:
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Barany, Zoltan. “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military.” Journal of
Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 24-35.
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of Military-Opposition Alliances.” Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 4 (2011): 485491. Parsons, William and William Taylor. Arbiters of Social Unrest: Military Responses
to the Arab Spring. West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2011.
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November 2, 2011. http://www.aina.org/news/20111102190752.pdf.
Taiwan 12/10/1979-11/16/1985 – neutral
The Kuomintang (KMT) government of Chiang Ching-Kuo was intolerant of basically
any political opposition, and reacted to the initial anti-regime demonstrations in 1979
with repression. On December 10, for example, the police cracked down and injured
more than 40 and arrested others. This led the protest movement to engage more
forcefully in electoral politics, alongside demonstrations. In late 1985, Chiang (who had
inherited the presidency from his father) announced a political transition and stated that
neither his family nor the military should take over. He recognized that the KMT’s
continued rule required reforms. As part of the transition, Chiang transferred power to his
vice president, Lee Teng Hui. The military did not play any role in the protest movement
or transition.
Sources:
Chi, Chang Tieh. “Chiang Chang-Kuo and the Democratization of Taiwan.” China
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Lynne Rienner, 2008.
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So, Alvin Y. “Democratization in East Asia in the Late 1980s: Taiwan Breakthrough,
Hong Kong Frustration.” Studies in Comparative International Development 28, no. 2
(1993): 61-80.
Tanzania 5/1/1992-11/23/1995 - neutral
These protests pressed for democratic reforms and followed a December 1991
commission report that recommended President Ali Hassan Mwinyi adopt a multiparty
system. The following years were to be a transition period, with the country’s first freely
democratic presidential elections scheduled for 1995. The ruling party (Chama Cha
Mapinduzi) tightly controlled the process, but Mwinyi chose to stand down before the
elections. The military was uninvolved.
Sources:
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Security Review 10, no. 3 (2001): 34-47.
Baker, Bruce. “The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocratic Leaders of Sub-Saharan
Africa Fared Under Democratization?” Third World Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1998): 115-127.
Thailand 10/6/1973-11/13/1973 – fragmented high level
Thailand had been under martial law since a November 1971 coup. The military rulers
and high command were disunited, however; Prime Minister General Thanom
Kittikachorn and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien were grooming Colonel
Narong Kittikachorn (son of Thanom and son in law of Praphas) for the office of prime
minister after their retirements. Other officers were upset by this, and especially younger
generations. When anti-regime protests broke out on October 6, the military responded
with many arrests. The protests continued, and in early October the king met with the
movement’s leaders and announced a new constitution would be in place by October
1974. The opposition was skeptical and staged new demonstrations. On October 14, 66
students demonstrating outside the palace were killed by army troops. The government
gave up power that night, though Thanom remained Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces. A caretaker government appointed civilian Sanya Thammasakdi as prime
minister, but the protest movement was not satisfied. The embattled military leadership
tried to discredit it by connecting it to the communists who were concurrently launching a
rebellion. The movement’s leaders consequently asked the rebels to end their challenge,
but at the same time were dividing over whether or not to use violence. Thanom, Prapat,
Narong met with General Kris Sivara (who on October 1 had been appointed the Army
Commander in Chief to replace the retiring Prapat) and ordered him to deploy more army
units to Bangkok to use against the ongoing protests. Kris refused, and other army
commanders as well as the leaders of the Air Force, Navy, and Border Patrol Police
expressed they would not use force and supported the new government. Prapass and
Narong left for Taiwan.
Sources:
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Darling, Frank C. “Thailand in 1976: Another Defeat for Constitutional Democracy.”
Asian Survey 17, no. 2 (1977): 116-132.
Heinze, Ruth-Inge. “Ten Days in October – Students vs the Military: An Account of the
Student Uprising in Thailand.” Asian Survey 14, no. 6 (1974): 491-508.
Neher, Clark D. “Stability and Instability in Contemporary Thailand.” Asian Survey 15,
no. 12 (1975): 1097-1113.
Race, Jeffrey. “Thailand 1973: ‘We Certainly Have Been Ravaged by Something...’.”
Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (1974): 192-203.
Thailand 4/16/1992-6/30/1992 – loyal
The military regime of General Suchinda Kraprayoon held elections in March 1992.
Afterwards, Suchinda took the position of prime minister, even though he had said he
wouldn’t. Protests followed, including demonstrations on May 17 that involved rioting.
The military acted with force against them. Over this period, rumors swirled that the
ongoing conflict would prompt Suchinda’s rivals to act against him. The king intervened
on May 20 and forced Suchinda to resign, hoping to end the violence. The military, its
reputation tarnished because of the violence, backed down as well. An interim civilian
prime minister was installed.
Sources:
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Wright, Joseph J. “Thailand’s Return to Democracy.” Current History 91, no. 569
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Thailand 2/9/2005-9/19/2006 – fragmented high level
This protest movement was aimed at Thaksin Shinawatra’s government. There had been
tensions between the military and his government from its start. First, the military
disagreed with the government’s strategy for the insurgency in the South. Second,
Thaksin’s promotion policies tended to favor his classmates and allies over other
candidates. They also challenged the influence of General Prem Tinsulanonda. Prem had
been prime minister until 1988, and then became president of the King’s Privy Council
(advisory body). Consequently, the military was divided into pro- and anti-Thaksin
factions. During the demonstrations, Thaksin sought to declare a state of emergency, but
Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (an ally of Prem) responded there was
no need because they were peaceful and lawful. Meanwhile, Sonthi made moves to
transfer pro-Thaksin middle-ranking officers away from the demonstrations, to prevent
them from intervening in support. In the end, the army seized power from Thaksin on
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September 19, 2006. As justification, it said the government had planned to crack down
on the protesters the following day.
Sources:
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(2007): 133- 140.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, T. “Thailand Since the Coup.” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4
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Thailand 6/9/2007-8/15/2007 - neutral
Following the 2006 coup, protesters called for Prem Tinsulononda’s resignation as
President of the Privy Council (believing him responsible for the coup), and an end to the
military-backed Council for Democratic Reform government. They also responded to the
May 2007 ban on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party. The
government and its security forces arrested many protesters. At the same time, the
People’s Alliance for Democracy, an anti-Thaksin movement, called on the government
to take a harder stance on the protesters. The government organized a national
referendum on a draft of a new constitution (the 1997 one had been abrogated after the
2006 coup). The referendum was held on August 19, 2007, and the constitution was
approved. The king signed it into law on August 24. The protests ended around this
period, not having achieved their overall goals.
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Thailand 5/25/2008-12/3/2008 – fragmented high level
The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) began daily protests calling for the Samak
Sundaravej (of the People Power Party, or PPP) government to step down in late May
2008. They became more disruptive as time went on, with PAD demonstrators, some
armed, attacking a government television broadcasting station in Bangkok in August.
Leading up to this, PAD had been training its own security guards, and Thaksin
supporters formed the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship of Thailand with
armed units. Violence broke out. In response, the government declared a state of
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emergency. The military mostly refused to act to restore order. This strengthened
perceptions that PAD was backed by elites including General Prem Tinsulonanda, Privy
Council president. Prem’s faction did support the protesters, but others in the military,
such as Major-General Kattiya Sawadiphol, supported Thaksin. These divisions meant
the military was reluctant to become involved in the crisis, especially following the 2006
coup. On September 9, the Constitutional Court disqualified Samak as prime minister
because of conflicts of interest. Parliament moved to inaugurate a new PPP-government,
led by Somchai Wongsawat, spouse of Thaksin’s younger sister. This change did not
satisfy PAD, which wanted all Thaksin influence gone from government. It continued
protests through October. At this stage, the government deployed the police, resulting in
the deaths of two and injuries to over 400. Army Commander Anupong Paochinda was
publicly critical of Somchai over the violence. On November 23, PAD attempted to seize
parliament, the Finance Ministry, and an airport, and neither the police nor military acted.
In early December, the courts found PPP guilty of buying votes in the 2007 election and
disbanded it, leading Somchai to resign and ending the protests. Throughout this case, the
military and particularly the army dominated by Anupong and Prem resisted supporting
the government, refusing to intervene to end the unrest.
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Current History 107, no. 712 (2008): 381.
Thailand 12/28/2008-5/19/2010 – low level
Opposition soon developed to the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat Party
put in place on December 17, 2008. It organized into a protest movement called the
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as the Red Shirts.
The security forces responded to the demonstrations with force, but they continued and
intensified in April 2010. Discontent within the lower ranks of the military had also
developed, though, as the anti-Thaksin faction had become dominant in the upper ranks.
In a 2009 reshuffle, for example, officers close to the Queen’s Guard faction led by
General Anupong Paochinda and his heir General Prayuth Chanocha took leadership
positions. Some lower ranks became unwilling to act against the protesters. On April 10,
a demonstration resulted in hundreds of casualties, including some soldiers who were
believed attacked by soldiers aligned with pro-Thaksin junior officers. As the protests
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continued over the next month, however, the military leadership was able to unite the
institution for an operation to end the movement. This occurred as the UDD was splitting
on whether to negotiate and compromise with Abhisit. On May 19, troops killed 91. The
Democrat Party was anti-Thaksin and its position in the coalition government came about
in part through the help of senior army officers.
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Thailand 10/31/2013-5/7/2014 – united defections
These protests organized by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC),
against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, were motivated in part by a proposed
amnesty bill that would have absolved corruption charges against Yingluck’s brother,
Thaksin. On December 7, 2013, after pressure from military leaders, including Prem
Tinsulanonda, Yingluck dissolved Congress and called for new elections. Protests
continued, though, and the military was unwilling to actively support Yingluck. On
December 22, for example, General Prayut Chanocha refused to order troops against the
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on the streets, and announced the military was
neutral. The demonstrations became more violent in January 2014, when the PDRC
launched an effort to shutdown Bangkok. The government declared a 60-day state of
emergency soon after. Elections were held in February but declared invalid by the
Constitutional Court. The Court then ousted Yingluck on May 7. Protests went on for two
weeks until the army, led by Prayut, launched a coup. At first he declared martial law, but
when the politicians and protest leaders failed to come to an agreement, he announced the
coup, and became prime minister. The coup was endorsed by King Bhumibol. There was
likely collaboration among the PDRC, the military, and the Privy Council. At lower
levels, there were reports of armed soldiers providing protection to some of the protests.
Sources:
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Thailand 5/23/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – loyal
The country remained under martial law after General Prayut Chanocha’s coup, but
protests developed against him and the new military regime. In response, the military
cracked down brutally, arresting and prosecuting hundreds. It maintained a massive
presence at any show of regime opposition. Reports detailed ongoing military
factionalism, but no part of the military shifted loyalty from the regime to the protesters.
Sources:
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Togo 6/6/1991-6/12/1991 – low level
These anti-President Gnassingbe Eyadema protests were short-lasting and gained limited
support from the military. Eyadama had used the military to secure his regime, and in
particular elite units within the army headed by his close associates. Further, most of the
army was composed of Eyadema’a Kabye ethnic group – while the protests were largely
divided along ethnic lines, or the Kabyes of the north against the Ewes of the south. The
marine commandos were the only section of the military under the command of
southerners, and they refused to repress the demonstrators. Otherwise, the officers who
had expressed support for democracy had already been expelled from the army. Eyadema
agreed to a national conference but held on to power.
Sources:
Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. “Civil Society in Africa. Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2
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General Conference, Montreal, Canada, August 26-29, 2015.
Togo 2/12/2005-2/25/2005 - loyal
On February 5, 2005, President Gnassingbe Eyadema suffered a heart attack. His son,
Faure, could not succeed him according to the constitution. However, the high military
command, led by General Zakari Nandja, swore allegiance to Faure. While a small
military clique was responsible for the decision, there were no signs any in the military
disagreed. Protests attempted to prevent Faure from taking power and a continuation of
the regime but were unsuccessful.
Sources:
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Togo 6/12/2012-5/23/2013 - loyal
Opposition to Faure Gnassingbe developed in April 2012, when several political parties
and other groups united in a political coalition called the Save Togo Collective (CST). It
launched protests in June 2012, focused mostly on elections and the use of excessive
force by security forces. The demonstrators were subject to arrest and some violence,
with at least one person killed. The government remained in power, though made some
senior personnel changes which may have indicated tensions within the ruling coalition.
The security forces as a whole were loyal; this included the military, security services,
and pro-Eyadema militias, all of which were dominated by the Kabye ethnic group (the
same as the Gnassingbe family). The army leadership was also personally linked to the
Gnassingbes. Though there were reported to be rivalries within the military ranks, and a
coup attempt in 2009, these did not translate into any loyalty shifts.
Sources:
Tobolka, Radim. “Togo: Legislative Elections of July 2013.” Electoral Studies 35 (2014):
389- 394.
Kohnert, Dirk. “Donor’s Double Talk Undermines African Agency: Comparative Study
of Civic Agency in Burkina Faso and Togo.” Paper presented at the APAD 2015
International Conference, Cotonou, Benin, November 17-20, 2015.
Kohnert, Dirk. “Togo: Recent Political and Economic Development.” MPRA Paper no.
63411 (2015). https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63411/.
Tonga 5/26/2005-11/17/2006 - loyal
Protests against the government of Prime Minister Feleti Sevele became violent in
November 2006. The small Tonga military assisted the police in controlling the situation.
Australia readied some defense personnel to deploy if needed, but King George Tupou V
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did not request assistance. Rather, the government conceded to protesters’ demands for
salary increases, and promised additional reforms.
Sources:
Singh, Shailendra and Som Prakash. “Politics, Democracy, and the Media: Case Studies
in Fiji, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands.” Pacific Journalism Review 12, no. 2 (2006).
Ungerer, Carl. “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy.” The Australian Journal of Politics
and History 53, no. 2 (2007): 267-280.
Tunisia 12/17/2010-1/23/2011 – united defections
Protests began in December 2010 and were quickly too large for the police and other
security forces to handle. President Ben Ali sent out his elite Presidential Guard and
armed gangs of thugs, and also ordered the army to deploy troops in support. The army
first followed Ali’s directions, and focused mostly on protecting infrastructure. Soldiers
began to talk to the demonstrators and in some cases join them. The Army Chief of Staff
General Rachid Ammar reportedly ordered his men not to shoot the protesters, and
warned the police not to either. During this period Ben Ali made a number of
concessions, but to no avail. When he attempted to declare martial law on January 13,
2011, Ammar refused. Ben Ali tried to fire Ammar for subordination, but the next day
fled the country. After, the military fought the Presidential Guard and state militias for
control of the situation. The military had resented being put under the Presidential
Guard’s orders in responding to the demonstrations. Ben Ali had personally controlled
military appointments rather than look to senior military officials.
Sources:
Barany, Zoltan. “The Role of the Military.” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011).
Lutterbeck, Derek. “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and
Resistance.” DCAF SSR Paper 2 (2011).
Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. “Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role
of Military-Opposition Alliances.” Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 4 (2011): 485491. Tanriverdi, Nebahat. “Background of the Tunisian Revolution.” Alternative Politics
3, no. 3 (2011): 547-570.
Tunisia 10/12/2013-12/14/2013 – neutral
Protests led in large part by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the National
Salvation Front groups ended after the ruling Ennahda party agreed to join the Quartet’s
national dialogue. Then, the parties accepted a caretaker government of technocrats to
govern until the 2014 elections. The military was not involved in these events.
Sources:
Boubekeur, Amel. “The Politics of Protest in Tunisia.” SWP Comments 13 (2015).
Grewel, Sharan. “A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military After Ben Ali.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. February 24, 2016.
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http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/24/quiet-revolution-tunisian-military-after-benali-pub-62780.
Tunisia 8/26/2013-1/26/2014 – neutral
Tensions were high in summer 2013, especially following the July assassination of a
leader of the Popular Front political alliance. The Popular Front joined with two other
political party groups, Union for Tunisia and Nidda Tounes, to form the National
Salvation Front. Together, they opposed Ennahda, the governing party. The anti-Ennahda
campaign grew in August and came to demand the Constituent Assembly’s dissolution,
the replacement of the Troika (or alliance) government, and the removal of Ennahdaappointed officials. The National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four civil society
organizations, oversaw negotiations, which resulted in the naming of Mehdi Jomaa as
prime minister in December. He presided over the government until the 2014 elections.
During the protests, the police engaged in repression. There were rumors that the
opposition appealed to some military generals to attempt a coup, but the military never
acted. President Moncef Marzougui also reshuffled some of the army leadership as a
precaution.
Sources:
Abba, Sadeeque, Mukhtar Imam, and Mohamed M. Wader. “Arab Uprisings and the
Outstanding Return to Democracy: Tunisia as a Model.” International Journal of
Humanities and Social Science Invention 4, no. 8 (2015): 1-11.
Boubekeur, Amel. “Islamists, Secularists, and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained
Competition.” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 (2016): 107-127.
Chamkhi, Tarek. “Ennahda as a Neo-Islamist Party in Power.” Paper presented at “An
Arab Exception? The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia’s Democratic Transition”
Symposium, Melbourne, Australia, July 25, 2015.
Turkey 12/26/2013-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – neutral
Protests against the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were met with
riot police armed with water cannons and tear gas. The unrest followed the December
2013 arrests of a number of politicians and business people allegedly involved in corrupt
activities. Erdogan denounced the unrests, saying they were politically motivated, and in
the process brought criticism upon himself. However, his Justice and Development Party
won two elections in March, and in August, Erdogan was directly elected president.
Erdogan set out on a mission to purge the state of those he considered disloyal.
Sources:
“Freedom in the World 2014: Turkey.” Freedom House.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey.
“Turkish Police Tear Gas Protesters on Taksim Anniversary.” BBC. May 31, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27649472.
Uganda 3/9/2011-8/7/2013 - loyal
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The first crackdown against the anti-Yoweri Museveni protest movement took place in
April and May 2011. Together, the police and army were responsible for hundreds of
casualties. The protests continued, though having lost momentum. The only other notable
event involving the military was in January 2013, when Museveni, the defense minister,
and the chief of defense forces threatened an army coup if the parliament continued to
challenge the president.
Sources:
Kagoro, Jude. “Competitive Authoritarianism in Uganda: The Not So Hidden Hand of the
Military.” In Democratization and Competitive Authoritarianism in Africa, edited by
Matthijs Bogaards and Sebastian Elischer, 155-172. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften,
2016.
Thurston, Alex. “As 2012 Closes, What Legacy for an ‘African Spring’?” Footnote.
October 29, 2012. http://footnote.co/as-2012-closes-what-legacy-for-an-african-spring/.
Ukraine 12/15/2000-12/26/2004 – fragmented high level
After nearly four years of popular opposition to the regime, Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych was elected president in a runoff on November 21, 2004. The results were
immediately disputed and on November 22 opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko
declared himself president and asked the security forces to support him and the protest
movement. This created confusion within the rank and file, and fragmentation of the
military and other forces as the demonstrations continued and grew. There was a
breakdown in command and control, and many rank and file and middle to upper-middle
ranks of officers defected. They did not stop the protesters from accessing central Kiev.
Security force units that might have obeyed repression orders decided against acting
because other units were likely to refuse. Some regime members urged outgoing
president Yanukovych-ally Leonid Kuchma to use violent repression against the
protesters, but he realized he did not have the support of the security forces. On
November 25, Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmek announced the army would not fire
on the protesters. Generals from other forces made similar statements, and even the
Interior Ministry said it would defend the people over the regime. On December 1, the
parliament passed a non-confidence vote against Yanukovych, but neither he nor Kuchma
recognized it. Shortly after, on December 3, the Supreme Court invalidated the election
results and called for a revote of the run-off on December 26. Yushchenko won. Overall,
the military defections were disorganized, with various units rather than the united
military organization shifting loyalty.
Sources:
Binnendijk, Anika Locke. “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence
State Security Services in Serbia and Ukraine.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies
39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429.
D’Anieri, Paul. “Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions.”
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 331-350.
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Karatnycky, Adrian. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005).
Pion-Berlin, David, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham. “Staying Quartered: Civilian
Uprisings and Military Obedience in the 21st Century.” Comparative Political Studies
47, no. 2 (2014): 230-259.
Kuzio, Taras. “From Kuchma to Yuschenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and
the Orange Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 2 (2005): 29-44.
Kuzio, Taras. “State-Led Revolution in Ukraine’s 2004 Elections and Orange
Revolution.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 4 (2010): 383-395.
Ukraine 11/21/2013-2/23/2014 – fragmented high level
Protests against President Victor Yanukovych began in late November 2013, and his
government almost immediately sent its special police units (the Berkut) to end them.
The Berkut used extreme violence, which set off a cycle of escalation. More radical
segments of the protesters formed self-defense units and engaged in battles with the
Berkut. On February 20, 2014, during a particularly violent episode, the Berkut killed
dozens of protesters. The parliament then voted to remove Yanukovych. The army also
refused to attack the people – following some confusion and intra-force disagreements.
Yanukovych fired the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Volodymyr Zamana,
around February 19, likely because he did not want to use force. Soon after, the new
Chief, Yuriv Ilyin, and Minister of DefensePavlo Lebedyev prepared to deploy the
military. On February 21, following the Berkut’s violence, the Armed Forces’ Deputy
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yuri Dumansky resigned to protest any military
involvement. The opposition soon announced the military was supporting it. The Berkut,
though, remained loyal to Yanukovych. After his ouster, the new government dismantled
the force.
Sources:
Anderson, Kevin B. 2014. “Ukraine: Democratic Aspirations and Inter-Imperialist
Rivalry.” New Politics 15, no. 1 (2014): 65-70.
Khmelko, Irino. “An Anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and
Euromaydan Compared.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 227236.
Granholm, Niklas, Johannes Malminen, and Gudrun Persson, eds. A Rude Awakening:
Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine. FOI, 2014.
McFaul, Michael. “Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis.” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 6 (2014): 167-178.
Uruguay 1/18/1984-3/1/1985 – neutral
Amid ongoing protests, the military regime and opposition political parties negotiated a
transfer of power. They broke off once but started again in May 1984. In August, the
participants reached the Club Naval agreement, which stipulated elections for November.
The protest movement’s demonstrations and strikes were crucial in pressuring the
military to give up power, and to make more concessions during negotiations. The
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military was largely united over this period, with the general staff making most of the
decisions, and no signs of disagreement over them – within the regime, or between the
regime and military institution.
Sources:
Finch, Henry. “Democratization in Uruguay.” Third World Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1985):
495-609.
Collier, Ruth Berins and James Mahoney. “Adding Collective Actors to Collective
Outcomes.” Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997): 285-303.
Venezuela 1/11/1958-1/23/1958 – united defections
President Marcos Perez Jimenez was overthrown on January 23, ending military rule in
Venezuela. He had been losing military and civilian support throughout 1957, and the
military opposition developed into two factions: higher ranking officers close to the
government that tried to pressure Jimenez into reforms, and lower ranking officers who
organized into a dissident group. The younger officers were particular upset by Jimenez’s
corruption and reliance on loyalists within the civilian ministry. He also created
Seguridad Nacional, a counterforce that increased police power over the military. On
January 1st, the dissidents launched a coup attempt that failed but triggered a crisis within
Jimenez’s cabinet. On January 9, Jimenez’s ministers forced him to resign. But a few
days later, on January 13, Jimenez appointed himself Minister of Defense in an attempt to
stay in power. The opposition (specifically Junta Patriotica, an umbrella organization for
the political parties) launched a general strike to force Jimenez out. The military had
decided that in the interests of the military organization Jimenez needed to leave and it
refused to end the strike. Jimenez resigned, and pressure for democratization forced the
new military junta to gradually transition.
Sources:
Karl, Terry Lynn. “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in
Venezuela.” Latin American Research Review 22, no. 1 (1987): 63-94.
Venezuela 4/11/2002-4/14/2002 – fragmented high level
During anti-President Hugo Chavez protests on April 11, 2002, the National Guard
fatally shot a demonstrator. Senior military officers held Chavez responsible, and asked
for his resignation. The commander of the army, General Vasquez Velasco, in particular,
stated he would not suppress anti-government demonstrations, and others followed his
lead. Chavez was ousted by these high ranking officers, but the military overall was
divided in how to respond (despite most being anti-repression). Events rapidly shifted,
and a transitional government led by businessman Pedro Carmono took power,
unconstitutionally. Carmono lost support almost immediately, by grabbing power against
pro-democracy civil society groups and appointing officers besides those who had helped
him take over. Anti-coup and pro-Chavez protests developed, and soon pro- Chavez army
officers such as General Raul Baduel returned Chavez to the presidency. Those who
staged the coup withdrew their support from the transitional government, understanding
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they would have to fight the pro-Chavez officers to defend it, and observing the growing
popular resistance to Carmona. They remained dissatisfied with Chavez’s personal
involvement in military promotions, however. Overall the military responded to the anticoup protest movement with high level shifts that were disunited and disorganized.
Sources:
Barracca, Steven. “Military Coups in the Post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador, and
Venezuela.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 137-154.
Pion-Berlin, David. “Democratization, Social Crisis, and the Impact of Military Domestic
Roles in Latin America.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 33, no. 1 (2005): 526.
Sylvia, Ronald D. and Constantine P. Danopoulos. “The Chavez Phenomenon: Political
Change in Venezuela.” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2003): 63-76.
Venezuela 2/14/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - loyal
After elections in late December 2013, part of the opposition began to carry out protests
against what it alleged were irregularities. At first the government of President Nicolas
Maduro deployed the National Guard and police against the demonstrators, and then it
started to arm pro-government civilians. In January 2015, as the protests continued,
Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino Lopez authorized the military to use deadly force
against the opposition. Maduro came to power after Hugo Chavez’s death in April 2013
and followed his reliance on the military.
Sources:
Corrales, Javier. “Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 2
(2015).
Ellis, R. Evan. “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for
the United States.” Strategic Studies Institute. July 10, 2015.
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-ofvenezuela/2015/07/10
Hawkins, Kirk A. “Responding to Radical Populism: Chavismo in Venezuela.”
Democratization 23, no. 2 (2016).
Hidalgo, Manuel. “The 2015 Parliamentary Elections in Venezuela.” Electoral Studies
(2016).
Yemen 1/16/2011-2/27/2012 – united defections
The first military loyalty shifts occurred on March 18, 2011, when pro-government
snipers fired on anti-President Ali Abdullha Saleh demonstrators, killing around 50. The
army, under Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, and its powerful First Armored Division,
commanded by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, defected from Saleh. Mohsen declared
that the army supported the protest movement, and it remained united under his
command. His decision prompted some defections by officers and rank and file from the
other security forces, like the Republican Guards. Some joined a recently formed group
called the Armed Forces Supporting the Peaceful Revolution. The divide between
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defectors and loyalists in the armed forces led to conflict in May. Violence broke out on
May 23 between the First Armored Division and the Republican Guards, as well as tribal
fighters. On June 3, the presidential palace was hit by a bomb, injuring Saleh. He left for
Saudi Arabia and Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi took over officially,
though Saleh’s son Summer 2011 saw more violent conflict and more loyalty shifts from
Saleh’s forces. He had created a number of institutional rivals to the military, including
the Republican Guards, paramilitary units, and tribal reserves. He also promoted loyal kin
to positions of control in these organizations. Importantly, the army and specifically the
First Armored Division commanders were not personally tied to Saleh (and their united
shift was key to Saleh’s removal from power). After a number of attempts at negotiations
for a transition, Saleh agreed in August to hold elections in the next few months. Saleh
returned to Yemen in late September, but left for Saudi Arabia and then the United States
in November. During these travels he signed onto an agreement brokered by the Gulf
Cooperation Council where Hadi took full power until elections in February. Hadi won
these elections.
Sources:
Alley, April Longley. “Assessing (In)security After the Arab Spring: The Case of
Yemen.” PS: Political Science and Politics 46, no. 4 (2013): 721-726.
Knights, Michael. “The Military Role in Yemen’s Protests: Civil-Military Relations in
the Tribal Republic.” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 261-288.
Makara, Michael. “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring.” Democracy
and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 334-359.
Thiel, Tobias. 2012. “After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?” In IDEAS
Reports – Special Reports, edited by Nicholas Kitchen. London: London School of
Economics, 2012.
Yugoslavia 6/3/1968-7/2/1968 – neutral
Students organized into a protest movement sought to overthrow the Communist regime
of President Josip Broz Tito. Tito repressed the movement, especially the more radical
factions, using internal security forces. The protests died down without the state pursuing
a military response.
Sources:
Klimke, Martin, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth, eds. Between Prague Spring and
French May. Berghahn Books, 2011.
Zabic, Sarah D. “Praxis, Student Protest, and Purposive Social Action: The Humanist
Marxist Critique of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.” MA thesis, Kent State
University, 2010.
Zambia 6/30/1990-10/31/1991 – neutral
Opposition had been growing during the election campaign between the ruling United
National Independence Party and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. The
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Kenneth Kaunda government deployed paramilitary forces to maintain order during.
Protests developed at the end of June because of an increase in the prices of food staples.
The government used force, and killed 27. On June 30, a few junior officers led by
Lieutenant Lichembe launched a coup. Thousands of demonstrators celebrated the end of
the regime, but the rest of the military put down the attempt by the small faction. Kaunda
remained committed to the referendum scheduled for October 17. During the subsequent
general elections, the military remained in the barracks and did not interfere with the
transition. The military and party were deeply integrated; the party had organs in the
military, and army promotions were made on the basis of party loyalty. Another key force
was the Department of Military Intelligence.
Sources:
Andreassen, Bard-Anders, Gisela Geisler, and Arne Tostensen. “Setting a Standard for
Africa? Lessons from the 1991 Zambian Elections.” Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 5
(1992).
Habasonda, Lee M. “The Military, Civil Society, and Democracy in Zambia.” African
Security Review 11, no. 2 (2002): 6-16.
Lindemann, Stefan. “Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia:
Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism.” Crisis States Research Center Working Paper 80
(2010).
Zambia 5/28/2001-12/27/2001 – neutral
The ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy campaigned for a change to the
constitution to allow Frederick Chiluba a third term, after voting him as their nominee in
the upcoming presidential election. These moves were very unpopular. Chiluba conceded
when he did not get parliamentary support for the constitutional amendment. The military
was neutral during the process, remaining on the sidelines. Sources report some in the
military wanted Chiluba out but they were sure Chiluba would leave through
constitutional means. Chiluba’s vice president Levy Mwanawasa was elected president in
December 2001.
Sources:
Haatobolo, Godfrey Haamweela Nachitumbi. “Civil Control of the Military in Zambia.”
PhD diss., University of Zambia, 2008.
Venter, Denis. “Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent Elections in
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho.” Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review 19,
no. 1 (2003): 1-39.
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK FOR UPDATED AND EXPANDED GWF
What follows is a portion of Jonathan Pinckney’s (2016) codebook, which he generously
shared with me. I further updated and expanded the data for cases in my dataset he did
not include.
Pinckney’s Codebook
For countries coded as democracies by GWF my first source to check was the V-Dem
Polyarchy score. If the score had remained more or less the same as in 2010 (less than a
0.2 decline), I simply coded a democratic regime as continuing through 2015. If there had
been a decline in the Polyarchy score I then checked the Freedom House reports on the
country to ascertain the reasons for the declining score. This was typically enough to
determine whether a democratic breakdown (as defined by the GWF codebook) had
occurred. I attempted to follow GWF’s coding rules as closely as possible.
For authoritarian regimes I checked the Archigos dataset to determine whether there had
been an irregular leader entry or exit from 2010-2015. If no irregular leader change had
occurred I simply coded the regime as continuing through 2015. If Archigos did code an
irregular leadership change I checked the Archigos case narratives and other secondary
sources to determine the nature of the change.
Honduras: Coded as democratic regime continuing despite coup in 2009 – coupmakers
did not fundamentally change regime rules, democratic elections (according to GWF
rules) held in 2010 and 2014.
Thailand: I code the democratic regime as ending in 2014 with the military coup that
overthrew Yingluck Shinawatra, and a military regime in 2015.
Yemen: I code the Saleh regime as ending on 23 November with Saleh’s signing the
GCC power-transfer agreement. The following Hadi regime I code as provisional because
Hadi was elected in an unopposed election with a mandate to orchestrate a transition to
democracy. I code this regime as ending in 2014 with the Houthi takeover of Sana’a and
subsequent breakout of civil war across Yemen.
Egypt: I code the “Egypt 52-NA” regime as ending with Mubarak’s resignation on Feb
11th, 2011. I code the following regime as “provisional.” While it was led by the
military, it explicitly took power as a temporary measure to lead up to democratic
elections, and then did in fact allow the elections to occur in 2012 when Mohammed
Morsi was elected. I code Morsi’s regime as democratic because his election was widely
considered to be free and fair. I code the beginning of a new regime with the coup that
overthrew Morsi in 2013, and the subsequent regime under Abdel-fatah al-Sisi as
Military-Personalistic.
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Iraq: GWF code Iraq as transitioning from foreign occupation to autocracy in the
beginning of 2011. I code the subsequent regime as party-personal, reflecting the
domination both by Shi’a political parties and specifically by Nouri al-Maliki.
Turkey: I strongly considered Turkey as moving to a personalistic regime during this
period. However, Freedom House reports that the 2015 election, while certainly
contentious, was relatively free and fair. It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the
Erdogan regime’s crackdown on opposition following the 2016 attempted coup mark
Turkey’s move away from democracy, but it does not appear that this transition occurred
prior to 2016.
Tunisia: I code the Ben Ali as ending with Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia on January 14th,
2011. I code the following regime as provisional, first under Fouad Mebazaa and then
under the National Constituent Assembly, which was tasked with running the government
until a constitution could be written and democratic elections held. I code this regime as
continuing until the presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2014, when I
code Tunisia as becoming a democracy.
Madagascar: GWF code the regime of Andry Rajoelina beginning in 2009 as
personalistic. Rajoelina maintained that his regime was transitional, and did in fact allow
another candidate to take power in 2014. Thus, I considered coding the regime as
provisional. However, by a strict reading of GWF’s coding rules, provisional
governments are only those charged with conducting elections as “part of a transition to
democracy,” and thus coding the Rajoelina regime as autocratic is closer to their rules. I
code the regime as failing with the assumption of power by democratically-elected
president Rajaonarimampianina in January 2014.
Burundi: GWF code Burundi as a democracy beginning with the election of 2005. I code
this democratic regime as ending in 2010 because of the widespread electoral fraud and
intimidation of the opposition that characterized the May-July 2010 elections. This
follows GWF’s coding rules of an authoritarian regime starting when a leader assumes
power through an election that is not free and fair (GWF Codebook page 6). I code the
following regime as a party-personal regime.
Burkina Faso: I code the Compaore regime in Burkina Faso as ending in October 2014
with Compaore’s ouster in the 2014 Lwili Revolution. I code the following regime under
interim president Michel Kafando as provisional – the regime was explicitly set up to
prepare for democratic elections, which did in fact take place in late 2015. Late 2015
marks the beginning of a democratic regime. There was an attempted coup in late 2015,
but the coup failed to ultimately unseat Kafando.
Ukraine: This is the only place where I directly diverge from a coding by GWF. They
code Ukraine as democratic from its independence from the Soviet Union in 1992.
However, by their coding rules autocratic regimes start when an executive achieves
power through undemocratic means, i.e. elections that are not reasonably competitive.
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According to experts, the 1999 election of Leonid Kuchma was very far from free and
fair, and Kuchma subsequently significantly changed the rules for choosing leaders and
policies, centralizing presidential power. Thus I code Ukraine as autocratic from 1999 to
2004, when the Orange Revolution defeated Kuchma’s successor. I code Ukraine as
democratic subsequently. V-Dem shows a precipitous decline in Ukraine’s polyarchy
score following the Euromaidan protests and ouster of President Yanukovych. I decided
to code a regime failure event in 2014, considering the dramatic change in rules for
choosing leaders and policies that took place in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests.
However, because Yanukovych’s ouster and a free and fair executive election both took
place in 2014, the country-years show up as a continuous democratic period.
Kingma Neu’s Coding
Bahrain 2011-2015 (2010): monarchy
From Archigos, al-Khalifa’s entry into power was regular, and he was still leader. AlKhalifa was the son of Bahrain’s previous leader. From Polity, Bahrain was a
nondemocracy.
Chile 1931 (1930): military
From Archigos, the leader was Ibanez, a military general. From Polity, Chile was a
nondemocracy.
Other sources: Chile was a military dictatorship, following military intervention against
the oligarchy.
Haring, Clarence H. “The Chilean Revolution of 1931.” The Hispanic American
Historical Review 13, no. 2 (1933): 197-203.
Vidal, Hernan. “The Gravitation of Narratives of National Identity on Human Rights: The
Case of Chile.” Hispanic Issues On Line 5, no. 1 (2009).
Djibouti 2011 (2010): party
From Archigos, Guelleh’s entry into power was regular, and he was still leader. From
Polity, Djibouti was a nondemocracy.
Other sources: The first president of Djibouti turned it into a one-party state in 1981.
Guelleh succeeded him (Gradstein p. 25).
Gradstein, Mark. “Dictatorship, Transitions, and Development.” Monaster Center for
Economic Research Discussion Paper 11 (2011).
Guatemala 1944 (1943): personalist
From Archigos, Ubico’s entry into power was regular, but his exit was irregular. From
Polity, Guatemala was a nondemocracy.
Other sources: Guatemala was military dictatorship, but Ubico exercised personal control
over the military institution (Gleijeses p. 15). The dictatorship was highly personalist
(Grieb p. 524). Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the
United States, 1944-1954. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
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Grieb, Kenneth J. “The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of 1944.” The Americas
32, no. 4 (1976): 524-543.
Guyana 1990-1992 (1989): single-party
From Archigos, Hoyte’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity,
Guyana was a nondemocracy.
Other sources: Hoyte was part of the ruling People’s National Congress Party and
appointed ruler. Under Hoyte, though, the party was not as powerful as previously
(Griffith p. 269). Yet – it remained the “dominant political force” (Griffith 1991).
Griffith, Ivelaw L. “The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana.” Journal of
Interamarican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 2 (1991).
Griffith, Ivelaw L. “Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana.” Third
World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 267-275.
East Timor 2006 (2005): democratic
From Polity, East Timor was a democracy.
Fiji 1987 (1986): democratic
From Archigos, Mara’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Fiji
was a democracy.
Fiji 2000 (1999): democratic
From Archigos, Rabuka’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Fiji
was a democracy.
Maldives 2003-2008 (2002): personalist
From Archigos, Gayoom’s entry into and exit from power were regular. He was elected
president. From Polity, Maldives was a nondemocracy. From VDem, there are no
mentions of a political party or the military.
Other sources: Gayoom had absolute power (Bonofer p. 438).
Bonofer, Jacob Ashik. “The Challenges of Democracy in Maldives.” IJSAS 3, no. 2
(2010): 433- 449.
Maldives 2012 (2011): democratic
From Archigos, Nasheed’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity,
Maldives was a nondemocracy. FreedomHouse classified it as “Partly Free”, and
specifically, an “electoral democracy”.
Maldives 2012-2013 (2011)
See above.
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Suriname 1983-1984 (1982): military
From Archigos, Bouterse’s entry into power was irregular and he was still leader. From
Polity, Suriname was a nondemocracy. From VDem, Suriname’s head of state was
appointed by the military.
Other sources: The military didn’t rule directly but exercised authority over the mostly
civilian government (Singh p. 71). Bouterse sought to personally control the military, was
this was not complete by 1983 (p. 80).
Singh, Chaitram. “Re-Democratization in Guyana and Suriname.” European Review of
Latin America and Caribbean Studies 84 (2008): 71-85.
Tonga 2005-2006 (2004): monarchy
Not in Archigos. From Polity, Tonga was a nondemocracy. Based on FreedomHouse, it
was a monarchy.
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER THREE
Additional, Unreported Tests
Table 1. Correlation between defections and the defect_sec variable from MEC
defections
defect_sec

defections
1
0.4957

defect_sec
1

Table 2. Summary statistics of EffectiveNumber across regime types
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Personalist
34
1.768491 0.6585462
1
3.614155
Party
31
1.994791 0.5003857
1
3.070187
Military
17
1.89134 0.6372488
1
3.149361
Note: This shows that institutional coup-proofing is not exclusive to personalist regimes.
Table 3. Models of defections and other measures of ICP: non-transformed
EffectiveNumber, its squared term, and a measure of deviation from two armed
organizations
EffectiveNumber -0.3460
(1.1720)
EffNumSQ
0.1370
(0.2710)
ENdev
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.3370
(1.2040)
94
0.01
123.975
131.605

0.2570
(0.3370)
-0.567**
(0.2090)
94
0.004
122.72
127.806

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 4. Models of types of loyalty shifts and other measures of ICP
Low Level
EffectiveNumber -1.8330
EffNumSQ
0.4730
ENdev
Constant
0.2600
Fragmented
EffectiveNumber -1.9450
EffNumSQ
0.5020
ENdev
Constant
0.6240
United
EffectiveNumber
EffNumSQ
ENdev
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

0.6150
0.0390
-2.6810
94
0.013
240.989
263.879

(2.9440)
(0.6770)
(2.9560)

0.2590
-1.470**

(0.9260)
(0.5700)

0.7250
-1.446***

(0.6260)
(0.4140)

0.1540
-1.345*
94
0.004
237.125
252.385

(0.9480)
(0.5500)

(2.1540)
(0.4810)
(2.2920)

(3.4000)
(0.7930)
(3.4360)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 5. Model of variable for institutionalized opposition (presence of an opposition
political party) and defections
Opposition
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.0140
(0.2420)
-0.448*
(0.1960)
111
0.00
143.876
149.295

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 6. Model of variable for institutionalized opposition (presence of an opposition
political party) and types of loyalty shifts
Opposition
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
-0.4900
(0.5060)
-1.061**
(0.3380)
111
0.007
277.239
293.496

Fragmented
-0.4390
(0.5070)
-0.860*
(0.3760)

United
0.2720
(0.5190)
-1.466**
(0.4540)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 7. Model of variable for voluntarily recruited military and defections
Recruit
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.2480
(0.3010)
-0.398*
(0.1850)
82
0.006
105.808
110.621

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 8. Model of variable for voluntarily recruited military and types of loyalty shifts
Recruit
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
-0.7790
(0.7310)
-0.956**
(0.3300)
82
0.01
206.641
221.081

Fragmented
-0.4510
(0.6020)
-0.773*
(0.3310)

United
-0.8280
(0.8560)
-1.312**
(0.4590)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
On page 83 of Chapter Three, I report that the interaction between nonviolence and size
is not significant for defections. I show this below.
Table 9. Model of protester characteristics and defections
Size
Nonviolence
NV x Size
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.8990
-1.0530
0.6800
0.2240
0.769**
0.2850
-0.660**
1.422*
-2.2370
94
0.209
113.329
136.219

(2.8260)
(1.9920)
(2.9240)
(1.2040)
(0.2600)
(0.1890)
(0.2220)
(0.5720)
(2.7950)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Prior to the 3-way interaction between size, PCP, and ICP in Table 10 of Chapter Three, I
calculated 2-way interactions between combinations of the coup-proofing variables (ICP
and PCP) and those related to the protest movement (size and nonviolence). They are
displayed below.
Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, conditional on ICP
Size
ICP
Size x ICP
Nonviolence
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Nonviolence
Nonviolence x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-16.1070
-5.5170
12.2800
-0.4670
1.210**
1.1230
1.015**
0.857**
-1.274**
2.034**

(9.8550)
(4.8910)
(7.5330)
(0.3430)
(0.4200)
(1.4770)
(0.3350)
(0.2950)
(0.4100)
(0.6840)

2.3730
90
0.33
99.701
127.199

(6.8770)

0.0930
9.992***

(1.2080)
(2.4050)

1.396**
0.5460
1.206***
0.980**
-1.403***
1.790**
11.225***
-8.388***
-19.91***
90
0.38
93.903
121.4

(0.4560)
(1.5810)
(0.3210)
(0.3190)
(0.4100)
(0.6680)
(3.2280)
(2.3230)
(4.8480)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 11. Models of protester characteristics and defections, conditional on PCP
Size
ICP
PCP
Size x PCP
Nonviolence
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Nonviolence
Nonviolence x PCP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
AIC
BIC

0.1250
2.405**
1.1470
0.0540
-0.4650
0.5940
0.953**
0.775**
-1.176**
1.784**

(1.6810)
(0.7740)
(1.6240)
(2.3540)
(0.3270)
(1.4390)
(0.3260)
(0.2860)
(0.3780)
(0.6200)

-7.611**
90
0.311
101.865
129.363

(2.9540)

0.1350
2.398**
1.0230

(1.2220)
(0.7460)
(0.6740)

0.6620
0.952**
0.763*
-1.165**
1.771**
-0.5480
0.2110
-7.556**
90
0.312
101.785
129.283

(1.4080)
(0.3250)
(0.2980)
(0.3850)
(0.6150)
(0.4540)
(0.6000)
(2.8510)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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In Table 10 of the main text, I interact PCP and ICP with size. In Table 12 below, I
interact PCP and ICP with nonviolence.
Table 12. Models of nonviolence and defections, conditional on coup-proofing
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Nonviolence x ICP x PCP
Nonviolence x ICP
Nonviolence x PCP
PCP x ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
AIC

-0.1870
10.411*
8.523**
-9.6770
-6.6500
-7.737*
8.8870
8.1200
0.0750
1.126***
0.911**
-1.312***
1.676*
-17.170**
90
0.392
98.442

BIC

133.439
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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(1.2690)
(4.7340)
(3.2150)
(8.0730)
(5.8410)
(3.2830)
(8.2770)
(5.6650)
(1.6390)
(0.3220)
(0.3120)
(0.3950)
(0.6580)
(5.8440)

On page 94 of Chapter Three, I note an absence of results for the interaction between ICP
and loss. I report this in Table 13 below.
Table 13. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries (ICP) and loyalty shift types
Loss
PCP
Loss x ICP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
29.829*
(12.4770)
1.984*
(0.8200)
-23.646*
(10.2240)
4.2010

Fragmented
15.878**
(5.6320)
2.956**
(0.9110)
-11.994**
(3.9630)
7.349***

United
5.0500
(5.0640)
2.178*
(0.9060)
-3.4800
(3.4140)
5.965**

(2.3400)
-4.611*
(2.3520)
0.2520

(2.1630)
-1.8010
(5.0060)
2.198*

(1.8310)
1.3000
(3.7150)
1.245*

(0.4410)
0.0980
(0.4140)
0.0570
(0.7310)

(0.9260)
2.030*
(0.7910)
-2.567*
(1.0130)

(0.5330)
0.5780
(0.5100)
-1.4410
(0.8510)

1.5260
(1.4580)
-10.1460
(6.1380)
94
0.278
223.129
299.428

4.509**
(1.4820)
-23.500*
(9.1280)

1.3580
(1.3570)
-12.624*
(5.2900)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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In Tables 14-16, I display the results for the individual probit regressions I summarize in
footnote 192 of Chapter Three.
Table 14. Tests of H5a-b for low level shifts, controlling for protester characteristics
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita

4.336**
-0.3970
0.4380
0.7270
-2.2710
-0.0680
-0.1860

(1.6050)
(0.3850)
(0.8690)
(0.4190)
(1.3140)
(0.0980)
(0.2040)

Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant

0.3620
0.3860
-5.519*

(0.2920)
(0.4740)
(2.5710)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

90
0.17
78.674
103.672

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 15. Tests of H5a-b for fragmented high level shifts, controlling for protester
characteristics
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Dem Level

-0.1250
-0.3580
1.5510
1.082**
-0.3050

(1.3650)
(0.3140)
(0.8600)
(0.3990)
(1.9340)

Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

1.012*
1.089**
-1.226**
2.274**

(0.4390)
(0.3490)
(0.4340)
(0.7280)

Constant

-9.255*

(3.7600)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC

90
0.33
78.407

BIC

103.405
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 16. Tests of H5a-b for united defections, controlling for protester characteristics
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Dem Level

0.0250
-0.4290
1.729*
0.4570
0.9760

(1.5700)
(0.3360)
(0.7520)
(0.3780)
(1.4910)

Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant

0.366*
-0.0410
-0.3730
-0.0170
-3.0030

(0.1650)
(0.1860)
(0.2920)
(0.6110)
(2.5900)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

90
0.173
84.369
109.367

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

358

Tables 17-19 show the results for the interactions of other combinations of coup-proofing
and protest movement variables besides size and ICP as reported in Table 17 of Chapter
Three. The interaction between nonviolence and ICP is significant on all loyalty shift
types, but in the opposite direction than expected. The interaction between size and PCP
is significant on fragmented high level shifts, but the marginal effects at the variables’
substantively meaningful values are not significant.
Table 17. Model of interaction between nonviolence and ICP, on loyalty shift types
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
NV x ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
10.859**
(3.4470)
13.228
(6.9650)
11.751**
(4.4320)
3.384**
(1.0610)

Fragmented
3.662
(2.7080)
19.322*
(9.7450)
19.370**
(6.9440)
4.043***
(1.2190)

United
3.517
(3.9670)
28.131***
(8.2910)
24.512***
(6.0920)
3.241*
(1.2980)

-10.138*
(4.9620)
-4.869
(2.8480)
0.481
(0.3540)
0.299
(0.5570)
-0.441
(0.7920)
1.434
(1.0810)
-26.915**
(9.9420)
90
0.354
206.85
289.344

-14.769*
(6.8470)
-2.475
(5.5050)
2.549*
(1.1180)
2.592**
(0.9730)
-3.152*
(1.3080)
5.099**
(1.9060)
-43.978***
(12.7770)

-20.66***
(5.7370)
1.461
(5.4220)
1.992***
(0.5670)
1.137
(0.6140)
-2.280*
(0.9940)
1.647
(1.9990)
-43.89***
(10.9040)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 18. Model of interaction between size and PCP, on loyalty shift types
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Size x PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
6.984*
(3.4270)
-0.9560
(0.8500)
2.5940
(1.9450)
-4.2070
(4.6730)
11.0590

Fragmented
0.6090
(3.2060)
-1.0800
(0.8260)
4.738*
(1.8580)
-3.0690
(2.9020)
10.487*

United
3.5690
(5.8030)
-0.9290
(0.8750)
5.645**
(1.9960)
1.2140
(5.8780)
2.7850

(6.7850)
-5.0780
(3.0180)
0.1970
(0.2620)
0.2420
(0.5090)
-0.3070
(0.7350)
1.7080
(0.9590)
-9.5790
(6.7640)
90
0.317
215.111
297.605

(4.7090)
-2.4630
(4.8010)
2.130*
(1.0130)
2.216*
(0.9170)
-2.701*
(1.1940)
4.970**
(1.7430)
-19.028*
(7.9870)

(8.5390)
1.0570
(4.9020)
1.312*
(0.5980)
0.7880
(0.6280)
-1.7450
(0.9690)
1.6370
(1.5100)
-13.4510
(7.1430)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

360

Table 19. Model of interaction between nonviolence and PCP, on loyalty shift types
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
NV x PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
10.395**
(3.3330)
-0.369
(1.1930)
3.068
(1.8620)
3.831*
(1.7840)
-1.053

Fragmented
3.659
(2.6240)
-0.995
(0.9100)
5.581**
(2.1310)
3.770*
(1.5850)
-0.249

United
3.012
(3.7920)
-1.285
(1.2900)
5.516**
(1.7540)
2.248
(1.7140)
0.48

(1.8410)
-4.946
(2.9160)
0.12
(0.2840)
0.19
(0.4760)
-0.231
(0.6930)
1.616
(0.9010)
-12.890*
(6.2720)
90
0.309
216.829
299.323

(1.4680)
-2.729
(4.5800)
2.110*
(0.9990)
2.240*
(0.9090)
-2.737*
(1.2010)
4.957**
(1.6760)
-22.097*
(8.7020)

(1.5950)
1.341
(4.7410)
1.252*
(0.5590)
0.66
(0.5720)
-1.611
(0.8950)
1.466
(1.5060)
-12.353*
(5.8120)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

361

I interact size and ICP in Table 17 of Chapter Three. The interaction term on low level
shifts is negative and statistically significant. I summarize what that means substantively
in the text, and show the marginal effects in Figure 1 below. Few are significant, but the
predicted probability of low level shifts increases to .75 with large protests and no
counterforces.
Figure 1. Marginal effects of ICP and size on low level shifts
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All Reported Tests Without Controls
Table 20. Models of coup-proofing and defections
H1-H1a

Interaction

ICP
PCP
PCP x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC

0.9220
0.596*

(0.5930)
(0.2780)

-1.954*
96
0.044
121.456

(0.8890)

BIC

129.149

-0.1720
-2.6410
2.390*
-0.4080
96
0.07
120.293

(0.6890)
(1.6820)
(1.1990)
(1.0140)

130.55

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 21. Models of other regime types and defections
H1b
Party Regime
Mil Regime
ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.5810
0.1030
0.7460
-1.3400
96
0.043
123.593
133.851

(0.3280)
(0.3450)
(0.6130)
(0.8880)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 22. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and
conditional on coup-proofing
H2

Interaction

Size
Nonviolence
PCP
ICP
SizexPCPxICP
Size x ICP
Size x PCP
PCP x ICP

0.9690
-0.1280
0.657*
0.6480

(1.1180)
(0.2760)
(0.3030)
(0.6170)

-7.4070
-0.1610
-4.2100
-4.2930
-1.1350
5.8270
2.6990
2.9970

(8.5870)
(0.2810)
(10.7860)
(3.9930)
(11.9370)
(6.0730)
(16.0740)
(8.0480)

Constant

-2.1140

(1.3250)

5.0030

(5.7630)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

92
0.048
121.873
134.482

92
0.076
126.62
149.316

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 23. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing
Loss

Interaction

Loss
ICP
PCP
LossxICPxPCP
Loss x ICP
Loss x PCP
ICP x PCP
Constant

0.2000
0.9200
0.592*

(0.4460)
(0.5800)
(0.2780)

2.3910
0.0300
-2.4330
2.8340
-2.1330
-2.3580
2.1510
-0.6620

-1.970*

(0.8730)

Observations

96

96

Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

0.046
123.253
133.511

0.09
125.949
146.464

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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(2.6620)
(0.8530)
(1.9660)
(3.1530)
(1.7870)
(4.5950)
(1.4160)
(1.2290)

Table 24. Models of ongoing conflict and defections
Conflict
Viol Campaign
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

0.1260
-0.528***
109
0.002
139.086
144.469

(0.2620)
(0.1590)

0.4670
-0.615***
112
0.022
141.531
146.968

(0.2510)
(0.1570)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 25. Models of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types
PCP
ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

Low Level
1.0590
(0.6600)
0.8830
(1.6220)
-2.9600 (2.4230)
96
0.045

AIC

236.25

BIC

259.329

Fragmented
0.8440
(0.6340)
0.7800
(1.3330)
-2.4560
(1.9950)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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United
1.716** (0.6140)
2.938*
(1.2910)
-6.116** (2.0190)

Table 26. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types
Low Level
0.4130
(1.2410)
0.9320
(0.6520)
14.466***
(1.6020)
0.9100
(1.5950)

Fragmented United
0.0050
13.331***
(1.2590)
(0.9950)
0.6940
1.347*
(0.6780)
(0.6640)
14.693*** 28.610***
(1.7310)
(1.2960)
0.7950
2.916*
(1.3460)
(1.3730)

Constant

-3.0470
(2.3270)

-2.4790
(2.0120)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC

96
0.069
242.848

BIC

281.313

Loss
PCP
Loss x PCP
ICP

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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-5.977**
(2.1030)

Table 27. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coupproofing
Low Level

Fragmented United

9.741**
(3.0910)
-0.8320
(0.7940)
1.6150
(1.6230)
2.174**
(0.7210)

4.0850
(2.6730)
-0.2810
(0.6410)
0.5640
(1.4740)
1.2700
(0.7320)

2.9730
(3.0250)
-0.5290
(0.5970)
2.816*
(1.4350)
2.074**
(0.6520)

Constant

-10.58***
(2.9680)

-4.7250
(3.4950)

-7.576*
(3.3050)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC

92
0.104
227.819

BIC

265.646

Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 28. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Size x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R
AIC
BIC

2

Low Level

Fragmented United

48.438*
(18.9150)
-0.8100
(0.7860)
21.797*
(9.0780)
2.403***
(0.7120)
-27.843*

9.3560
(15.8370)
-0.2820
(0.6400)
3.1680
(7.4510)
1.3080
(0.7550)
-3.8470

-15.1150
(18.3620)
-0.6550
(0.6290)
-5.7040
(8.6790)
1.987**
(0.6790)
13.0040

(13.1110)
-38.896**
(13.5620)

(11.1150)
-8.3020
(10.9490)

(13.2690)
4.3350
(12.0510)

92
0.123
229.682
275.074
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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All Reported Tests Including Democracies
Table 29. Models of coup-proofing and defections
H1-H1a

Interaction

1.498**
(0.5500)
0.4720
(0.2710)
0.8870
(0.9370)
0.1880

1.0940
(0.6940)
-0.9720
(1.3760)
0.9070
(0.9310)
0.1760

(0.1190)
0.2410
(0.1750)
-0.643**
(0.2120)

(0.1200)
0.2500
(0.1740)
-0.653**
(0.2100)

0.2840
(0.3740)

0.2450
(0.3570)
1.0730
(1.0210)

Constant

-0.5150
(1.5080)

0.1610
(1.6850)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC

128
0.111
163.524

128
0.116
164.669

BIC

186.34

190.337

ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
PCP x ICP

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 30. Models of other regime types and defections
H1b
Party Regime

-0.977**
(0.3600)
Military Regime -0.3620
(0.3910)
ICP
1.532**
(0.5420)
Dem Level
0.1580
(0.9680)
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality

0.2440
(0.1360)
0.2610
(0.1790)
-0.646**
(0.2330)
0.3010
(0.3540)
-0.4470

Coup
Constant

(1.6100)
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

128
0.147
159.552
185.221

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 31. Models of protester characteristics and defections, with coup-proofing
Size
Nonviolence
PCP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

H2

Interaction

1.7770
(1.0900)
-0.479*
(0.2420)
0.5610
(0.3050)
1.254*
(0.5750)

-9.9010
(8.6150)
-0.508*
(0.2490)
2.1880
(8.1440)
-4.5630
(4.1000)

1.0800
(0.9170)
0.1940
(0.1180)
0.2040

1.1960
(0.9230)
0.1760
(0.1210)
0.2770

(0.1850)
-0.696**
(0.2300)
0.3590

(0.1850)
-0.721**
(0.2320)
0.4380

(0.3840)

(0.3790)
5.5840
(9.1740)
8.2500
(5.9960)
-5.3810
(12.6760)
-2.1970
(5.8470)
7.6160
(6.0240)
121
0.182
157.803
196.944

Size x PCP x ICP
Size x ICP
Size x PCP
PCP x ICP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.3960
(1.6960)
121
0.155
153.962
181.92

Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.05, **
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p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 32. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing
Loss
ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup

Loss

Interaction

0.3350
(0.3890)
1.458**
(0.5480)
0.4610
(0.2700)
0.9390
(0.9440)

-0.2330
(2.3540)
1.0260
(0.7950)
-0.8660
(1.5770)
0.9440
(0.9310)

0.1980
(0.1250)
0.2300
(0.1740)

0.1800
(0.1230)
0.2450
(0.1830)

-0.635**
(0.2110)
0.2910
(0.3670)

-0.641**
(0.2140)
0.2670
(0.3560)
2.1980

Loss x ICP x PCP

(3.3270)
0.2750
(1.6170)
-2.1000

Loss x ICP
Loss x PCP
ICP x PCP
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.5690
(1.5440)
128
0.115
164.828
190.496

(4.5200)
0.9480
(1.1810)
0.1330
(1.8010)
128
0.125
171.321
208.397

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 33. Models of ongoing conflict and defections
Conflict
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality

0.2500
(0.2660)
0.9100
(0.7700)
0.1770
(0.1010)
0.0870
(0.1370)
-0.362**

0.9100
(0.7650)
0.1720
(0.1010)
0.0780
(0.1340)
-0.363**

(0.1340)
0.1990
(0.3090)

(0.1310)
0.2050
(0.2920)
0.2900
(0.2240)

Observations
Pseudo R2

0.4150
(1.3000)
139
0.065

0.5150
(1.2980)
139
0.068

AIC
BIC

183.718
204.259

183.333
203.874

Coup
Viol Campaign
Constant

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 34. Models of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types
PCP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
1.449*
(0.6600)
0.8870
(1.4560)
-1.1480
(2.1180)
0.1590
(0.1680)

Fragmented
1.478*
(0.6420)
4.205**
(1.3340)
3.6460
(1.9050)
1.272**
(0.4490)

United
0.9710
(0.5770)
2.3620
(1.2870)
0.7920
(1.7420)
0.1830
(0.2340)

0.2800
(0.3280)
-0.0130
(0.6100)
1.3600
(0.7670)
-6.2410
(4.1960)

1.505**
(0.5370)
-2.126***
(0.5780)
2.249*
(0.9030)
-11.699*
(5.5150)

-0.1420
(0.3660)
-0.4540
(0.4950)
0.2100
(1.0690)
-1.3250
(2.6920)

128
0.144
310.515
378.963
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 35. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types
Loss
PCP
Loss x PCP
ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
0.1900
(0.9840)
1.289*
(0.6430)
13.963***
(1.4110)
0.8210
(1.4530)

Fragmented
-0.3740
(1.1050)
1.418*
(0.6790)
13.570***
(1.5040)
4.194**
(1.3470)

United
0.6710
(0.9670)
0.7610
(0.6300)
14.145***
(1.2010)
1.9600
(1.3110)

-0.9040
(2.0800)
0.1630
(0.1720)
0.2250
(0.3290)
0.0220
(0.6160)
1.3810
(0.7390)
-6.1700
(4.1620)
128
0.159
317.904
403.465

3.6620
(1.9040)
1.272**
(0.4490)
1.513**
(0.5580)
-2.136***
(0.6020)
2.271*
(0.9000)
-11.649*
(5.4000)

1.0360
(1.7390)
0.1930
(0.2420)
-0.1890
(0.3540)
-0.4130
(0.5020)
0.2940
(1.0270)
-1.0010
(2.7650)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 36. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coupproofing
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
6.856*
(3.2620)
-0.8110
(0.7170)
1.2910
(1.4720)
2.053**
(0.7450)

Fragmented
4.7150
(2.5590)
-0.7140
(0.6230)
4.066**
(1.4060)
1.804**
(0.6530)

United
4.2510
(2.4980)
-1.222*
(0.5370)
1.9780
(1.4080)
1.2960
(0.6770)

-0.2820
(2.1380)
0.1100
(0.1400)
0.1130
(0.3760)
-0.1660
(0.5990)
0.8050
(0.7360)
-8.2030
(4.9120)
121
0.193
296.109
379.982

3.9270
(2.0170)
1.201*
(0.5000)
1.389*
(0.5590)
-2.202***
(0.6640)
2.171*
(1.0450)
-12.075*
(5.4240)

1.1800
(1.8470)
0.2110
(0.2320)
-0.1810
(0.3960)
-0.6810
(0.5880)
0.2570
(1.0090)
-0.8550
(3.1730)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 37. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP
Size
Nonviolence
ICP
PCP
Size x ICP
Dem Level
Incumbent
GDP per capita
Soldier Quality
Coup
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

Low Level
15.6650
(19.2070)
-0.7250
(0.7540)
5.8300
(9.9110)
2.005**
(0.7310)
-6.3510

Fragmented
-16.5380
(12.3320)
-0.7080
(0.6270)
-6.0790
(5.8600)
1.845**
(0.6730)
15.7870

United
-13.1990
(14.9680)
-1.200*
(0.5430)
-6.1890
(6.5730)
1.3050
(0.6880)
12.9500

(14.4450)
-0.2610
(2.1500)
0.0940
(0.1380)
0.0520
(0.3910)
-0.1620
(0.5900)
0.6320
(0.7390)
-14.0000
(12.1500)
121
0.204
298.893
391.154

(9.0150)
4.402*
(1.9960)
1.247*
(0.4960)
1.495*
(0.5850)
-2.260***
(0.6860)
2.472*
(1.0170)
0.6860
(9.3180)

(10.5780)
1.3420
(1.8990)
0.2050
(0.2410)
-0.1360
(0.3990)
-0.6840
(0.6010)
0.3040
(1.0480)
9.7820
(9.2650)

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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APPENDIX D: QCA
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Table 1. Full dataset
Variable
PCP
NV
OPP
LOSS
VIOL

0

1
68
31
43
92
71

35
72
57
11
32

Total
103
103
100
103
103

Table 2. Reduced dataset
Variable
PCP
NV
OPP
LOSS
VIOL

0

1
34
18
21
51
37

24
40
36
7
21

Total
58
58
57
58
58

Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables
Table 3. Full dataset
Variable
Defections
Low Level
Fragmented
United

0

1
69
89
85
87

34
14
18
16

Total
103
103
103
103

Table 4. Reduced dataset
Variable
0
1
Total
Defections
43
15
58
Low Level
50
8
58
Fragmented
63
8
71
United
48
10
58
(Note: There are more observations for Fragmented because I do not drop cases that have
experienced coups when testing it as an outcome.)
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Summary Statistics for ICP and SIZE, Calibrated for Different Outcomes
Table 5. Defections outcome, full dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
57
61

39
38

Total
96
99

Table 6. Defections outcome, reduced dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
31
40

24
17

Total
55
57

Table 7. Low level outcome, full dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
44

Mean
0.48370

Std Dev
0.30227

Min
0

Max
1

Total
96
99

Max
1

Total
55
57

55

Table 8. Low level outcome, reduced dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
28

Mean
0.51245

Std Dev
0.27448

Min
0

29

Table 9. Fragmented outcome, full dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
70
44

26
55

Total
96
99

Table 10. Fragmented outcome, reduced dataset
Variable
COUP
ICP
PCP
LOSS
SIZE
NV
VIOL
OPP

0

1
58
45
42
61
33
22
44
21
379

10
20
27
8
35
47
25
46

Total
68
65
69
69
68
69
69
67

Table 11. United defections outcome, full dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
70
61

26
38

Total
96
99

Table 12. United defections outcome, reduced dataset
Variable
ICP
SIZE

0

1
41
40
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14
17

Total
55
57

APPENDIX E: CHAPTER FIVE
Additional Summary Statistics
Table 1 includes summary statistics of the determinants of type shift included in Tables 7
and 8 of Chapter Five.
Table 1. Summary statistics of additional independent variables
Variable

N

ICP
Size

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

89
89

1.385059
0.6628707
1

0.2129828
0.1195083

1
0.3780322

1.901093
0.9207059

57
74

32
15

0
PCP
Coup

Robustness Checks with Other Measures of Democracy
Table 2. type shift and democratization measured as dempost5
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Neutral

0.3450
(0.3590)

-0.3500
(0.4090)

-0.3270
(0.3770)

Low Level

0.4150
(0.4490)
1.365**
(0.4500)
0.6380

0.1070
(0.6950)
1.0430
(0.8400)
0.4070

0.0940
(0.5420)
0.8690
(0.5380)
0.1590

(0.3720)
0.085**
(0.0310)

(0.6250)
0.1140
(0.0590)

(0.4870)
0.105*
(0.0440)

0.979*

1.149**

(0.4260)
-0.0950
(0.3940)
-0.0040
(0.0070)

(0.3650)
0.3720
(0.2690)

Fragmented
United
Dem Level (Polity)
Success
GDP per capita
Trade
Fuel Exports

-0.0010
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Area
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe
FSU
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC
BIC

-0.3100
(0.3330)
110
0.0997
147.676
163.879

(0.0120)
-0.3040

-0.0170

(0.1620)
1.234*
(0.5770)
1.805*
(0.8270)
2.682**
(1.0010)
-0.6080
(0.9300)
1.0420
(1.2230)
-0.8980
(1.0420)
3.0480
(3.9000)
67
0.3517
93.432
130.911

(0.1370)
0.9260
(0.5310)
1.563*
(0.6080)
2.156**
(0.7130)
0.3480
(0.6670)
1.1560
(0.7840)
-0.0670
(0.7280)
-4.5680
(2.7830)
101
0.3318
123.228
162.455

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 3. type shift and democratization (measured as dempost5), with determinants of
type shift
Model 1

Model 2

Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented

0.0940
0.1930
0.6100

(0.4360)
(0.6660)
(0.5610)

0.2040
-0.0930
1.342*

(0.3750)
(0.6090)
(0.5350)

United
Dem Level (Polity)
ICP
PCP
Size

-0.0350
0.135***
0.8140
1.331*
-0.1600

(0.5820)
(0.0380)
(0.9790)
(0.5700)
(1.5300)

0.7210
0.127**
0.7170
1.0920
0.7430

(0.5160)
(0.0410)
(0.9740)
(0.5580)
(1.4950)

Coup
Success
GDP per capita
Area

-0.4820
1.430***
0.539*
0.0020

(0.4240)
(0.3340)
(0.2610)
(0.1860)

-0.5250

(0.4190)

0.3720
0.0160

(0.2180)
(0.1620)

Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe

0.4620
1.811*
2.707**
0.2620
1.6870

(0.4490)
(0.7810)
(0.9830)
(0.7770)
(0.9300)

0.5390
1.760*
2.943***
0.2950
1.874*

(0.4160)
(0.7440)
(0.8840)
(0.7230)
(0.8210)

FSU
Constant

-0.8290
-7.2970

(0.7970)
(3.8250)

-0.2980
-6.2090

(0.8210)
(3.6080)

Observations
Pseudo R2

89
0.426

89
0.3363

AIC
BIC

108.81
156.094

117.879
162.675

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 4. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (dempost5)
Model 1

Model 2

Pr(Fragmented)
Success
Area
Cold War

-0.4720
1.223***
-0.0380
0.4470

(0.5760)
(0.3180)
(0.1460)
(0.4130)

0.1420

(0.5800)

-0.0010
0.4590

(0.1460)
(0.3520)

Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe

0.9050
1.3830
-0.3590
0.9910

(0.6210)
(0.7480)
(0.6160)
(0.8070)

0.8800
1.715*
0.0650
1.2920

(0.5850)
(0.7190)
(0.5860)
(0.7340)

FSU
Constant

-0.2090
-0.8410

(0.6740)
(2.0830)

0.2190
-0.9340

(0.7140)
(2.1290)

Observations
Pseudo R2
AIC

88
0.2294
113.973

88
0.1122
126.261

BIC

138.747

148.557

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 5. type shift and democratization measured as V-Dempost5
Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United
Dem Level (V-Dem)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.129*
(0.0520)
-0.0310
(0.0700)

-0.0520
(0.0720)
-0.0600
(0.1130)

0.0120
(0.0530)
-0.0620
(0.0710)

0.194*
(0.0780)
0.1280
(0.0700)

0.0150
(0.0960)
-0.0170
(0.0940)

0.0590
(0.0800)
0.0290
(0.0660)

0.3330
(0.1870)

-0.0550
(0.3050)
0.219**
(0.0770)
0.1010

-0.0160
(0.2170)
0.179**
(0.0570)
0.098**

(0.0520)
-0.0010
(0.0010)
0.0000

(0.0320)

Success
GDP per capita
Trade
Fuel Exports
Area
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe
FSU
Constant

0.274***
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(0.0020)
-0.0200
(0.0240)
0.201*
(0.0970)

-0.0070
(0.0130)
0.180**
(0.0640)

0.1570
(0.1370)
0.3040
(0.1640)
0.1010
(0.1530)
0.0660
(0.1860)
0.0260
(0.1540)
-0.3490

0.217*
(0.1000)
0.342**
(0.1020)
0.1980
(0.0990)
0.227*
(0.1090)
0.1210
(0.1020)
-0.6180

Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

(0.0700)
97
0.148
-7.217
8.231

(0.4930)
56
0.493
-6.972
27.459

(0.3410)
88
0.52
-36.655
0.505

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 6. type shift and democratization (V-Dempost5), with determinants of type shift
Model 1

Model 2

Neutral

0.0300

(0.0500)

0.0630

(0.0540)

Low Level
Fragmented
United
Dem Level (V-Dem)
ICP

-0.0420
0.0180
0.0010
0.1840
0.0250

(0.0820)
(0.0690)
(0.0830)
(0.1820)
(0.0920)

-0.0620
0.1190
0.0870
0.2250
0.0040

(0.0910)
(0.0810)
(0.0900)
(0.2060)
(0.1040)

PCP
Size
Coup
Success

0.0960
0.1140
-0.0520
0.172***

(0.0510)
(0.1980)
(0.0540)
(0.0470)

0.0980
0.2420
-0.0670

(0.0540)
(0.2160)
(0.0510)

GDP per capita
Area
Cold War
Asia

0.091**
-0.0070
0.1000
-0.0850

(0.0320)
(0.0200)
(0.0590)
(0.1020)

0.085*
0.0010
0.1170
-0.1320

(0.0340)
(0.0210)
(0.0670)
(0.0990)

Americas
Africa
FSU
MENA
Constant

0.0770
-0.1400
-0.260*
-0.297*
-0.3700

(0.1000)
(0.0990)
(0.1020)
(0.1120)
(0.4150)

0.0880
-0.1560
-0.258*
-0.368**
-0.4140

(0.1020)
(0.0980)
(0.1260)
(0.1130)
(0.4300)

Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

76
0.61
-40.001
4.283

76
0.534
-28.376
13.577

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 7. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (V-Dempost5)
Model 1

Model 2

Pr(Fragmented)
Success
Area
Cold War

-0.0160
0.202***
-0.0070
0.1080

(0.0640)
(0.0490)
(0.0250)
(0.0560)

0.0700

(0.0810)

0.0050
0.1150

(0.0280)
(0.0620)

Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe

0.0940
0.307**
0.0150
0.338***

(0.0740)
(0.1000)
(0.0520)
(0.0850)

0.0350
0.321**
0.0370
0.345***

(0.0870)
(0.1140)
(0.0750)
(0.0920)

MENA
Constant

-0.0420
0.2710

(0.0880)
(0.3040)

-0.1280
0.2380

(0.1070)
(0.3560)

Observations
R2
AIC

76
0.487
-35.07

76
0.347
-18.783

BIC

-11.763

2.194

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 8. type shift and democratization measured as V-Demchange5
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.118*
(0.0530)
-0.0060

-0.1070
(0.0660)
-0.0560

0.0150
(0.0590)
-0.0390

Fragmented

(0.0690)
0.211**
(0.0760)

(0.1050)
0.0520
(0.0950)

(0.0660)
0.0970
(0.0830)

United

0.0860

-0.0270

0.0140

Dem Level (V-Dem)

(0.0750)
-0.479**
(0.1770)

(0.0870)
-0.841**
(0.2610)
0.178*
(0.0670)

(0.0730)
-0.775***
(0.2210)
0.157*
(0.0600)

0.095*

0.096***

Neutral
Low Level

Success
GDP per capita
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(0.0420)
0.0000

Trade
Fuel Exports
Area
Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe
FSU
Constant
Observations
R-squared
AIC
BIC

0.228**
(0.0670)
97
0.175
-7.179
8.27

(0.0010)
-0.0010
(0.0010)
0.0000

-0.0080

(0.0200)
0.188*
(0.0880)
0.1100
(0.1240)
0.2610
(0.1470)
0.0620
(0.1400)
0.0820
(0.1620)
-0.0130
(0.1440)
-0.5790
(0.4230)
56
0.607
-15.38
19.051

(0.0130)
0.154*
(0.0670)
0.213*
(0.0910)
0.335**
(0.1100)
0.1550
(0.1010)
0.2140
(0.1160)
0.1140
(0.1040)
-0.6160
(0.3110)
88
0.535
-33.247
3.913

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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(0.0260)

Table 9. type shift and democratization (measured as V-Demchange5), with determinants
of type shift
Model 1

Model 2

Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented

0.0160
-0.0020
0.0410

(0.0510)
(0.0740)
(0.0740)

0.0480
-0.0220
0.1390

(0.0510)
(0.0820)
(0.0830)

United
Dem Level (V-Dem)
ICP
PCP
Size

-0.0010
-0.673***
-0.0170
0.0720
0.0360

(0.0850)
(0.1780)
(0.1070)
(0.0530)
(0.1850)

0.0830
-0.634**
-0.0370
0.0740
0.1600

(0.0890)
(0.1990)
(0.1170)
(0.0550)
(0.2060)

Coup
Success
GDP per capita
Area

0.0080
0.167***
0.092***
-0.0080

(0.0460)
(0.0470)
(0.0250)
(0.0190)

-0.0060

(0.0510)

0.086**
0.0000

(0.0290)
(0.0200)

Cold War
Asia
Americas
Africa
FSU

0.0920
-0.0970
0.0220
-0.190*
-0.265**

(0.0580)
(0.0850)
(0.0940)
(0.0900)
(0.0950)

0.1090
-0.1420
0.0320
-0.206*
-0.264*

(0.0640)
(0.0880)
(0.0960)
(0.0890)
(0.1160)

MENA
Constant

-0.302*
-0.2760

(0.1150)
(0.4070)

-0.371**
-0.3190

(0.1150)
(0.4300)

Observations
R2

76
0.651

76
0.585

AIC
BIC

-41.594
2.69

-30.444
11.509

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (V-Demchange5)
Model 1

Model 2

Pr(Fragmented)
Success
Area
Cold War

0.1020
0.175**
-0.0030
0.0070

(0.0650)
(0.0510)
(0.0210)
(0.0570)

0.177*

(0.0780)

0.0070
0.0140

(0.0240)
(0.0580)

Asia
Americas
Africa
Europe

0.0980
0.296**
-0.0190
0.359***

(0.0570)
(0.0920)
(0.0470)
(0.0780)

0.0480
0.308**
0.0000
0.365***

(0.0710)
(0.1010)
(0.0650)
(0.0820)

MENA
Constant

-0.0030
0.0260

(0.0830)
(0.2660)

-0.0780
-0.0030

(0.1000)
(0.3100)

Observations
R2
AIC

76
0.53
-36.148

76
0.433
-23.943

BIC

-12.841

-2.966

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

390

Reported Tests with Democratic Cases Included
Table 11. type shift and democratization measured as politypost5
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Neutral

1.6060
(1.1430)

0.7320
(1.2320)

0.9440
(1.1340)

Low Level

0.2570
(1.8610)
4.911***
(1.4090)
0.9560

-0.2830
(1.9470)
2.9400
(1.7830)
-1.6320

-1.0120
(1.5680)
3.100*
(1.5190)
-0.5990

(1.5310)
0.408***
(0.0820)

(2.1920)
0.1810
(0.1310)
1.8700

(1.8320)
0.305**
(0.0940)
2.699*

(1.1740)
-0.4810
(0.5850)
0.0010
(0.0160)

(1.1170)
0.4950
(0.5790)

Fragmented
United
Dem Level (Polity)
Success
GDP per capita
Trade
Fuel Exports

-0.0060
(0.0260)
-0.3720
(0.3830)

Area
Cold War

1.8620
(1.6360)
3.312*
(1.4720)
6.145**
(2.2090)
4.2900
(2.5890)
2.0590
(1.9620)
1.2630

Asia
Americas
Europe
FSU
MENA
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-0.4560
(0.3390)
1.9280
(1.3110)
0.5750
(2.0510)
1.9850
(2.2600)

-1.1530
(2.2850)
-3.3650

(2.7690)
Africa
Constant

1.7080
(0.9520)
146
0.236
908.286
926.188

Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

6.5410
(7.3790)
100
0.305
607.703
651.991

(2.6520)
-1.5580
(2.1790)
2.2730
(7.3140)
137
0.376
833.151
876.95

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 12. type shift and democratization measured as politychange5
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Neutral

1.6060
(1.1430)

0.7320
(1.2320)

0.9440
(1.1340)

Low Level

0.2570
(1.8610)
4.911***
(1.4090)

-0.2830
(1.9470)
2.9400
(1.7830)

-1.0120
(1.5680)
3.100*
(1.5190)

0.9560
(1.5310)
-0.592***
(0.0820)

-1.6320
(2.1920)
-0.819***
(0.1310)
1.8700

-0.5990
(1.8320)
-0.695***
(0.0940)
2.699*

(1.1740)
-0.4810
(0.5850)
0.0010

(1.1170)
0.4950
(0.5790)

Fragmented
United
Dem Level (Polity)
Success
GDP per capita
Trade
Fuel Exports
Area
Cold War
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(0.0160)
-0.0060
(0.0260)
-0.3720
(0.3830)

-0.4560
(0.3390)

1.8620

1.9280

(1.6360)
3.312*
(1.4720)
6.145**
(2.2090)
4.2900
(2.5890)
2.0590
(1.9620)
1.2630
(2.7690)

Asia
Americas
Europe
FSU
MENA
Africa
Constant
Observations
R2
AIC
BIC

1.7080
(0.9520)
146
0.382
908.286
926.188

6.5410
(7.3790)
100
0.606
607.703
651.991

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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(1.3110)
0.5750
(2.0510)
1.9850
(2.2600)

-1.1530
(2.2850)
-3.3650
(2.6520)
-1.5580
(2.1790)
2.2730
(7.3140)
137
0.529
833.151
876.95

Table 13. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift
Model 1

Model 2

Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United

1.5470
-1.4130
2.2210
-1.5930

(1.3440)
(1.7220)
(1.4650)
(2.0870)

1.5470
-1.4130
2.2210
-1.5930

(1.3440)
(1.7220)
(1.4650)
(2.0870)

Dem Level (Polity)
ICP
PCP
Size

0.316**
-0.4570
2.1250
2.6730

(0.1090)
(2.3130)
(1.1490)
(4.9600)

-0.684***
-0.4570
2.1250
2.6730

(0.1090)
(2.3130)
(1.1490)
(4.9600)

Coup
Success
GDP per capita
Area
Cold War

0.9160
2.937**
0.2330
-0.3040
1.2550

(1.2890)
(1.0050)
(0.6050)
(0.4920)
(1.4450)

0.9160
2.937**
0.2330
-0.3040
1.2550

(1.2890)
(1.0050)
(0.6050)
(0.4920)
(1.4450)

Asia
Americas
Africa
FSU

-2.3900
-0.3250
-5.088*
-4.589*

(1.6950)
(2.5510)
(2.0430)
(2.1600)

-2.3900
-0.3250
-5.088*
-4.589*

(1.6950)
(2.5510)
(2.0430)
(2.1600)

MENA
Constant

-5.847*
3.8760

(2.5500)
(10.0070)

-5.847*
3.8760

(2.5500)
(10.0070)

Observations
R2
AIC

120
0.397
728.135

120
0.601
728.135

BIC

781.097

781.097

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 14. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift and no success
Model 1

Model 2

Neutral
Low Level
Fragmented
United

2.1130
-0.9410
4.124**
0.4950

(1.3350)
(1.7110)
(1.3490)
(1.8680)

2.1130
-0.9410
4.124**
0.4950

(1.3350)
(1.7110)
(1.3490)
(1.8680)

Dem Level (Polity)
ICP
PCP
Size

0.305**
-0.7150
1.7220
3.5720

(0.1110)
(2.4040)
(1.1450)
(5.2120)

-0.695***
-0.7150
1.7220
3.5720

(0.1110)
(2.4040)
(1.1450)
(5.2120)

Coup
GDP per capita
Area
Cold War
Asia

0.6250
0.1160
-0.3560
1.5530
-2.8890

(1.2810)
(0.6350)
(0.5230)
(1.6030)
(1.6900)

0.6250
0.1160
-0.3560
1.5530
-2.8890

(1.2810)
(0.6350)
(0.5230)
(1.6030)
(1.6900)

Americas
Africa
FSU
MENA

-0.2880
-5.459**
-4.874*
-6.787*

(2.6520)
(2.0000)
(2.3660)
(2.6330)

-0.2880
-5.459**
-4.874*
-6.787*

(2.6520)
(2.0000)
(2.3660)
(2.6330)

Constant

6.2890

(10.1590)

6.2890

(10.1590)

Observations
R-squared
AIC
BIC

120
0.354
734.341
784.516

120
0.573
734.341
784.516

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 15. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (politychange5)
Model 1

Model 2

Pr(Fragmented)
Success
Area
Cold War

9.586***
2.3870
-0.0620
-0.7630

(2.4040)
(1.2250)
(0.4150)
(1.4710)

10.376***

(2.4400)

-0.0980
-0.6350

(0.4440)
(1.5570)

Asia
Americas
Africa
FSU

-4.912**
-2.8070
-5.133*
-7.371***

(1.5820)
(2.4310)
(1.9680)
(2.0500)

-5.141**
-2.4810
-5.047*
-7.573**

(1.7770)
(2.5760)
(2.1770)
(2.4070)

MENA
Constant

-7.522***
7.7090

(2.0490)
(5.4250)

-8.067***
9.4660

(2.2850)
(5.6640)

Observations
R2
AIC

118
0.31
764.956

118
0.283
767.52

BIC

792.663

792.456

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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